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
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**MEMOIRS**  
**OF**  
**DON MANUEL DE GODOY,**  
**&c. &c.**







*The Prince of the Peace. Le Prince de la Paix.  
at the age of 25. age de 25 ans.*

# MEMOIRS

OF

**DON MANUEL DE GODOY,**

**PRINCE OF THE PEACE,**

**DUKE DEL ALCUDIA, COUNT D'EVERAMONTE, &c.,**

**FORMERLY PRIME MINISTER OF THE KING OF SPAIN, GENERALISSIMO  
OF HIS ARMIES, HIGH ADMIRAL, &c.**

**WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.**

**EDITED, UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIS HIGHNESS,**

**BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. B. D'ESMÉNARD.**

**WITH**

**AN INTRODUCTION,**

**HISTORICAL & BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, &c.**

**IN TWO VOLUMES.**

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# MEMOIRS

## OF THE

### PRINCE OF THE PEACE.

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#### INTRODUCTION.

**DON MANUEL DE GODOY**, Duke de l'Alcudia, Count d'Evoramonte, Prince of the Peace, must be numbered amongst the distinguished characters of the age.

In 1784, when only seventeen years old, and a mere life-guardsman, he was soon promoted to superior ranks: a general officer in 1791; a grandee of Spain, closely allied to the royal family by his marriage with a princess of Bourbon; \* the

\* The Infant Don Louis and Doña Maria Theresa de Vallabriga de Drummond had a son and two daughters: one of the latter married the Prince of the Peace, during the reign of Charles IV; the other married, during the reign of Ferdinand VII, M. de Melgareço, who was raised on the occasion to the title of Duke of St. Fernando. The son was Cardinal de Bourbon, and afterwards Archbishop of Toledo and of Seville. He is now dead.

head of all state councils and public establishments; adorned with every decoration awarded to merit, to favour, or to high birth; envied, courted, calumniated, and proscribed, his career runs through a long period fertile in revolutions. None have watched more closely—none from a more elevated sphere—the inward or outward springs which set the imposing and ancient monarchy of Spain in motion.

It behoved him to render to his native country, and to public opinion, an account of what he has done, of what has come to his knowledge, of what has fallen under his observation: the time has arrived for his acquitting this debt; he has, accordingly, written the memoirs of his life.

The First Part contains an account of his private and public life from 1784 to 1800. As prime minister of Spain during a period of six years, (from 1792 to 1798,) he directed the affairs of the kingdom, made war and peace with France, repelled the attempted inroads of jacobinical principles and the political tyranny of England: the struggle was a long and an arduous one, but it was maintained with equal skill and success.

In the Second Part, the Prince of the Peace, who was appointed generalissimo in 1801, and high admiral in 1806, relates the share he again took in the civil, political, and military administration of his country. In 1807, the dark intrigues of a

few court servants and of a priest bring about a double conspiracy. During the night of the 17th of March 1808, the palace is besieged by rebels: Charles IV, surrounded by cowards, and insulted by factious men, exclaims in the depth of his anguish, "*And you, also, my son!*"<sup>b</sup> The Prince of the Peace is thrown into a dungeon, from whence he is rescued by French bayonets,<sup>c</sup> and conducted to Bayonne, where the King and Queen of Spain have likewise been entrapped into Napoleon's protection. . . . After the sentence which, like the lion in the fable, this self-constituted umpire passed upon these illustrious litigants, the Prince of the Peace follows his dethroned king, first to Marseilles, and afterwards to Rome. . . . The Emperor of the French has proved wanting in generosity towards the victims of his baffled ambition. Ferdinand VII. reascends the throne in 1814. Grief, rather than length of years, abridges the painful existence of Maria Louisa and of Charles IV.—their death occurred

<sup>b</sup> *Con que tu tambien*—and you, also! Such was the king's exclamation.

<sup>c</sup> Murat, Grand-duke of Berg, sent off in all haste a detachment of cavalry to the castle of Villaviciosa, and in the emperor's name demanded the prisoner. This detachment was under the orders of Generals Exelmans and Paul de la Vauguyon, Murat's aides-de-camp. The chief of squadron, now Lieutenant-general Manès, another aide-de-camp of the grand-duke, was commissioned to escort the Prince of the Peace to Bayonne.

in 1819. The Prince of the Peace alone remains a solitary being ; he comes in 1830 to take shelter amidst the crowd of Paris.

This second part is richly stored with facts, and reveals many interesting occurrences.

The original memoirs in Spanish, and my translation of them, appear in separate works at one and the same time. An English translation is likewise preparing in London. With respect to my own version, I have closely adhered to the text ; for the Castilian is a proud and pompous language, and rejects all foreign ornaments. The literary talents of the Prince of the Peace have been as unfairly depreciated as all his actions : this was consistent with the original aim and object of his enemies. The perusal of the work cannot fail to dispel many prejudices ; and I can avouch for his having composed, and drawn it up, I might say, under my own eyes. The original manuscript is wholly in his handwriting ; the copy confided to the press has been revised, corrected, compared by himself ; his flourish at the end of each page, and his signature at the end of each chapter, attest its authenticity.

I have readily accepted the task of translating these memoirs, reserving to myself the right of adding certain developments, together with explanatory and biographical notes. What emanates from myself will not escape observation, being indicated by the initial of my name.

The Prince of the Peace entertains for his beloved Spain a feeling which cannot fail to delight his fellow-countrymen; like a son, the victim of an unjust and passionate mother, he hesitates to speak his mind to her, or reproach her with her wrongs towards him. . . . As I feel more disinterested in this domestic quarrel, I need not imitate his timidity. My own experience of the men and events he speaks of, made me anxious to record my individual recollections beyond the risk of oblivion. The present appeared to me a favourable opportunity, and I have taken advantage of it.

The rapid elevation of the Prince of the Peace, nearly fifty years ago, could not but afford matter for the lively gossiping of the ladies of the palace, the gentlemen of the bedchamber, the usual attendants upon the court, and the suitors for places,<sup>d</sup> so eager to find out in what direction blows the court favour. . . . All posthumous research on the subject would be superfluous at the present day.

Young, well educated, gifted with playful wit and a handsome countenance; brought by the very nature of his daily service in constant con-

<sup>d</sup> Suitors, *Pretendientes*, are in Spain a numerous, and, as it were, a legally acknowledged class. In petitions addressed to the king or his ministers, when speaking of their titles and their rights, they never fail to add: "Suitors during so many years," *tantos años de pretendiente*.



tact with the royal family ; Don Manuel de Godoy attracted Maria Louisa's notice. But the favour of Charles IV. so happily coincided with the kindness of his consort, that it never was well ascertained which of them formed the first attachment, or evinced the greatest affection for the young life-guardsmen. This august and two-fold sympathy has acquired historical renown: it never experienced any interruption; death alone separated from him Maria Louisa and Charles IV: a friendship so constant and so uncommon is ennobled by thirty-six years of reciprocal fidelity. Detraction has had its day: there is a prescription even to envy, which usually respects misfortune and pursues not beyond the grave.

The close of the last, and the first quarter of the present century, are already a part of by-gone history. We are no longer to consider the Prince of the Peace, at the present day, in any other character than as a public man, a statesman, the minister to whom Charles IV. was alleged to have transferred the care of governing in his stead.\*

The reign of this monarch has supplied an ample store of historical matter, from 1789 to 1808, independently of what Spain has since fur-

\* This transfer of power, which always fell short of public report, could only have lasted, at any rate, from 1792 to 1798, when the Prince of the Peace performed the functions of prime minister; which, it will be seen, he never abused. His acts are now about to be laid before his impartial readers.

nished, and *is still likely to provide*. This reign is but faintly, and, which is far worse, is but very incorrectly known.

Since the improved organization of the Holy Office under the reign of Philip II. towards the middle of the sixteenth century, Spaniards never had been afforded the opportunity nor the power to publish their thoughts, even when clothed in moderate language.<sup>1</sup> The freedom of the press in 1808 was for them a novel weapon, of which they neither knew the use nor the effect. Accordingly, it only sent forth, in the first instance, coarse pamphlets replete with exaggeration, with bitterness, with ill-disguised selfish motives.

The statement of Don Pedro Ceballos Guerra, who was by turns the minister of Charles IV, of Ferdinand VII, of Joseph, and again of Ferdinand VII, was a prelude to the overflowing of this *liberated* press. At that time, the whole Continent was silent in presence of Napoleon and his works. The voice of Ceballos alone was heard from afar, and spread in all directions. He denounced his relative, his friend, his benefactor. . . . By disowning the official sanction which he himself, in his capacity of minister for foreign affairs, had given to the negotiations of the state

<sup>1</sup> The formidable tribunal of the Inquisition was commissioned to exercise the right of censure. *Con el Rey y con la Inquisición, chiton*—with respect to the king and the Inquisition, be silent. A popular Spanish proverb.

counsellor Don Eugenio Izquierdo in Paris, he was the cause that a calumny hovered over the Prince of the Peace, which was the origin or the pretext of all subsequent ones : nevertheless, the king and his minister for foreign affairs were fully acquainted with Izquierdo's mission, which was consequently an authorised, lawful, and official mission, and not a special and secret proceeding carried on for the Prince of the Peace's exclusive advantage. Izquierdo acted in the name and for account of his government. The rank of nominal ambassador was no doubt ostensibly given to the Prince of Masserano ; but is it not a circumstance of daily occurrence, especially in an absolute monarchy, that a man of confidence and talents is associated with those titled mannikins covered with stars and embroidery, who are only employed for appearance sake, and in order that they may cut a figure in diplomatic parades ? Napoleon did not compromise his dignity : he openly acknowledged the character and mission of Izquierdo, constantly sent for him, and ordered the Grand-marshal Duroc to keep up an intercourse with him. Assuredly the emperor would never have consented to receive in a public capacity an emissary of an obscure, equivocal, unacknowledged character ; still less, to enter into a treaty with him. The emperor himself dictated the treaty of Fontainebleau, because it suited his views, was a favourite scheme, and a settled pur-

pose of his mind. This important fact is proved, beyond all doubt, by the Prince of the Peace in the second part of his memoirs. Ceballos is a base man, who designedly, and in opposition to the truth, which none knew better than he did, allowed the Prince of the Peace to be made the victim of an infamous accusation, such as that of *having sold and betrayed* his country to a foreign power. . . .

The Duke de l'Infantado, the Count de Montijo, and many others, published at the time manifestoes in justification of their conduct, or impassioned narratives of the recent occurrences. A countless number of anonymous writers and reviewers, as immoderate in their language as they were insignificant, filled the newspapers and other publications with their remarks: not one of those ephemeral writings has survived the event which gave rise to them.

MM. Azanza and Ofarill, both ministers of Ferdinand VII. when he first seized upon the crown, and afterwards of Joseph, who was doomed to replace him in the regal dignity, are also the authors of an exculpatory memoir; for every one deemed himself bound to protest his innocence in respect of the mysterious occurrences of the Escorial and of Aranjuez. MM. Azanza and Ofarill, who were upright men and lovers of truth, stood not in need of vindicating themselves; they were free from reproach. Theirs is merely a

personal defence, and they speak with becoming reserve of the government of Charles IV. and of the Prince of the Peace.

The Marquis d'Almenara, formerly better known in Paris under his first name of Hervàs, only took up the pen to refute, in brief terms, another perfidious insinuation which M. Ceballos had thrown out.

Almenara formed a very correct estimate of the men who had excited, and turned to their own account, the passions of Ferdinand VII; but he merely sought to save the honour of his son: he observes a respectful silence regarding the events anterior to 1808.

The canon Llorente (Nellerto), an upright, plodding, heavy writer, has collected many official documents relating to that epoch: he has omitted several important ones; nevertheless, his collection is a valuable one. I doubt the authenticity of the letters ascribed to Don Mariano Louis Urquijo: Llorente, however, exhibits two letters from Dr. Garcia Suelto, which would of themselves avouch for the high merit of his collection.

The work of the canon Escoiquiz, the literary and political preceptor of Ferdinand VII, is no more than a false defence of Escoiquiz himself and of his pupil. It well became the principal agent in the intrigue, or conspiracy, to be the historian of it: but he placed too much reliance on simplicity of his readers. What he says is

sufficient to afford an insight into what he would conceal; and the Prince of the Peace inflicts a signal chastisement upon him.

M. Muriel, another canon, has published a translation of the history of the Spanish house of Bourbon, by William Coxe, to which he has appended notes and supplemental chapters. He might, in imitation of his author, have laid down his pen at the close of the reign of Charles III; but he volunteered an inroad upon the following reign: the Prince of the Peace justly complains of the attack unexpectedly levelled at him by M. Muriel, whom he refutes with great superiority of argument. The reader will decide which of them bears the palm of truth and reason over his antagonist.

We must not omit from this list the Marquises Cavallero and Labrador; the one a former minister of Charles IV, the other a diplomatist of Ferdinand VII. at the congress of Vienna, in Paris, Rome, &c. but now a disaffected man, or a refugee in France, and of late embarked in a strange altercation with the minister Martinez de La Rosa. The Prince of the Peace assigns their true value to the letters and explanations of both *marquises*, who might, in Paris, be mistaken for *grandees* or men in high authority.

King Ferdinand ordered, on his return, that a *History of the War of Independence* should be drawn up and published by a commission of staff

officers, who have never avowed their names. This pompously announced work ceased at the close of the first volume. The only apparent object of the commission was to hold up the character and conduct of Ferdinand, during the emergency, in a favourable point of view. This first and only volume is dedicated to him: *he was then living, and seated on the throne*. It is a memoir exculpatory of his majesty, who stood as much and in far greater need of purifying himself than any other actor in the scenes enacted at the Escorial and Aranjuez.

The illustrious General Foy, amongst our own countrymen, had undertaken a *History of the War in Spain*; but his premature death prevented his revising and improving his first design. He did me the honour of frequently consulting me, and even attaching some value to my observations. The imperfect manuscripts of that brilliant orator have been reviewed and amended by other hands. In this posthumous history, incorrect and malicious assertions have been imputed to him; whereas I can vouch that he did more justice to the Prince of the Peace's administration. Had an edition been prepared under General Foy's own eyes, those sarcasms would have been suppressed, of which he would himself have felt the unfairness and unbecoming character.

M. de Pradt has derived from Escoïquiz's pam-

phlet his historical romance entitled: *Memoirs on the Spanish Revolution*. In vain does he assure us that he listened at the door whilst Napoleon, the supreme judge, proceeded to a summary hearing of the celebrated cause which was tried at Bayonne: M. de Pradt never had the patience to listen. In haste to compose a pamphlet suitable to the occasion which gave rise to it, and finding the cast-off clothes of Escoiquiz at hand, he formed a French dress out of the turned cassock of the Spanish priest. To be serious, this witty and imaginative historian has never bestowed a thought on the accuracy of his *facts*,—never attempted to make himself acquainted with them. I feel assured that M. de Pradt will readily acknowledge his errors.

I have adverted to the principal works thrown into circulation. The names and peculiar position of their authors gave weight to their testimony.

During a long residence in Madrid, (from 1792 to 1808,) and a further stay in Spain during the whole of the war which commenced in the latter year, I was unremitting in my inquiries,—a practice I ever had through life,—and attentively treasured up the answers given to them. I have read all that has been written, seen with my own eyes whatever was to be seen, and was by no means prepossessed in the Prince of the Peace's favour. . . . The result is, that I have yet to dis-



cover any clear and precise fact which can be adduced against the public or private character of Charles IV's prime minister. . . .

The studious and enduring animosity of the Inquisition and the cloister, are alone calculated to work upon so slender a ground.

Every imputation has its origin in popular rumours, which vanish upon the slightest inquiry. It is a torrent without a source; formed and swollen by a heavy shower, roaring and rapid in its progress, it carries everything before it: we notice, on the following day, the traces of its passage, but are at a loss to find how or whence it arose.

The pretended despotism of the Prince of the Peace has not been sullied by a single act of cruelty or even of harshness. How many acts of indulgence and of the kindest good-nature might we not, on the contrary, adduce on his behalf! In a country governed by an absolute sovereign, adjoining revolutionary France, imbued with the unavoidable contagion of new ideas,—in such a country as Spain, where a man's life is held at so cheap a rate, the Prince of the Peace never caused the effusion of a single drop of blood; \* no liberal opinion was ever persecuted so long as he held in

\* I must lay particular stress upon this point. When I accepted the task of translating and publishing these memoirs, I did so with the express intention of openly congratulating the Prince of the Peace on his signal humanity.

his hands the reins of government.....He gave away much money in secret charities.<sup>b</sup>

The Prince of the Peace had a taste for literature, and protected those who promoted its improvement. The formation or revival of a multitude of useful institutions and establishments date from the time of his being raised to the rank of prime minister and subsequently of generalissimo of the forces. It would be next to impossible to name a single Spaniard of any talent who did not live in comparative comfort during the reign of Charles IV.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>b</sup> The judge delegate appointed in 1808, with two other counsellors of Castile, to take an inventory of the Prince of the Peace's papers, often told me that he had seen with great surprise the private list of persons who were paid yearly allowances out of his own funds. Genteel families, but straitened in their circumstances, annually received upwards of two hundred thousand francs. The public did not give the prince credit for so much generosity; he was even suspected of parsimony.... I apprehend that neither Spain nor any other country ever afforded so splendid an example of beneficence combined with so much discretion. The memoirs will afford evidence that this *favourite of fortune* was not possessed of such extravagant wealth as was generally imagined. Spaniards have greatly exaggerated it: this is a Spanish failing; the Castilian is, of all modern languages, that which most abounds in superlative expressions. The respectable magistrate who has supplied me with these details is still living; he even resides in Paris: but he also practises the virtue of discretion, and has requested that I should avoid the mention of his name.

<sup>c</sup> Olavide, the last victim of the Inquisition, underwent the torture during the preceding reign. The power of doing evil or of preventing it was then vested in Counts Florida Blanca and d'Aranda; the latter of whom was represented by his panegyrista

The army is also indebted to the Prince of the Peace for considerable improvements; I will even add, for its being restored to its former character; since, under Florida Blanca's administration, it had been systematically neglected, and humbled in its spirit.

The magistracy has never accused the all-powerful minister of having permitted the interference of arbitrary power in the exercise of the judicial functions.<sup>k</sup>

The high nobility possessed little political influence. Insensible to the ties of family or of

as a lover of philosophy and the friend of French encyclopædists: nevertheless, it was the Prince of the Peace who, at a later period, put an end to Olavide's banishment, and procured him the permission of quietly ending in Spain his venturesome career. Lieutenant-general Urbina had married the niece of that illustrious outlaw. He solicited his pardon from the Prince of the Peace, who resolutely exerted himself to obtain it. The Inquisition took note of this act, and watched the opportunity of punishing the bold man who dared to rescue a victim from its grasp.... Colonel Urbina, son of the lieutenant-general, is in Paris, where he has for a length of years established his residence. His testimony would confirm the above statement.

<sup>k</sup> The respect with which the Prince of the Peace maintained unimpaired the sacred functions of the magistracy is the more honourable to him, as his predecessors, especially the two last, Florida Blanca and Aranda, had left none but traditions savouring of the most absolute despotism. Florida Blanca was the first who arrogated to himself the power of conveying the king's commands by means of a ministerial order: before his time, the monarch affixed his signature to every document. It is notorious what latitude of action the minister derived from the adoption of this new method.

party spirit, alike servile and debased, they conspired not; they bore animosity to no one; they would have even been at a loss how to complain. The ante-rooms of the palace were, as heretofore, open to them. That nobility, once so haughty and so powerful, had, for the last hundred years, confined their ambition to securing to themselves the places in the royal household.<sup>1</sup> The choice of the sovereign, be he who he might, was always secure of their approbation and homage; so accustomed were they to the sudden apparition from the clouds, as it were, or the no less sudden springing up out of the bowels of the earth, of those who were to relieve the monarch of the irksome administration of his vast dominions.

Nothing is farther from my intention than to asperse the memory of these illustrious upstarts, when I recall the uncertainty or meanness of their

<sup>1</sup> The descendant of that distinguished captain, Gonsalvo de Cordova, the Duke of Medina-Celi, the wealthiest of all the Spanish grandees, was the First Familiar of the Inquisition, (*Alguazil mayor*,\*) and very proud of that dignity. All the high nobility resided near the court: they amount to nearly two hundred, of whom not more than twenty inhabited Saragossa, Valencia, Barcelona, or the province of Andalusia. The grandees of Spain were part of the *moveable property* of the palace. I doubt much whether two of the number could be named who possessed, in the whole extent of their territorial estates, a manor-house or an humble *chateau* to which they could retire and enjoy repose for the shortest season.

\* The *Alguazil mayor* directed in person the arrests determined upon by the Inquisition.

origin. Alberoni the Cardinal, Don Zenon Somodevila Marquis de la Ensenada, Moñino Count de Florida Blanca, were ennobled through their personal merit. However, in presenting those specimens of men unexpectedly elevated to grandeur, who so easily rose about the persons of Spanish sovereigns, especially since the time of Philip V, I have done so with the view of proving that the Castilian aristocracy was used to such plebeian adoptions.<sup>m</sup> For the rest, Don Manuel

<sup>m</sup> Alberoni was only a poor Italian priest, the son of a gardener of Parma, whose facetious wit occasionally enlivened the satirical mind of our Duke of Vendome. He governed Spain under Philip V. His disgrace was owing to external interference, some traces of which might be found amongst the archives of *our younger branch*. Philip the Regent powerfully contributed to, and beheld with pleasure, Alberoni's downfall. Dubois was jealous of his fellow-minister in Spain, both being of the same profession.

The Marquis de la Ensenada, known by his display of wealth, by the splendour of his jewels, with which he delighted to deck himself, and as a minister in high favour with Ferdinand VI, was, I believe, a foundling taken from an almshouse. During his exile at Salamanca, he always affected the same display, the same extravagance in his house and in his dress. His bed-curtains were of lace made with filaments of *amianthus*. As a lady, the Countess de V. G. was admiring this splendid furniture, the marquis suddenly drew near with the light he held in his hand, and set fire to it. It is easy to conceive the flurry occasioned by this supposed accident, which fortunately had no other consequence. . . . Many more of these foundlings have made their way in Spain, a country which is supposed to be the chosen land of aristocracy, and so swarming with *gentility*. I might adduce many other instances of the kind in the diplomatic career. For the rest, an act under the sign-manual has

de Godoy was not deficient in solid titles whereon to establish his own genealogy. He bore one of the most ancient historical names of the monarchy, which it was never attempted to contest to him.

Neither men of letters, the army, the magistracy, nor the nobility, had any grounds of complaint against him. Under his administration agriculture in general was greatly encouraged: the enormous expenses of the war, first against France, and afterwards against England, entailed

decreed, that those children of chance were nobles or nearly as good. The text of this act has been quoted by the Prince of the Peace in the course of his Memoirs.

Mosino, Count de Florida Blanca, a minister of some celebrity under Charles III, and even at the commencement of the reign of Charles IV, was the son of a cryer attached to a secondary tribunal in the province of Murcia.

What was the origin of the famous Riparda, who suddenly rose after Alberoni's downfall? he is supposed to have belonged to a noble Dutch family. But in what manner, and through what means, did he attain the rank of minister for foreign affairs in Spain? He exercised for a time undisputed influence. His fall was likewise owing to foreign interference, after he had been created duke, grandee of Spain, &c. A perfect adventurer as he was, he hastened to seek his fortunes in the dominions of Morocco, where he turned mussulman, became minister, general, &c.

I shall occasionally bring before the reader those upstart counts, marquises, and dons, created by the several kings of Spain ever since Philip V, who first set the example, and paid all the contractors of his reign in titles. Ferdinand VI. and Charles III. readily followed this precedent. Charles IV. did not abuse his prerogative; but the marquises created by Ferdinand VI. attract special notice by the slenderness of their claims, and the nature of the services rendered by them.

no augmentation of existing taxes. The commercial class acknowledged the protection he extended to them. The financial operations, during the period of his administration, from 1792 to 1798, were applauded, even at a time when a relentless ill-will was bent upon condemning in the mass all that had been done under the pretended reign of Charles IV's minister.

We now turn to another question.

I have witnessed, in common with all the world, that endless stream of compliments poured forth, during an unbroken period of eighteen years; the crowds of flatterers and parasites of both sexes daily inundating the saloons of the Prince of the Peace. I have seen what perfection the art of praising and of begging the means of honourable existence had attained in a country whose monarchical and religious institutions greatly favoured this species of industry.

I have witnessed the generous confidence of the sovereign of Spain and of the Indies, who, for nearly six years, entrusted to his prime minister the almost exclusive exercise of the supreme power; and when the latter, no longer belonging to the administration, came to reside in Madrid, after the year 1798, Charles IV. and Maria Louisa, alternately residing in the silent retreats of Aranjuez, St. Ildefonso, and the Escorial, during eleven months of the year, only received, on rare and solemn occasions, the overflowings of the

habitual and constant court of the prince generalissimo and high admiral.

Amidst a cloud of incense calculated to turn the strongest mind giddy, the plain gentleman of Estramadura, recently arrived from his province, appeared no way dazzled or embarrassed by such oriental parade; he maintained a calm attitude, and displayed great presence of mind and much power of memory. He listened with close attention; his answers were easy, short, and satisfactory; he readily granted a favour; and if he occasionally felt himself compelled to refuse an unjust or unseasonable request, the struggle within him visibly affected his gentle and good-natured physiognomy. No Spanish minister previously to, none especially after his disgrace, had his saloons beset by so great a crowd of obsequious and frequent visitors. The female sex hurried headlong to them; the most attractive and most distinguished by the gifts of nature and of wit came to display themselves before the Prince of the Peace, endeavouring to win his notice, and anxious to bear the stamp of his protection. If he did not always prove insensible amidst the personal charms which beset him in all directions, — if he had the failings of a man (and he does not deny it), he was ever known to screen his weakness under the veil of decorum; he was never guilty of the slightest act of indiscretion: jealousy has magnified the objects it worked upon;



they were envenomed by ill-will, and hypocrisy affected to be scandalized. . . . . I appeal to the testimony of those who frequented the court circles and society at large at the period to which I allude. Did not the traditional irritability of Spanish husbands appear to have been slumbering? What mother ever invoked the vengeance of heaven or of human justice against the seducer of her daughter? Was a single complaint or reproach ever raised against him? Assuredly not: the licentiousness of public morals was not the work of the Prince of the Peace; for this is the vulgar text for the invectives of a hypocritical and jealous sect. When first raised to the ministry, he found in full maturity the seeds sown by an uncontrolled monarchical power,—ultramontane catholicism, with all its severity and indulgences combined, monastic superfetation, the Inquisition, elderships, and the scorching sun of the Peninsula. . . . It is proved that the manners and influence of the young minister have, on the contrary, softened down, I may even say purified, that corruption of the age. The African ardour of Spaniards was confined within the limits of civilized gallantry; the ladies of the court no longer ventured to contend before the world for the favours of a stage-player, a butcher, or a gladiator.\*

\* In 1789, under the reign and within sight of the wise and pious Charles III, the Duchesses of A. and O. disputed the possession of Castillones or of Romero, the first bull-ayers in

These disgusting tastes fled for concealment to the barren provinces of Estramadura and Andalusia, where the costume of the *Majo*,<sup>o</sup> the coarse revels of the circus, the wantonness of gipsy dancers,<sup>r</sup> still afford delight to the populace, and to some noblemen who frequent the lowest company.<sup>a</sup> In the saloons open to friendship, in the *tertulias*,<sup>r</sup> under the protecting shelter of the balcony, behind the mysterious Persian blind, which admits of our seeing without being seen, churchmen no doubt gave way to men of the world,—the coif and the hood disappeared before the brilliant uniform of the Guards . . . . One half of the scandal was thus lopped off. The priest continued to subsist upon his perquisites. The

Spain. Such despicable dissoluteness was of public notoriety; high and low, at court and in town, all spoke of it; it was the theme of daily conversation; the episodes, the bursts of passion and generosity of each rival, were related with full details; but none were shocked at the immorality, the insolence, the scandal of this struggle. Such were the morals which the Prince of the Peace was accused of having corrupted!

<sup>o</sup> *Majo*.—Costume of the *Majo* is the peculiar costume of bolero and fandango dancers, of bull-prickers and slayers, of all who practised the art or carried on the trade of bull-fighting.

<sup>r</sup> *Las gitanas*, or gipsies; dancers by profession, and such dancers!

<sup>a</sup> Of this race of amateurs, there only remained in Madrid the Marquis de Peralès, an obscure, inoffensive man, who was, nevertheless, assassinated by the mob during a tumult which occurred at the time when the capital was surrendered to Napoleon in 1808.

<sup>r</sup> *Assemblies*; social meetings.

first-fruits devolved to others ;—where was the evil?

For the rest, this social change, in which morality gained more than it could have lost, was not the exclusive work of one man. *The age was in full march*, according to the military expression of M. de Pradt. There was then springing up in every country, even in Spain, an eagerness for novelty. Urged on, like the rest, by the general movement, but firmer, more enlightened, more generous than his predecessors, Florida Blanca and Aranda,—both restless, mistrustful, and timid old men,—the Prince of the Peace had the courage to face, to forestall, and disarm his enemy.... Making a vigorous appeal to the national honour and patriotism, he encouraged knowledge, the arts, labour, civilization, and refinement in morals as in manners; and thus affording but slender hold to the revolution which threatened Spain from without, he succeeded in arresting its progress at the foot of the French Pyrenees, without turning withal to his own advantage the concessions made to liberty. Slander has never succeeded in pointing, nor could it point at the present day, to two women whose character he ever compromised, so strictly did he observe the rules of decorum :<sup>\*</sup> neither the ardent coquetry,

<sup>\*</sup> At a later period, the lady to whom he had given the first preference became his second wife ; and this great corruptor of morals, according to the hyperbolical language of his enemies,

the gentle voice, the impassioned attitudes, of the veriest siren, ever succeeded in distracting him from his duties of prime minister and of a statesman. He conscientiously fulfilled the task imposed upon him.

After having presided at the council during six memorable years, he ceased to belong to it: he either withdrew, or was removed from office.

In countries swayed by an absolute government, it is easy to attain the height of honours; but thence arrived at the summit, the descent is ever abrupt and precipitate. Since the days of Philip II, and even of his great-grandfather, Ferdinand the Catholic, renowned commanders, distinguished ministers, glittering favourites, were sent to expiate in exile or in a dungeon the crime of having ceased to be agreeable to their master.

The Prince of the Peace effected his retreat in good order, and without a slur upon his character. He re-appeared at court; his numerous retainers of friends, literary men and adulators, never deserted him. His exclusion from the cabinet proved himself a model of the most honourable delicacy as well as a masterpiece. He legitimated the only wandering imputed to him.

Cardinal Ximenez, Christopher Columbus, Fernan Cortés, the Duke of Alba, Alexander Farnese, the renowned Captain Gonsalvo de Cordova, Antonio Perez, the Count Duke d'Olivares, the Cardinal Duke of Lerma, the Marquis of Siete Iglesias, Rodrigo Calderon, Alberoni, Ripperda, Ensenada, were all banished, poisoned, or imprisoned.

seemed rather a discharge solicited by himself than an actual disgrace. Successors were assigned to him. They were, as it was said in the case of M. de Turenne, the small coins taken in exchange for a single piece of gold.

Nevertheless, a man was found to force his way from the dust of the Record Court, who proved his skill in taking advantage of the royal weakness; in turning to his own account an in-born spirit of mistrust, the irritability, the sudden ingratitude, the constant apprehensions, all the evil passions of the supreme power. This man succeeded in holding for a short time the direction of two or three seals of office, and retained that of Justice whilst Maria Louisa and Charles IV. continued on the throne. . . . The Prince of the Peace had to endure the affront of this base rivalry, so mysteriously fomented, and which, shunning all external display, allowed the late prime minister to bear the whole responsibility of acts which were not his own, and which he was unable to prevent. The world in general, and all superficial minds, still pretend at the present day that the supposed omnipotence of the Prince of the Peace never experienced any diminution."

\* The following are the common expressions adopted and repeated by all biographical compilers: "The weak-minded Charles IV! Abusing this weakness, the favourite disposed of everything, did everything, never ceased to do everything at his pleasure." But there is a contradiction in these words,—

Three years of this equivocal and painful position had scarce elapsed, when a signal return of confidence on the part of the sovereign placed him at the head of the army, which had been suffered to dwindle away; but which Spain, harassed on all quarters, was anxious to exhibit to advantage in the presence of her friends and her enemies. He re-organized that army, led it in person against Portugal, and brought the war to a conclusion in a few days; securing to Spain advantages which she had never succeeded in obtaining since the restoration of the house of Braganza in 1640. He had the farther merit of sending back a French auxiliary army, alike dangerous and burdensome to the country, which it was important to get rid of at any price. It was the advanced guard of all the expeditions so long meditated against the Peninsula.

The Prince of the Peace was welcomed on that occasion with fresh congratulations, the unanimity and eagerness of which could only be warranted by his acknowledged superior talents, and the eminent services he had rendered.

In 1808, during the intoxication of its freedom, the anonymous and daily press vomited forth against him a frightful deluge of libels, of absurd

weakness, on the one hand; a prolonged abuse of that weakness, on the other: weak-minded kings can never be governed by one man; they are led by everybody, by whoever approaches them; and none are so accessible as Spanish sovereigns.

exaggerations, which, after inundating the Peninsula, were circulated through foreign countries: The reviewers of France and England, the concocters of contemporary biographies, of apocryphal mémoires, of *histories written at the time*, hastened to quench their thirst in these troubled waters; they swallowed an ample share of mud with their drink.

Those waters have settled, after a lapse of twenty-five years; we may now see the bottom of the stream. Spain, like every other country, had her habitual egotists; men whose course is already run; conservators, according to a modern definition they have assumed; friends of the *statu quo*, because they are already in possession: whether it was foresight, instinct, or jealousy, the appearance of the young minister of Charles IV. gave great displeasure to these conservators. In fact, Don Manuel de Godoy was not raised to that elevation by an organized cabal, by a political, financial, or religious brotherhood; he had no other patron than himself, the occasion that offered, his youth, and his moral, and as yet untried, strength.

His frankness, his liberality, his noble bearing, triumphed at once over an antiquated etiquette; and that proverbial gravity of which Philip II. had laid down the rules and supplied the model. Every thing in this decrepit court seemed to acquire fresh vigour. A new actor on that stage,

where his appearance had not been announced, his lively, natural, and brilliant performance, threw into despair *the old comedians in ordinary to the king*.

"What subversion of everything!" they exclaimed: "this is a revolutionary symptom; a concession made to the spirit of the age, to the pernicious maxims which the French of 1789 had just thrown into circulation."

\* Long after the peace of 1795, namely, in the year 1806, the Prince caused the army to adopt the new head-dress of French soldiers, the hair *à la Titus* without powder! This example was followed by all young men. Charles IV. himself submitted to the sacrifice of his long tail. The *blockheads* of Madrid were greatly alarmed at this occurrence, which caused far more sensation than did amongst the Athenians the tail of Alcibiades' dog. Few old men would conform to this foreign fashion. Count d'Altamira, one of the first *grandees* of Spain, and grand equerry of the palace, whose stature fell short of four feet, wore a very long tail, to which he was wonderfully attached. He solicited of the king, as a signal favour, that he should be excused parting with it. This favour was generously granted to him.\*

† In 1765, a popular tumult broke out against the minister Esquilace; the cause of it was an order to diminish by a few inches the long cloaks, and especially the broad slouched hats, at that time in vogue. The Jesuits were accused of having excited the commotion; the king's guard was slaughtered; the aged king, Charles III., presented himself at the balcony of his palace, conceded everything to the mutineers, dismissed his minister, and escaped, it is said, by a subterraneous passage. His fear did not subside until he reached the royal residence of Aranjuez. Count d'Aranda, who was on this occasion appointed president of the Council of Castile, caused the guilty to be punished. By great skill and severity he succeeded in restoring order. The minister Esquilace, was compelled to quit Spain; his loss was ever regretted by Charles III. The family name of the Marquis Esquilace is Gregori, or Gregorio.



The alarmed conservators were soon reinforced by powerful auxiliaries. These were the old priest-party.\* The alliance was a natural one. But the church, which never submits to act a subordinate part, assumed the whole management to itself. The church party became the real, the chief enemy of the Prince of the Peace; an enemy never losing sight of the object of its pursuit, neither in this world nor in the next. . . . And when the sentence of anathema could at last be hurled at the devoted victim, when the wrecks of this fallen grandeur were reviled and irrecoverably dispersed, the habit and the cassock figured in the first ranks of the tumult; the village curate had instructed his country auditory; thousands of strolling preachers issuing from their pious dens harangued in the public places; the hue and cry was sounded from the steeple; from the sacristy the watch-word emanated.\*

\* There existed amongst the Spanish clergy, even amongst the monks, men of merit, well enlightened, benevolent, inclined to a spirit of toleration; men, in short, who belonged to their age far more than to the habit or cassock which covered them. But, whatever may be said to the contrary, they were only exceptions to the rule. All the rest, from top to bottom of the clerical ladder, formed the church party.

\* Already, some years before, the volcano had threatened an eruption; but it only emitted at that time a cloud of smoke,

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He was the father of the present cardinal of that name, and of several other children, the youngest of whom bore a surprising resemblance to Charles III.

But the men possessed of any talent—poets themselves, always so prone to worship the rising sun—abstained from insulting the idol at whose feet they had poured forth their homage. None of them has retracted the praises bestowed upon the Prince of the Peace when in the zenith of his prosperity. The breath of calumny has always blown from one and the same quarter : we have, in the first instance, the canon Escoiquiz heading the procession of the league, of which he afterwards constitutes himself the *historical whitewasher* ; next comes the Archbishop de Pradt, hastening from afar to join the sacred battalion ; and lastly, even the canon Muriel, a writer in other respects so circumspect, so rational, and who might well have acted a neutral part in the quarrel . . . .

The Prince of the Peace openly professed principles of toleration ; the religious police was, in his estimation, an immoral resource unworthy of a government strong in the consciousness of its good intentions. He did not spare the Inquisition ; if he did not altogether rid his country of it, at any rate he mitigated the evil. In short, so long as he held the reins of power, he never failed to pare the monster's claws as often as it attempted to stretch them out. These memoirs

The rising star of the young minister dispelled those dark vapours. In the course of these Memoirs will be found the anecdote of the three archbishops, one of whom was no less a man than the Inquisitor-General.

will afford more than one proof of this assertion.

At the same time, the material, the pecuniary immunities of the clergy, were curtailed by the fiscal measures which the Prince of the Peace had the boldness to adopt: the pope had admitted the fairness of them; but the clergy never forgave the author of this *incipient ecclesiastical reform*. Though the breach effected was not wide, it was rendered practicable; it pointed out the weak side by which the enemy might gain access to the fortress. *Inde iræ!*

The reader is now in the right track.

The approach of the French army in 1808 having determined the crisis, and removed every mask, it was discovered that the priest Escoiquiz was the agent, the confidential secretary, of the conspiracy or camarilla of Ferdinand VII.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, the *odium of the foreign invasion* was skillfully thrown upon the Prince of the Peace, who

<sup>7</sup> Ferdinand's camarilla was confined to a small group of envious, disappointed, and factious men, who always, and in all countries, gather round the immediate successor to the crown. This party, though weak in numbers, was active and persevering in its object. It only consisted of the canon Escoiquiz, preceptor of the Prince of Asturias, the Duke de l'Infantado, and a few others of his highness's household. In this conventicle, eager for the enjoyment of power, the creditable plan of calling in the aid of Napoleon was meditated and carried into effect. M. T. de Beauharnais promoted it, and was entrusted with the part of conveying the message to the proper quarter.

had constantly endeavoured to avert an event of which he became the first victim.

The idea of this invasion emanated from a higher quarter. We are now to turn to Napoleon.

This great performer, having given up the game in the East, had come to repair his fortunes in Europe. His activity of mind, the wonderful success of his arms, his iron will removed all difficulties. The consulate is but the footstool to the throne; France accepts his yoke, and beholds him with admiration. Old royalties bend to him; the daughter of the Cæsars will come to share his bed. The obsequious autocrat, respecting the afternoon's nap of the great man, will say to him, "*My brother, far be it from me to awake you.*"<sup>\*</sup> Monarchs already rise from their thrones, and uncover at his appearance, waiting till he bids them be seated. At the period of this general prostration, the ambassadors and representatives of all those powers were seen to cringe in the Emperor's ante-rooms, seeking the protection of a doorkeeper of the palace, or of an official clerk, in order that they might not miss the hour of the levee, or the chance of procuring a passport or some wretched police token. Napoleon commanded, and could set in motion at his bidding, a million of soldiers, mostly Frenchmen. No other human being ever held

<sup>\*</sup> At Erfurth.

control over so mighty a force. The northern princes deemed themselves too fortunate if he condescended to fix a limit to his empire in close contact with their own frontiers, not to have assented beforehand to any territorial overthrow he might think proper to effect in the west of Europe.

Those who argue after the event,—who fancy that the world, as at present constituted, may be governed by protocols,—arrogant men, whose past conduct is a censure upon the meanness they displayed at the time, as well as upon their later ingratitude, are now endeavouring to banish the epoch of Napoleon to the regions of fancy.

Nevertheless, the western empire was a vast reality, as history will yet reveal it to us. Napoleon has increased in importance since his death.

One European nation, and one only, refused to bend the knee before the colossus. Sheltered by the ocean and by her thousand ships of war; strong in her exhaustless resources, in her national spirit, in her powerful aristocracy, in her liberal institutions; reduced, besides, to the alternative of maintaining herself, at all risks, at the summit of greatness, or of descending to a state of irksome mediocrity,—England bade defiance to and waged unrelenting war against the ruler of Europe.

Braved and harassed by a foe who always

eluded his blows, Napoleon exhausted his genius and his fortune in search of the means of reaching him. He conceived the vast project of shutting him out from the Continent, driving him back to his enchanted island, besieging it altogether, and reducing, by a merciless blockade, the fortress he was unable to carry by assault. He ground down and tortured the Continent, fettered the press, attempted to fetter the human mind, to enlist chemistry in support of nature, triumphed over all obstacles, and answered every objection by a fresh victory. . . . .

The northern sea-shore, from the Baltic to Bayonne; that of the south, from the mouths of the Cattaro to the rise of the eastern Pyrenees, were lined with means of defence: the British flag dared not appear in sight.

Nothing remained but to bring the Spanish Peninsula within the circle. . . . . The western empire would then be sufficiently extensive and well-rounded; the new dynasty would find ample space to spread itself and form a settlement; the problem of the continental blockade would then be solved; England would be reduced to the necessity of giving up her sword.

Such were the views, the ambition, the settled purpose of Napoleon.

The grand historical picture of Charlemagne stood before him. . . . .

Louis XIV. had said that there should no longer be any Pyrenees.

At a later period, in 1796, the rising Republic entertained on two occasions the idea of seizing upon Portugal by a *coup-de-main*.

In 1801, the First Consul had scarce arrived, when he directed an army to cross Spain and proceed in its course until it should reach Lisbon.<sup>a</sup> The Peninsula, in the mind of Napoleon, must of necessity belong to him.

The road was therefore marked out, and each march indicated. In 1806, the division of the Gironde was collected at the gates of Spain.<sup>b</sup>

It was at the interview of the Niemen that the two Emperors of the North and of the West agreed upon a territorial division at the expense of their respective allies.

In like manner the triumvirs of ancient Rome, at their meeting in the island of Rennus,<sup>c</sup> set about carving the world, readily awarding to each

<sup>a</sup> Appointed generalissimo of the Spanish army on occasion of the war declared against Portugal in 1801, the Prince of the Peace had under his orders the troops commanded, in the first instance, by General Le Clerc, and afterwards by Gouvion St. Cyr. It will be seen in these Memoirs how this third attempt at an invasion of Portugal was arrested by the Prince of the Peace, who placed himself at the head of the movement, and left nothing for the French to achieve.

<sup>b</sup> The order for assembling that army was issued at Osterode, a few days before the battle of Eylau.—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 213, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Reno, at the present day.

other the spoils or the heads of their respective friends.<sup>d</sup>

“I am no longer the ally of Turkey,” said Napoleon. “Well, then, take Spain for your share,” was Alexander’s reply.<sup>e</sup> Accordingly,

<sup>d</sup> “France required that Russia should frankly espouse her quarrel with England, and consent to certain changes in Spain; the first of which were to be, the departure of the reigning family for America, and the meeting of the Cortes for the purpose of sanctioning the change of dynasty: in other words, to re-enact the work of Louis XIV.” Napoleon, very probably, conceived the idea of sending the Spanish Bourbons away to America; but neither the Bourbons, nor the Prince of the Peace more especially, ever adopted such an act of political cowardice. See, on this point, the Second Part of these Memoirs.

• “The Emperor of Russia further assented to the possession of Hanover by France: he restored Corfu to her: generally speaking, *he agreed with the Emperor Napoleon*, not only respecting the changes which were consequent upon the open treaty, but in regard to *others likewise which were in the Emperor’s contemplation, and as to which he had conferred with him.*

“I will afford the best explanation in my power of the grounds upon which I rest my opinion.

“After all matters had been settled at Tilsit, the two sovereigns took leave of each other with great demonstrations of personal esteem and attachment. The Emperor Napoleon accompanied the Emperor of Russia to the left bank of the Niemen, where the Russian guards were drawn up in order of battle. Here it was that, embracing him, the Emperor Napoleon took off his cross of the legion of honour, and fixed it to the button-hole of the grenadier on the right of the first rank of the Russian guards, saying: ‘You will recollect having received it on the day on which your sovereign and I became friends.’”—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 39, 40 and 41.)



when Junot's army made its appearance at Lisbon, on the 30th November 1807, it found the Russian Admiral Siniavin anchored in the Tagus, with an auxiliary squadron of eight sail of the line and a frigate. This was the balance of the account struck at Friedland, and definitively settled at Tilsit: ' and the Emperor of Austria, for the sake of form, subsequently ratified at Erfurth all that had been done, or that might eventually be done in Spain, and gave his daughter as a hostage!

' " On reaching Lisbon, we found there eight sail of the line and a frigate under Admiral Siniavin's orders. This fleet, which, in consequence of *the alliance between France and Russia, and of the war between Russia and England*, was to afford us an additional guarantee for the protection of the harbour, gave us, in the sequel, far more apprehension than security."—*Narrative of the Expedition to Portugal by General Thiebault, Major-General of the French army*, pp. 86 and 87.

The presence of the Russian squadron at the moment of the arrival of the French army, was a *condition agreed on* at Tilsit.

" The treaty of Tilsit had been accomplished for the sole object of humbling England; in other words, of bringing about a general peace; for England was the only obstacle to it. Peace was ever the constant aim of the Emperor Napoleon; he was too enlightened not to perceive that on peace alone depended his safety and the permanence of his system.—England had in full parliament proclaimed perpetual war; she never deviated from this course. France, by binding Russia to her cause, adopted the only means of attaining the object she had in view."—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. v. page 198.

Yes, assuredly, Napoleon was anxious for *peace* and for the *stability* of his system; but he desired to combine them with the maintenance of all his acquisitions,—of all that constituted and completed the western empire.

Such was, accordingly, the high ground from whence the torrent was rushing with impelling force towards Spain and Portugal. We are to seek in the exaggeration of mind of Napoleon, in the compliance of Fortune with his will, the motives which determined the double invasion of the Peninsula.

The Duke d'Enghien had already been put to death, an event which occurred on the 22nd of March 1804. The system of Continental blockade, proclaimed on the 21st November 1806, was the announcement of the unavoidable and proximate occupation of the Peninsula. . . . It was easy to foresee the storm which threatened the Spanish territory and the reigning family.

England, who watched the slightest oscillations of the Continent, was manifesting, at this time, the desire of drawing nearer to it; she tendered to the court of Madrid every satisfaction and assistance. Austria gave secret intimation of her readiness to respond to the first signal; Prussia could not fail to run all hazards in the attempt to support her vain boasting at the sword's point, and to recover what she had lost; Russia bade fair to renew her efforts, and bear with all her might upon the common enemy. . . . Napoleon was on the eve of entangling himself in the mire of Poland reeking with blood. . . . Spain was urged on all sides to join the reviving coalition, in order to avert the dangers which threatened her very existence as a nation.

On the 5th of October 1806, the Prince of the Peace published his address or proclamation,<sup>‡</sup> a document which has acquired historical importance, and which has at least refuted, beforehand, the numberless calumnies heaped upon him. This proceeding was blamed, after the event had taken place : the defection of those who had urged him to it, who had offered to support the cause he was advocating, exhibited in more glaring colours the too confiding boldness of the Spanish generalissimo; but it is self-evident that the man who carried patriotism, and his sense of national independence, to a degree of temerity, did not deserve to be accused, at a later period, of *betraying his country to Napoleon*.

The battle of Jena overturned the monarchy of Frederick the Great ; countless victories followed in regular and rapid succession ; the Emperor Alexander, who was at first destined to appear as the Agamemnon of the second coalition of sovereigns, subsequently became the ally of the strongest, and obtained his share of the spoils wrested from the weaker party.

<sup>‡</sup> It is inserted word for word in these Memoirs. The proclamation of the Prince of the Peace was antecedent to the Berlin decree by a few days only. The expected promulgation of this decree was already known in Madrid. It was tantamount to proclaiming the Continental blockade ; and its consequences were obvious. The battle of Jena took place on the 15th or 16th of the same month of October 1806. See the Second Part of these Memoirs, where the Prince of the Peace explains and justifies the measure he resorted to.

Napoleon, who had long been warned of the disposition of Spain in his regard, never forgave the Prince of the Peace for presuming to penetrate his views, still less for attempting to forestall them.<sup>a</sup>

Whilst the Emperor of the West was meditat-

<sup>a</sup> The Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo initiate us into the secret of the sentiments entertained at that time by M. de Talleyrand.\* The details supplied by the former minister of the

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\* "It has been designedly asserted that M. de Talleyrand was opposed to this attempt: it may have suited the views of party men to endeavour to convey this belief, but it is at variance with truth. Not only did he not oppose, but he advised it, and laid down the plan for carrying it into effect. It was with the view of acting upon this plan that he evinced so much anxiety for the conclusion of the peace of Tilsit, observing to the Emperor that *the most important business on his hands* was that of the South, where sooner or later a warlike prince might spring up who would exert himself to subvert his work; and reminding him that a single proclamation had sufficed to agitate the whole Peninsula; that if a second battle of Eylau should be fought, (which was not unlikely to have occurred in the heart of the Russian provinces, where he would have had to force his way had not the peace been concluded,) it was possible that the Spaniards and Austrians might reach Paris before he could receive information in time to arrest their progress: on the other hand, if he made peace with England ere he could settle at his will the affairs of Spain, he would have to *desist altogether* from the object he had in view, as Europe would not fail to array itself against him whenever he should attempt its accomplishment; whereas, if he should have the good fortune to succeed, he might then treat with England upon a new basis, and consent, on the other hand, to such sacrifices as might be imposed upon him. The *first idea of the invasion of Spain* originated with M. de Talleyrand: he had prepared the springs which were to be set in motion for that purpose; he no doubt desired to effect the intended object by different means, and might indeed have thus succeeded in bringing it to a more successful issue."—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 214 and 215.

These Memoirs were published under the Restoration; and M. de Talleyrand has never contradicted the Duke of Rovigo's assertions. How could he have done so? Proofs are wanting to establish their correctness, had they been called for.

ing and preparing his plan of taking forcible possession of the Peninsula, he received the letter of the Prince of Asturias, (since Ferdinand VII.) dated the 12th of October 1807 ;<sup>1</sup> and, a few days afterwards, the letter of Charles IV. of the 29th of the same month ; both relating to the Escorial conspiracy.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, therefore, the Prince of the Peace, alarmed at the danger which threatened his country and the reigning dynasty, and urged on by the belligerent powers, assumed the initiative on one occasion, the 5th of October 1806, and almost declared war against Napoleon.

imperial police are occasionally wanting in accuracy when he does not relate what he has actually seen or heard ; his prejudices, his feelings of jealousy, lead him beyond bounds ; nevertheless he has correctly apprehended Napoleon's sentiments when the latter has condescended to lay himself open. The Duke of Rovigo has more than once seen his master in an undisguised attire.

<sup>1</sup> The canon Escoiquiz is well known to have dictated it. The Duke de l'Infantado, and a few others, were in the secret. M. de Beauharnais, at that time ambassador in Madrid, undertook to transmit the letter to the proper quarter, and he was not ignorant of its contents. After Ferdinand's return to Spain in 1814, M. de Beauharnais received in Paris the grand cross of the order of Charles III ; it was a reward for the good offices rendered by him in 1807 and 1808. Napoleon no sooner received Ferdinand's letter, than he dictated the convention or treaty of Fontainebleau, signed by Duroc and Izquierdo on the 27th of the same month.

<sup>2</sup> The proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, and the letters of Ferdinand and of his father Charles IV, are inserted word for word in the Second Part of these Memoirs.

We then find the presumptive heir to the crown denouncing his father's government; soliciting, unknown to his father and sovereign, the hand of an imperial princess; and urging Napoleon to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain!

Charles IV, the oldest ally of France, informs the Emperor "that an unnatural conspiracy has just broken out in his own palace; that he is compelled to punish its authors; and that *the order of succession to the crown is endangered!*"

Napoleon is at once courted, enticed, called by the son to his aid; consulted, implored, by the father. . . . He had been defied and threatened by the Prince of the Peace two years before.

Long before these various grounds of excitement had been afforded to him, the new Charlemagne, the creator, the director of the Continental blockade, had already dreamed the completion of his empire by the annexation to it of the Spanish Peninsula; for all his efforts, all his labours in the north as well as in the south were illusory, incomplete, void of any result, so long as the two lines of coast in the west of Europe were not hermetically closed against England.

Whilst the occupation of Portugal was in course of being accomplished, on the 30th of November 1807, the French armies were simultaneously penetrating into Spain through Catalonia

and Biscay, the two extremities of the chain of the Pyrenees.

The titular generalissimo, Murat—a perfect Apollo of Belvidere on horseback, combining with the accent and gait of a frivolous coxcomb the most conspicuous valour and rashness on a field of battle—surrounded by a staff as glittering as himself, unprovided with positive instructions, not knowing whether he was to wage war or maintain himself at peace, with whom or on what points he was to treat, Murat proceeded at a horse's prance towards the capital in March 1808: his advanced guard consisted of twenty-five thousand men.<sup>1</sup> More astonished than alarmed at his approach, the Spaniards manifested no ill-will towards him.

We are here at a loss to conceive what extravagant and petty Machiavelism led to the adoption of measures more worthy of an Italian prince of the thirteenth century, than of a conqueror having a million of victorious soldiers at his command.

<sup>1</sup> Eight thousand men had just entered Spain through Biscay, independently of the troops which had previously marched in the directions of Lisbon and Catalonia. After treacherously obtaining possession of some fortified towns, twenty thousand men remained stationed between Vittoria and Madrid for the purpose of protecting the communication of the French armies. General Dupont, with a straggling force composed of three divisions, moved on the right towards Valladolid, and took the road to Andalusia, penetrating through La Mancha and the Sierra Morena. Marshal Moncey, with a force of less than ten thousand men of all arms, advanced upon Valencia, hoping to

These troops, which had so signalised themselves in a multitude of hard-fought battles, were employed, on entering Spain, in obtaining by stealth successes, the whole merit of which consists in the reciprocal dangers of attack and defence. General officers<sup>m</sup> received and fulfilled the mission of taking, on their way, and under cover of an unworthy deception, the fortresses of Pampeluna, Figueras, and Barcelona! Fatal beginning of an enterprise! Insulting and useless act of mistrust, unwarranted by any previous provocation! It created less terror than indignation amongst the Spaniards, who were thus treated as enemies whilst they were considering the French in the light of *allies*!

The men of Aranjuez, the confidants of the Prince of Asturias, those who had solicited the intervention of foreigners, rejoiced at witnessing their approach to Madrid.

“ Napoleon comes to substitute the son for the father, and us for the Prince of the Peace and his dependants”— such was their exclamation; and their emissaries were unwearied in their praises of the pretended generosity of the great Emperor. Foolish men! Sad parody of the litigants in the

obtain possession of it without striking a blow, in the same manner as Duhesme and d'Armagnac had succeeded in occupying the cities of Pampeluna and Barcelona.

I shall have to advert, in the Second Part of these Memoirs, to the grand movement of the invading army.

<sup>m</sup> D'Armagnac in Navarre, Duhesme in Catalonia, &c. &c.



fable! Was it, then, with a view to settle the internal dissensions of the Spanish Bourbons, and to calm the passions of an obscure and stupid camarilla, that Napoleon crossed the Pyrenees? *Napoleon never deviated from his object.* On that occasion the Prince of the Peace evinced as much courage as patriotism and loyalty. "He advised the king to place himself in the first instance beyond the reach of French bayonets by retiring into Andalusia, and leaving Murat to himself in the heart of the Peninsula, beset on all sides by an excited population, which would soon rise in a body to overwhelm him."

The army sent into Spain consisted at first of an amalgamation of suddenly raised conscripts, and of detachments of various corps loosely organized. This was a notorious fact.

The distance from Bayonne to Seville is three hundred post-leagues, on a single high-road intersected by the defiles of the Sierra Morena.

Murat could not cover so extensive a line; he was compelled to stop, and await fresh instructions.\*

\* In fact, after the whole royal family had disappeared or been forcibly carried off to France, after Murat's occupation of the capital, and when he held the chief military and political positions, the difficulties which arose on all sides, and those he encountered in endeavouring to maintain his ground for some time longer, are well known. The various army-corps detached to a short distance were compelled to fall back upon Madrid; Moncey was closely followed in his retreat from Valencia;

The advice of the Prince of the Peace was therefore a prudent one, and worthy of a Spaniard having the good of his country at heart. But this retreat to Andalusia was at variance with engagements entered into, with sordid or guilty interests. Those who had enticed and called in Napoleon were determined to *await his coming*. They hoped much from his presence and protection; they fancied he had been rendered their accomplice. . . . Charles IV, the whole royal family, all the ministers, were at Aranjuez. This residence stands in a borough of three or four thousand inhabitants, the greater part attached to the household of the palace;\* an idle, hungry tribe, subsisting upon the fragments of the court meals, and viewing with regret the extraordinary journey which the court was about to undertake; the rather so, as the civil list, which was for some time past involved in debt, was not exact in paying the various salaries. They feared to lose their arrears, or to have long to wait for the settlement of them.

*Dupont never returned.* The aversion in Madrid itself was so openly manifested, that after a stay of eight days, Joseph abandoned the royal residence he had come to inhabit. . . . On the other hand, Napoleon wrote to the Grand-duke of Berg: "*Should the war be once kindled, all is lost.*"—See the *Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. p. 258. The letter is of the 19th March 1808, same vol. p. 264.

\* The court resided there during five months in the year, from the middle of February to the end of June. It was much

To this alarmed pack of footmen, we must add other officious valets, who also objected to the removal of the court: the numerous retinue of nobles attached to the king's person, who would have been compelled to accompany him on the journey. Those who did duty in the king's stables rendered themselves conspicuous by their violence; the working class of the vicinity was

enlivened from the 15th of April to the end of June; and the population was doubled, owing to the numerous and distinguished visitors who repaired thither to partake the enjoyment of a delightful spring. But on the approach of the great heats, the court quitted Aranjuez for St. Ildefonso or La Granja. Aranjuez dwindled back to its usual population of three or four thousand inhabitants, who were all attached to the menial offices in the king's household.

Amongst these we are to number M. Melgarejo, who was afterwards created Duke of St. Fernando, and married the eldest daughter of the infant Don Louis, sister of the Princess of the Peace: at that time, M. Melgarejo, though a very secondary agent, warmly promoted the cause of Ferdinand VII.; for which service he was rewarded at first by an accumulation of honours, and subsequently by banishment:—Count d'Altamira, Grand Equerry, (*cavallerizo mayor*); Count d'Ofiate, husband of the lady who superintended the queen's household, (*camarera mayor*); the Duke de l'Infantado, already so deeply involved in the affair of the Escorial; and some other gentlemen of the bedchamber. They possessed seigniorial rights over nearly all the villages within the jurisdiction of Madrid,\* and their stewards exercised great influence amongst the peasantry.

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\* Count d'Altamira, Lord of Liganes and of the lands dependent upon the marquisate of that title; Count d'Ofiate, Lord and Count of Batres; the Duke de l'Infantado, Lord of Chammartin, and of a multitude of villages in the vicinity of Guadalajara, where he had a large establishment in the centre of his extensive domains, &c.

brought to Aranjuez in order to add strength to the contemplated disturbance.

The sudden departure of the King of Spain on the approach of the French army, unquestionably evinced great energy and dignity of character. This measure was still more significant than the proclamation of the 5th of October 1806.<sup>1</sup> To abandon his capital, and remove his family and the whole machinery of government to the furthest extremity of the kingdom, was on the part of Charles IV. an open rupture,—an act of independence; it was placing Napoleon under the necessity of declaring in the face of the world that his seizure of Spain was effected by dispossessing without remorse, without a plausible pretext, the most faithful of his allies.

This insurrection of Aranjuez has been much commented upon; it was represented, at the time, in Spain and throughout Europe, as the explosion of a national sentiment, as the vigorous burst of a people oppressed and exasperated by an insolent and destructive *favouritism*. This was a flagrant exaggeration.

Two thousand peasants, attracted by curiosity, perhaps likewise by the hope of plunder; as many valets ill paid, and apprehensive of not being paid at all; others, who were reluctant to separate from their wives and their habits of life; a sprinkling of

<sup>1</sup> It will be seen in these Memoirs to what extent Napoleon carried his animosity against the Prince of the Peace.

assassins by profession, ever ready to enact their part, dagger in hand, when the opportunity offers ; certain intimate friends of Ferdinand, those who had advised his having recourse to Napoleon, and who relied upon the protection of the French army ; such were the elements of that so much vaunted insurrection.

There was no display of courage, of patriotism, of generosity, of fighting ; not even the shadow of resistance. . . . On beholding this tumultuous assemblage, Charles IV. fancied himself surrounded by conspirators and traitors within the precincts of his palace. This was no doubt the case ; but their number was insignificant : all the rest were dispirited and trembling like himself ; sheep-like courtiers, whose fidelity was no more than a habit of serving their master, and who, rather prepossessed with the dignity than with the person of the monarch, beheld in the Prince of Asturias the natural substitute,—in a word, the equivalent for another king.

But the chief object was to get rid of the man who had counselled the departure, and who might still inspire the monarch with sufficient energy to carry it into effect with greater circumspection at another moment.\*

The firmness and presence of mind of Charles

\* Accordingly, the imperial ambassador, M. de Beauharnais, hastened from Madrid to the residence of Aranjuez, in the night from the 17th to the 18th. He was seen to mix with the groups

IV. failed him on the occasion ;\* and the Prince of Asturias betrayed, dispossessed, and delivered up his father.

Ministers, generals, counsellors, body-guards, all proved wanting in their duty. The Prince of the Peace alone “bethought himself of saving the royal dignity and the national independence.” Ferdinand and Napoleon took their revenge for the resistance he had opposed to them. The former foamed with rage when compelled by superior force to yield up his victim ; the latter, whilst pretending to grant to the Prince of the Peace an asylum in his dominions, forgot to assign to him, or rather affected to deprive him of, the means of existence under this state of banishment.”†

of disaffected people, however disguised by his careless travelling dress, in order not to compromise his diplomatic character : this did not prevent his being recognized. His presence had been deemed necessary, as evidence that the movement was approved of ; this, at least, was the interpretation given to it. It was Napoleon’s wish that neither the father nor the son should be supposed inclined to reject his protectorship, or the arbitrement which he claimed to exercise in the character of umpire. M. de Beauharnais, on the other hand, had so familiarized himself with the elevated alliances contracted by his family, that he beheld with mortification, in the removal of the Prince of Asturias, the indefinite postponement of the marriage of which he had himself conveyed the proposal to the Emperor’s knowledge.

\* See the details and circumstances of Charles IV’s abdication in the Second Part of these Memoirs.

† Napoleon carried his animosity, and the forgetfulness of

We have yet to explain the strange grant of the principality of the Algarves.

After lowering the Alps, swallowing up the whole of Italy, crushing Austria, oversetting Prussia, driving the Cossacks beyond the Niemen, and compelling the autocrat to associate with him, and to look for his share of the profits to the Dardanelles or the regions beyond the Caucasus, Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of Switzerland, delighted to survey upon a map that splendid portion of Europe which he had so proudly disquieted : he marked, or struck out with his pencil, the limits and compartments of his empire ; and the double coast of the Spanish

all political decorum, so far as to set the first example of spoliation. He bestowed upon Marshal Suchet the splendid domain of Albufera, of the annual value of three hundred thousand francs, which belonged to the Prince of the Peace, a refugee in France under protection of the treaty of Bayonne !

King Joseph did not fail, on his part, to distribute to his dependents the Prince's spoils. He stripped his hotel, took possession of its furniture, caused a strict search to be made in the public treasury for the funds which the Prince's debtors had been compelled to lodge there as belonging to him.

The military grants conferred by Napoleon may, strictly speaking, be accounted for : he fancied himself vested with the power of taking away and of bestowing crowns ; he had many ambitions to gratify, for he himself had excited them. . . . .

But what are we to say of the pacific, the righteous Joseph, who was said to reign against his will, and who neither had the rights nor the passions of a conqueror ? . . . . For the rest, the spoliation of the property of an absent man, of a sub-

Peninsula ever stood before him, as the last link of the chain of the grand Continental blockade.

On the 26th October 1807, he summoned Duroc to his presence : " Attend to me, Grand Marshal. See Izquierdo, whether at your house, at Talleyrand's, or at Hervás's." This must have an end.

" I send the *petty Bourbons of Etruria* to the northern extremity of Portugal, with the title of *Kings of Northern Lusitania ; their dominion will be on the sea-coast*. Junot is on the point of occupying Lisbon and the mouth of the Tagus ; he will maintain possession of the country ; I shall then see what next. . . .

" What has that Prince of the Peace to do in

ject who was the martyr of his fidelity to his sovereign and his country,—this deliberate plunder, under the government of Joseph, was but giving application to the system adopted by Napoleon. This great man was not altogether free from acts of meanness : he punished the Prince of the Peace for his proclamation of 1806 ; for the advice given to Charles IV. in 1808, to withdraw at the approach of the French ; in a word, for having at all times thwarted his monomania of Peninsular invasion.

And yet the stupid populace believed that Don Manuel de Godoy was bartering away the honour and independence of Spain ! The real traitors, if we can give the name to ambitious miscreants devoid of courage and talent, are those who had called in Napoleon. . . . But when the letter from the Prince of Asturias to the Emperor of the French was made public, the blow had already been struck. . . . Twenty-seven years have since elapsed . . . and the wound is still bleeding !

\* Don Joseph Hervás, eldest son of the Marquis of Almenara, and brother-in-law of the Grand Marshal Duroc, resided then in his hotel, Rue St. Florentin, now the property of M. de Tal-



Spain? he acted last year the part of a bully. He it is who leads the court of Madrid. Tell him that he shall have the Algarves: let him be gone: I have no need of him to arrange matters with Charles IV. and his son, who are at variance with each other, and who both call for my assistance.”<sup>v</sup> Thus spoke the oracle. Copying word for word the jostled phrases of Napoleon, Duroc drew up the article of the convention of Fontainebleau, which was signed on the following day, the 27th October, and ratified by the Emperor on the 29th.

What means, in this treaty, *the gift of the principality of the Algarves*? *It was a banishment!* It was important to get rid of a man of spirit, an upright man, who stood in the way . . . to remove him, render him an object of suspicion to his fellow-countrymen, and force upon him a shadow of nominal sovereignty.

To point out a place of residence; to define, however loosely, the limits of the imaginary sovereignty, were objects not even thought of.

leyrand. Don Eugenio Izquierdo was on terms of intimate intercourse with Don Joseph Hervás, and Madame Duroc, who inhabited her brother's hotel.

<sup>v</sup> I repeat here word for word what I heard from the lips of the Grand Marshal Duroc, in the presence of his brother-in-law, Don Joseph Hervás, the son of my friend the Marquis of Almenara. It is for the reader to judge whether I have ascribed to Napoleon other sentiments or words than those which several persons, still in existence, must likewise have heard.

It was the government which the Duke, in Cervantes, assigns to the esquire of Don Quixote. The Prince of the Algarves would have received the like greeting from his vassals.\*

The Prince of the Peace forbore accepting that treacherous present, which he had neither deserved nor sought to obtain. Nevertheless, his

\* "I have seen nothing to warrant the belief that the Prince of the Peace intended to take possession of the *vast* dominions of which he had secured to himself the enjoyment." (It has been seen that they had been assigned to him by Napoleon.) "On the contrary, the Prince of the Peace was already informed of the Milan decree, which appointed Junot governor of Portugal, and directed him to carry on the administration of it in the Emperor's name. The principality of the Algarves was, therefore, no longer in question; and the Prince no longer indulged in illusions respecting it. He summoned the King's Council to the palace of Aranjuez, and, after laying before them the dangers which threatened the monarchy, he caused his advice to be adopted, and every preparation to be made for the departure of the royal family for Seville," &c.—*Memoirs of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 246, 247.\*

However, advantage was taken in Madrid of one of the clauses of the treaty of Fontainebleau, in virtue of which an elective province of Portugal, erected by a stroke of the imperial conjuror's wand into a sovereign principality, that of Algarves, appeared to be the price of a cowardly act of acquiescence in Napoleon's wishes. "Behold," said they, "how the traitor has betrayed his country to the usurper, who rewards him with a crown!" Was not the first inquiry that suggested itself, what proof did the treaty of Fontainebleau afford of any

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\* Napoleon was well known to have entertained the design of assigning Portugal to Prince Eugene. Junot had no sooner reached Lisbon, than the viceroy sent off two of his aides-de-camp to prepare his residence. The English were beforehand with him.

enemies will persist in asserting, and the people will still believe, that it was the price stipulated for his treachery.

But, independently of every other act of resistance, the proclamation of the 5th October 1806, the bold advice to retire into Andalusia, and his dignified conduct in the month of March 1808, are historical facts: they have been visited on the Prince of the Peace with sufficient severity to warrant his claiming the merit of them.

such treachery? How would Spain be injured by raising two adjoining provinces into principalities paying allegiance to the Peninsular sovereignty, one of which was to be conferred on the Prince of the Peace? Spain had formerly been in possession of the whole of Portugal: she had never ceased regretting, since the year 1640, the loss of this gem, which was wrested from the crown of Philip II. The clause in the treaty, so far from militating against the welfare of Spain, was laying, in some respects, the foundation for the wished-for recovery of her Portuguese dominions.

How extravagant was the idea, on the other hand, of attributing to the Prince of the Peace an ambition alike absurd and misplaced! Lord and owner of the Spanish estate of Albufera, in itself almost a province; of the magnificent Soto de Roma, which the generosity of the Cortes adjudged to be an adequate recompense for Wellington's services; of the domain of the Alcudia, one of the finest properties of the Jesuits, purchased as such by Charles IV. and greatly improved by the donor of it; possessor of many other lands, and of two palaces in Madrid, one of which was judicially estimated of the value of four millions and a half of francs; generalissimo of the land and sea forces; married to the cousin-germain of his king, a union which had already brought him a child; invested with the title of highness, which only belongs, on that side of the Pyrenees, to members of the royal family; grandee of Spain of the first

All the jesuitical craftiness of Escoiquiz, commented upon and revived by M. de Pradt, and so foolishly rehearsed by a crowd of ignorant compilers of all countries, will fail to lead any one astray respecting the aim, the treachery, the fatal consequences of the disloyal application made by Ferdinand to Napoleon. Heavy is the blame attaching to a son, the immediate heir to the throne, for having sought, unknown to his father

class, a dignity which, at the time of Philip the Fifth's accession, was not deemed inferior to that of our princes of the blood,\* still less to that of the Electors of Germany—by what whimsical or foolish calculation could he have been induced to exchange, or even lose sight of, such vast possessions and such solid honours, for an isolated and precarious sovereignty, of recent existence, enclosed within a country muzzled and already invaded by Napoleon, who always kept everything for himself? Had he thus stripped off his national character and quitted his native country, he must have endangered all his property in Spain. A moment's reflection would have divulged the true sense of that treaty, secretly got up, as yet unratified, and which assuredly stood in no need of ratification.

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\* A memorial was presented on this subject to Philip V. by the Duke d'Arcos, head of the ancient and powerful family of Ponce de Leon. Instead of complying with the duke's request, Philip V. ordered him to enter the service as a mere volunteer, and join the army in Flanders.

Nevertheless, the claim of the Spanish *grandees* to be considered and treated as princes of the blood, is not devoid of foundation. Many of these families have contracted alliances with the reigning house, though never since the accession of the Austrian dynasty. The Lacerdas, the Henriquez, the Velascos, the Osorios, &c. are instances of this truth. With regard to the Electors of Germany, some of them had accompanied Charles V. into Spain, a Marquis of Brandenburg amongst the rest: and it is quite certain that those foreign princes never assumed any superiority over the Constable of Castile (Velasco), the High Admiral (Henriquez), the Count de Benavente (Pimentel), and other *grandees* of the same stamp.

and sovereign, a foreign support against the government or the policy of his king, of whom he was the first subject. Subsequently, and during the last scene of the drama, the authors of this ill-judged and guilty proceeding, the advisers of the Prince of Asturias, paralysed every means of resisting the invasion: they impeded the intention of Charles IV. to place the plains of La Mancha and the gorges of the Sierra Morena between him and the French army, which was assuredly not in a condition to pursue its adventurous design to the gates of Seville.

It is doubtless evident that, under any circumstances, Napoleon would have taken possession of Madrid, and paraded his eagles throughout the Peninsula: such rapid conquest was to him an easy task; it was to be expected: and there is every probability that Charles IV, though protected in the first instance by the space of country which would have separated him from Murat, and by the inadequacy of the French forces to attack him, would, notwithstanding the zeal displayed by the Prince of the Peace, the attachment, the national spirit, the pride of the Spanish nation, have eventually found himself reduced to the necessity of flying for shelter to Majorca or the Canary islands;\* thus following the example of

\* Not to America, though falsely asserted. Such an idea never entered the minds of the king, of any member of the royal family, or of the Prince of the Peace.—See, in the Second Part of these Memoirs, what gave rise at the time to this unfounded report.

other sovereigns, whose capitals and provinces were by turns visited by our celebrated *groggnards*. Yes, the invasion would sooner or later have taken place, and nearly in the same manner as when Napoleon, in 1808, encircled Spain with eight or ten army-corps.<sup>7</sup> The gallant Moore alone had the courage to stand firm for a moment, and advanced to meet him; but the same causes, the same local difficulties, and especially the same men, must always have brought about the same results. The disputes between the marshals, Joseph's false position, the caudine forks of Baylen, the forcible expulsion from Lisbon, the retreat of Oporto, the disastrous siege of Saragossa,<sup>8</sup> the countless errors committed at Talavera and elsewhere, lastly the frosts of Russia, could not fail to raise the fortunes of Castaños and Palafox, and to adorn the brows of Sir Arthur Wellesley with laurels. . . . Charles IV. would have returned to his dominions in 1814, in imitation of the Kings of Prussia, Sardinia, and Naples, and of the elder branch of the Bourbons, who returned from a still greater distance. The aged King of Spain, ennobled by the persecution

<sup>7</sup> Napoleon proceeded as far as Astorga, where, despairing to overtake the English General Moore, and finding himself recalled to Germany by a fresh coalition set on foot, he resolved upon returning to Bayonne, and performed the journey, a distance of upwards of one hundred and fifty leagues, on horseback, and in the space of five days.

<sup>8</sup> These deplorable events are noticed in the Second Part of the *Memoirs*, and exhibited in their true light.

he had endured, innocent of what it was not in his power to prevent, could never have ceased to reign, according to the chronology of legitimate right: the disgusting revolt of Aranjuez, the sad episode of Bayonne, the mean acts of Valençay, the ingratitude and bad faith rewarded in 1814 with a crown,—these occurrences would not have tarnished the history of the descendants of Philip V; the foul linen of the family would not have been washed in sight of the public: Spain would not have affrighted the civilization of the age by those revolting and endless proscriptions and executions; the national honour would not have been placed in jeopardy.

The wise and prophetic advice of the Prince of the Peace, had it been adopted, might have saved his country from such accumulated disgrace.

What we have since witnessed must have given cause to the Spaniards for regretting the days of Charles IV. and of his former prime minister.

The accomplices of Ferdinand VII, who attained under his reign some degree of power, have given evidence of their capacity: he has himself cast them off one by one, and treated them with every species of indignity.\*

\* The last struggles of that obscure and destructive faction are seen in a late letter addressed by the Marquis Pedro Gomez Labrador to the Minister Martinez de la Rosa; in which the ex-minister gives the ass's kick, first to Napoleon, and next to the Prince of the Peace. The wound is by no means dangerous. Fortunately, M. Labrador has no other weapon to wield than

The faithful and conscientious account of the private and public life of the Prince of the Peace will disarm and silence his detractors, if any should still be found.

Don Manuel de Godoy was indebted to chance, or to the special favour of his sovereign, which is no less a matter of chance, for his elevation to the highest employments in an absolute monarchy. After he quitted the ministry, Charles IV. retained for him his former esteem and affection.

Of a gentle and obliging disposition ;<sup>b</sup> a friend to literature, to the fine arts, to knowledge of every kind ; passionate after his country's glory, he thought that his fortune would be forgiven him if he made a good use of it. His administra-

his pen. The Duke de l'Infantado, Melgarejo, Duke of St. Fernando, and others, have all been successively dismissed by Ferdinand. Escoiquiz died in exile ; Macanaz was thrown into a prison, and God only knows what has become of his daughters ! Ostolaza, banished and imprisoned, has ended his life on a gallows.

<sup>b</sup> " He was really a mild and good-natured man," says the rigid Colonel Napier. He no doubt adds, " although a sensual and corrupt one," which is carrying English prudery rather too far.—See *History of the War in the Peninsula*, by W. J. P. Napier, vol. i. pp. 12, &c.

Colonel Napier is not open to suspicion when he praises the Spaniards, any more than when he abuses them. His history is written with conspicuous talent and great impartiality. He is called by his fellow-countrymen the *British Tacitus*. In fact, his style is not unlike that of Tacitus ; those who have the honour of knowing him can aver that he resembles Cato in stoicism and loftiness of soul. All the Napiers, and they are many, are distinguished characters.



tion of the finances was unsullied: having several millions of money at his command, he never dreamt of placing the smallest portion of it in foreign funds. A Spaniard and a minister, he suffered his enemies to live on, exercised no act of revenge, allowed great latitude of speech and of writing, averted from Spain the dangers of the French revolution; and claims a debt of obligation from his country for the institution of a multitude of useful establishments.

How and in what manner did so general and so bitter a prejudice prevail against him?

His personal enemies, those who coveted his spoils, remained masters of the ground.

The weight of gratitude is irksome of endurance; absent, proscribed, calumniated, none were left to him but weak and timid friends . . . . many proved ungrateful:—there is but a stage from ingratitude to hatred.\*

The church party never forgives. A resentment, which had been brooding during a space of sixteen years, was at last enabled to break out under cover of the complicated revolt of Aranjuez.

The faction which was guilty of calling in foreign aid, hastened to direct the people's rage against the Prince of the Peace, who was pre-

\* "Ah! can it be right in a man to inherit the property of those he assassinates!"—such was the exclamation of a celebrated poet.

vented by the early success of the insurrection from acting or speaking out.

From that moment, the most absurd, the most wicked imputations, circulated over the Peninsula and throughout Europe.

What could France, England, the whole North, conjecture as to what was taking place in Spain? What can be affirmed on the subject at the present day? Beyond the limits of that Spain, which is placed at the extreme end of the civilized world, none felt an interest in raising their voice on behalf of a man who abstained from complaining.

M. de Pradt had formed a slight acquaintance with Escoïquiz in 1808; the work of the latter no sooner appeared in 1814, than the French writer clothed in his lively style the misrepresentations of Ferdinand's preceptor. Contemporary and successive biographies are but the diluting of the impostures of the Spanish hypocrite coloured by M. de Pradt.

Bound by his duty, by an overwhelming necessity, to the sad fortune of Charles IV. and of Maria Louisa, the Prince of the Peace had attended them to Marseilles and Rome. Utterly destitute on quitting Spain, where Ferdinand in the first instance, then Murat, Napoleon, Joseph, and others whom I am unwilling to name, had invaded, confiscated, plundered his hotels, his estates, and his portfolio; exposed to the insolent

vexations of Bargas, of the Marquis Labrador, of St. Martin,—instruments of the severity of Ferdinand VII, for the promotion of whose views they laboured in foreign countries,—the Prince of the Peace's only subsistence consisted of the crumbs which dropped from his old master's table; and the aged king, saturated with parricidal insults, still clung to life. . . . He always feared that his son would suffer him to die of hunger! He enjoined his unhappy follower never to break silence so long as he, Charles IV, should not have descended to the tomb, so long as Ferdinand himself should be living.

The man who, in his sixty-ninth year, without connexions in a foreign land, without books, without aid, without intercourse, and deprived of his papers, has nevertheless rendered so faithful an account of an important historical epoch, embracing a period of a quarter of a century, from which he is separated by twenty-seven years of exile and mental sufferings,—that man, I say, will no longer have to reply to absurd slander or empty insults.

He recalls, in his work, much national glory forgotten or unacknowledged: this inheritance will possess some merit with the Spaniards who were entitled to it, but they will owe its enjoyment to the care of a generous outlaw. Many families will delight to recover their titles of nobility, and Don Manuel de Godoy has also

revived those which belonged to him. If the author has been unwilling to divulge everything, nevertheless what he has said is true; this is a virtue of rare occurrence at the present day. And yet, a prudent reserve affords evidence of great strength of mind!

The work is therefore, in some respects, peculiarly adapted to the time of its appearance. Spain is agitated in all directions; every theory of government is eagerly coveted: the constitutional royalty had many partisans; federalism and the republic, one and indivisible, may also have theirs. It is curious to watch how, fifty years ago, a young minister upheld a pure monarchy, having to combat the French revolution arrayed in his presence, the Inquisition behind him, and the inveterate prejudices of his fellow-countrymen.

The Prince of the Peace has no doubt proved himself tardy in demanding the satisfaction due to him. The wind of calumny has long prevailed; the public are unwilling to retract their opinion. This monster, composed of eyes, mouths, and ears, receives every impression first offered to him. It resembles a sponge soaked in a fetid liquor,—in vain you press and wring it, a portion of the liquid still remains.

Resignation, however, must exhaust the spirit of hatred: the men of the present cannot adopt the feelings of interested rancour entertained by

the past generation ; Time has pleaded this cause, and justified the late minister of Charles IV.

What were the charges against him ? "*He raised a sacrilegious hand against the altar !*" exclaimed churchmen ; whereas, he but gently shook the tree, in order to detach some of the fruit already ripe. . . . They were resolved to punish this extraordinary act of freedom, and be revenged at any price : the blind passions of the mob were excited ; the people exceeded their instructions. The church party had raised the storm ; their vessel was upset—who is to blame for it ?

"*He has betrayed and given up his country to foreigners !*" such was the infamous calumny invented and propagated by the factious men of the Escorial and Aranjuez : they called in Napoleon, who would have found his way without their invitation. Well then, a minister, president of the council, having under his hand all the public and secret negotiations, all the official and officious information which encumbers the archives of the government,—M. de Toreno himself, after having carefully collected the vague reports—the popular traditions upon which a statesman should set no value—acknowledges and proclaims the patriotic loyalty of the Prince of the Peace.

In fact, no other reproach now attaches to him than the splendour and rapidity of his rise. "The

stream of the royal favour has left its channel; the overflowing is complete," said the Spaniards in their Oriental language. There is much exaggeration in this. The wealth of the Prince of the Peace and his influence at court were not unlimited: sufficient was left, however, to excite the feelings of envy,—that fever so inherent to mankind, and which manifests itself amongst our neighbours with more dangerous symptoms than in any other country. If the Spaniards, so rigid at that period, had taken the pains to look back to the origin and titles of their historical families, they would have found how much these were indebted to the munificence of the crown, so often laid under contribution by grasping or rebellious nobles.

The Prince of the Peace never received anything beyond what was spontaneously, lawfully given to him. . . . How and by whom does he see himself stripped of his property?<sup>d</sup> He will find amongst his young fellow-countrymen judges less prepossessed against him, who seem to have at heart to shake off all old prejudices. Sincere and reflecting men of all civilized countries will feel indebted to him for having at last published his *Memoirs*. Would that it had ere now been in his power to commit them to the press!

J. D'ESMENARD.

Paris, August 1835.

<sup>d</sup> See the *Memoirs*, vol. iv.



**MEMOIRS**  
**OF**  
**DON MANUEL DE GODOY,**  
**PRINCE OF THE PEACE.**

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**CHAPTER I.**

Motives of my past silence.—Object of this Work.—Historical Sketch.—Preliminary Reflections.

TOWARDS the close of the month of May 1808, the culpable intrigues of a faction had brought upon Spain the interference of a neighbour alike audacious, inflexible in his vast projects, and all-powerful. I have designated the Emperor Napoleon.

A victim to those fatal intrigues, Charles IV, my venerable lord and master, attended only by Maria Louisa his august consort, and by the infant Don Francisco de Paula, the youngest of his three sons, had just arrived at the dull and solitary residence of Fontainebleau.<sup>1</sup>

Admitted as a stranger into the palace which his ancestors had built, and labouring under ex-

<sup>1</sup> The — May 1808.



cruciating pains of mind and body, he was reclining on a couch. The majestic old man assumed on a sudden a sitting posture: his head, though large, was erect, and well placed on his shoulders; his broad and bald forehead commanded respect; his eyes, less oppressed than inflamed from want of rest, preserved their striking vivacity; and at this moment, his physiognomy, combining dignity with candour, and abruptness with benevolence,—the faithful reflection of a soul incapable of disguise,—exhibited a calm, grave, and lofty bearing. Indulging at last the freedom of breathing without restraint and unmolested by witnesses, observing round his couch the few friends who thus proved faithful to him in his misfortunes, he alternately fixed his eyes upon each. Our tears, which flowed in spite of our endeavours to check them, sufficiently explained our grief and our silence. The king addressed us in the following words:

“Great indeed should be your affliction, if in this singular vicissitude of fortune we had to reproach ourselves with having deservedly incurred it; but, as our conscience is free from blame, we are indifferent to all other considerations. Power, the splendour of a crown, worldly honours, are no more than imaginary enjoyments; sooner or later, they must be surrendered at Death’s summons. What matters the loss of a fleeting possession? Away then with the memory of the

past! . . . We have outlived an appalling storm ; we are still together as before ; there is opened to us a new existence, far less agitated and painful than the preceding one. Those who have not attended this family meeting,—but the blame of their absence cannot be laid to our charge,—let us beseech Heaven that by their repentance and their tears they may repair their heavy transgressions. Should that grace be vouchsafed them, there may yet be peace for them on earth ; their sufferings will be less acute. As for us, a conscience without reproach will be our support ; ours is the peace of the soul, which it is not in the power of any one to take away. You, Manuel, the tried friend who have so long proved to me the fidelity of your attachment and loyalty, you will persevere in that course : hear with resignation what I have to say to you. I have been the whole night a prey to my nervous attacks, which have not allowed me a moment's rest ; one thought alone has absorbed my mind. I have seriously considered the determination you seem to have formed, and which you mentioned to me on our journey,—that of appealing to public opinion by writing and committing to the press the *defence* of our cause. This is a correct and a generous idea ; but I must tell you that your giving it effect at this day would be ill-timed and impossible. Are we not in the hands and under the yoke of him who has overturned our

house? My brother of Naples, and Charles Emanuel of Sardinia, found, under circumstances equally deplorable, a refuge in their insular dominions. There they could write, speak out, and loudly protest against the usurper: we, however, have no other asylum than the enemy's camp; our very host is our oppressor. Would you desert us, and seek in a distant country the liberty to raise a courageous voice in our favour? And if you succeeded in reaching that land of safety, where you might brave with impunity the unjust man who has so cruelly turned to his account the misconduct of my son, how could you write our defence and your own without aggravating the position of the ill-fated Ferdinand, and exposing him to still more rigorous treatment? for such would inevitably be the result. Would you add that further sorrow to the many bitter ones I have had to experience? I feel assured you would not. Compelled to modify, to suppress much, our joint justification would be thus mutilated: weakened by circumspect language, our defence would not, after all, receive a more indulgent interpretation; it would but afford a more signal triumph to our enemies.

“Recollect, Manuel, that from the hour you were first attached to my person, (and it is a long time since,) up to the present moment, my will has always been the rule of your conduct. Well then, it is now my will that we should observe the

most absolute silence ; that, on our part, nothing—nothing whatever—should be published : this silent resignation will not be lost on the least reflecting minds ; and it will be understood by the more discerning, who are not swayed by mere appearances.

“ You will tell me that your work might appear under your own name ; but our cause is one—inseparable : whether you récriminate or attack, all this is in my defence. I must necessarily stand in the foreground. In short, Manuel, shall we dare to raise the last veil which conceals the errors of my children ? or shall we, apprehensive of saying everything, or of pleading our cause without reserve, consent to appear guilty ?

“ The men whose evil counsels have ruined my family, are at liberty to calumniate us with impunity ; the advantage is wholly on their side in this unnatural dispute : and, if I could stoop to reply to their impostures, they would not fail to invent and propagate others ; whilst honour, religion, nature, alike command me to be silent.

“ I consent that you should write, though for ourselves only. Write the plain and naked truth. Call up the remembrance of our past deeds ; relate our anxiety, our unwearied efforts to avert the storm which was impending over Spain, and to prevent the evils that have at last fallen upon her : let us write to disburthen our hearts, and to procure for each other a mutual consolation

against the injustice and ingratitude which have assailed us.

“ The time may come when it will be proper to publish what you shall have written ; but what you write must, I repeat it, have no other object in view than to protect your honour and mine : to this object you must confine yourself ; I seek for nothing else : nay, come what may at a future time, my resolution is irrevocable ; and to give it effect I feel a strength of mind which God alone can have vouchsafed to me. Of this I am well convinced, I never would replace upon my brows a tarnished crown.

“ When the violence of passions shall have subsided, Spaniards will recover their natural good sense, and acknowledge their injustice towards us. This is the only satisfaction I expect, and it should suffice us.

“ If calumny should not relent in our regard, but retain upon the popular mind its original hold, the moment of speaking out will arrive, rest assured of it : the publication of your work will then be seasonable ; you will have attained your aim : and should death overtake us both ere the day of our justification shall have dawned upon us, your testimony will have still greater weight, —there is something harmonious and sacred in words issuing from the tomb.

“ Can you suppose for a moment, dear friend, that Divine Providence would abandon a father

so unjustly persecuted and disgraced ! O God ! extinguish in my heart the slightest feeling of irritation. I forgive both my children, and I do so in all sincerity. The errors of kings and of princes recoil upon their innocent subjects. O God ! extend your divine clemency to them ; chastise not my children or Spain for the injuries they have inflicted upon me. I feel no regret for the crown I once bore ; I have no desire to recover it, no wish to prolong my existence ! I never had any other aim than the happiness of all,—would that it were in my power to compass it !” . . . .

The king was unable to proceed ; a death-like paleness spread over his face. His convulsive movements hurried us to his assistance ; we could only hear the vague sound of half-smothered words. Such was the painful scene that awaited our first awakening in the palace of Fontainebleau : it is ever present to my mind.

We were at last recovering our composure, and our emotion was gradually subsiding, when the sub-prefect caused himself to be announced without previously asking his majesty's pleasure.

The condition of the king precluded his receiving him : he feigned an attack of the gout ; and it devolved upon Queen Maria Louisa to submit to this visit, and to many others that followed. Her heart was broken, but she was compelled to compose her appearance.

This narrative, which is wholly free from ex-

aggragation, explains the motives of my silence during the first six years of our long exile. I shall have occasion to exhibit in the sequel of these Memoirs, and in gradual succession, other proofs of the resignation of these illustrious sufferers.

After 1814, the period of the restoration of the Spanish monarchy, or rather of the Spanish dynasty, fresh afflictions awaited us.

The king and queen, however, were elated beyond bounds at the news of their son's restoration to the throne of Spain, and their joy was undissembled. All was forgiven and forgotten. Ferdinand could no longer doubt either the generous resignation or the paternal tenderness of Charles IV; he also knew how zealously and loyally I had co-operated to their reconciliation. The old king felt, assuredly, no longing for a crown already fallen from his head, and which unexpected events had transferred to that of his son.<sup>2</sup> I may even add that his august parents were as delighted at the political resuscitation of Ferdinand as they had been at his coming into the world.

Their parental anxiety was only disturbed by

<sup>2</sup> I shall relate in its proper place how much the situation of Ferdinand excited the interest of his father and mother during his captivity, the means they employed to procure his rescue, and the endeavours I also exerted towards that object. These efforts proved, no doubt, unsuccessful; but it is no less true that I staked my life in the attempt to serve him.

the apprehension of finding in the Peninsula an ill-smothered focus of civil discords, and about the person of the young monarch the greater part of those men who had taken unworthy advantage of his inexperience, and had caused so many calamities.

Powerful considerations, however, tended to allay the king's apprehension. Six years of adversity could not have been wholly lost upon young Ferdinand. He must have acquired sufficient experience to perceive the quicksands of the new career of fortune which the affection of his people was opening for him. Charles IV. had long been intimately convinced of the necessity of preparing by anticipation, and of carrying by degrees into effect, those essential reforms which the march of the times so loudly called for.<sup>3</sup> His majesty, it must be acknowledged, deemed it impossible to govern under the restraints imposed by the Cadiz constitution; which he considered to be impregnated with too large a share of democratic elements. Nevertheless, the opportunity

<sup>3</sup> The wise resolutions of this excellent prince, and my own measures, had for object to bestow upon Spain institutions of a moderate and liberal character. Few persons were in the secret; but many were beginning to suspect it, when they beheld the acts which gradually paved the way for the projected reforms and institutions. I shall have to advert to them at greater length in their proper place. The knowledge which some individuals were enabled to procure of my intentions in this respect, gave rise to that hatred and persecution which from thenceforward unceasingly thwarted my career.



presented itself of improving the legislative system, since many favourable changes had already been effected, and the Spanish nation had familiarized itself with the idea of a progressive movement. That heroic nation was assuredly well entitled, by its recent sacrifices, to be reinstated at least in the enjoyment of its ancient Castilian liberties. Such a concession was due to it by a grateful monarch. Oh! never would Charles IV. have adopted the insane resolution to destroy what was already erected; far less to proscribe men who, urged on, in difficult and stormy times, by a lofty sense of national honour, may have fallen into errors, but whose admirable firmness powerfully contributed to the salvation of the country and the return of the fallen dynasty.

The king was apprehensive, on the contrary, that too much yielding on the part of his son should expose the government of the latter to fresh dangers. The decree issued at Valencia on the 4th of May 1814, gave great satisfaction to Charles IV, and quieted his fears in respect to the future. He who, ever faithful to his word, held that the promise of a king, freely given, was a religious and inviolable engagement, considered that the fate of Spain was thenceforward irrevocably fixed: the decree was no sooner brought to him, than the upright old man hastened to make us acquainted with it. "Fortunate is he," he exclaimed, "upon whom Providence

bestows the favour of enabling him to realise what I could have wished to have performed! If the happiness of my subjects was to be purchased at the price of the afflictions and sufferings I have hitherto endured, I return thanks to Heaven for having imposed them upon me. Yes! let us bless the high judgments of Divine Providence. The project of erecting the tabernacle originated with David; to his son was reserved, by the Almighty, the honour of realising that holy thought. May my crown be happily borne by Ferdinand, since he desires to render himself worthy of it! He will be the consolation of our old age. To you, Manuel, the faithful friend of his father, he will not fail to do justice. Let us rejoice at not having hurried ourselves into publishing any manifestoes; at not having raised the veil that concealed acts into which his youth had been drawn, unaware of their criminality."

The subsequent events are but too well known. The men of Aranjuez and of Bayonne recovered their fatal influence. Those who had upset the throne of Charles IV. trampled under foot the rising institutions which held out a brighter prospect for the future. Everything was destroyed. An unlimited proscription spread mourning over Spain. The whole power became wielded by the chiefs, the accomplices, the satellites of a faction as cruel as it was grasping. The fruits of a heroic resistance, of a victory achieved at so high a price,

were applied to no other object than to fatten the vampires of the new court—a vivacious and domineering faction, which held Ferdinand as the first of its slaves, and has not even respected his tomb. . . . It is still seen at the present time (1833) endeavouring to drown in torrents of blood the feeble rays of light which were beginning to dawn over our country.

But I must return to the period of which I had been speaking. . . . Could I flatter myself—I, the special object of their envenomed hatred—to be forgotten in my retirement, or to enjoy a moment's rest in the capital of a sovereign without an army, under the powerless shield of my own sovereign, who was like myself an exile? Whilst I was daily giving fresh proofs of my unalterable loyalty, of a perfect self-abnegation, the virulence of my enemies persevered in pursuing me as a guilty man unworthy of pardon, and in representing me under the most odious colours. The counsels of clemency, of peace, of sound policy, which Charles IV. occasionally addressed to his son with the only view of conciliating to him the affection and esteem of his subjects, were envenomed with a diabolical art, with relentless animosity. They were designedly tortured into proofs of deeply meditated perfidiousness and treason, of which I alone was the promoter. "This," they alleged, "was braving, was insulting the supreme

power of Ferdinand : was the latter to be so weak as to listen to the unceasing remonstrances of his aged father?" (What unworthy weakness!) By dint of such insinuations it was hoped to efface the last traces of filial respect; to intimidate an old man of seventy, already overwhelmed with sorrows; to wound him in his early affections; forcibly to separate me from him; and to persist in stigmatising me with impunity in the eyes of all Europe.

I must now advert to a circumstance wherein they succeeded in instilling serious alarm in the mind of Ferdinand, and obtaining from him, by the most revolting act of tyranny, a triumph upon which they set the highest value.

The King of France, H. M. Louis XVIII, had written a private and confidential letter to Charles IV, apprising the king his cousin of the object of the congress at which the ambassadors of the principal powers were about to meet. "1st. It was essential to secure the general peace on solid bases; 2ndly, fears were entertained on the side of Spain, where a spirit of discontent was breaking out, owing to the violent reaction in which the scarcely established government was indulging: the slightest disturbances in the Peninsula might spread and penetrate into France. Louis XVIII. added, that reports were circulating in France and in Germany which called again in question the lawfulness of King Ferdinand's rights, as exclu-

sively resting on the abdication of Aranjuez, disavowed by his father as soon as it was made, thus giving rise to dangerous discussions: that it was desirable, for the sake of tranquillity in Spain and in the rest of Europe, that all doubts should be set at rest on so delicate a question; the rather so as the magnanimous generosity of Charles IV. led him to a voluntary renunciation of his rights, and that he no longer aimed at reascending the throne."

The king's reply was of that grave character which the occasion called for. It was drawn up and written by myself. He assured the King of France that, "willing as he was to consign to eternal oblivion the abdication of Aranjuez, the mention of which was uncalled for, he was ready to sign a fresh act of renunciation with suitable solemnity, and under the conditions usually adopted in similar cases. . . . His affection for his son, the desire to concur in the pacification of Spain and of Europe, and lastly, his fixed determination to end his days in tranquil retirement, induced him to make this free and spontaneous renunciation. . . . In consideration of these motives, it was his wish that the congress of Vienna should unreservedly confer with his son on the subject, and agree to recognise him as the true and lawful King of Spain; he, Charles IV, reserving however to himself, as a preliminary condition, the same honorary title, as well as the prerogatives, rights, and revenues appertaining to his dignity. He

desired, at the same time, that this solemn act should be guaranteed in its full extent by the principal powers represented at the congress."

It was in the nature of Charles IV. to urge the conclusion of any business which he deemed of high importance. Averse to the smallest delay, ever governed by a kind of presentiment of disturbances and of popular agitations, this habitual fear appeared still more intense on the present occasion. He burned with impatience to revive the act of his renunciation, feeling apprehensive of any sudden accident or obstruction, which would be imputed to tardiness or ill-will on his part. He forthwith addressed letters to their Majesties the Emperors of Germany and Russia, to the King of Prussia, and to the Prince Regent of England.

Loud clamours forthwith break out in Madrid; the privy counsellors take the alarm. "To declare the abdication of Aranjuez null and void, is equivalent to an absolute condemnation of all our acts! . . . We must positively conceal this proceeding from the knowledge of the public. . . . What extravagant conditions may we not expect to receive from Rome!!! The new renunciation may contain the most reviling clauses . . . the officious eagerness of Charles IV. conceals some afterthought." His intentions are calumniated beforehand; the perfidious designs alleged to be in contemplation are ascribed to my suggestions.

Emissaries are sent in all directions. They solicit, they require, they succeed in reluctantly obtaining from the sovereign pontiff, that I shall be separated from the royal family;—the town of the pontifical states the most distant from Rome is assigned to me as my place of residence, or banishment. . . . I only mention what personally concerns me. Other acts of violence, other outrages were committed. We will allow them to remain buried in that oblivion which shelters them from public reproof!

I was not slow in deciding upon my course of conduct. It was my wish instantly to quit Rome; to seek, at any sacrifice, an asylum in a foreign country, and there publish to the world the history of my life; to arraign my cowardly enemies before the tribunal of public opinion, unreservedly to proclaim such truths as would fix an indelible stigma upon them, and save at least my honour,—the only property now left to me,—which I could no longer allow to be so unworthily assailed.

But it had not yet fallen to my lot to recover the natural right of complaining, and of vindicating myself. I was bound by my promise, and fettered by the ties of loyalty. . . . Oh! it is as impossible for me to describe as to forget for a moment that memorable night. We were,—the king, the queen, and I,—closeted alone with the pope; the doors were shut against any one else.

. . . The pope hesitated, with signs of visible emotion. . . . "The court of Madrid," said he, at last, "no longer listens to reason; there must either be an open rupture with it, or its demands must, to a certain extent at least, be complied with, if we desire to obtain some mitigation of them."

Recovering on a sudden that noble assurance so becoming in a king and in an offended father, Charles IV. proudly exclaimed: "What! holy father, are we prisoners here?" "Yes, sire; pledges of the peace of the world, prisoners of Jesus Christ, captives of whom I come to supplicate a favour; of you, the well-beloved son of the church; of that minister who in the days of his power gave so many proofs of his respect for the holy see. . . . This last sacrifice is the least of all the evils which assail us, and will, I hope, prove sufficient to calm every irritated feeling; it will be the means of averting a serious scandal. I shall act the part of mediator; I pledge myself to your majesties that this storm will be of short duration."

I have said enough: the yoke was accepted with resignation; I received a positive command to bear my sufferings in silence. This painful task was, for the second time, imposed upon me by Charles IV. He condescended, no doubt, to give me, at the same time, the assurance that he never would forsake the charge of protecting my honour and providing me with the means of existence.



I repaired to Pezzaro,—the directions given by the holy father having caused every preparation to be made which was calculated, at so short a notice, to *lessen the sorrows* of an exile.

The Spanish minister, M. Bargas,<sup>4</sup> reached Rome at this time, too late however for the object he had in view. He hoped to obtain humiliating declarations in favour of the acts of Aranjuez ; but the new abdication had been completed. The king himself had prepared and dictated the terms of abdication, which were inoffensive towards all parties, plain, dignified, and, above all, moderate in what related to the indemnities demanded by the king for himself, and for those of his family who accompanied him in his retirement.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See, in the Biographical Table, the article under the head of *Bargas*.

<sup>5</sup> The preamble of this act of abdication was as follows :

“ I, Charles Antoine de Bourbon, by the grace of God, King of Spain and of the Indies, wishing to end in peace the days which Divine Providence may still reserve to me, and to withdraw myself from the difficulties and cares with which the throne is unavoidably beset, perfectly uncontrolled in my conduct and acting of my own free will, sound in body and mind, transfer to you, Don Ferdinand, my eldest son, all my undeniable rights to the said kingdoms of Spain and the Indies, which I renounce ; specially enjoining you to see that our holy, catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion be respected, and that no other be tolerated in your dominions : you will consider your subjects as being truly your children, and you will treat with clemency the many persons who, in these times of agitation, have allowed themselves to be drawn into error. I declare and sign the foregoing, under the following conditions, which are never to be violated nor altered, &c. &c. &c.”

The court of Madrid was eager to take advantage of this guaranteeing title. Once possessed of that document, it recklessly resorted to every means in order to impose fresh sacrifices on the king, whose singular kindness of disposition was well known. The minister Bargas felt the necessity of concealing from the Spaniards the knowledge of the abdication. He invented a thousand pretexts with a view of procuring the consent of Charles IV. to the signing of a separate agreement or convention, which should merely contain the clauses immediately following the preamble of the act; and in this separate and detached agreement the renunciation was only alluded to in general terms as a fact already completed, without either advertng to the *first abdication of Aranjuez*, or to the second, concluded at Rome on the 10th of October 1814. . . . This last act exhausted the remaining strength of Charles IV, which had been visibly on the decline. His subsequent conduct was that of a submissive and resigned vassal, so scrupulous was the august old man in the observance of a promise once given. He retained the apparent, the nominal dignity of a father; but his son had ceased to be a minor. Charles IV. no longer used any other language towards him than that of supplication.

The complete text of this act, as well as of the convention afterwards agreed upon, shall be given in a subsequent part of these Memoirs, according as the order of events will bring us back to the period in question.

I shall abstain from relating the fresh sorrows, the painful disappointments, that occurred nearly at the moment when this treaty of peace and reconciliation was concluded. Napoleon suddenly reappeared on the political stage : Murat was invading the Roman states. . . . The king and queen on the one hand, and I on the other, alternately meeting and separating, we wandered for a long time over Italy, without an object, without money, without support, and unable to fix on any place of residence.

When the storm had blown over, I returned to Pezzaro, where I languished in melancholy exile, until at last the repeated entreaties of the sovereign pontiff and of Charles IV. procured my return to their majesties.

Unalterably devoted to their service, indulging the constant hope that their remonstrances might procure me an honourable reparation of past injuries, and the restitution of the wrecks of my former fortune from thenceforward I never left them.

Not only, however, did Charles IV. persist in opposing my wish to write the history of his reign and my own defence at the same time, but he required of me, as the last proof of my attachment, that I should publish nothing *so long as his son should be living*.<sup>6</sup> “ You cannot defend

<sup>6</sup> Born in 1784, (the 14th of October,) Ferdinand was seventeen years younger than the Prince of the Peace. In other words,

yourself," said he, "without attacking, without wounding him, whatever circumspection you may, through a feeling of generosity, adopt in his regard. If, after any publication on your part, one of those popular movements should unfortunately take place which his bad policy is daily provoking, it would infallibly be alleged that you had supplied weapons to the disaffected; and you might well, indeed, supply them, for they are at your command. Let us rather hope that your resigned conduct will open his eyes; that he will at last do us justice, and shake off the fetters and prejudices by which your enemies and ours hold him in subjection. I shall never cease to raise my voice in your favour; and if my efforts and entreaties prove in vain, the whole world will at least acknowledge that, faithful and loyal towards the father who was your friend, you have shown yourself loyal and faithful towards the son who persecutes you."

In state matters, which are always seen and commented upon in so many different ways, those who are the most conscious of guilt are usually foremost in publishing their justification. Accordingly, the *Cevallos*, the *Escoiquiz*, the *Montijos*, the *Cavalleros*, and other leaders or principal

the latter was condemned to die without the power of defending himself in his life-time; such was at least the natural order of things. The rather premature death of Ferdinand VII. has released the Prince of the Peace from his pledge.—E.

agents in the conspiracy of Aranjuez, hastened to throw out their manifestoes ; whilst I, proscribed, gagged, fettered by an imperious duty, was compelled to be silent. . . . A mere glance at those slanderous libels was doubtless sufficient to open to view the perpetual contradictions, the flat denials, the odious imputations they flung at one another; so much so, that their common treachery being partly proved by their own admissions, I was almost relieved from the necessity of refuting them, or at least my justification became an easy task. I had well nigh hoped for a moment, that, amongst the numerous Spaniards to whose solid merit I had shown favour, or whose civil and military career I had promoted, some would be found generous enough to interpret in a fair light the silence to which I was condemned, and to take upon themselves the defence of an absent and calumniated patron.

But a deep sense of fear had frozen every courage ; public opinion and liberty were oppressed ; evil passions had outstepped all bounds ; they were rather fomented than checked by the supreme authority ; whilst I, oppressed with misfortune, deprived of the power of speaking out, had my slightest movements watched by the police of France, Spain, and Italy ; and my written defence (had it been possible for me to find a printer) could never have crossed the seas, nor the high ridges of the Pyrenees. . . .

“ A better time will come,” I then said to my-

self: "whilst the storm sets the sea in motion, waves of foam mixed with mud are cast on its shores: let us, at least, prepare materials drawn from a pure source and worthy of being collected. Sooner or later the clamour of civil discord will cease to disturb the public judgment: after us, the truth shall be known. Amongst civilized nations, in Europe especially, printing and the rostrum form an association for mutual insurance: here, perhaps, truth may for a moment be obscured or disfigured by local passions; but, at a greater distance, there is raised an independent voice which proclaims and avenges it."

Alas! may not this hope prove vain and illusory? The art of writing is now no more than a mere trade: the writers of contemporary histories, of memoirs, of biographies, of weekly or daily pamphlets, gather indiscriminately, and propagate without remorse, every species of calumny, even the most indecent gossiping: nothing is sought but sheer scandal; each discovery of this kind is a piece of good fortune. Invention makes up for the deficiency of news, or for the simplicity of facts. Thus it is that the public is treated with the whole life, the most minute details, of a man who was never seen by these writers nor known to them: names, places, dates, events, all are wretchedly disguised or distorted! What matters it? A multitude of people are by such means enabled to exist. . . . .

Amidst all the sorrows which have alternately

lacerated my heart, I have had to bear with the further infliction of the unrelenting insults of that crowd of shameless compilers who have preyed upon me. They have been unanimous in representing me as a culprit, sentenced without appeal, and who had given assent to his condemnation.

Great is the distance, no doubt, between those ephemeral productions and the authenticity of history destined to fix the opinion of posterity: but since those of my fellow-countrymen with whom I have been in habits of intercourse, have not had the courage to compare my administration with the previous or succeeding ones, and to point out how much the difference redounds to my advantage; since my enemies only have hitherto spoken; would not imposture, by dint of lying with impunity, be admitted at last as an undisputed tradition? The list of eye-witnesses is already diminishing: death has daily reduced their numbers during the last twenty-six years. Their children were born amidst the din of calumnious vociferations, which have unceasingly resounded around them. The reign of Charles IV. is not known. All the evils of a general conflagration in Europe are imputed to his government. It devolves upon me to defend his honour and mine, as well as the honour of a multitude of Spaniards who have illustrated our epoch. Treason, envy, and hatred have laboured

to tarnish their glory ; mine is the task of repairing its lustre : a brief exposition of facts will restore each one to his proper place. These Memoirs are designed to record nothing but the truth : many may be beholden to me for having occasionally softened its asperity. The example of my august sovereigns warns me not to remove altogether the veil which screens from public view certain details of a highly deplorable character : I shall respect the last will of those illustrious exiles, who, dying in their banishment, forgave all offences.

Noble and generous hearts ! what efforts did it not cost you to spare me the painful necessity of penning these Memoirs ! Twenty-six years have elapsed ; every term prescribed to me is completed ; and I yet doubt whether their publication should not be still further delayed. . . .

Nevertheless, old age advances rapidly upon me. My ancestors bequeathed to me an inheritance of honour ; I am bound to hand it over untarnished to my children. Calumny dies with the man whose life was passed in obscurity ; it survives the public man, and proudly rears its head over his tomb, when the pusillanimous endurance of his contemporaries has quietly allowed it to fasten its fangs upon his memory.

Has it not been attempted to forbid my return to my native country ? In vain have I called for the severity of a legal judgment : neither the



tribunals nor my bitterest enemies have dared to accept my defiance. My country, which is ever dear to me, can alone, then, indemnify me for so long a denial of justice. I submit to it an account of my life; I disguise nothing. If these Memoirs are admitted to be—as I anticipate they will be found—in strict accordance with truth, Spain will not refuse to reckon me in the number of her children, and amongst those who have served her faithfully, and have suffered in her cause. Whilst I revive the recollection of glorious deeds which a dark faction has endeavoured to throw into obscurity, I shall do justice to many of those who were my personal enemies. My expostulation shall neither be indiscreet nor tinctured with violence: I shall be moderate, in short, in exercising the privilege of defending myself, and of defending, at the same time, the cause of my sovereign and that of my country, which, in my estimation, are inseparable.

If I am occasionally betrayed into the language of self-satisfaction, let my readers of every country abstain from charging me with a misplaced vanity; for I am writing with a view to my own apology. The man who is persecuted, when intimately convinced of his innocence, has a right to congratulate himself for the good he has achieved: this is, moreover, his duty: if he hesitated boldly to fulfil it, he would fail of re-

instating his character, and would not deserve to succeed in that object.

My readers are now acquainted with the motives of my silence during twenty-five years of bitter sorrows, and of abnegation of my dearest and my most sacred interests.

Charles IV. has ceased to live; Ferdinand has also descended to the tomb: the one and the other belong alike to history. I may, then, be permitted to speak out, and to relieve my oppressed heart.

## CHAPTER II.

*My Birth.—House of Godoy.—First Years of my Life.*

I WAS born at Badajoz, capital of the province of Estramadura, on the 12th of May 1767, and not 1764, as asserted by biographers. My father, Don Joseph de Godoy, and my mother, Doña Maria Antoinette Alvarez de Faria, belonged to the nobility : their fortune was limited ; it consisted of an ancient patrimonial estate, handed down to them from early times, and diminished instead of increasing in successive generations.

I am aware how misplaced is the pride of old parchments of nobility, especially in the present age, when so many modern illustrations have rapidly reached the summit of human elevation. Nevertheless, the solid remembrances of our ancestors are not without their degree of importance, if they hand down to their children those traditions, examples and modes of living and of acting, which incline us to preserve and improve that honourable trust.

My patrimonial dwelling, which is so ancient as to be almost ruined by the lapse of time, is situated at Castuera, where my paternal ancestors

first established themselves; they removed from thence to Badajoz. That dwelling, with its old appendages, must, at the present day, be in the possession of my niece, the daughter of my deceased elder brother, Don Louis de Godoy. My mother was also born at Badajoz; she was of Portuguese origin, and belonged to an illustrious family very highly connected. The august grandmother of the princes<sup>1</sup> who are contending at this moment for the throne of Portugal, having done me the honour of creating me Count of Evoramonte, and of sending me the grand cross of the order of Christ, was pleased to record in the patent those exalted family ties of my excellent mother. When his majesty Charles IV. bestowed upon me the favour of a cross of the military order of Santiago, into which no knight is admitted without first exhibiting the proofs of *eight* uninterrupted degrees of nobility, mine were required of me with the customary rigour. They testified that many of my forefathers had obtained the same decorations—and the highest commandries: one of them was Pero Muniz de Godoy, grand master of both the orders of Santiago and of Calatrava, the only one in Spanish history who had held those two high dignities at one and the same time.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Don Miguel and Don Pedro.

<sup>2</sup> In what remains of ancient institutions of the nobility, the purest test is, assuredly, the ordeal required in the four military

On the occasion of my being elevated to the rank of grandee, the supreme council of Castile, on whom exclusively devolved the duty of seeing that my titles were regular ere I could be admitted into that class, could not avoid declaring, in communicating to the king the result of its consultation, that it had not, for a long time past, been furnished with proofs of nobility so complete as mine were found to be. On every new distinction which the king was pleased to confer upon me, the same formalities were complied with, and each time with the requisite solemnity.

If I enter into these details, it is certainly not owing to any intrinsic value I attach to them. What human being can be more undeceived than I am as to such wretched testimonials of vanity? Nevertheless, I felt anxious to advert to them with a view to reply once for all to those who

orders; it is even the only one respecting which there has never been any relaxation: my eldest brother, Don Louis, was compelled to undergo that ordeal when he obtained the cross of Santiago; and the youngest of us, Don Diego, had likewise to conform to it when he was created a knight of the order of *Calatrava*.

So rigid is the inquiry enjoined in the four noble corporations, that the proofs previously furnished and admitted in favour of the father do not release the son from the obligation of supplying fresh proofs on his own account, and thus respectively from the son to the father, or even to one of his own brothers. The same ordeal must be renewed for each person; and it does not avail him to allege either public notoriety, the identity of the family, or any other pretext whatever.

have accused me of borrowing mythological genealogies and affiliations. All kinds of weapons have been deemed lawful, even those of ridicule, when it was question of attacking me and of aspersing my character.

I appeal to the common sense of my readers. Sufficiently well-born to present myself openly at the court of my sovereigns, and become their ally, because such was their pleasure, and they obtained the consent of their august family to the alliance, what inconceivable aberration of mind could have induced me to seek a nearly fabulous, or semi-barbarian origin? None laughed more heartily than I did at the pretended discoveries with which my patience was exhausted by those arrant visionaries, those frivolous and needy professors of the science—or rather the art—of heraldry, in their attempt to flatter my vanity. I entertained no less a feeling of contempt, and with difficulty could I disguise it, when certain high personages,—whose family had no connexion with mine, except the common origin of *Adam*, from whom we are all descended,—impelled by motives of base adulation, by an insatiable thirst for court favours, came to converse with me respecting their ancient or modern ties of relationship with my family,—ties hitherto unknown on either side. If an occasional blush betrayed but slightly the emotion I could scarcely suppress,—if I felt reluctant to repel with rudeness those who thus came to make trial

of my patience,—is it, therefore, to be inferred that I set any great value on such acts of meanness? Where is the man who, having attained the summit of power, has not found himself surrounded with flatterers, and greedy, insipid men? Oh! I knew them well: many have afterwards attempted to revenge upon my head their former cringing, to belie which they have eagerly sought to place themselves in the foremost ranks of my enemies.<sup>3</sup>

I shall add little to what I have stated respecting the means of existence of my family. It no doubt possessed but a moderate fortune; my detractors in Spain, and foreign biographers after them, have stigmatised it with being poor. Strange contradiction of those writers, who boast for the greater part of their liberal sentiments, and yet pause to examine empty titles of nobility and the income enjoyed by my family! Yes, my family was poor, if you understand by that term a decent mediocrity of fortune. Our predecessors in life bequeathed honour, and even illustrious titles, but no riches, to their children: however we were not *poor* in the strict sense of the word. The house in which I was born was found sufficiently commodious to become the residence of the royal family on their journey to Seville in February 1796. They passed a few days at Badajoz, and

<sup>3</sup> See the Biographical Table.

condescended to occupy it.<sup>4</sup> My father's means of existence, though very moderate, enabled him to live without being a burden to any one; they also allowed of his rearing his children according to their rank, and even with a degree of extravagance in the choice of the private tutors who were entrusted with our education.

I pause here for a moment.

Those who have taken pleasure in depreciating and vilifying me by ludicrous imputations, have represented me as an adventurer devoid of all education, with no other talent except that of playing the guitar and singing national airs. A modern Orpheus, allege Messrs. Jay, Jouy, and Arnault, respectable members of the French Academy;<sup>5</sup> a great flute-player am I called by General Foy.<sup>6</sup> What is the effect of this rage for making assertions without attempting to inquire into their truth? it leads to the compilation of ridiculous falsehoods, and to the assumption of the responsible editorship of the most silly impostures, of every species of nonsense.<sup>7</sup> It is

<sup>4</sup> I apprehend there is still to be found in our house the chain which the Kings of Spain bestow, as an honourable privilege, on those houses which they have deigned to inhabit; and I held in my possession the patent of this title granted to my father, Don Joseph de Godoy, by his majesty King Charles IV.

<sup>5</sup> *Biography of Contemporaries.*

<sup>6</sup> *History of the War in the Peninsula under Napoleon.*

<sup>7</sup> *Dictionary of Conversation*, now publishing in Paris,



quite certain that I never played any instrument, that I am wholly a stranger to music,—an ignorance which I very sincerely regret. Envy is generally artful and ingenious, but on this occasion it displays great want of skill; for, in order to lower my character, it ascribes a talent to me which I was never known to possess. . . . And yet men of gravity will collect all these idle stories, and publish them under their own names! Thus it is they write a contemporary history! the compilers and framers of biographical dictionaries seize upon and give circulation to all such imperinences. . . . Really the age to come will scarcely know what to credit, when it shall detect the unaccountable levity of literary men of the present epoch. . . .

Principles of morality were rigidly enforced by our parents. As to those arts which merely generate a taste for extravagance or pleasure, my brothers and I were barely allowed to acquire that superficial knowledge of them which, in our sphere of society, was held to be indispensable. Destined to embark in the military career, our hours of recreation were exclusively devoted to riding and fencing,—those wholesome exercises which warded off the dangers of idleness, whilst they strengthened our physical organization.

wherein the article of Messrs. Arnault, Jay, and Jouy, the academicians above mentioned, is almost literally introduced.

My father superintended all our studies: whether it was owing to the excess of his affection, or to prudent foresight, he preferred our being educated at home and under his own eye; he accordingly called in the aid of tutors. Anxious that the qualities of the heart should be no less attended to than those of the mind, he made a careful selection of talented and virtuous men. We had not the advantage, it is true, of attending public schools, in which the subtleties of peripatetic philosophy, and the endless commentaries of the Roman law, were held in the highest estimation; for these were the only studies which led to fame and fortune: but we learned to apply our reasoning faculties to a proper use, and turned to good account the time we should have wasted away in a different course of studies.

I had for successive tutors Don Francisco Ortega, Don Pedro Muñoz de Mena, Don Alonzo Montalvo, and Don Matheo Delgado. The last was afterwards made bishop of Badajoz: I know not whether he is still living at the present day; in 1832 this learned and venerable prelate presided over his church, in the enjoyment of the esteem and affection of all his diocesans. His cousin, Don Alonzo Montalvo, who superintended, before him, an education for which I am indebted to their joint care, died a few years

ago, a canon of the metropolitan church of Grenada.<sup>s</sup>

My primary instruction being completed, I applied myself, for eight successive years, to mathematics, belles-lettres, and modern philosophy in its various branches, as defined under the comprehensive term of ideology. The professors I have named readily kept pace with the intellectual progress of the age, but were as unwilling to exceed its bounds as to be behindhand with it. They were deeply versed in Greek and Roman literature, and took early pains to convey to me their partiality for the best Latin writers, our masters in history, morals, and politics. Those favourite authors have proved of essential assistance to me in my varied career; and I am indebted to them for my purest enjoyments.

Such was the modest stock of learning with which, at the age of seventeen, I took my departure for Madrid. It has been said, and repeatedly affirmed, that I could scarcely read or write when I entered the service. I have shown who were my professors, all well known and highly valued in their province; and I may yet appeal to persons who were then, and at a subsequent period, well acquainted with me.

Appointed one of the king's body-guards in

<sup>s</sup> All these professors were highly esteemed and distinguished.  
—E.

1784, under the reign of Charles III, my taste for literature and the fine arts was not weakened by court distractions. I met there two of my companions, MM. Joubert, brothers, Frenchmen educated in France, well informed, passionately addicted to study, and both gifted with the gentlest disposition. We immediately contracted the warmest friendship: it bore that impress of truth and candour which is only met with in early attachments. I feel a pleasure in recalling to mind MM. Joubert, to whom I am indebted for my knowledge of the French and Italian languages: all our leisure hours were employed in serious readings, and in long and profitable conversations, from which I had the good fortune to derive great benefit. I must likewise name, with an expression of gratitude which no time can efface, the venerable Father Enguid, and other learned men of his order,—true Christian philosophers, who imparted to me the most valuable rules of conduct: to them I owe the advice, never to be carried away by the warmth of disputation, and to be always on my guard against prejudices and sophistry. . . . Such were my earliest social relations, unquestionably the most grateful to my feelings; for, at this period of my life, they were of my own choice, and in harmony with those feelings. I was seldom seen at the theatre; more rarely still did I partake of court diversions, or of the

amusements of the metropolis. Gambling I always held in utter aversion; such a pursuit may well be called killing time!

The first years of my military life were thus passed in the king's household. . . . Have I not some reason to complain of Messrs. Jay, Jouy, Arnault, and their companions in biographical labours? They have substituted romance for history. They banish me to a garret, like a needy bard, or a juggler, subsisting only by means of his guitar, and having no other coin wherewith to acquit his rent than couplets of a *bolero*! What has, then, become of historical gravity; of good sense; of the spirit of discrimination; of sound criticism; of the respect which is due to one's readers and to oneself? Methinks, that distinguished academicians should not exhibit such extraordinary levity of character. Nevertheless, French and foreign compilers are found to propagate these idle stories!

From the first day of my arrival in Madrid, I resided at the hotel of the body-guards, where my elder brother was quartered, who had preceded me in the military career I had just entered upon. My father remitted to us an annuity proportioned to our wants: and I repeat, once for all, that I never had, even as a mere amateur, the least taste for music, or the talent to play the guitar or any other instrument.

My enemies have sought every means of as-

persing my character: every species of falsehood has been circulated in my regard. They have affected to ascribe to gallantry and to frivolous accomplishments the high favours heaped upon me by my sovereigns: I shall be sparing of explanations on this subject; for it is a sacred duty enjoined to me by the respect I owe to their memory.

## CHAPTER III.

True motive of my elevation to the Ministry.

THIS is the field of battle upon which my enemies have so freely manœuvred, in order to fall with odds upon me.

I have assuredly not the vanity to suppose that I possessed any acknowledged or tried personal merit which could justify beforehand the elevation I attained in the lapse of a few years. It were needless to mention in this place the many persons who, like myself, rose to high favour without having to allege any previous right or title which could either afford a ground or an excuse for their success. Numberless are the instances supplied by history: my own dear countrymen have witnessed a sufficient number before and after that period; I feel no desire to name them.

I shall merely observe, and this is in my opinion sufficient for my justification, that I was not called to the ministry for the purpose of answering any views, or executing any plans, hostile to my country. Charles IV. did not select me as an instrument of oppression, or as the leader

of a party; I may boldly make this assertion, and shall have occasion to prove it in the sequel of these Memoirs. If my youth presented at first but a weak basis whereon to rest the elevation to which I was afterwards raised, the whole of my subsequent conduct was one continuous effort to prove myself worthy of it. As to the private motives which induced the king to place in my hands the reins of government, and to grant me his full confidence, an impartial and conscientious historian, though at a loss for the exact clue to unravel this mystery, would abstain nevertheless from adopting reports as vulgar as they are equivocal in their nature, as the means of explaining so grave a determination on the part of a monarch who was neither devoid of instruction, of good sense, nor of a certain degree of experience. Such a historian, after closely studying the whole life of Charles IV. up to the period of his death, would reason as follows :

“ The esteem and favour enjoyed by this minister never underwent the least change. We do not behold, in his case, any of those vicissitudes which the capriciousness of princes, the intrigues of courtiers, degrading passions, the natural inconstancy of the human heart, aversion, the usual weariness of constancy in all attachments, are generally found to produce in royal habitations. Charles IV., and his consort Maria Louisa, agreed by mutual consent in calling this minister to the



bosom of their own family, and bestowed upon him the hand of a descendant of Louis XIV. In the plenitude of their power, they loaded him with honours. The affection they evinced towards him was not merely distinguished by its unanimity on the part of the king and queen; but Charles IV. exceeded Maria Louisa in his anxiety to heap upon him every proof of their attachment. A friendship so perfect, so constant, so rare amongst princes, must necessarily have rested upon other foundations than those vulgar tales circulated to gratify public avidity. Charles IV. persevered, to the last moment of his life, in the warmest affection for his minister: in conversation, as well as in writing, he called him *his true friend*; and, what is more wonderful still in a monarch, *his only friend*. This noble friendship was never weakened by prosperity or misfortune. When a sovereign in the plenitude of power, he loved this minister; when dethroned and unfortunate, he loved him still more: he beheld in him the victim of loyalty, the support, the consolation of his old age and of his sorrows. Such constancy reflects undoubted honour upon the minister, and should prepossess in his favour. Whence, then, originated this singular favour at the moment of his just appearing on the scene of life?"

I was myself at first ignorant of the cause; this is the explanation I have to give of it. Charles

IV. and Maria Louisa daily received a powerful moral shock, as may well be supposed, at every intelligence brought of what was then occurring in France. It was the period of the anguish, of the appalling sorrows, of Louis XVI, of Marie Antoinette, and of their unfortunate family. Deeply affected at these disastrous events, Charles IV. and Maria Louisa ascribed them in some degree (and they were not much mistaken,) to the constant renewal of the ministers of that ill-served king, who was kept in a state of suspense by the intrigues and conflicting and fatal influences of his court. The close vicinity of the two kingdoms led to perpetual fear lest the conflagration should communicate from one to the other. Charles IV. looked around him, dreaded to rely upon his own resources, and knew not on whom to repose his confidence. He sought the daylight, and found obscurity—a deceitful obscurity in his path. He hesitated. . . .

It does not become me either to excuse or to blame this irresolution; I merely observe that such was their majesties' state of mind. They could have wished to alight upon a man who should be wholly indebted to them for his elevation,—a true friend, attached and devoted to their persons and their house,—a faithful guardian of the national weal,—a subject, in short, whose private interest should identify itself with that of his masters. Pointed out to their attention by the

name I bore, by the very nature of my daily functions, I was admitted to the palace of my sovereigns with a degree of familiarity far more usual in Spain than will be credited by those who are ignorant of her manners. Their benevolent readiness of access, the constant opportunities afforded, as I have stated, by my daily attendance upon duty, enabled me on frequent occasions to express my opinion respecting public occurrences, which were, moreover, the theme of every anxious conversation in the palace and beyond its precincts. If their majesties formed a favourable estimate of my aptitude for business, of the loyalty of my principles—if they hoped to have found in me the confidential subject of whom they were in search,—this predisposition in my favour, whether well or ill founded, but in the end so fatal to me, was assuredly not the result on my part of any settled or presumptuous ambition. I was, no doubt, as anxious as others of raising myself to distinction; but all my dreams of fortune were limited to the hopes of my gradual advancement in the military career: and before I became acquainted with the king's intentions in my regard, I can safely affirm, (and I may well be believed upon my word,) that I received with reluctance and alarm the distinctions and favours which were in the short space of a few years lavishly heaped upon me.

In the mean time the disturbances in France

daily assumed a more serious aspect, and the danger of contagion became more threatening. . . . A minister, irresolute and stricken in years,<sup>6</sup> had made way for another minister of advanced age,<sup>7</sup> who, by the rule of contraries, never hesitated, and was prepared to run all hazards. The king mistrusted alike the timidity of the one and the rashness of the other. Provocations and direct insults proceeded from the French rostrum. The throne of Louis XVI. had just given way; the republic was installed; nothing was talked of but revolutionizing foreign states and making war upon them; the north of France was already invaded; Louis XVI, head of the house of Bourbon, the queen and her children, were shut up in the Temple, and on the eve of being brought to trial.

What was to be done? what political course was it safest to pursue? how escape that fatal destiny impending over Europe? The storm had burst and was raging on all sides. It was thus; as it were, in the midst of a convulsion of nature, on the brink of a volcano whose dark smoke portended an immediate explosion, when terror was at our gates and agitated every mind, that I was unexpectedly summoned—O God!—to sit at the helm of the state.

My sovereigns bore testimony to the sincerity of an attachment to their service, which could

<sup>6</sup> Count Florida Blanca.

<sup>7</sup> Count d'Aranda.

induce me to brave the dangers of so novel a situation. This will, I trust, claim the consideration of history when it speaks of my exertions, of the success which attended them, of my undeviating loyalty whilst I held the reins of authority and was at liberty to act for the public good.

Of all the nations adjoining France, Spain alone, during fifteen successive years of violent convulsions, whilst empires and kingdoms fell to the ground, or were shaken to their very foundations, and despoiled of their finest provinces,—Spain alone stood erect, preserved her lawful princes, her religion, laws, manners, rights, and the full possession of her vast dominions in both hemispheres.

The conviction is deeply engraven in my heart, so help me God! that this unquestionable result was happily owing to my personal co-operation. Every successive event was calculated to open the eyes of my boldest detractors. Had it not been for the conspiracy of Aranjuez, as perfidious as it was impolitic and coarsely contrived, a plank of safety was yet within our reach, notwithstanding the approach of the Colossus who favoured underhand the dissensions of which he proposed to take advantage. Had it not been for the ambitious and unnatural folly which, by undermining the foundations of the edifice, opened a breach for the enemy who was already preparing to make the assault,—but for this signal act of treachery, I

say, the august Charles IV. might, under favour of Providence, have securely wielded the sceptre of Spain and of the Indies: he would not have wandered as an exile in his old age, moving from country to country, in want, almost deserted by every one, and drinking the cup of bitterness to the last moment of his spotless life! His spotless life,—I assert it in the face of all Europe, and with the full conviction that I shall not even be belied by Spaniards at the present day; the spotless life of a king a friend of peace and of humanity, who always recoiled at the effusion of blood, pitied the weakness of our human nature, forgave all errors, and under whose reign not one of his subjects was ever reduced to the necessity of soliciting relief from the proud compassion of foreigners. . . . .

Let those who have entailed upon us misfortunes hitherto unknown to Spain, let them enjoy happy moments and rejoice in their success: let those boast of their fidelity who were bringing disgrace upon the crown, and did not shudder to hazard the fate of their country at so desperate a game! Spain has not been able to extricate herself, after a lapse of twenty-five years, from the bottomless abyss which is swallowing up all her past glories, all the benefits of a wise and cautious administration.

Those perverse men were, however, in a far greater degree the enemies of Spain than they

were mine. I was in my own person no more than an obstacle to the accomplishment of their evil designs ; my name was but a pretext which served to cloak wicked treasons, and to divert the public attention from a parricidal attempt. They have imputed to me the evil which themselves have compassed ; and, to fill up the measure of their injustice, they have ascribed to me all the misfortunes, the fatal germ of which, originating in past ages, could not fail to develope itself in the present age. Indefatigable and absurd calumniators ! the moment has arrived : I summon them before the tribunal of public opinion. Let them render an account of their deeds, as I am about to account for mine.

## CHAPTER IV.

## Order of Matters.—Epochs of my Life.

THIS work must proceed slowly. I beseech the reader to dismiss for a moment any bias, whether favourable or otherwise, by which his mind may have been prepossessed. The first duty of a judge is impartiality: I readily submit to the sentence that he may pronounce after he shall have read me with attention, and without omitting a single line of my defence, in which I have endeavoured to avoid superfluity.

My whole life has been calumniated: everything that has emanated from the government of Charles IV, from the 15th of November 1792, when he named me his prime minister, until the 19th of March 1808, when he abdicated the crown amidst the clamours of a populace misled and secretly urged on to insurrection,—all has been perverted and misconstrued by my enemies, indifferent alike to the dictates of common shame and of justice, which should have suggested at least the semblance of praise or of excuse for some one act of my administration. Everything has been unmercifully aspersed: such is the blind-



ness of hatred and envy! I am therefore under the necessity of explaining the most trifling details of each state matter which has occurred during the sixteen years I have pointed out. I shall follow the natural order of facts, examine them separately, and avoid passing over or anticipating any subject.

I am aware that the rage so skilfully directed against me originates in the epoch of a catastrophe which my enemies alone drew down upon the kingdom; that they have imputed it to me, and loudly proclaimed that I alone was the cause of it. I forgive the error of those whose judgment and penetration were bewildered by the common danger; who, fondly attached to their country, but alarmed for their personal interests, unreflectingly gave credit to the odious calumny directed against me, instead of fixing the blame upon the real authors of the calamity.

But the acts of my public life are so connected with each other,—they have been held up to view with such perfidious address,—that my defence would lose much of its energy were I to attempt, in the first instance, a refutation of the latest imposture, which afforded to my enemies the means of achieving some triumph over me.

A perusal of these Memoirs will show that I have never for a moment deviated from an uniform course of conduct throughout my long political career: the closest examination will illus-

trate this truth. Nevertheless, should the impatient curiosity of my reader induce him to direct at once his attention to the events of Aranjuez, the Escorial, and Bayonne, I beseech him to return to the commencement of the work, and to read again those events in the order of their occurrence: for the question is not exclusively one relating to my own personal interests; it relates to the interests of the country, whose history during that epoch is not devoid of glory, and may present an imposing lesson to nations in general, and to those who are called upon to rule over them.

The plan I am about to adopt will embrace four distinct epochs: the first, from the 15th of November 1792, the date of my entrance into the ministry, until the 28th March 1798, when my retreat was granted to me. The second, reckoning from 1801, when the king was pleased to call me to his service as generalissimo of his armies, ended with the last month of 1806. It was at this latter period that the increasing influence of my enemies paralysed my endeavours to profit by the critical and sudden opportunity which then presented itself, with the view of arresting the rapid and no longer disguised strides of the Emperor Napoleon towards universal dominion, and of preserving Spain from an invasion which was so openly threatened. The third epoch dates from 1807, when the intestine faction, redoubling

its perfidiousness and activity, caused the miscarriage of my plans of national resistance,—the only means of safety left to us, until the fatal disaster of Aranjuez, brought about by the blind obstinacy and the undisguised treason of the leaders of the conspiracy. The fourth and last epoch will contain a narrative of the sorrows of my sovereigns up to the period when death terminated their existence, and of my own sorrows up to the moment at which I am writing.

My enemies have painted in their own colours, and described according to their fancy, the various actions of my life. Strong in their lamentable success after the events of the year 1808, they were nevertheless unable to lay any crime to my charge. My unvaried loyalty, my heroic patience, sufficiently plead my cause. I have the advantage over them of having it in my power to denounce what they were when I held the reins of power, and what they did when that power fell into their hands. Excesses so grievous as to be scarcely credible demonstrate what were their principles, what affection they bore the people, and in what manner they served their country. I appeal to the testimony of Spaniards, and of all European nations.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The faction I am denouncing shows itself in every line, and figures in every epoch, of these Memoirs: unwilling, however, to interrupt the order of events, I shall now satisfy the reader's impatience by a brief historical analysis of this parri-  
cidal faction.

My elevation to the ministry, and the march of my internal

and external policy, (the object of the internal policy was to prepare a better state of things by the reform of many inveterate abuses,) excited against me a host of enemies, the more violent as my very elevation placed me beyond their reach. Indefatigable in their designs, but unable to carry them into effect by their unaided efforts, they sought an authority under the mantle of which they might find an asylum in case of failure. They eventually found this protection in the candour and inexperience of the heir presumptive to the crown. Determined to impose upon this young prince the belief that I wished to deprive him of the natural affection of his august parents, they so far succeeded in alarming him, that his highness was brought to look upon me as a dangerous rival who aspired to seat himself on the throne. To such perfidious insinuations they added other indirect practices. They threw a multitude of embarrassments in the way of the foreign relations, which the events occurring in Europe rendered daily more critical; the internal administration of the country also experienced the vexatious obstacles interposed by a dark and malevolent opposition. They at last conceived the idea of making the Emperor Napoleon himself an instrument of their policy and of my downfall. Unhappily for the country, they so far succeeded, as the sequel of these Memoirs will show, in terrifying Charles IV. as to make him tremble at the bare idea of a war with France, whilst I had, in September 1806, firmly resolved upon proclaiming it. This was, in my opinion, the only means of supporting the crown and the independence of Spain. Then it was that these men, blinded by their hatred, carried into effect their fatal design of calling upon the formidable Emperor to interfere in our family dissensions and in the government of the country. A secret intercourse was established with the French ambassador,\* who had already avowed himself my enemy. He addressed notes to Paris, in which I was denounced as a partizan of England, and devoted to her interests. The vanity of this ambassador had led him to nourish the hope of marrying one of his nieces with the heir presumptive to the Spanish monarchy; and the young prince, forgetful of the duties he owed his father and sovereign, had the weakness to write clandes-

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\* M. de Beauharnais.

tinely to the tyrant of Europe, "to solicit a consort at his hands, and to implore his protection: he threw out suspicions respecting the policy of our cabinet; besought him to remove the obstacles which some treacherous men, as he said, were attempting to throw in the way of a close union between the royal family of Spain and the imperial house of France; he implored him to undeceive his parents, and to come and secure their happiness, the happiness of himself, (of him, Ferdinand de Bourbon!) and of the whole Spanish nation!" His letter was made public at a later period. . . . How little did the Spaniards suspect its existence, whilst I was lingering in a prison, and borne down by the calumnies of those who had dictated that language!

The consequence is well known. . . . Vanquisher of the fourth coalition, after two sanguinary campaigns in which fortune appeared sometimes suspended in the balance,—proud of his peace of Tilsit,—the successful Napoleon had attained the apogee of his glory. . . .

What was then the position of Spain? To negotiate with honour, if possible, whilst asserting the integrity of the crown; or, in the last extremity, to make an appeal to arms. Feeling assured that the latter choice was the only one left to us, I resolutely adopted it; my orders were immediately issued, and I recalled our army of Portugal. The most urgent, the most sacred of our duties, in this conjuncture, was that of saving the king, the queen, and the royal family. All measures of precaution had been taken; they were rendered powerless by the intrigues of the faction. Charles IV. was dethroned by an insurrection paid for that purpose; his minister was loaded with irons, declared an enemy to the state, and handed over, like an expiatory victim, to the fury of an unbridled populace. . . . The conspirators, intoxicated with their success, for which they expected their reward amidst the applauses of the misled populace, drove before them, like a flock of sheep, the whole Spanish dynasty as far as Bayonne, where this ill-fated family fell a prey to the French eagle. . . .

This slight sketch of the events will be sufficient to put the reader on a proper scent. In the third epoch of my life I shall furnish the details of these facts, when all obscurities will be cleared up.

## CHAPTER V.

**First Epoch—from the 15th November 1792, to the 28th March 1798.—State of the Monarchy at the time of my entering the Administration.**

**DURING** a period of more than three centuries, Spain reckons very few moments of calm and prosperity : glorious, and yet always suffering, her virtue has never been rewarded : these are the colours in which history exhibits her to our view.

Happy those who were born in privileged times ! happy those who, appointed to guide the vessel of the state, and protected by favourable winds, proceeded on their course with all sails set and in perfect security !

To me was reserved the task of making head against the fiercest storm of which the annals of Europe have preserved the recollection !

The following was the condition of Spain when, on the 15th November 1792, I was called to the ministry.

The unpopular and improvident war<sup>1</sup> waged by Spain, in concert with France, against England in 1779, had for its object to favour the insurrection of the British colonies in North America ; a war which exhausted the scanty remains of a public

<sup>1</sup> The war of American independence.

treasury already involved in difficulties. It was no longer possible to maintain the balance between the revenue of the state and the demands upon it. In Spain, as in France, public credit received a fatal shock.

Charles IV. had just ascended the throne; the bank of St. Carlos was rapidly falling and on the verge of bankruptcy. The company of the Gremios<sup>2</sup> could no longer disguise its difficulties, which were notorious to all. The losses of the company of the Philippines; the annihilation of the companies of the Caraccas and of Buena Fé; the destruction of the life annuities; the failure of the chief commercial houses; the discredit of the royal bonds, or *valés*, of the *Juros*,<sup>3</sup> and of other national debts, contracted under previous reigns,—all these grave symptoms of national misery were simultaneously breaking out.

The government bethought itself at first to effect reductions in all branches of the public service; but the peace of 1783 having been concluded, the reforms and economies chiefly bore upon the military forces.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Los quatro gremios mayores*—the four great commercial companies of Madrid bearing that name.

<sup>3</sup> Old claims against the state, which are traced back to the days of the Catholic kings.

<sup>4</sup> The minister Florida Blanca was always averse to military establishments, and bent his whole attention to reducing them. The Spanish army was a mere skeleton at the close of the reign of Charles III. They are the vermin of the state, said Florida Blanca—" *la polilla del estado*."

Our land and sea forces, at the approach of an unavoidable war, scarcely amounted in the whole to more than thirty-six thousand men. The cavalry were dismounted, the arsenals empty, our manufactures of arms falling to decay, and our effective forces every way inadequate, with the exception of the royal navy, to the support of which the apprehension of England had compelled us to bestow all the funds which the treasury had at its disposal.

Family alliances with France and Portugal having banished all uneasiness with respect to the Continent, whatever exceeded the number of soldiers strictly requisite for the service of the fortified towns was deemed to be a useless and ruinous extravagance. Nay, this prolonged state of tranquillity had given rise to apathetic idleness; the military art was utterly neglected. During the half century which had just elapsed, Spain had scarcely attempted some wretched partial operations: these were, the unfortunate campaign of Portugal in 1762, directed by Count d'Aranda; the short and disastrous expedition of Algiers, led by Count O'Reilly; those of Buenos-Ayres in 1776, of Western Florida in 1779; the blockade of Gibraltar, and the invasion or retaking of Minorca. But, above all, the study of war on a large scale had fallen into disuse.

Spain might have been in possession of vast material resources had not her preceding governments,



under the sway of antiquated prejudices, recoiled at all times from those innovations and comprehensive measures so long required for the promotion of agriculture, of arts, commerce, navigation, and the natural productiveness of the vast dominions composing the Spanish monarchy. There existed, no doubt, great landed and monied opulence, so unequally distributed however, that it was nearly as useless or injurious as poverty itself. The bulk of the population, being deprived of every element of labour, could not improve their means of existence. Landed property was enfeoffed, confined within a narrow circle of nominal owners, the greater part in mortmain. There scarcely remained a weak impulse of industry amongst the lowest classes; and commerce, which was alone calculated to revive it, was proudly disdained by the nobility as a condition unworthy of them.

Functions in the state and church attracted every ambition; the whole middling class was infected with this baneful and degrading spirit of cupidity. Most families acquired, by dint of privations, the happiness of beholding some one at least of their children a lawyer or a theologian. This general mania had the effect of supplying the church with a far greater number of priests than it stood in need of; the cloisters were encumbered with an ever increasing number of monks of all orders and of all ages: Spain was

overrun by a swarm of lawyers, attorneys, notaries, registrars, special pleaders, and officers of justice; to these are to be added a multitude of inferior agents and solicitors aspiring in their turn to preferment;—unproductive consumers, who lived at the expense of the public.

There existed, as I have said, much opulence and large fortunes: but they were inactive, piled up in coffers, from the dread of fiscal encroachments; and exhibiting no other vital impulse than the foundation of some elderships, pious works, or religious establishments, which tended to swell the enormous mass of mortmain property.

Notwithstanding the absence of knowledge and of sound laws, there was an innate fund of patriotism springing from a pure and active source. This first principle of preservation was combined with a religious sentiment which likewise imparts social and domestic virtues,—another element of strength and power, when amalgamated with the national spirit.

These two distinctive attributes of the Spanish character revived my confidence when I assumed the reins of government. The danger which threatened us on the side of France was self-evident; there was little hope of averting a war; nevertheless, little or no preparation was made for it on the part of Spain. Some corps had been sent towards the Pyrenees, most of them mere frames of regiments. Attempts were made to

form a cordon of troops; the few open points were occupied, and the garrisons of fortresses slightly reinforced. The ministers to whom I was succeeding had bent their whole anxiety to conceal from the Spaniards the true state of France. The only gazette published in Madrid had been silent for three years respecting the occurrences beyond our frontier; the entrance of foreign books and newspapers was strictly prohibited, and commercial correspondence was subjected to the severest scrutiny. The most rigid watch was kept over literary men and whatever related to public instruction; the wisest reforms were arrested in their progress; a retrograde movement was adopted at all points. . . . Such were the measures resorted to at that moment when the question of peace or war was to be determined! The mysterious conduct assumed by the government, the more or less exaggerated news clandestinely spread over the Peninsula and circulated from mouth to mouth, aggravated our moral position. General consternation prevailed in the public mind.

## CHAPTER VI.

Negotiation with France.—Project of Neutrality.—Mediation of Charles IV. in favour of Louis XVI.

COUNT FLORIDA BLANCA had just been succeeded in the ministry by Count d'Aranda <sup>1</sup>. The political relations of the Spanish cabinet with that of France, after having been for some time suspended, had recovered some degree of activity, and this renewed intercourse was even of a pacific nature. M. Bourgoing, the envoy of his most Christian Majesty, was received in the character of minister plenipotentiary at the court of his Catholic Majesty.

He was the bearer of an autograph letter from Louis XVI, expressive in the strongest terms of his majesty's "adhesion to the constitution he had accepted, and of the necessity of maintaining the general peace, without which he could not venture to answer for the internal tranquillity of France, or for the security of his crown. He was desirous that the Spanish cabinet, far from

<sup>1</sup> May 1792.

adopting the hostile policy of other states, should concur with him in the maintenance of that peace, the object of his most Christian Majesty's anxious wishes: the influence and mediation of Spain could alone avert the calamities which threatened France from within and from without, if war should unhappily break out."

In restoring the amicable relations of the two cabinets, Count d'Aranda might have given them that impulse and consistency which, whilst they afforded to France the most perfect security on the side of Spain, would also have the effect of calming the apprehensions occasioned by the intrigues of the emigrants, by the warlike preparations of Austria and Prussia, and, above all, by the doubts circulated of the sincerity of Louis XVI. in his constitutional protestations.

It might not, perhaps, have been difficult to turn to favourable account the slender hopes which royalty could yet indulge in. Count d'Aranda, who affected a kind of philosophical indulgence, to say the least of it, for the French revolution, ought to have profited by the opportunity offered, and, without compromising the honour of Spain, to have then concluded the treaty of neutrality which was afterwards so haughtily demanded of us. Such a timely and seasonable transaction, bearing the character of a friendly, spontaneous, and free act on the part of our cabinet, coupled with a solemn and explicit

declaration, would have dispelled many clouds in our political horizon. This was not the course adopted; and that so highly vaunted diplomatist confined himself to a pure and simple renewal of amicable and official relations between the two courts.

The events of the 10th of June, those of the 10th of August, the abolition of royalty, the proclaiming of the republic, the establishing of the revolutionary government, followed each other in rapid succession. . . . Austria and Prussia had been defeated in their combined attack: the enemies of royalty were flushed with the pride of victory. The minister Bourgoing, who had ceased to represent the king, and was no longer received at the court of Madrid, summoned the Spanish government to make known what were its intentions in the existing crisis. "If they are of a peaceful character," said he, "proclaim them without disguise, and let them be guaranteed by a formal treaty."

Apprehensive of aggravating the painful position of Louis XVI, frightened at the danger of a war for which we had left ourselves wholly unprepared, Count d'Aranda prevailed upon Charles IV. to come to an accommodation with the victorious republic, by adopting a course of neutrality towards France and the coalesced powers.

The bases of the treaty had just been settled

and agreed on with M. Bourgoing when I was summoned to the ministry. We were then called upon to make every possible sacrifice, with a view to protect, not only the crown, but the liberty, the very life of the King of France. . . . . These grave considerations—I say it in perfect sincerity—could alone prevent me from arresting the progress of the negotiation which was already so far advanced. I was far more influenced by those motives than by any hope of avoiding a disastrous war. It was obvious that the arrogance of the republicans, and the hatred they publicly avowed towards all monarchical governments, would soon drive us, however reluctantly, into war. Desirous, nevertheless, of combining my predecessor's diplomatic act of neutrality with measures exclusively directed to the protection of the august captive and of the royal family, I proposed to the king that he should, at the same time, interpose his mediation on their behalf. A separate, distinct, and, as it were, confidential communication was to be delivered to the French government simultaneously with the treaty of neutrality negotiated by Mr. Bourgoing. The character of these modern republicans was well known: it was necessary to address them with great circumspection, in order to allay their excitement. Our additional proceeding, thus presented to

them, manifested the king's intentions, without bearing the semblance of a condition imposed upon the French government. It bore the stamp of confidence and friendship, and was calculated, as such, to disarm the republicans. Charles IV. was moved to tears at the suggestion, and readily adopted it. If it were possible by this means to save the life of Louis XVI, the act of neutrality, which appeared in the nature of a sacrifice, was at least an honourable one, justified by the object it had in view, and the price which was dependent upon it. I did not stop at this measure: I wrote to our ambassador in London, and commissioned him, in the king's name, to confer with Mr. Pitt, the British minister, on the subject, and strongly urge his adopting the same course in the name of the British government. The concurrence of two great powers, which were still neutral in the quarrel, could not fail to add weight to their intercession. In order, moreover, to neglect nothing that was calculated to procure the desired result, our ambassador in London was authorised to employ, with becoming prudence and reserve, all the means which might appear to him likely to succeed with the influential members of both houses of the British Parliament.

An unlimited credit was opened in Paris: every effort was tried to excite sympathy in favour



of the august captive, and, at any price, to secure votes in his favour.<sup>3</sup> The instructions given to the court agent were ample and generous. Should the mediation be accepted, it was to be followed, first, by a simple recognition of the French government, as the act of one state towards another, without in any manner interfering with her internal affairs; secondly, by an offer of the mediation of Spain towards inducing the coalesced powers to conclude a peace; thirdly, should the abdication of Louis XVI. be definitively insisted on as an indispensable condition, by the consent of Spain to that measure, and her becoming guarantee for the monarch's subsequent conduct; fourthly, in the last extremity, and if there existed no other means of saving the king's life, by the offer of hostages, who should answer in their own persons for the good faith of that unhappy monarch. . . . I had brothers and

<sup>3</sup> M. de Pradt states, in his Memoirs respecting the Spanish revolution, that our court authorised its minister to dispose of a sum of three millions, with a view to interest the leading members of the Convention, and of the municipality of Paris, in favour of Louis XVI. M. de Pradt is mistaken as to the amount of the sum. The authority was perfectly unlimited. Money was ordered to be given to any extent that might be deemed necessary for saving Louis XVI. and his family. This was not merely an act of noble and pious sympathy: such profusion was, in the end, a real and well-understood economy; since, the object being once attained, there ceased to be any motive for the war, on the part of Spain at least, which could not have failed to suffer considerably from its burdens.

friends; thousands of heroic Spaniards would also be found willing to devote themselves in such a cause.

Nothing was left untried; couriers were flying in all directions: not a moment was to be lost. Already, a motion made on the 6th November, for bringing Louis XVI. to trial, had been strongly supported. His enemies thirsted for his blood: grown every day more violent, they were fast gaining ground: at each sitting the fatal catastrophe was urged on to its conclusion.

These facts are of public notoriety . . . . This was the opening of my career. The road was beset with thorns and dangers. It has proved long and irksome; but I have not received much credit for my courage and good-will.

In France, praises are lavished on Count d'Aranda, my predecessor. He has been represented as *the man of peace*. . . . For my part, I aimed at a still higher object. I was anxious to avoid a general war, and especially the scandalous exhibition of a king dragged to the scaffold by his own subjects. . . . . The death of Louis XVI. was accordingly the signal for all the horrors which followed in its train: had it not been for that revolting execution, France would not have plunged into all those excesses which are still a reproach to her at the present day. Is it any fault of mine that my endeavours proved ineffectual; that my voice found no echo

in Europe; that I was left to my unaided efforts instead of being seconded in my generous attempt?

How much those have been at variance with the truth, how little they have sought it, who have accused me in this instance of yielding to foreign suggestions! What follows is an extract from M. Thiers, the historian of the French revolution, who is no less unjust than other writers in his observations.<sup>3</sup>

“Resisting the suggestions of England, the intrigues of the emigrants, and the angry temper of the Spanish aristocracy, the prudent Count d’Aranda abstained from offending the susceptible feelings of our new government; nevertheless, he was eventually dismissed to make way for Don Manuel de Godoy, afterwards Prince of the Peace: thus leaving his country a prey to the most pernicious counsels,” &c.<sup>4</sup>

I have just represented the facts such as they actually occurred; facts well known to M. Thiers, and related by himself immediately after the above passage, respecting the mediation of Charles IV, and his firm resolve to come to an accommo-

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Pitt obstinately refused to concur with us in this act of humanity. I am bound to acknowledge that many distinguished Englishmen endeavoured to excite the compassion of this inexorable minister. Fox, Sheridan, Grey, Lansdown, and other worthy members of parliament, wasted their eloquence in vain. Pitt remained unmoved.

<sup>4</sup> Thiers’ History of the French Revolution, vol. iv.

dation with the new French government without any other condition than that of their sparing the life of the dethroned monarch.

Can it then be said that Charles IV. and his minister were impelled by foreign suggestions? Did a single cabinet of Europe manifest the same intentions? Did they not all maintain a silent reserve? To assert that Pitt prevailed upon Spain to adopt that step, whilst it was Spain who urged Pitt to concur with her, but failed to overcome his obstinacy in declining it, is to disguise, to violate the truth of history with contemptible levity.

With respect to the celebrated Count d'Aranda, whom M. Thiers so considerately affects to extol at my expense, the following occurrence throws some light on the opinions of that old diplomatist, as well as upon my own sentiments, on this subject.

It has already been seen that I spontaneously proposed to the king to interfere in the character of mediator. The question was an important one, and admitted of no delay. I was desirous it should be discussed in the council of state; few counsellors were admitted, no more than were strictly requisite to form a council: the king, however, well assured of the propriety of the measure about to be adopted, sanguine in his hope of the result, and anxious not to neglect any means of success, summoned Count d'Aranda

to his presence, and spoke to him of my project of mediation as of an act determined upon, urging him to afford me the advantage of his experience.

The count feigned to approve the idea: he afterwards came to my cabinet with the view of endeavouring to dissuade me from it, and to prevent, if possible, its being carried into effect. "I know not," said he, as he entered, "whether my arrival be seasonable; the king has just spoken to me of the measure which he is adopting with a view to save the life of the unfortunate Louis XVI. I was unwilling to contradict his noble and generous determination; but, between ourselves, have you seriously reflected upon the matter?"

"In truth," I replied, "the circumstances allow of little time for reflection; but my mind is bent upon two points, which throw every other consideration into shade: I mean the position of the King of France, and the honour of the King of Spain."

"But," exclaimed the count, "should the king meet with a refusal?"

"The whole blame will then recoil upon the French, and history will pronounce between them."

"The opinion of mankind, however, is not so much swayed by our acts as by the good or bad result which may have attended them. If the

step you are about to take through an impulse of generosity should prove unsuccessful, which may possibly be the case, it will infallibly be said that the Spanish ministry has been guided by a romantic feeling rather than by the lessons of experience."

The count was an old man ; I was very young, and bound to respect his age. " But," said I, " the measure I have proposed has its parallel in history.<sup>5</sup> Holland, in a case perfectly in point, sent ambassadors to England with a view to intercede in favour of the unfortunate Charles Stuart." . . .

" Very true ; but were they attended to ? "

" Assuredly they were not, count ; but the conduct of the Dutch was not the less noble and generous because it failed of success."

" Granted. I will suppose, then, that you shall have been more fortunate,—that the mediation may prove effectual, and be accepted ; have you foreseen and considered the embarrassment into which we shall be thrown by a king and his son, the heir presumptive of his crown, whose consent to the loss of it must be guaranteed by the King of Spain ? "

" Is it not far worse," I replied, " that we should suffer him to be dragged to the scaffold ? Setting aside the well-known gentleness and moderation

<sup>5</sup> Spain also interceded.

of Louis XVI, I do not suppose, should we succeed in saving him, that he can ever afterwards feel any great desire to recover his lost crown. Admitting even a change in political circumstances, his enemies have so humbled and offended him, that, happen what may, his abdication becomes an act of necessity. The Dauphin is still very young: who knows what may happen in France before he attains the age of manhood? But, after all, should his crown be irretrievably gone from him, he will not forget that its loss was the price paid for the ransom of his father's life."

"And the king's brothers?" added Count d'Aranda.

"His brothers have forfeited it; they are not entitled to consideration."

"What course will the other cabinets adopt?"

"They will either pay respect to treaties, or make war upon France, as they best like."

"In the mean while the worthy king will remain a prisoner in our hands?"

"The worthy king," I replied, "will no doubt faithfully comply with the condition of treaties which shall have saved him from the scaffold. I can have no better pledge of this than his christian virtues. Let me add, that, in the extraordinary situation in which France is placed, we must leave something to chance, and choose, between two extremes, that which is most in accordance with honour and with the dictates of humanity."

“Right well,” said the count; “but let us look at the other side of the picture. If our mediation should be haughtily rejected, and the king humbled by a refusal, what will Spain do? Will it be in our power to avoid a war?”

“The object of the step we are taking is to avoid a war. If the King of France should perish on a scaffold, a general war is unavoidable, not only for the purpose of punishing so scandalous a crime, but also to arrest the progress of an enemy who threatens the overthrow of every European monarchy. By the murder of Louis XVI. they will have flung a challenge at every sovereign. But we are not yet come to that extremity. . . . Nevertheless, be pleased to read this French bulletin which has just reached me.”—I handed to the count the decree of the 19th November, by which the Convention tendered its support and assistance to all nations disposed to shake off the yoke of their old governments.—“What will happen then, when those men shall have perpetrated the most heinous of crimes, and, when giving effect to their threats, they shall seek for and perhaps enlist in other countries further accomplices of their misdeeds?”

“I must acknowledge,” replied the count, “that your generous views have the sanction of morality; but let us not forget that what is morally good may often prove politically the reverse.”

“Well then, count, I beg leave to assure you



that I never will separate political from moral considerations; and in the present case they may safely go hand in hand: a spirit of Machiavelism is quite foreign to me."

Thus ended the discussion. From that day . Count d'Aranda became, I shall not say my rival—it were vanity in me to use the expression—but, what is still worse, he avowed himself my enemy.

## CHAPTER VII.

The mediation of the King of Spain is rejected by the National Convention.—Trial and Execution of Louis XVI.—Rupture of the negotiations.

THE convulsive movements to which all France was a prey after the fatal 10th of August are recorded in history, and known to all. The armed intervention of Austria and Prussia powerfully contributed to irritate the public mind. Flushed with victory and democratic fanaticism, the constitutionalists had become intractable; the lust of power in some, the thirst after money in others, broke through all bounds; the smallest municipal body arrogated to itself an absolute authority; each club was a focus of anarchy; the infuriated and blind populace threatened or summarily put to death whosoever ventured to invoke the name of justice or the restoration of social order.

A hatred of monarchical government broke through these loud contending passions; nothing was heard but sarcasms and imprecations against Louis XVI. A thousand popular assemblies were clamorous for his death.

A few virtuous men were still exerting all their efforts to save him. Don Joseph de Ocariz, ever indefatigable in his zeal, was watching the moment

when the voice of Charles IV. might be heard with good effect. The Spanish minister was not to be intimidated either by the disfavour which then attached to the envoy of a sovereign, or by the dread of the inquisitorial ochlocracy which kept watch, night and day, over the slightest movements of every public man. He concerted his chief plan of operations with a few deputies who loudly opposed the violence of anarchical men. How many pious artifices was he not compelled to resort to in order to conceal from the revolutionary police his secret intercourse with those deputies, prepared as they were to run all risks in their holy and virtuous opposition? Ocariz sought friends in all directions; he found some in the very committee entrusted with diplomatic affairs. . . . Not one of them betrayed him. . . . I wish it were in my power to record in this place the names of those who aided our envoy with their advice and assistance; and I regret I can only recall to mind, at this moment, Morisson, Lanjuinais, Boissy-d'Anglas, Fauchet, Salles, Henry de la Rivière. . . . Be it also said, to the honour of these now historical men, their devoted conduct sprang from no consideration of sordid interest or of personal advantage. They were flattered, on the contrary, at the perilous confidence which had pointed them out; they consoled, they encouraged Ocariz, who had to bear singly, and unaided, the whole weight of so arduous an undertaking.

It was agreed amongst them, and in conjunction with the illustrious defenders of Louis XVI, first, to await the effect produced by the speeches about to be uttered at the tribune, and in which the trial itself, or, subsequently, the capital punishment, were to be openly resisted; secondly, to address to the minister for foreign affairs the two notes from the court of Madrid respecting the neutrality and the disarming;<sup>1</sup> thirdly,

<sup>1</sup> The following is the literal text of the two notes transmitted to the Spanish chargé d'affaires in Paris: the dates were left in blank.

First note.—“The French government having manifested to that of Spain the desire that the neutrality actually subsisting between both nations should be secured on a firm basis, H. C. M. authorizes the undersigned, his principal secretary of state, to declare by this note that Spain will maintain the most complete neutrality in respect to the war in which France is engaged with other powers.

The present note shall be exchanged in Paris against a corresponding note from the minister for foreign affairs, containing the like assurances on the part of France.

“DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.”

“Madrid . . . . December, 1792.”

Second note.—“In consequence of the neutrality agreed upon, under guarantee of the friendship and good faith of the French nation, H. C. M. will withdraw the troops which line the frontiers of the Pyrenees, and only keep up in the fortified towns the garrisons requisite for their service, and the necessary detachments. This withdrawal of troops will take place as soon as France shall have delivered a note in which she binds herself to the adoption of a similar course. Commissaries shall be appointed on the part of both powers, and by common accord, at the period determined upon for the faithful execution of every suitable arrangement.

“This

to await still further, and as long as possible, the arrival of the pacific mission solicited from England, and hourly expected, in order to make the mediation of that power concur with the mediation of his Catholic Majesty at the most seasonable moment.

Both notes were duly communicated. The British cabinet not having sent any mission, Ocariz handed to the minister for foreign affairs, on the 26th of December, the first day of the defence of Louis XVI, the request of intercession on the part of Charles IV, which was addressed on the following day, the 27th, to the Convention, with a report couched in the following terms :

“ Paris, 27 December, first year of the Republic.

“ LE BRUN, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE  
“ PRESIDENT OF THE CONVENTION.

“ I RECEIVED last night, from the chargé d'affaires of Spain, a note relative to the question which engages at this moment the attention of the National Convention and of all Europe. The

“ This note, signed by H. C. M.'s principal secretary of state, shall be exchanged in Paris against a corresponding note from the minister for foreign affairs, containing the like stipulations and assurances on the part of France.

“ DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.”

“ Madrid . . . . December, 1792.”

(The date affixed to these two notes by our chargé d'affaires was the 17th December.)

duty of my office requires that I should transmit this letter to the Convention, and accompany it with a few particulars on the subject to which it relates. The hostile preparations on the part of Spain, and the precautionary measures adopted on our part, had of late given rise to mutual complaints. These had led to overtures of reconciliation, and, amongst others, to an offer of reciprocal disarming, under the condition of a clear and formal avowal of neutrality on the part of Spain during the present war. Those negotiations, set on foot three months ago, were interrupted for a time when Count d'Aranda quitted the ministry; but they have been resumed by his successor, who shows himself equally well disposed towards us. I should be happy at having it now in my power to announce that this business has been brought to a successful conclusion, had I not reasons for supposing that the complying spirit manifested by the court of Madrid is, in some degree, dependent upon conditions calculated to lessen its value.

“ In fact, citizen president, at the time I received the two notes of which I annex copies, (the first containing the neutrality of the Spanish government; the second, the proposed disarming, as well as the mode of carrying it into effect,) I was already aware that the Duke de la Alcu<sup>dia</sup> had not disguised from the minister plenipotentiary of the republic one of the principal

motives which led the King of Spain to this two-fold act of deference towards us,—the hope of exercising a favourable influence over the fate of the ex-king, his cousin.

“I have been fully convinced of this fact, as the National Convention cannot fail to be also convinced of it, by the contents of the letter of the Chevalier Ocariz, who has remained in Paris since the 10th of last August in the capacity of Spanish chargé d'affaires. I think it right to abstain from any further observation on the subject of that letter.

(Signed)

“LE BRUN.”

The two notes, and the official letter of mediation, presented by Ocariz, were read in the Convention on the following day, the 28th. A deep silence pervaded the assembly and the tribunes: this was an unexpected display of moderation; for not a word had hitherto been allowed to be uttered in favour of the unhappy monarch.

There was yet a glimmering of hope. . . . Dignity without ostentation, truth without acerbity, calm arguments, the language of friendly persuasion, sincerity, delicacy of expression, a gentle burst of generous sentiments appealing to the interest and the glory of France,—such was in form and in substance that conciliating and withal circumspect document. As we had to deal with proud democrats, the mediation was not solicited in the name of the King of Spain only; the

loyalty of his minister brought the whole Spanish nation to interpose along with their sovereign, and presented the result as a decisive event which would draw closer the bonds of friendship between the two nations,—a friendship the more solid and becoming, as it would be founded on the rights of humanity, acknowledged and respected alike by both<sup>2</sup>.

But the dreadful sentence was about to be pronounced by men of blood, who, in default of good reasons, signified their will by insulting provocations. “Away with the influence of kings!” exclaimed the ferocious Thuriot,—“Let us not allow the ministers of foreign courts to come and form a congress amongst us, and intimate to us the orders of crowned ruffians. Would the Spanish despot dare to threaten us?”

“There is not a word of threat,” interrupted a solitary voice. Thuriot instantly fixed his serpent’s eyes on that spot in the assembly from whence the voice had emanated. “No!” he ironically exclaimed, “not a word of threat for those who will neither see nor understand the combinations which crime and perversity can prepare against the independence of our country. Would it be wished to form a congress of crowned heads, which should sit in judgment upon the ex-king and upon us along with him? Let us

<sup>2</sup> The text of that ministerial letter, which is little known in Spain, will be found in the explanatory documents, No. I.



be mighty and all-powerful under the shield of the law ; let us baffle royal intrigues. . . . Perhaps he who reigns in Spain has not yet renounced the hope of reigning here, after the probable extinction of that branch of his family which once wielded the sceptre of France. The constitution says nothing of his pretended rights ; but, although royalty be abolished amongst us, he no doubt still indulges in illusions on the subject, and wishes to make trial of his future power."

These declamations were vociferously applauded in the assembly and in the very tribunes. Courage failed every honest man ; no one dared to second the proposal of a foreign court. . . . Nevertheless, Charles IV. still hoped for success from his forbearance. Persisting in his endeavours to spare France from the commission of a frightful crime, to prevent an occurrence which contained within itself all the elements of a general war, and still to hold out a protecting hand to the deserted monarch so long as there remained the slightest ray of hope ; his Catholic Majesty sent fresh orders to Ocariz, directing him to redouble his efforts, and, considering the then peremptory circumstances, to employ, whether publicly or in secret, every means which his talents and loyalty might suggest, without derogating from what was due to Spanish honour.

Meanwhile the French government interpreted to its own advantage the notes communicated to it ;

objecting by plausible pretexts to the withdrawal of the French troops stationed at Bayonne, and explaining the text of the notes in such a manner that a mere reciprocal acceptance was equivalent, as regarded us, to a formal acknowledgment of the republic. Proceeding boldly to the object they had in view; regardless of the resentment Spain might feel at their insulting conduct; disdain to state any reasons for their brutal refusal to listen to our intercession, the French government vigorously urged us to complete the still pending treaty, and coupled with menaces their haughty demand. Castilian pride was made to undergo a severe ordeal; every insult was borne with becoming dignity; what could not be granted was adjourned, with fair words, until a more favourable opportunity. . . . and some delay was gained.

It was not of long duration; the catastrophe was approaching. A witness to the unbridled violence of those who swayed the Convention, Ocariz had the courage once more to raise his voice; he again interposed the entreaties of the generous and kind-hearted Charles IV. Noble but fruitless entreaties! it was the last cry of distress on the edge of the abyss into which the victim was about to be plunged.

In the dreadful night of the 17th of January the votes had been deposited in the box; they were commencing to decide by ballot in a case of

life and death ; when a pressing note from the Spanish envoy was announced to the Convention. Ocariz repeated in it the offers of mediation and guarantee already communicated to the executive council in the preceding December ; he reiterated in the most affecting terms the wishes and entreaties of Charles IV, and was even content to ask that they should merely spare the life of the French monarch. He concluded by offering to receive and transmit to the court of Madrid every honourable condition which the Convention might deem necessary to require, provided they would allow of a reprieve. "Considered in a political point of view," he added, in conclusion, "this trial may be the occasion of an honourable treaty, worthy of the present epoch, a sure pledge of a general peace, and from henceforward the most solid basis of the independence of France." No less than three hundred deputies anxiously hoped that the reading of this note should be ordered ; and that the discussion being thus opened anew, might present some means of suspending the fatal blow. Those, however, who thirsted for blood, strong in the support of an armed and infuriated mob, opposed the reading. Danton demanded that war should be instantly declared against Spain ; the discussion was stifled by the order of the day, and amidst the threatening vociferations and applauses of the tribunes.

By what painful fatality did it come to pass

that Charles IV. was unaided in so pious, so praiseworthy an undertaking? His intercession, his support, his august name, no doubt influenced a great number of deputies whose votes were favourable to his views; but how much the co-operation of England would have promoted his means of success! Had other powerful sovereigns consented to join us! . . . . Louis XVI. was dragged to the scaffold by a very small majority. In this critical emergency, in which it was impossible to have recourse to arms, policy alone could save the monarch; but a policy, I repeat it, which should merely wield the arms of persuasion and entreaty.

Spain, at any rate, did all which it behoved her to do for the good of France, and for bringing about a general peace. Charles IV. fulfilled every duty of an affectionate relative; in a word, all means of conciliation were exhausted in the attempt.

When the venerable chief of the house of Bourbon perished upon a scaffold, all negotiations were from that moment suspended. The French minister Bourgoing tried to revive them; but I had no difficulty in satisfying him that his presence and his proceedings at such an afflicting moment, were no longer compatible with the mourning of the court: he was compelled to withdraw, to the great regret of both.

Would it be believed that Count d'Aranda

continued to urge the propriety of negotiating a treaty with France still reeking with the blood of the monarch in whose behalf Charles IV. had condescended to supplicate? "No," said I to the count, with a deep sentiment of grief—"no; the treaty of peace with the French republic would now be a disgraceful act of cowardice. We should thus be accomplices in a crime which is a cause of scandal to Spain and to every other nation.

## CHAPTER VIII.

Hostile attitude and provocation of the National Convention against the several governments of Europe, at the period of the trial and execution of Louis XVI.

It has been asserted in Spain and elsewhere that I advocated a war against the French republic; I have even been reproached with provoking it: both imputations are equally unfounded. The course I adopted was forced upon me by irresistible circumstances. Far greater blame would have been laid to my charge, had I, in attention to the advice of Count d'Aranda, my predecessor, betrayed the honour of the crown and the safety of the state by consenting to sign a humiliating and precarious peace; had I resisted the prevailing opinion of Spain, and of all the nations adjoining France, which, in order to avert a common danger, were clamorous for war.

Who could evince a greater inclination for peace than I did? What monarch of Europe made greater concessions than Charles IV, or went so far to arrest an eruption on the eve of spreading over every country? If the volcano burst in spite of all our efforts, other hands than mine

had stirred up the fire. Far from exciting the warlike ardour of the conventionalists, Spain never ceased to show herself the friend of France, and her true ally : she urged, she advised a peaceful course; she offered her mediation. Fearless of committing herself in various ways, she was neither arrested nor discouraged by the obstacles constantly raised by the less benevolent, less tractable policy of other cabinets. But the political masters of France at that period were averse to a peace; the coalition had justice on their side, inasmuch as thrones, which were threatened with destruction, were warranted in adopting the means best calculated to avert their downfall.

It is incumbent on the real lover of truth to take a careful retrospect of past events, and to view them in their true character.

By the sentence and execution of Louis XVI. the Convention flung an audacious defiance, steeped in blood, at all the sovereigns of Europe : the greater part had, until then, maintained a strict neutrality. Victorious over Austria and Prussia, whose troops she had driven from her territory, France was in a condition to negotiate with advantage, whether owing to her recent triumph, or in consideration of the valuable pledges she still held at her command. The crime she had just perpetrated being justified by no new danger, by no desperate excitement of the public mind, proved that the fanaticism of a mob haughtily proceeded

towards its object, and that it aimed at effecting, at all risks, that republican crusade which was already avowed in the speeches and the acts of the National Convention.

The pages of history afforded no example of a similar invasion. The rulers of France, urged on, some by a frenzied enthusiasm, others by the ambition of power, the thirst after plunder, and a species of innate perverseness, conceived the daring project of changing the face of the world by holding up to its view, at the bayonet's point, the Alcoran of the republic. To such an object, or such a delirium, Louis XVI. fell a sacrifice.

Out of the multitude of speeches uttered on the king's trial, or in the stormy sittings which took place before and after his death, I shall only select a few passages for quotation.

"Hasten, citizens, to pronounce a sentence which will be a prelude to the agony of kings. See you not that all nations are ready to strike the hour of that agony?"—MANUEL.

"Strike! cut off that head! whilst from north to south your victorious phalanxes are purifying the soil which tyranny had contaminated; whilst the cry of liberty announces throughout Europe the first hour of nations, the last hour of kings."  
—CHÉNIER.

"Quickly pass sentence upon the criminal. Let the scaffold of a perjured king be the pedestal of the universal republic."—THIBEAUDEAU.



“ Let the pain of death be awarded to the tyrant of my country, and, in his person, to royalty.”—**ROBERSPIERRE.**

“ Kings are educated in the absurd maxim that they hold their crown from God and their sword. Well then ! nations who, like us, are ready to pulverize those monsters, are about to prove, in their turn, that they hold their liberty from God and their swords.”—**ABBÉ GRÉGOIRE.**

“ In attention to the welfare of my country and the liberty of the world, I vote for death. Kings have too long presided as judges over nations ; the day will come when nations shall sit in judgment upon kings.”—**ROBERT.**

Speaking of the mediation of Spain, Barère exclaims, “ What is the subject under discussion ? conjectures, diplomatic illusions ! Citizens, beware how you lose sight of your splendid mission, that of revolutionizing all nations. Let us not crawl through the rut of antiquated diplomacy ; to us belongs the task of opening new roads of communication with other people, and of originating a new law of nations.”

It were easy to multiply quotations. What shall I say of the incendiary matter daily vomited by the press in all directions, and scattered through neighbouring states ? Can it be pretended that such threatening and desolating language only emanated from a few orators or writers of heated imagination ? But the whole National Assembly, on the 19th of November

preceding, heard, applauded, and ordered to be published in every living language, the following decree :

“ The National Convention declares, in the name of the French nation, that it promises fraternity and support to all nations desirous of recovering their liberty.

“ To this effect, it directs that the executive power shall transmit to all the generals of the republic the order to afford assistance to every nation desirous of being emancipated, and to protect all those citizens who may have been oppressed, or who may be so hereafter, in the cause of liberty.”

The way was thus opened, and an encouragement offered to the factious or violent men of all countries.

This decree cannot be called a transient sally caused by a momentary irritation. Orders were despatched to the commanders of all the French armies. They apply for instructions as to the mode of carrying them into effect ; a report is presented by the three committees,—of diplomacy, of the finances, and of war ; and the Convention issues the decree of the 15th December following,—a perfectly radical measure, destructive of all social order, of all property, of all pre-existing right, wherever such a measure may be carried into effect.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Those who may wish to see the decree itself, and the report of the three committees, can refer to the *Moniteur* of the

Shall it be urged, in short, that it remained a dead letter, that it was softened down? The principality of Orange, the bailiwick of Armstadt, the duchy of Limburgh, Savoy, the county of Nice, the Belgic provinces, were suffering its severest penalties. With respect to Belgium alone, M. Thiers furnishes a specimen of the effects produced by that extraordinary creation of democratic fiefs.

“ A swarm of agents, selected from amongst the Jacobins by the executive power, immediately spread over Belgium. The provisional administrations were formed under their influence, and they urged them on to the most levelling measures. Thus instigated against the middling

19th December 1792. The following is an extract, inserted by M. Thiers in his History of the French Revolution, vol. iv. p. 23. “ We must,” said Cambon, amidst the warmest applauses,— “ we must declare ourselves a *revolutionary power* in all the countries we may enter. It is useless to assume any disguise; the despots know what we aim at; let us then loudly proclaim it, since it is already surmised,—since justice, moreover, need not be dissembled. Whatever countries our generals may enter, let them proclaim the sovereignty of the people, the abolition of the feudal system, of tithes, of all abuses; let the old authorities be dissolved, and new local administrations be provisionally formed under the guidance of our generals; let those administrations govern the country, and devise the means of forming national conventions which shall decide upon its fate; let the property of our enemies, that is to say, the property of nobles, of priests, of lay or religious communities, of churches, &c. be forthwith sequestrated, and placed under the safeguard of the French nation, that an account be rendered of it to the local administrations, and that it may serve as a deposit

classes, the mob were guilty of the greatest excesses. It was the anarchy of 93, which, gradually introduced amongst us by four years of disorders, broke out on a sudden in Belgium without any transition from the old to the new order of things. These pro-consuls, invested with almost absolute power, seized upon individuals as well as their property, and filled the public prisons. They alienated the unfortunate Belgians, so much attached to their religion, by carrying away all the church plate, and were guilty of every kind of malversation. They formed a species of conventions for deciding upon the fate of each district; and, under their despotic influence, the annexation to France was voted at

to meet the expenses of the war, of which the freed nations will have to bear a proportion, since the object of the war was to rescue them from thralldom. The settlement of accounts must take place when the campaign is over. If the supplies furnished to the republic exceed the proportion of expenses owing to it, the republic shall refund the excess; it shall receive, in the contrary case, any excess to which it may have a claim. Our assignats, resting upon the new distribution of property, must be received in the conquered country, and their circulation must extend with the principles out of which they have grown. Let, in short, the executive power send commissioners to confer with those provisional administrations, to fraternise with them, to keep the accounts of the republic, and to carry the decreed sequestration into effect. No semi-revolution for us," added Cambon. "Every nation which shall reject our present proposal will be our natural enemy, and deserve to be dealt with as such. Peace and fraternity to all the friends of liberty! War to the dastardly supporters of despotism! War to the mansions, peace to the cottages!"

Liege, Bruxelles, Mons, and other places. These were unavoidable misfortunes, the more oppressive as revolutionary violence combined with military outrage to produce them."<sup>2</sup>

None can form an idea of those acts of violence except they who were the victims of them. Who will venture to arraign the countries bordering upon France for taking up arms to resist the torrent? Was any calming manifesto addressed by the Convention to its alarmed neighbours? Did it condescend to intimate its intention of keeping within the limits of self-defence, without attempting to disturb social order beyond the French frontiers? What nation was secure from its insolent threats?

Nevertheless, M. Thiers praises the policy of Denmark and Sweden, who maintained their neutrality at a distance of three hundred leagues; adding, that Holland and Spain should have followed their example, and have adhered, as they did, to the armed neutrality.

Might I not ask M. Thiers what nation bordering upon France, exercising the natural right of arming in self-defence, and claiming to remain neutral, could hope to meet with consideration and respect at the hands of the French government?

Did not the Convention declare war against

<sup>2</sup> History of the French Revolution, vol. iv. p. 26.

every power, on the mere ground of their remaining armed? Was not the alternative imposed upon all, of disarming and acknowledging the republic, or of being held as enemies unless they consented to disarm, notwithstanding their offer of observing a strict neutrality?

The same historian, however, is soon found at variance with himself. Immediately after the paragraph I have just quoted, he justifies our conduct, and undertakes to plead our defence: he was alluding to the several powers which were arming at sight of the dangers that threatened them. M. Thiers expresses himself as follows:

“The French government had correctly estimated the general dispositions of those powers; the impatient spirit of the French, which was, moreover, a feature in the national character, did not allow it to await a declaration of war. Everything, on the contrary, urged the provocation of it. Ever since the 10th of August it had unceasingly called upon every other government to acknowledge the republic. It scarcely evinced any circumspection towards England, whose neutrality was of advantage to it, whilst it had a host of enemies to contend with; but, immediately after the 21st of January, it cast aside every scruple, and thought of nothing but a universal war. Considering, thenceforward, that a disguised was no less dangerous than an open

hostility, it determined to sound its enemies and compel them to throw off the mask. With this view, the Convention resolved to brave all European cabinets, and ordered, on the 22nd January, a report to be presented to it respecting the conduct of each, firmly resolving to declare war if they delayed a single moment in giving an explicit answer."

This is M. Thiers' own avowal, and he keeps within the limits of truth. Now, can it be pretended that, under such circumstances, it was possible for any of the nations adjoining France to arm out of pure precaution, and to adopt a system of mere neutrality? Does not M. Thiers soon add, with the same frankness, that "by the execution of the 21st of January, France broke off all intercourse with crowned heads, and was irrevocably hurled into the career of revolution."

Let us conclude from all this, that, if a general war was kindled, it was exclusively to be ascribed to the fact that the rulers of France both willed and provoked it.

## CHAPTER IX.

Further importunities of the French Chargé d'Affaires.—He demands of our Government a formal answer.—Answer given to him.—Last interview with M. Bourgoing.

THE painful solution of the trial of Louis XVI. created a lively sympathy throughout Spain. Witness of the general indignation, M. Bourgoing voluntarily withdrew from court. He shut himself up in his residence at Madrid, where he remained for several days, apprehensive that his appearance might still further irritate the public mind, and desirous also of manifesting his respect for public opinion and for the mourning of the royal family. Urged on, at last, by his government, he addressed to me a note, in which he demanded a precise and definitive answer respecting the negotiation already entered upon, and the question of peace or war with France. The reply was couched in the following terms :

“The undersigned, first minister of state of H. C. M. acknowledges receipt of the note addressed to him by M. Bourgoing on the part of the French government.

“The undersigned is commanded to declare, in



the name of his august sovereign, that, under present circumstances, H. C. M. does not deem it proper to follow up the negotiations already commenced; and that, wishing henceforward to regulate his conduct, with regard to the question of peace or war with France, by that which may be observed towards Spain, it is his royal determination to adopt all the precautionary measures requisite for the honour of the crown and the security of his dominions."

Undaunted at the concluding expressions of this reply, M. Bourgoing had it intimated to me, that he was desirous I should admit him to an extra-diplomatic interview, the only object of which was to try whether there was not yet some possibility of avoiding a war. I was acquainted with M. Bourgoing's rectitude of feeling; his great regard for the Spanish nation; the moderation of his principles: I knew that he ardently wished for the maintenance of peace. . . . . Accordingly, after obtaining his majesty's permission, I consented to the interview, and M. Bourgoing repaired to Aranjuez with all the circumspection called for by the public ferment.

Our conversation was perfectly frank and cordial. He opened it by showing me the imperative order, enjoining him to demand his passports if the Spanish government hesitated to sign the treaty insisted on by the French government.

I subjoin the text of the conversation between us :

M. BOURGOING.—“ You perceive, duke, that, after the reply which has been given to me, I am now exceeding my instructions. I have taken upon myself to solicit this friendly and courteous conference, in order to try whether we might not come to an understanding, and devise some means of avoiding a rupture between the two countries.”

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—“ On my part, likewise, sir, I could only consent to a confidential interview. France has twice refused the friendly and benevolent mediation of the King of Spain. This mediation has been disregarded, rejected with haughty and insulting language; it were quite impossible for me to listen to any direct proposal from the French government without a previous atonement for such an offence.”

M. BOURGOING.—“ Well, then, since we have opened the subject, and are conversing in confidence, I must own,—and I do so with regret,—that offence has been given; but it should be exclusively imputed to its authors. Those men who, at the present day, reign paramount in France, may be nothing to-morrow. . . . Does Spain stand in need of accelerating events?”

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—“ Assuredly not. Spain acts without precipitation; she adopts the precautions becoming her power and her dignity. Those who govern France affect to despise us.

By assuming the attitude worthy of a great nation, offended, but always calm in her resolves and confident in her strength, Spain will not provoke a war. We will leave to France all the odium, all the consequences of the aggression; the justice of our cause will be the more apparent: but if France is determined upon giving the signal, she will find us prepared. As to the sovereignty of those destructive men, I also believe it must have an end. Nevertheless, it may still last long enough to disturb Europe, and cause the downfall of many states."

M. BOURGOING.—"Woe be to the proud madmen who have invaded the territory of France at the most critical moment, and have only excited the passions of a mighty nation by threatening it with conquest and slavery! If the aggressors were unable to wrest from France her liberty, they have, at least, achieved the cruel satisfaction of hurling her into anarchy."

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—"Let us be candid: the French revolution, on its first outbreak, showed a tendency to engraft its dangerous doctrines upon all surrounding states. Your clubs, your factious men, your rage for proselytism, have created well-founded alarms. Every power has a right to watch over its preservation. In virtue of what authority, of what divine or human mission, is it attempted to subvert the whole world by preaching the insurrection of nations? Was it not to be anticipated that go-

vernments, assailed in the very basis of their existence, would think of defending themselves by every means at their command?

“Not long ago, at the tribune of the Convention, did not Buzot, an ardent republican, but of some political sagacity, say to his colleagues: ‘*Kings desire your downfall, because you have imprudently inspired them with apprehensions for their own safety.*’ Whatever may have been the excesses committed on either side in this struggle, the first aggression, that is to say, the first wrong, was on the part of France. This is undeniable. The Convention has placed amongst the orders of the day the subversion of ancient governments: that decree is being carried into effect in every country into which you penetrate. . . . At sight of so frightful a danger, nations are warranted by the universal law to unite against an irregular and turbulent power which aims at nothing but destruction.”

M. BOURGOING. — “Thus, then, is the coalition approved and defended by Spain. But I will venture to ask you with the same frankness—are the motives which impel other powers on this occasion as pure as those which actuate Spain? Are they not influenced by views of individual interest, by ill-disguised ambition? Could Spain rejoice at the triumph of a coalition whose aim would be to dismember France, your ancient ally?”

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—“God forbid that France

should ever experience so great a calamity ! Rather let her moderate her conduct, modify her policy, and respect other nations. Should France be dismembered, there is an end to all equilibrium in Europe ; but is it necessary for the maintenance of France in her integral state, and of European equilibrium, that Europe should be overturned and subjugated by France ?”

M. BOURGOING.—“ Let us judge with calmness. Whatever appearance the decrees and measures of the Convention may bear, her real aim, her real intention, at least, is no more than to strike at her enemies. Has Spain become ours ?”

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—“ What sinister intention, sir, can be ours, when we require that France should not introduce into her plans the invasion and overthrow of Spain, who is likewise your ancient ally ? . . . France is embarked in a war which will daily increase in extent and violence. We held out to her a helping hand ; we offered her means of safety—the only means calculated to restore a general, and for her a glorious peace ! What have we obtained in return ? — contempt and threats ! What said Barère, a few days ago ‘ in the Convention, amidst the most clamorous applauses ? Here are his very words, which are a warning to us : ‘ *Should Spain even offer to be our ally, to fight for us, are we warranted in relying upon the alliance of a despot of eighteen centuries*

‘ The 19th January.—Moniteur of the 24th.

*with the nascent republic? Can there exist a community of interests and of principles between us? Citizens, never lose sight of your splendid mission, which is that of revolutionising all nations.'*"

"You perceive, then, M. Bourgoing, that France is more bent upon establishing disorder in Spain than upon forming an alliance or sympathising with her. . . . Do you desire more facts in proof of the assertion? Would you know the extent of their insincerity towards us. Take these files of papers, collected together and placed by order of date: they contain substantial proofs of systematic treachery. They are proclamations, addresses, revolutionary plans, profusely scattered over Spain, and exciting to rebellion a people who entertain a religious veneration for their kings. Observe likewise, and point out to your government at a suitable time, that wherever these incendiary writings have been found, Spanish loyalty has hastened forthwith to denounce and transmit them to the public authority; that the king's subjects loudly call for war; that they offer to risk their lives, — the lives of their children — all they possess, in defence of the monarchy. . . . Has France to lay any such reproaches to our charge?"

M. BOURGOING.—"Those writings, those plans, are not the work of the French government; they proceed from the clubs, which have unfortunately extended over the greater part of France."

**DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.**—"You are quite right in endeavouring to defend your government; but that government sees, tolerates, approves everything of this nature which is proposed by popular assemblies. Can you deny it? The famous decrees of the 19th November and 15th December,—acts unheard of in the political history of nations,—whatever has been done, whatever is still doing, proves that the Convention is controlled by the clubs. If moderate men are to be found—as I doubt not there are—amongst its members, certain it is, nevertheless, that the majority yields and gives way, whether willingly or through compulsion, to every command of an infuriated ochlocracy. . . . What guarantee, what hope of peace can there exist with a government tossed about by every faction, were it even to offer us such a peace, which it is however very far from proposing? . . . Spain is a prey which tempts the republican cupidity. The Convention does not disguise the ambition and hatred with which it is tormented."

**M. BOURGOING.**—"Everything appears to you, duke, in too dark a colour." . . .

**DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.**—"Well then, let us go to the proof: it will be unanswerable. Spain is offended; her honour is compromised: she justly refuses to sign a treaty which, after the late events, would be ignominious to her. . . . To sign such a treaty under present circumstances,

would be to drain the cup to the very dregs. The King of Spain has not obtained the shadow of satisfaction, not even the favour of a common but courteous expression of regret, of which diplomacy is always unsparing: on the contrary, insults have been heaped upon insults; nothing but imperative demands, every species of threat, if Spain does not consent to smother her wrongs, to dissemble her regret,—if she hesitates to sign over the bleeding corpse of the chief of her reigning family an approbation of the crime perpetrated by the French government!!! To require so many sacrifices at once, is it not driving us to extremity? Is it not declaring war against us?"

M. BOURGOING.—“ Such, however, is the necessity in which the French government is placed; finding itself threatened on all sides, and apprehensive of having given Spain just causes of complaint, it seeks for guarantees.” . . .

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—“ The means which it resorts to are not those of a civilized nation. Let it have the courage to brave the danger it has wilfully incurred, but not require of another nation the sacrifice of its honour. There is a middle course open for adoption: time is a healer of most evils: it softens the memory of sorrows, calms the public mind. . . . France should appreciate the moderation of Spain, which, with such just grounds of complaint, has not ordered



the French minister to take his passports. Your government, and they who are unacquainted with our country, view this moderation as the effect of weakness; . . . but by those who have studied our national character, his Catholic Majesty's forbearance will be otherwise interpreted. If the French government had any feeling, what might we not yet hope, and even accomplish, in furtherance of a peace, which is still within our reach, but to which Europe may soon become a stranger."

M. BOURGOING.—"In short, duke, under what conditions would Spain resume the negotiations with France?"

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—"One condition, M. Bourgoing, a single condition, would satisfy us as well as all Europe. I venture to affirm it. . . . "Let the French government shake off the yoke of the atrocious faction which tyrannizes over it; let it frankly return to the course marked out by the common law of nations. There are but two ways of acting:

"First. Since the past is beyond the reach of remedy, let us treat of the fate of the illustrious and unhappy prisoners immured in the prison of the Temple.

"Secondly. Revoke the decrees which sanction that disgraceful and subversive revolutionary crusade. Repress internal anarchy; and by the mutual accord of every government, let there be no

longer, under any pretext whatever, a war of *principles* or of *doctrines*; France being thenceforward at liberty to govern herself as she pleases, or as best she may. . . . Am I asking too much?"

M. BOURGOING. — "Assuredly not. . . . I could desire nothing better for the happiness of my country," (the worthy M. Bourgoing uttered these words with a sigh,) "nothing beyond what you have just proposed. Sooner or later we must come to that course; at least I hope so. . . . But I must now assure you, duke—and I do it with unfeigned regret, that no human persuasion could, at this moment, induce the adoption of proposals as just as they are honourable. No one will even have the courage to name them to those who now rule over France."

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—"You perceive, sir, that Spain is a true friend . . . . One word more: since you are so good a Frenchman—since you speak to me with such frankness. I must not be behindhand in sincerity.

"The king's government is still free to act. . . . With respect to the war, it may abstain from taking an active part in it; it is at liberty to join, or not, the coalition which threatens France. There is in his Catholic Majesty's council a person well known to you, who always recommends, as likely to be assented to, an *armed neutrality* towards France and the coalition. . . . What would you

say, were Spain to propose such a measure, under the guarantee of a promise which has never been broken,—the promise of a king who has always given proofs of his friendship and good faith towards France?”

M. BOURGOING.—“I should reply, (these words were uttered with evident emotion,) that the French government will not listen to any other proposal than that of a *pure and simple neutrality*, with a disarming on both sides, such as I have represented in my former notes, and admitting of no other exception than the garrisons deemed requisite for the fortified towns along the frontiers. My formal and inflexible instructions leave me no kind of latitude on the subject. In the critical situation in which France is placed, her government cannot rest satisfied with a mere *promise*. If Spain does not instantly disarm, war will be declared.”

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—“In that case Spain will have nothing to reproach herself with.”

Thus ended our political conversation. We continued to converse as men of honour, who entertain a reciprocal esteem for each other; who agreed upon many points, but had nothing more to confer upon. M. Bourgoing demanded his passports. . . . On the 23rd of February, he took his departure for France.

## CHAPTER X.

The Convention declares war against Spain.

THE French government did not wait for the last despatches of its chargé d'affaires at Madrid. War had already been resolved upon. Persuaded that Spain would not yield to haughty and unbecoming demands, it commenced hostilities. Our merchant-vessels were seized in the ports of France; letters of marque were indiscriminately issued against us. These were followed by the official declaration of war, which was published on the 7th of March, accompanied by a long report of the Committee of General Defence. Barère was the author of that singular document, drawn up in a style of hyperbolical bombast which ill disguised its utter want of argument, as may be seen by the subjoined specimen :

“ The intrigues of the court of St. James’s are all-powerful at Madrid, and the pope’s nuncio is whetting the daggers of fanaticism in the dominions of the Catholic King.” Barère thus concludes his threatening invective: “ We are now called upon to act; let the Bourbons be hurled

from a usurped throne. Thanks to the support and the treasures which our ancestors have placed within our reach ! we may introduce liberty into those splendid regions which are inhabited by the most magnanimous of European nations.”<sup>1</sup>

The following are the grievances on which the declaration of war is made to rest.

“ 1. The Spanish government has never ceased, since the 14th July 1789, to insult the sovereignty of the French people, by affecting, in every diplomatic act, to give to Louis XVI. the title of monarch.

“ 2. By a decree of 20th July 1791, the King of Spain inflicts numberless vexations upon the French domiciled in his dominions, and compels them, moreover, to renounce their country.”<sup>2</sup>

“ 3. During the revolt of the blacks in the

<sup>1</sup> Whosoever may have the curiosity to read the report of the Committee of General Defence, and the decree of the Convention, will find the one and the other in the *Moniteur* of 8th March 1793.

<sup>2</sup> This royal decree exclusively emanated from Count Florida Blanca. “ *All foreigners, of whatever nation they may be, who should desire to reside in Spain, whether permanently or for a time, were compelled to make oath of professing the Catholic faith and of allegiance to the King of Spain ; they were to renounce their character of strangers, as well as all intercourse, connexion, or relations with their native country ; and bind themselves not to resort to the protection of their ambassadors, ministers, or consuls, under pain of the galleys, the presidencies, or absolute expulsion from the dominions of his Catholic Majesty, and confiscation of property, according to the quality of each person or the nature of the contravention.*”

This

island of St. Domingo, the Spaniards aided the latter by supplying them with provisions and warlike ammunitions, and placing at their disposal several French refugees, whom the blacks immediately put to death.<sup>3</sup>

This measure was dictated by an excessive dread of the French revolution. Florida Blanca trembled at the bare mention of the Propaganda. There were in Spain thirteen thousand three hundred and thirty-two domiciled Frenchmen, and four thousand three hundred and thirty-five persons of that nation travelling, or temporarily established, in the country. In each of these the count beheld an agent of Jacobinism. The complaints of other cabinets, as well as that of France, against a measure as violent as it was impolitic, compelled our ministry to recall many parts of it; so much so, that ere a month had elapsed since the royal decree was issued, it was reduced to the taking of a pure and simple oath, and the renouncing all recourse to the ministers or agents of their nation: this was directed against travellers only, whose residence might the rather create mistrust, as it appeared to be without an object. The oath was moreover limited to a pledge that they would obey the laws of the country, and abstain from all foreign correspondence which might endanger the tranquillity of the country, or impugn the acts of government.

However disposed, therefore, the French government might be to take offence, the royal decree having undergone suitable modification, all ground of complaint respecting it was set aside; and it was absurd to hold up, two years afterwards, that decree as an offence, or as an act of hostility which could justify a declaration of war.

<sup>3</sup> The insurrection of St. Domingo was the fruit of French revolutionary principles. Nothing is more notorious than the fatal discord subsisting between the colonists themselves, the ferocity displayed by the people of colour, and the deplorable excesses which desolated that island. The Spanish portion, from its proximity to the insurgent part, incurred numberless dangers.

“4. The Spanish government recalled its ambassador after the 10th August 1792, and refused to acknowledge the provisional executive council.<sup>4</sup>

The government of His Catholic Majesty, so far from fanning the flame, employed every means to extinguish it. Its chief endeavours were directed to the object of averting the storm which thus threatened our possessions; but the revolted negroes of the French part of the island made frequent inroads beyond their limits, and with superior forces, such was their savage animosity in pursuit of the whites. The Spanish authorities threw the shield of their protection over a great number of fugitives who came to implore their assistance. Some were concealed in the interior of the country; to others were afforded the means of escaping on board ship; but many were unfortunately overtaken on our frontiers, to which they had fled for shelter from the blacks. Their rescue was impossible. . . .

With respect to supplying their own enemies with provisions and ammunition, it will never be believed that they willingly did so. If the negroes received, or rather were allowed to take any, the reason is that there were no other means of getting rid of their presence. . . . In the absence of real ground of complaint against us, the French government endeavours to find one in the very disturbances it had created, and which placed the existence of our own colonies in such imminent danger.

<sup>4</sup> That determination had, nevertheless, been taken by Count d'Aranda, who was then our first minister of state, and upon whom Barère, in his report in the name of the Committee of General Defence, bestowed the following encomium :

“This minister, taking experience and wisdom for his guides, had felt the necessity of a sincere alliance with France. Mistrusting the perfidious solicitations of England, he had replied to the belligerent powers, that, owing to the distance at which she was placed from those powers, Spain felt herself dispensed from taking any part in the great quarrel that had sprung up between France and them.”

"5. After the Convention had been installed, the Spanish government ceased to keep up the usual intercourse between both nations, and refused to acknowledge the ambassador of the French republic.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> In the state of anarchy into which France was thrown, and after the constant insults levelled from the French tribune at all crowned heads, it was assuredly natural for every monarch to refuse acknowledging a new and turbulent government, which, instead of offering the least guarantee, excited the liveliest apprehensions. Nevertheless, this alleged grievance is, like the preceding one, incorrectly represented. A proof of this will be found in M. Bourgoing's work, entitled, "Picture of Modern Spain," vol. iii. chapter x. pp. 195, 196, 197, second edition. "The Court of Spain had anticipated the storm which was gathering over the head of the unfortunate Louis XVI; and believing, or feigning to believe, in the sincerity of this prince's assurances, that court, in the hope of dispelling it, admitted me as his minister plenipotentiary in the month of May 1792. I must observe in this place, that the Spanish monarch and those about his person were inconsistent in their conduct towards me. In appearance, they freely and spontaneously acknowledged my public character; whilst, in the reception they gave me during four months, it was easy to perceive how repugnant was that acknowledgment to their principles. Whilst I was placed in this ambiguous position, the unexpected news of the events of the 10th August reached me at St. Ildefonso, on the eve of the day of St. Louis, the queen's patron saint. I still presented myself at court; this was an effort of courage, but it was the last. I deemed it the more incumbent upon me to keep away, as I was no longer recognised in the character of the king's representative after he had been declared to have forfeited the crown. This circumstance did not prevent my seeing M. d'Aranda, and his successor, the Duke d'Alcudia, as often as the interests of my country required it.

"Notwithstanding the pacific intentions of which I was directed to convey every assurance to the new French govern-



“ 6. Instead of aiding France with the quota of troops stipulated by the treaty of alliance, Spain raised armaments by land and sea without any other object than that of combating France, and of joining the powers in league against her.”<sup>6</sup>

ment, Spain was making preparations which appeared to indicate views of hostility. I kept watch over her movements, and more than once called for an explanation of them. The Spanish minister appeared astonished that a foreign government should interfere with his measures of internal policy. But *as he was still anxious to maintain peace, and as he more especially entertained hopes of saving Louis XVI, he was about to pledge himself to a course of neutrality by a formal act.* This act was accordingly drawn up in my presence, and sent to Paris,” &c.

M. Bourgoing’s testimony completely refutes the two imputations I have just quoted.

<sup>6</sup> The report of the Committee of General Defence often dwells upon the ingratitude of Spain, at whose demand France had prepared a naval armament in 1790, to assist her in the war on the point of breaking out between Spain and England respecting the English settlements of Nootka Sound. This was really the case: obstinately bent on asserting the right of Spain over the whole south-west coast of North America as far as the pole, Count Florida Blanca had involved himself in this discussion by acts of hostility which caused a misunderstanding between the two powers.

In this emergency, the count overlooked his avowed antipathy for the innovations recently introduced in the French monarchy, and did not scruple to claim the assistance of France in virtue of the family compact. Louis XVI. gave his immediate assent. The case was laid before the constituent assembly, and it was admitted as a principle that all pre-existing engagements should be respected by the French nation; France reserving to herself the right of investigating the treaties more in detail when the time should come for regulating her external policy, and it being well understood that she would thenceforward recognise no stipulations but what were purely of a de-

"7. The naval armament of Spain was represented as arising from the apprehension enter-

sive or of a commercial nature. "With regard to Spain, the King of the French would be solicited to treat and negotiate with his Catholic Majesty, through the medium of his ambassador, on all points calculated to draw closer the bonds of friendship subsisting between the two nations, and to favour their common interests." The penetration of Count Florida Blanca failed to comprehend that, after the step he had just taken, the *family compact* ceased to be a *dynastic treaty*, and assumed the character of a *national* one, thereby laying the foundations of a general alliance with France and her government. Neither did he foresee that such alliance might be attended with serious objections, owing to the rapid and monstrous changes which the French revolution would undergo in its progress; nevertheless, the war in which he was involving himself against England, and for which he was contracting such serious engagements with France, had no other object than the insignificant consideration of a petty trade in furs . . . . Be this as it may, the French government furnished, at first, its quota of twelve sail of the line and six frigates, conformably to the fifth article of the *family compact*. This assistance proved unnecessary. An accommodation took place, by which the English were allowed to establish themselves on the American coast from Cape Mendoza to Nootka Sound. The republic had, however, no ground of complaint against us. First. The alliance founded upon the *family compact* was acknowledged by the constituent assembly, without losing altogether its *dynastic* character; but the head of the house of Bourbon having been dethroned to make way for the republic, Spain was still required to renew a treaty the chief condition of which was already set aside. Secondly. Under whatever aspect the question could be considered, the French government had neither directly nor indirectly, nor in any manner whatever, claimed the assistance of Spain after the 10th of August, when Austria and Prussia invaded its territory. . . . The very nature of the armament which Spain was preparing at the period in question,

tained of England, whereas Spain was then negotiating with that power.<sup>7</sup>

“ 8. Spain was sending troops to the frontiers of France.<sup>8</sup>

“ 9. Spain granted protection and assistance to the emigrants.<sup>9</sup>

sufficiently manifested that no attack was contemplated, and that such armament was barely sufficient to place her in a defensive attitude in the event of a possible aggression on the part of France.

<sup>7</sup> This armament had commenced in 1790. Count Florida Blanca was then minister : and on the occasion of the misunderstandings which arose between England and Spain, it had not yet been wholly laid aside ; it afterwards assumed a greater degree of activity in order to keep up, according to the dictates of common prudence, a force adequate to meet any future contingency, or to protect our commerce and our colonies under any possible event.

The negotiations and the treaty with England did not take place until three months after the declaration of war against us.

This treaty, which was concluded with some degree of precipitancy, was only sanctioned on the 25th of May 1793. France ought, moreover, to have seen that, ever ready to exert its mediation with the other powers in case its intervention on behalf of Louis XVI. and of the royal family had met with favourable attention, the Spanish government was bound to assume such an attitude as would enable it to give suitable effect to its pacific proposals to the Northern powers, which were on the eve of embarking in a general war.

<sup>8</sup> This was not a measure of hostility, but a proper precaution, from the proximity of Spain to a country a prey to anarchy, which had already attempted to disturb the tranquillity of neighbouring states and threatened all established governments.

<sup>9</sup> In so doing, Spain had only adhered to the laws of hospitality, which were respected by all civilized nations, and were

“ 10. She continued to arm ; large forces and a numerous artillery were moving towards the frontier.<sup>10</sup>

“ 11. The King of Spain openly manifested his adhesion to Louis XVI, and the intention of supporting him.<sup>11</sup>

“ 12. On learning the execution of Louis XVI, the King of Spain insulted the republic by suspending all communication with the French ambassador.<sup>12</sup>

specially consistent with the Spanish character such as it is recorded in history. France, however, was well aware of the pains taken to remove the emigrants from the frontier adjoining her territory. Those who were in a condition to bear arms were only employed in the Spanish service after the Convention had declared war against Spain.

<sup>10</sup> France was adopting similar measures ; as a proof of which, her own proposals adverted to a reciprocal disarming. What other course was left to Spain after the publication of the decrees of 19th November and 15th December 1792 ? after the insults heaped upon her by the Convention in her sittings of 28th December of the same year, and of the 4th and 18th January 1793 ?

<sup>11</sup> That such imputations should have been charged against Spain would scarcely be credited were they not found at full length in the *Moniteur* of 8th February, and in the other newspapers of the period (1793). It can only be concluded, after their perusal, that the French government was under the influence of a frantic delirium.

<sup>12</sup> When resting its declaration of war on a grievance of this nature, the French Convention doubtless imagined that all other governments were divested of every feeling of justice, of honour, and of humanity. Such, in fact, appeared to be the opinion formed of all cabinets by these revolutionists. . . . Let

“ 13. The Spanish government refused to receive the two official notes of the provisional executive council, despatched on the 4th of January in reply to the note presented by Spain on the 17th December preceding, and consequently rejected the proposal of a strict neutrality coupled with the act of disarming.”<sup>13</sup>

“ 14. The extraordinary intimacy subsisting between the cabinets of Spain and of St. James’s was self-evident, although the French republic had formally declared war against England.”<sup>14</sup>

us once more, in proof of it, listen to the language of the same Barère, when, amidst the applauses of his colleagues and of the galleries of the assembly, he adverted, on the 4th of January, to our mediation in favour of Louis XVI.

“ You are told that the King of Spain urges his request on the grounds of relationship, and that it may, on due reflection, be the means of bringing about a peace; as if the ties of blood could ever be considered by those who wear a crown; as if kings had relations; as if considerations of relationship between crowned heads had ever averted war from any nation,” &c. &c.

<sup>13</sup> Without reverting to M. Bourgoing’s positive declaration, in his last conference with me, respecting the impossibility of procuring the consent of the republic to an armed neutrality, or adding any superfluous explanations, those which I have already given respecting the pretended offences on our part, will be deemed sufficient to refute this charge. What will M. Thiers now say? What will be said by so many others who have blamed the Spanish government for not confining itself within the limits of an *armed neutrality* towards France?

<sup>14</sup> This grievance is undeserving of refutation. It is not founded on any fact offensive to the French nation. Was it, then, incumbent upon Spain to break off all intercourse with governments at war with the new republic?

“ 15. The King of Spain allowed the clergy to attack from the pulpit the principles which France had adopted.<sup>15</sup>

“ 16. The Spanish government suffered the French to be insulted by the people.<sup>16</sup>

“ 17. Lastly, these offences were real acts of hostility against France, and of coalition with the Northern powers. These acts, taken together, were tantamount to a declaration of war.”

I have perhaps laid too much stress upon this decree of the French Convention. But it was incumbent upon me to examine all its articles, in order to prove beyond a doubt that the war was determined upon, provoked, and commenced by the then rulers of France ; that it was absolutely compulsory upon Spain to meet a warlike declaration by war ; that it was on our part a question of honour, of self-preservation, of personal safety, and not the caprice of a young minister or a party question, still less, the result of any foreign influence.

<sup>15</sup> It is really unaccountable that this grievance should be brought forward by the French Convention, when its members gave daily utterance to the most subversive doctrines, the most violent animadversions, the most furious attacks against all crowned heads. . . . But I have copied the text of the declaration of war.

<sup>16</sup> All Frenchmen then residing in Spain were witnesses to and appreciated the extraordinary measures adopted by the government to protect them from the effects of popular excitement. Wherever any violent commotions took place, they were repressed by the strong arm of power.

## CHAPTER XI.

Spanish counter-declaration of war against France.—Public opinion in favour of war.

THE declaration of war against Spain was a tissue of impostures, of frivolous or perfidious pretences. To that provocation his Catholic Majesty opposed the veracity of facts, the power of sound reasoning, well-founded complaints, and the language of moderation. The Spanish manifesto is written with the candour of conviction: it displays the unoffending policy, the enlightened mind of Charles IV, his uprightness and sincerity; for that noble document, worthy of a record in the pages of history, is the production of the monarch himself. The ideas, and the mode of expressing them, are all his own; I unhesitatingly affirm it. Its text is as follows:

“Amongst other important objects which claim my attention since I have ascended the throne, my endeavours have been chiefly directed to the maintenance, as far as it laid in my power, of the peace of Europe. By thus contributing to the welfare of mankind, I have given to my faithful and beloved subjects a special proof of

the paternal watchfulness with which I attend to their happiness,—the object of my most ardent wishes, and to which they are as much entitled by their loyalty as by the generosity of their character.

“ The moderation of my conduct towards France ever since that country has displayed principles of disorder, anarchy, and irreligion,—the sources of so many troubles and misfortunes, is so notorious that it were superfluous to give any fresh proofs of it; I shall therefore merely allude to what has taken place of late months, without recalling the frightful and numberless catastrophes, the recollection of which I desire to dismiss from my thoughts, and from the minds of my beloved subjects. I must allude, however, to the most atrocious of all, the mention of which is indispensable in this place.

“ I was more particularly exerting my endeavours to bring France to a rational system which should give limits to her restless ambition, to avoid a general war in Europe, and to procure the liberty at least of the Most Christian King Louis XVI, and of his august family, captives with him in a prison, and daily exposed, like him, to fresh dangers. With a view to attain a result so calculated to produce a general peace, so much in accordance with the laws of humanity, so loudly called for by the ties of consanguinity and the honour of the crown, I yielded to the repeated



demands of the French ministry, and addressed two notes to them which stipulated for neutrality, and for the retreat of the troops of both nations stationed along the respective frontiers.

“ Whilst this concession afforded a probability that my double proposal would be accepted, the question of the withdrawal of the troops was modified by the French ministry. They were desirous of keeping up a part of their army in the vicinity of Bayonne, under the specious pretext of an apprehended invasion from England, but in reality to employ them in such manner as to France might seem most convenient; so that by maintaining a formidable force in our neighbourhood, a heavy burden was imposed upon us, owing to the necessity of keeping up, on our side, a force sufficient to protect us against any eventual insults from an ill-disciplined and restless soldiery.

“ The French ministry also affected to speak in each line of their communication in the name of the *French republic*, in order to lead us in this manner into an acknowledgment of it by implication, as well as by the fact of our admitting its diplomatic correspondence.

“ I had ordered, on my part, that, in transmitting to Paris the two last notes I had dictated, the most effectual and conciliatory means should be exerted on behalf of Louis XVI. and his unfortunate family.

“ If I was unwilling to require beforehand a mitigation of the fate of that monarch as a positive condition of the neutrality, this forbearance had for object to avoid injuring the success of a cause in which I took so deep an interest. I was well convinced, however, that, unless they displayed the most consummate bad faith, the French ministry could not help acknowledging that my request and interference, offered in so urgent a manner, at the very moment of the presentation of the notes, were so intimately connected with them, that the conditions of neutrality and of disarming could never be entertained without coupling with them the acceptance of the mediation. . . . My abstaining from a previous declaration to that effect was merely owing to a feeling of delicacy, and in order that the French ministry might meet from the parties which then agitated France, and still disturb her repose, less opposition to their endeavours in the accomplishment of the good work which I gave them credit for desiring to bring about.

“ Their bad faith soon became manifest, when, refusing to attend to the request and mediation of the sovereign of a powerful and generous nation, they dwelt exclusively upon the point of our admitting their notes thus qualified; and each fresh entreaty on our part was answered by a threat of the immediate recall of the French chargé d'affaires at our court.

“ Pending this stormy and often insulting discussion, they were perpetrating in Paris the cruel and unheard-of murder of a sovereign ; and at the time when I was, along with the whole Spanish nation, a prey to grief and indignation, the French ministry obstinately insisted upon treating with me, assuredly not with any hope of my compliance, but in order to level a fresh insult at me and at my people ; for they felt that, under such circumstances any demand on their part was no other than an act of bitter derision which a sense of our own dignity would forbid us to tolerate.

“ The chargé d'affaires of the republic insisted on his passports ; they were given to him. . . . At that moment a French vessel seized a Spanish one on the coast of Catalonia ; I immediately ordered the officer in command to resort to reprisals. Intelligence was brought in regular succession that other captures had been made, and that at Marseilles, and in several other ports of France, an embargo had been laid on Spanish shipping. At last war was declared against us on the 7th of this month, though it had been actually waged without any such declaration, ever since the 25th of the preceding month ; for such is the date of the letters of marque issued against our ships of war and trading vessels, as is proved by the papers found on board the French privateer the *Renard*, Captain J. B. Lalanne, when it was recaptured by our

brig the *Ligero*, under the orders of Lieutenant Don Juan de Dios Topete, along with a Spanish vessel, laden with powder, of which the privateer had taken possession.

“ In consequence of these provocations, and of the hostilities thus commenced by France without any declaration of war, I have given the necessary orders for checking and repelling the enemy, and falling upon him by land or sea, wherever he may be found. I have also determined, and I ordain, that war against France, her possessions and her inhabitants, be made public in this capital, and that throughout my dominions the requisite measures of defence be adopted for the protection of my subjects and the annoyance of the enemy. . . . Let this decree be well understood in the council; who shall carry it into effect as far as concerns them.

“ Aranjuez, the 21st of March 1793.”

“ To the Count de la Cañada.”

In this manifesto, conveying in unostentatious and unvengeful language the expression of deep sorrow, the King of Spain resents and deplores far less a personal offence, than he regrets the ill success of his efforts to save Europe from the evils he had foreseen: those efforts were not confined to mere professions; their sincerity is attested by his generous proceedings and by the conduct he actually pursued. They were calculated to soften the most envenomed hearts,

had it not been for the fatal influence of the men who ruled over the Convention. This manifesto, and the facts I have previously adverted to, will, if calmly considered, evince, I repeat it, that neither blind fanaticism nor aristocratic egotism, any more than the urgent entreaties of French emigrants or the suggestions of foreign cabinets, drove us into the war. Insult and aggression did not emanate from Spain. We accepted, but we had not provoked the war. In thus accepting, and in courageously sustaining it, we were influenced by no other than a sense of national honour and independence,—those vivifying and conservative passions, without which nations would be disgraced by an enemy who should insult and wound them with impunity! Our country was threatened in her religious opinions, in her political laws, in her peaceful habits.

Accordingly, she did not display on this occasion a silent loyalty, reluctantly submitting to the sacrifices imposed, as in the five years' war, by a capricious ministry.<sup>1</sup> In 1793, the public voice was unanimous in calling for war against France; nor did it vent itself in mere clamour. The nation was not satisfied with urging on the war; each one placed his property at the dis-

<sup>1</sup> The war waged by Spain and France against England, under the administration of Count Florida Blanca, respecting the American question.

posal of the state,—the nobleman tendered his wealth, the poor man his pittance.<sup>2</sup>

Spain never displayed, at any time, a more unanimous or determined will. The patriotic donations of France in defence of liberty, in 1789

<sup>2</sup> Enthusiasm displayed itself in the very lowest classes of society. The patriotic gifts lavished for upwards of two years, exhibit an example without its parallel in the history of modern nations. The official gazettes, in which the donations were recorded, presented the names of common workmen, of obscure artisans, of lonely women, of poor people supported by public charity. The indigent blind of Madrid and of other large towns, where their only resource is derived from the popular songs and wailings which they hawk about in the streets—bards of a novel character, not content with gratuitously hawking about the war against France, they would also loosen their purse-strings, and contribute out of their poor but honest earnings. Some of them made donations at which the rich man's pride would not have blushed: humble manufacturers, who had no ready money to bestow, supplied goods and the product of their trade or labour: those who possessed nothing solicited to be enlisted as common soldiers. The municipalities of the kingdom, which, being for the most part elective, correctly represented public opinion, rivalled one another in activity and devotedness to their country's cause: they raised extraordinary means for equipping and arming the volunteers of their respective districts. Many persons tendered their property and their personal services; widows consented to part with their children. A single fact will suffice to illustrate the public feeling. The enthusiasm or instinct of national preservation were at such a height that the government had no occasion to resort to the ordinary method of drawing for the militia or of recruiting for the service. The army was placed upon a war footing by the surprising influx of Spaniards of all classes, who, of their own free will, hurried forward to fill its ranks.

and 1790, did not amount to a tenth part of the donations made in Spain for the support of the throne and of the independence of the country. This liberality was ascribed by superficial observers to the exclusive influence of priests and monks. There is no doubt that the religious spirit of our clergy, alarmed at seeing their altars in danger, had its share in this splendid manifestation of the public feeling; but there existed in Spain a sentiment even more energetic than the spirit of religion—this was the sense of nationality, of the ancient, the immemorial honour of a mighty people, the declared enemy of every institution, of every control, nay, of every benefit, which foreigners might attempt to impose upon it. If some few were found to envy in secret the new political principles of France, not one, I affirm it, would have consented to receive them as a gift from the conventional proconsuls. . . . High-minded, heroic nation! a nation worthy of the happiness of which her destiny has so long been sparing towards her!

## CHAPTER XII.

Perfidious and absurd imputation refuted.

M. ANDRÉ MURIEL, a Spanish refugee priest residing in Paris since 1813, published in that city, in 1827, a French translation of the English work entitled *Spain under the Kings of the House of Bourbon*, from the accession of Philip V. in 1700, to the death of Charles III. in 1788, &c.

The translation is accompanied by notes and supplements added to the text of Mr. Coxe's work, which terminated with the close of the reign of Charles III. Proceeding from that point of time, M. Muriel makes an attack against the government of Charles IV. He was quite at liberty to write and to qualify the events of the latter reign, by way of commenting upon, and of continuing Mr. Coxe's history ; but his only object has been to gratify a feeling of resentment against myself. Instead of relating positive facts, of a nature which entitles them to be correctly described, he indulges in accusations founded on conjecture ; he hastens beforehand, of his own authority, and upon mere supposition, to pass judgment upon a monarch,



and upon a period of events of which history has not yet supplied the records. Some angry voices have no doubt been heard, some obscure calumniators have attempted to asperse the memory and the reign of Charles IV. This grave subject has not, however, up to the present time, been discussed by a calm and conscientious writer; by him who weighs men and events; who takes into account the times, the intentions, the very chances. The subject, in a word, has not yet found its proper historian.

To lower the character, to contest the personal merit of any one, without possessing or exhibiting proofs of an assertion, is tantamount to an act of defamation. But if to such defamation, which can only be an itching for slander, be fearlessly added imposture in holding up as positive and notorious certain alleged facts which have no existence, or in wilfully suppressing others the knowledge of which would demonstrate the truth in its proper light, what else is it but actual calumny?

It has already been seen upon what clear and authentic data I have established the statement of my conduct during the four first months of my elevation to the ministry, from the 15th November 1792 to the 28th March 1793, the date of the published declaration of war against France: my readers have the means of estimating the value of the insinuations of the pretended historian who

places me under the necessity of refuting him. If he has deemed himself at liberty to insult me with impunity because I had the appearance of being dead, and the dead cannot take their own part,—well then! he who was supposed to be no longer of this world claims to speak in his turn, and summons all those compilers of falsehoods before the tribunal of public opinion. . . . I meet them with facts and dates,—testimonies they cannot pretend to reject. The only difficulty of my task proceeds from the necessity of classifying and refuting, one by one, imputations as vague as they are false and insidious, since they present events through a distorted medium, purposely confound dates, and heap calumny upon calumny. My defence will be methodical and unreserved.

At the close of the ninth additional chapter of the sixth and last volume of his translation, under the title of *Conclusion of the Work* (p. 249), M. André Muriel presents, in the form of an epilogue, a short review of the occurrences of the epoch under the reign of the Bourbons to the end of 1788,—year of the demise of Charles III.

After pointing out the crisis which threatened Spain, owing to the contagious anarchy which convulsed France, he speaks as follows :

“It forms no part of our subject to determine in what degree the reign of a weak prince like Charles IV, and the inexperience of a favourite to whom he confided the management of state

affairs, have influenced the course and progress of the French revolution, and, as a necessary consequence, the destinies of Europe."

He proceeds to add :

"It is reasonable, however, to suppose, that, if death had not summoned away Charles III. at the commencement of the French revolution, a prince attached as he was to his family, with the ascendancy which his age, his experience, and especially the firmness of his character could not fail to command, would have proved himself of the greatest service to the French monarch under the difficulty of his position, by his advice, by the steps he would have adopted, or the assistance he would have procured him at a seasonable moment."

Both the above passages are literally extracted from the work : those who are unacquainted with the particulars of the contemporary history of our country will place faith in such malevolent insinuations, and believe that the government of Charles IV, when it was confided to my charge, might have directed at will the course of the French revolution ; but that it favoured, on the contrary, its progress, and basely contributed to the evils which it entailed upon Europe. They will also believe that Charles IV. did absolutely nothing to save the unfortunate Louis XVI. . . . Assuredly my bitterest enemies, those most eager to injure me, have not, in this instance, gone to such lengths as Father Muriel.

To ascribe to my ministerial policy such an influence over the French revolution and the evils of Europe, is an imputation so singular, of so novel a character, that no one had yet uttered or probably harboured the idea. Is this nothing more than an absolute ignorance of facts, or is it sheer bad faith and a monomania for slander? For how are we otherwise to account for such cruel levity in a matter of so delicate a nature? but this sainted man could not but be aware that the minister, Count Florida Blanca, on whom he lavishes such encomiums, was the exclusive director of the policy of Charles III. during a period of twelve years, until the death of that prince; that he likewise exclusively directed the policy of Charles IV. in 1789, 1790, 1791, and a part of 1792, until the close of February, when he was replaced by Count d'Aranda. There was an interval of four years from the convocation in France of the States General until my assuming the direction of the Spanish cabinet, on the 15th November 1792. . . . . The French revolution dates, at least, from the month of February 1787, epoch of the first opening of the Assembly of the Notables. From that moment the revolution moved in an onward course, and grew more powerful in its progress; it took a decided turn in 1789, and precipitately hurried forward to its object in the subsequent years. . . . .

When Charles IV. called me to the ministry in November 1792, the work was accomplished

and consummated. Louis XVI. had been dethroned and imprisoned; royalty had been abolished and the republic installed; the Jacobins had reached the highest degree of enthusiasm; a frightful anarchy was organized with a character more appalling than it ever had assumed. How can this man, who ventures in a doctoral tone to pronounce upon the events of that epoch, dare to render me responsible for what has been done or what has remained undone, and ascribe to me a decisive, all-powerful influence over the course and progress of the French revolution, when, politically speaking, I was not yet in existence,—when I was so far from having the slightest share in the government of the kingdom? Strange complication of ignorance and calumny! Was Muriel, then, so utterly unacquainted with what I did on the very first day of my entering the ministry?

Placed as I am under the painful necessity of often repeating myself, I claim the indulgence of my readers.

All that remained for the French revolution to accomplish, was the perpetration of one more act of atrocity ere it plunged headlong into a career of which it could not foresee the bounds; this was the crime of regicide, and everything was in readiness for committing it. I endeavoured to arrest the deed; disdaining the ordinary rules of diplomacy, I laid aside the lofty tone of official

language. The critical situation of France and of Europe, the imminent danger impending over the victim devoted to destruction, authorised my adopting an extraordinary course. Entreaties, money, solicitations suited to every emergency, burdensome engagements, whatever was calculated to bring about the desired result, every possible means were exerted on the occasion. I evinced neither lukewarmness nor the slightest hesitation; I beseeched other cabinets to join their efforts with mine, sought friends and support in all directions, and have assuredly not to reproach myself with having remained for an hour, for a single minute, inactive, from the moment the administration was confided to my care. Whose was the fault?—assuredly not mine, if these efforts came too late!

Let us even suppose that my efforts had been crowned with success: the French revolution would only have produced a change of government—a painful transition, doubtless to be deplored, but of frequent occurrence in the history of every country; for, had our mediation been accepted, the main danger, that of an armed intervention, which raised the passions of the people to their greatest height, would have wholly disappeared. France, grown more calm, would probably have listened to the counsels of moderation. Impressed with the advantages of peace, having no longer the dangers of the

moment to apprehend, the powers of Europe would have been less bent upon their warlike system. How many examples of a similar political compliance have not been witnessed by men younger than myself? It needed no long study of the practical policy of courts to consider the question in this light. Louis XVI. once rescued from death, there was everything to hope, after some lapse of time, from the national habits of Frenchmen, from the very excess of republican violence: they could not fail to be soon weary of popular tyranny. The moderate, well-intentioned, and conciliating conduct of other powers would have hastened the return of France to monarchical ideas. Left to her own direction, and at liberty to choose, France would sooner or later have bethought herself to recall the ancient dynasty of her kings.

Such were my sentiments, such my expectations. Oh! who would have then prognosticated to me that at a future day any one would have dared to accuse me of having encouraged and fomented the progress of the French revolution!

Let us now attend to this writer,<sup>1</sup> who, in order to depreciate Charles IV, alleges, upon his wonted ground of conjectures, what the father would have done in the place of his son, had not Providence called him away a few years before.

<sup>1</sup> *Escribidor*, says the manuscript—meaning a scribbler.—E.

Charles III. lived long enough to witness and appreciate the spirit of innovation, the deep-rooted restlessness, which were fermenting in France. The wavering conduct, the errors of the ministry of Louis XVI, the open struggle between the parliaments and the court, the inadequacy of the remedies applied to daily increasing dangers—were not these the manifest forebodings of a portentous revolution on the point of breaking out in a kingdom with which Spain was so closely connected?

Nevertheless it has never, to my knowledge at least, been asserted that the Spanish monarch had endeavoured, at the approach of this imminent danger, to exercise an effectual influence over the counsels of France, or to avail himself of his ascendancy over the other cabinets of Europe with a view to avert in time the storm which impended over all. Seized with apprehension, dejected, sharing the pusillanimous hesitation of his prime minister, Charles III. suddenly suspended the useful reforms to which he had applied himself; he exclusively confined his attention to a gloomy and rigorous superintendence over his own dominions. Florida Blanca, who knew not how to govern except by ministerial *absolutism*, was distrustful of every one. Insulating himself from all, he forbade every foreign communication; the supreme authority wrapped itself up in impenetrable mystery in order to crush the very semblance of discussion; he consummated the de-



struction of the council of state, and made the whole administration centre in his own person. The other secretaries of state, whatever might be their department, were bound to meet in general deliberation, which he insisted upon presiding in person; a measure very well calculated, no doubt, for establishing a unity of operations, but the chief object of which was to place everything under his exclusive and absolute direction.<sup>2</sup> His loyalty was never called in question; his intentions were doubtless pure, but he committed a signal error. Divested of the aid he might have derived from a more unfettered discussion in the *council of our statesmen*, he had to contend alone against every difficulty. Irresolute, perplexed, weak under circumstances calling for energy, this diplomatist,

<sup>2</sup> This measure, sanctioned by a royal decree of 8th July 1787, virtually created a *council of ministers*, hitherto unknown in Spain. Count Florida Blanca named it the *Supreme State Junta*; a title well adapted to palliate in some degree the removal of the old *council of state*, the functions of which appeared to him, at that time, of a dangerous tendency. An absolute power was thus centred in the ministerial body, which was already subordinate to the directing minister, who exercised every control over it. When Charles IV. became sensible of the disadvantages of that organization, he immediately restored the old council of state on a broad and solid basis; all the ministers were to be members of this council, and to take part in its deliberations.—(Royal Decree of 28th February 1792.) Ever since 1787 no personal responsibility, in regard to the policy of Spain, had rested upon any other minister than Count Florida Blanca.

who had distinguished himself by the suppleness and resources of his mind when representing Spain at the court of Rome, always dreaded to act, and failed to accomplish anything in a more elevated sphere. The convocation of the States General of France came upon him by surprise whilst in this state of moral languor.

Charles III, when at the point of death, had recommended this minister as a *protecting angel* in the critical condition in which was placed the mighty kingdom our neighbour. Charles IV. accordingly accepted Florida Blanca at his father's hands, and gave him his implicit confidence. Can it then be deemed an act of weakness on the part of a son, who has just ascended the throne, that he should adopt the advice of his father, and rely upon the experience and talents of a minister imposed in some measure upon him as if by hereditary transfer?

Florida Blanca continued to pursue, under the new reign, a policy characterised by the same features; for it was timid, irresolute, expectant,—often contradictory, always equivocal and mysterious.

For the rest, the manifest strides of the French revolution did not prevent his treating with it in virtue of the family compact. He demanded, in 1790, the assistance stipulated in that compact, on the occasion of the war on the point of breaking out between Spain and England. Had it not been for the reconciliation, which opportunely occur-

red to suspend hostilities, a war so imprudently undertaken would have involved us in the struggle which France had to maintain against the principal powers of Europe. Charles IV. was forewarned in a private conversation with the British ambassador. His majesty repaired the error of his minister, and ordered forthwith an amicable settlement of the disputed point. Nevertheless, Count Florida Blanca had revived the family compact. No subsequent measure bore any infringement upon it; on the contrary, so long as the ordinary communication was kept up between the two courts, they viewed and treated each other as being mutually allied.

Neither did these occurrences prevent Count Florida Blanca from lending a willing ear to the Emperor Leopold's proposals. It was a question of a joint understanding on the subject of the armed *intervention* in the affairs of France. Would to Heaven that the views of this illustrious prince had been frankly adopted by the other powers, according to the terms which he suggested with apparent earnestness of purpose! The object of those views, in fact, their ostensible object at least, —and I can have no doubt of Leopold's sincerity, — was not to startle France by exorbitant pretensions, but to agree to the principles of reform which were rendered indispensable by the situation and wants of that kingdom; to require no more of her than a proper respect for the dignity!

of a monarchical government, and a check upon those reckless writers who disturbed the tranquillity of nations: this species of intervention, urged Leopold, was in reality the offer of an alliance with the immense majority of Frenchmen, a majority openly pronounced in favour of a temperate monarchy; and it was the most effectual means of supporting it against the factious minority who perverted the public mind, and aimed at establishing a democracy. In accordance with this plan, the Empire, Austria, Prussia, the Swiss Cantons, Sardinia, and Spain, powers alike interested by their geographical position in the maintenance of social order in France, were to assume a strong but pacific attitude towards her; to determine upon a congress, to which France should be invited, when her right to regulate her own internal government should be acknowledged, and the common rights and reciprocal interests of all the powers should be likewise fixed and assented to. No appeal was to be made to arms, except in the event of France obstinately refusing her concurrence in such reasonable measures.

Had this project been adopted ere the government had fallen into the hands of the democratic faction; had it been carried into effect with good faith and unity of purpose, without regard for individual interests or exaggerated pretensions,—the French revolution might have taken a happy turn.

Unfortunately, however, the cabinets were not agreed respecting the conditions; the majority would compel France to restore an *unrestricted* monarchical authority, and would force the revolution to retrograde to the 20th of June 1789; a pretension which may have been useful and just in itself, but was wholly unattainable in the then state of the public mind. Such was, nevertheless, the condition which Florida Blanca required for the adhesion of Spain, in concert with Prussia, Sardinia, and especially Russia, on which he placed his greatest reliance. He had little experience of the character of the Empress Catherine, who fanned the flame of the coalition, though she had nothing less at heart than to afford it any effectual support.

There was no less misunderstanding as to the time and mode of carrying their views into effect. Those who desired to re-impose the yoke upon France were in no hurry to act: they hoped that the progress of anarchy and the revolutionary excesses would lay the country open to invasion, and render its projected dismembering an easy task. With respect to Spain in particular, Count Florida Blanca had but faint hopes of a good understanding with the other cabinets: whether he felt displeased at Leopold's sentiments; dreaded that by taking the lead, he might be left to engage single-handed in a disproportioned struggle; or that he preferred keeping back, and watching the

movements of other powers,—he wholly neglected to place Spain in an attitude suited to the emergency ; he omitted to form any friendly alliance, and had not the common prudence to dissemble his violent hatred against France.

Amidst this irresolution and uncertainty, the most favourable opportunities for applying political remedies were allowed to slip away, if any did really exist which could arrest the revolutionary disease. The acceptance by Louis XVI. of the constitutional act, a general amnesty, the decree of restraint issued against the *clubs*, followed in succession ; and Leopold paused in his warlike movements. He “ proposed to the coalesced powers to suspend carrying their respective engagements into effect, without prejudice to their afterwards pursuing them if fresh disorders should break out, and France should transgress the limits within which she appeared disposed to confine herself for the future.”

It was during this interval of lucid reasoning that the Emperor Leopold consented to re-admit M. de Noailles in the character of ambassador from Louis XVI, and was the first of all European sovereigns who allowed the tri-coloured flag to wave unmolested in his harbours.

The official demonstrations and replies of other princes, when Louis XVI. announced to them that he had accepted the constitution, bore a less peaceful aspect. None of the replies, however,

were of a repulsive nature, except those of Spain, Sweden, and Russia. Ever yielding to the suggestions of the latter, the Spanish minister declared that the Catholic King would pause until positive proofs were afforded that the King of France was in the enjoyment of his full liberty ; and that, so long as he was not convinced of the monarch's having freely accepted the constitution, he, the King of Spain, would decline replying to every despatch transmitted to him in the name of the King of the French.

Loud were the complaints beyond the Pyrenees when this declaration became known. Florida Blanca disguised from Charles IV. the more moderate course of proceeding recently adopted by the Emperor Leopold. The first intelligence the king obtained of it was from the minister plenipotentiary of the court of Austria. At the same time, M. d'Urtubize, the chargé d'affaires of France, succeeded in procuring a private audience of his majesty. At this interview, M. d'Urtubize depicted in the strongest colours the dangers to which such conduct exposed Louis XVI, and the hostility or cruel indifference evinced by certain cabinets. "The factions which have vowed hatred to the throne only await a pretext on the part of foreign monarchs. They discover it in those hostile manifestations against the system of constitutional monarchy which France has chosen for herself. The existence of that monarchy, in its

present state, depends on the support which may be afforded to Louis XVI. by the friendship of monarchical cabinets, and especially of the Spanish king and of the other branches of his dynasty, allied to him by virtue of the *family compact*. The exasperation of the public mind on the one hand, the instigations of the promoters of democracy on the other, cannot fail to call in question the duty of obedience to Louis XVI. He will be held up as guilty of duplicity, and of conniving with the emigrants and with the dissenting cabinets. If the King of the French is thus attacked, if he should succumb, the monarchy will die with him."

Charles IV. found himself unsupported; bereft of any other council than the *supreme junta*, consisting, as I have observed, of none but the ministers secretaries of state, and rarely venturing upon the incidental discussion of our foreign policy. The king determined to look for information without resorting to his prime minister. He sought the advice of those he deemed worthy of his confidence. M. d'Aranda was one of the persons consulted. With his wonted boldness of character he stigmatised the conduct of Count Florida Blanca as bearing the impress of folly and temerity: the latter could not boast of many friends; the higher nobility felt themselves humbled by him, and ardently longed for his downfall; the chief public functionaries, reduced to a species of nonentity in all that concerned state matters, shared the dis-



content of the nobility. The clergy were not better disposed towards him. All the information which the king was enabled to obtain proved unfavourable to the minister. Such were the motives of his disgrace.

Charles IV, who entertained much esteem for Florida Blanca, and had long granted him his confidence, was compelled to yield to the paramount interest of protecting the head of the house of Bourbon from danger : this consideration appeared to have been compromised or neglected through the policy of Florida Blanca ; the king resolved to pursue a different course ; Count d'Aranda was appointed, *ad interim*, prime minister ; his name was popular in France ; his appointment might prove extremely serviceable to Louis XVI, who stood in great need of all the support that Spain could afford him.

I have already detailed the subsequent events from that period until war was declared.

It only remains for me to inquire of M. Muriel how, and in what manner, the conduct of Charles IV, and mine in particular, when I was raised to the ministry, could have exercised any influence over the French revolution. I shall yet have occasion to put a few questions to him on the subject in the course of these Memoirs.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## Preliminary Observations respecting the War with the French Republic.

PROTRACTED wars of more recent occurrence, a state of interminable confusion, the obstinate struggle of principles at variance with each other, of private interests and of every species of ambition,—all having their rise in the French revolution, have obscured and nearly obliterated the part taken by Spain in the coalition of European powers. Nevertheless, our campaigns of 93, 94, and 95, are singularly entitled to remembrance.

Victory had declared in every quarter in favour of France. Fortune had betrayed the efforts of all who ventured to compete with the rising republic, . . . . . whilst Spain added fresh gems to her ancient military crown, and shone, not only in successful combats, but in the display of unbending firmness: she beheld the despondency of her allies without yielding to dismay.

The faithful portraiture of the reign of Charles IV, a final tribute which my loyalty pays to his memory, will recount many achievements, the more glorious for our army as its character had

been, for a long time, as it could not fail in many respects to be, inferior to that of the French army. The theory and practice of the science of war had been completely neglected under the two preceding reigns. Nothing had been foreseen by the two ministers to whom I was succeeding ; no preparations had been made : the only substitute I could discover for the want of experience and discipline was to be found in the good disposition of the officers, the devotedness of the soldiers ; in a word, in the national spirit.

Nevertheless, we gleaned a sufficiently ample harvest of glory in this unequal, difficult, and, as it were, extemporized war. It abounded in acts of courage and even of heroism. If in those modern times, grants of land, of titles of honour, of ready-made elderships, had been, as in our ancient struggles with the Moors, or in our enterprises in the New World, the admitted, the necessary reward of military distinction, how many thousand Spanish families would now date their nobility and their fortune from the memorable campaigns of 1793, 1794, and 1795 !

In vain does a spirit of envious malevolence affect to throw into oblivion that brilliant episode of the national history. Spanish valour and a wise policy preserved the country from a foreign yoke. What nation adjoining France can boast that its ancient institutions escaped destruction, that its provinces were not mutilated, nor its treasures

dilapidated? How many sacrifices had not each of those invaded nations to submit to, in order to ransom by dint of supplications a portion of their territory?

If our country was enabled to preserve itself from such humiliations, and from losses so painful, it was indebted for this to its brave army. Proud France no doubt maintained her imposing attitude towards us; but Castilian pride yielded none of her rights, and never dreaded to face her formidable opponent. It was then made a subject of reproach to me that I had by anticipation promised victory to our arms; the French themselves, in their official accounts, have redeemed my word. After a struggle of three years, in which the honours of the war were equally balanced, Spain appeared to yield for a moment to superior forces; but the colossal power of France, victorious over her other enemies, far from deeming itself safe in the portion of the Spanish territory of which it had obtained possession, proposed peace to us upon equal terms; and this peace was accepted without our yielding a single inch of territory, or submitting to the slightest pecuniary sacrifice. The republic was, moreover, taught by this war that our Peninsula was irrevocably closed against all foreign dominion.

For my share in this great crisis, I deem it sufficient that I was placed at the helm of government, and had the satisfaction or the merit

of selecting, of employing, of aiding by all the means in my power, the illustrious defenders of the country, who so valiantly fought her battles.

Honour to the brave leaders and to the soldiers of our glorious army!

There cannot justly be denied to Charles IV. another merit, the lustre of which must reflect upon the minister who, as the confident of his wishes, was directed to superintend and direct their being carried into effect. This merit consists in the loyalty, the uprightness of his policy. Naturally attached to France, his intention was to rescue, not to enslave her. Persuaded that she longed for the restoration of order, but was ruled by a tyrannical faction, an audacious minority; that she was less intent upon fighting for an absurd democracy than for her independence threatened by foreign aggression; wherever our victorious troops penetrated, the king ordered that the white flag should be immediately hoisted,—announced his intervention as being that of a sincere ally, of a disinterested friend, who desired alike the happiness of France and of Spain. Accordingly, the political morality of Charles IV. was never called in question: the republicans themselves did justice to his sincerity. However mortified he might have been at the personal offences unsparingly heaped upon him, Charles IV. never sought to take his revenge upon France; he never yielded

assent to any project of dismembering her ; and of all the sovereigns of Europe, he whom the republic had at first affected to brave, was the first whose friendship she solicited, to whom she subsequently gave the most positive proofs of respectful deference. This observation has not escaped French writers ; they have all paid homage to the noble frankness, the high morality, of the Spanish monarch.

It is proper to observe in this place, that the war on the part of Spain, and of the other allied powers, which failed in some measure to make an impression upon the republic, produced, nevertheless, a result of considerable importance. The French government modified its system of propaganda and of general subversion with respect to the nations who entered into treaty with it : it was admitted in principle that the republic was bound to pay deference and to exhibit sincere good faith towards those sovereigns who relinquished the project of attacking her. If this principle of wise reciprocity was not applied without exceptions, certain it is, however, that the Kings of Spain and Prussia, and many princes of the Germanic empire, after having vigorously asserted their honour and their rights, were thenceforward treated with respect. This was not the case with regard to those states which, during the common danger, and whilst the republican frenzy was at its height, main-

tained a cowardly neutrality which merely betrayed their weakness: such were Genoa, Venice, Switzerland, and Tuscany.

I have now fully answered the objections of those who blamed me, at first for resorting to arms, and afterwards for putting an end to hostilities. It is alleged that we failed to take advantage of the national energy; this reproach is equally unfounded. There is no doubt that the whole Peninsula protested as with one voice against the conduct of France; that Spain, like the rest of Europe, beheld in the coalition the only means of arresting the progress of the French revolution: but Spain never had the intention of co-operating in that crusade otherwise than within the limits marked out by the coalition itself. Notwithstanding the embarrassments of the treasury, which had long been exhausted, and with no other disposable resources than such as were presented by the spontaneous generosity of the nation, never having harboured the thought of receiving foreign subsidies, Spain developed extraordinary means for the contest: nevertheless the idea of a general levy of troops was not adopted, and could never enter a rational mind; first, because no civilized nation had set the example of it; secondly, because the incumbrance and enormous expense of such a multitude set in motion would have at once paralysed and endangered their efficacy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The reader will not have forgotten that the deplorable state

The sudden and monstrous reaction of France baffled the foresight and calculations of policy; still, in the third campaign, our army, already superior in numbers, had resumed the offensive with a vigour which filled the French with astonishment.

Peace was offered to us by the republic.

The details of the negotiation will be found in the sequel of these Memoirs.

Thus fall to the ground the insinuations of compilers of pamphlets who have spoken of this war in such terms of contempt, not knowing, or affecting ignorance of, the circumstances which preceded it, and of the manner in which it was carried on. I shall present the facts in their proper light. Spain so calumniated, so little known, will recover that portion of glory which it has been attempted to wrest from her.

of our finances was to be traced back to a very early period of time; and that scarcely four months had elapsed since I was appointed to the ministry, when I was under the necessity of embarking in a war for which no preparations had been made by my predecessors.



## CHAPTER XIV.

Continuation of the same subject.—King Charles IV. and his favourite.

M. DE PRADT inflicts at once upon me the vulgar appellation of *favourite*. This is his malignant interpretation of a title I always aspired to merit,—that of the *friend of my king*, which Charles IV. gave me throughout life. Strong in the testimony of my conscience, convinced that I shall receive justice at the hands of all who have known me, of every impartial man who may investigate my political career, I proudly reject the base qualification of *minion* or *favourite*, and every other appellation as inapplicable to the conduct I have faithfully pursued at the court of my sovereign as it is insulting to the distinguished favour which was bestowed upon me.

That favour never paralysed the acts of the other ministers: each of them was perfectly free in the exercise of the privileges of his department. I had often to confer with them for the good of the public service, and in order to introduce concord and harmony in the machinery of government; but I never attempted to govern single-handed, or

to transgress the limits of the power confided to me. The king's will was always the rule of my conduct; I did nothing without consulting him, not even in matters of little moment. Every weighty subject, whether relating to our internal or our foreign policy, I submitted without delay to the discussion of the council of state. So far from apprehending any display of talents or of knowledge in its members, I was eager to set them off; instead of encircling myself or the throne with men of plausible mediocrity, with servile nonentities, as a vulgar *favourite* would have done, I brought to light all men of acknowledged merit, and drew forth others from a state of complete obscurity. Unchecked by fear or by any feeling of jealousy, I set to each an active and conspicuous part, and thus reared up for future emergencies a crowd of talented men, who were afterwards found available when their services were required, and have, many of them, miraculously escaped the ravages of time and of political storms, to serve their country with credit to themselves at the present day.

With regard to myself, I never was guilty of any culpable proceeding or premeditated ambition. Charles IV. formed the determination of attaching to his person a subject who should be the special creature of his own making; who should have no other interest than that of his master; who should be indebted for everything

to his august benefactor; whose advice and judgment, unfettered by any previous influence or prepossession, might enlighten and support him in the critical situation in which Europe was then placed. Governed by that idea, which wholly and exclusively belonged to him, Charles IV. bound me to his person by every tie, made me an allowance out of his private purse, created me a grandee of Spain, adopted me as a member of his own family; in a word, he identified my existence with his own. This is assuredly true: but is it, therefore, to be supposed that he would have deposited in my hands the whole care and burden of the state,—of his own sovereign power? This I as assuredly deny: he neither would have confided the trust to me nor to any one else. Those who think otherwise have neither known nor seen Charles IV. in the intimacy of private intercourse. Jealous of his prerogative, to the full as much as his father Charles III, he wrote down or usually dictated his sentiments: after having thus declared his will or manifested his intentions, he would scarcely listen to a reply. A cautious or self-evident argument arrested his attention but for a moment: the starting-point was laid down, the principle of action established. He allowed, however, sufficient latitude for carrying it into effect; but he required a minute account of proceedings. Nor was his mind wholly free from a tendency to mistrust: not that he

willingly suspected a design of deceiving him ; he apprehended that his very ministers might be deceived. Whoever wandered from the rule established or the principle laid down was soon discharged from his service.

I carefully applied myself to acquire a knowledge of his intentions and scrupulously fulfil his views, which, in his judgment, were always correct and consistent with justice. By this conduct I won much of his confidence ; but it never was complete or exclusive ; he often preferred the advice of others to mine : as an instance of which, in the year 1806, he was dissuaded from the only measure which, if properly executed, was calculated, in my opinion, to protect his threatened crown. He occasionally maintained in place ministers whom I could have assuredly wished to see removed from his service ; the Marquis de Caballero amongst others, who so long held the seals of justice, and for a time added to it those of the war and marine departments.

This magistrate was a perpetual obstacle to the improvement of public instruction, and to all the salutary reforms I had meditated. Thus my power, which I fearlessly acknowledge was great, was nevertheless limited in extent : more than one proof of it will be afforded in the course of these Memoirs ; and the reader, having the facts before him, will judge whether that power, or the manner of its exercise, warrant my receiving the

injurious nickname of *favourite*, or whether it be not more correct to designate me as the true friend of the monarch and of my country. This, for the present, is enough. I return to M. de Pradt.

“From the remotest part of the palace, a favourite assumed to direct the armies as he governed the court.”

According to this assertion of M. de Pradt, no small share would accrue to me of the military renown of which our armies reaped so abundant a harvest, at first by their brilliant triumphs, and afterwards by their very reverses. Has M. de Pradt forgot our successes in the first campaign, our firmness in withstanding the disasters of the second, and the noble efforts of bravery and talent which arrested the progress of the French at the outset of the third campaign? But any praise or blame arising out of this war must be ascribed to others than to me : success or failure was not the work of one, but of many. The generals having all been pointed out and specially selected for the command, it was no longer the court, but the generals themselves, who, being assembled at a military council, of which I was no more than the nominal president, proposed and discussed plans, adopted the basis of them, regulated the operations, and were directed to carry them into effect, with a discretionary power to modify them in such manner as circumstances might render expedient. They immediately took their departure

for the army, enlightened with the suggestions of the council, confident of success, eager to add fresh lustre to the Spanish arms. These are facts known to all, of which there yet remain many eye-witnesses. It is, moreover, notorious that it is not the practice in Spain to direct the operations of the war by orders from the cabinet : were we likely to alter the practice at a time when we had to contend against an enthusiastic and valiant nation, who, disdaining the usual tactics of Europe, invented for itself a new science of war, and baffled at every moment the old system of warfare and all political combinations ?

## CHAPTER XV.

War against the Republic.—Reply to Archbishop de Pradt.

ALL the world knows M. de Pradt, whose fertile pen has supplied the politics of the time with so many memoirs and pamphlets. Amongst those productions of the moment, that which most attracted notice was a work published in 1816, bearing the title of *Historical Memoirs of the Spanish Revolution*. Of all the writers who have so bitterly inveighed against me, none have carried their slander to such lengths as the Archbishop of Mechlin. From what source has he drawn the gratuitous insults, the odious imputations, he heaps upon my head? Ignorant of all that occurred under the reign of Charles IV, he has picked up, commented upon, diluted the treacherous small-talk of Don Juan Escoïquiz, the bitterest of my enemies; he who is the first, the real author of all the evils of Spain, and whom I shall not fail to treat as he deserves in the progress of this work. M. de Pradt's penetration is here at fault; he has been the dupe of a wretched impostor; Escoïquiz is his oracle. Such is the poisoned source at which M. de Pradt has quenched his thirst. The French prelate has only

repeated the lesson of the Spanish priest ; nevertheless, the scholar was a man of more merit than the master.

Let us first quote the ex-archbishop, who unintentionally begins by sounding my praise.

“ Charles IV, King of Spain, was the only sovereign of Europe who, at the period of the ever-to-be-lamented catastrophe of Louis XVI, gave active proofs of the interest he took in the fate of this unfortunate prince. The proposals are well known which he caused to be publicly addressed to the governing powers who were on the point of sacrificing the life of the monarch ; and there can be no doubt that those advances were backed by many others intended to propitiate the men who at that time exercised a control over public opinion in Paris. That Louis XVI. was the head of the house of Bourbon — that he was seated on a family throne, were grounds sufficient to make it an object of the deepest anxiety for Charles IV. to avert the blow which threatened his unhappy relative. All his efforts were in vain ; and the consummation of that frightful act of iniquity became the signal of a war between France and Spain. If that crime carried consternation throughout Europe, it kindled a fire in the breasts of the Spaniards: too ardent to restrain the impressions made upon them, they fell upon the French who happened to be then in Spain, heedless of the considerations which should have



induced them to look upon those who were attracted to or were settled in their country through mere motives of private interest as perfect strangers to the event which excited this manifestation of animosity.<sup>1</sup> In a moment the fire spread over the whole nation ; all tendered their services and their money. Whatever modern history may at any time record of offerings made by patriotism to governments requiring its aid, was far surpassed by the Spanish people. Thus, whilst under the Constituent Assembly France had only furnished a sum of five millions ; whilst in England, at the commencement of the same war (1793), the public donations did not exceed forty-five millions ; the voluntary offerings in Spain amounted to seventy-three millions. This is assuredly the most splendid patriotic gift ever made by any modern nation."

Was M. de Pradt, whilst relating these facts, ignorant that the epoch of my entrance into the ministry perfectly coincides with the period at which those active and generous steps in favour of Louis XVI. were adopted? I am much inclined to think that he is only guilty of ignorance. How could he, in fact, wilfully suppress the cir-

<sup>1</sup> I have adverted elsewhere to the measures adopted by the government with the view of allaying the first burst of popular irritation ; its restraint quickly followed upon the evil : all the rights of hospitality were maintained. Great indulgence was, moreover, shown to some Frenchmen who had compromised themselves by expressions highly indiscreet during such a crisis.

cumstance, and level at me a train of abuse couched in the following words:

“ But it is not enough that a war should be undertaken to avenge the laws of honour and justice; its operations should be directed with consummate knowledge; and the want of it proved a stumbling-block to the success of the Spanish arms. *The same hand which paralysed the action of Spain in time of peace, paralysed its action during war.* From the remotest part of the palace, a favourite assumed to direct the armies as he governed the court; but as there is a wide contrast between them, and as an enemy, said Frederick, is no courtier, failure was the necessary consequence. The innate bravery of the soldiers, the devotedness of their commanders, were alike ineffectual, and the enemy penetrated into the very heart of Spain. The government entered into negotiations, and it is well known what are treaties by which the vanquished seeks protection against a reverse which is perhaps irretrievable. The French had crossed the Ebro, and were marching upon Madrid. They were arrested by the signing of a peace, of which the favourite assumed the name: thereby displaying even more folly than arrogance, and decking himself with a title recalling the public misfortunes; in contrast with other countries, where men are decked with titles which recall their prosperity and glory.”

The share taken by Spain in the general coalition against France has never been contested by those who have deliberately or accidentally alluded to this war. In the first campaign, our successes were at least as brilliant as those of any other power; none of them displayed more firmness than we did in moments of reverse. More fortunate than they, Spain at last, after having satisfied the call of honour, terminated the struggle at a seasonable moment, and alone succeeded in concluding a peace without humbling herself or submitting to any sacrifice. This result sufficiently proves that she sustained her part with becoming energy, and that her troops, though composed of fresh levies, and unpractised in military evolutions, were neither ill-instructed nor ill-commanded; for the absence of these two conditions cannot be supplied by valour alone in an open country and under every inclemency of the weather. It is moreover notorious, that wherever the republic was triumphant, and the vanquished were compelled to humble themselves before her, she evinced little mercy towards her enemies. If she did not fix her fangs upon Spain, or glut herself with booty; if she failed to enlarge her territory at the expense of ours; our protection from those evils is due to the courageous bearing of our warriors! In support of this reasoning, I may adduce the numberless testimonies recorded in all the accounts given by

the French themselves, who did not think that by doing justice to us they were lessening their own glory.

Of his own authority, however, and overlooking what has been officially published, as well as the uniform testimony of all historians,—mostly military men, who were witnesses of those memorable campaigns,—and acted a part in them,—M. de Pradt wrests from Spain and from me, in a few short lines, all the honour we achieved in a three years' struggle against the French republic! At what source, I repeat it, can he have drawn information of so novel a character? Throughout his *Memoirs*, when there is question of accusing me, he quotes no other authority than the assertions of Escoïquiz and of Ceballos, my open enemies.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, M. de Pradt declares that his only object has been to collect materials for the history of the Spanish revolution: he admits that it can only be written after scrupulously consulting the memoirs, the private accounts, the principal actors, eye-witnesses, &c.

"But at the present day," he adds, "each individual can only supply his own share of the work, confining himself to a detail of what he has witnessed and heard, and keeping strictly within the limits of truth; since it is unusual for eyes to see clearly, and for ears to hear distinctly: in times of revolution, there are party-eyes and party-ears; scarcely any others are to be found."—*Preface*, p. 9.

We thus find M. de Pradt pronouncing sentence upon himself: his eyes have seen nothing; his ears have only heard the men of the Escorial, of Aranjuez, and of Bayonne,—wretched intriguers who plunged Spain into an abyss of evils! He has

“The same hand,” says M. de Pradt, “which paralysed the action of Spain in time of peace, paralysed its action during war.” I have related, in sufficient detail, what was done during the four first months of my administration. M. de Pradt had himself related it with praise, without naming me, it is true,—having probably forgot who was minister at that period. Now, can it be alleged that to have thus acted was to have paralysed the action of Europe?<sup>3</sup>

But M. de Pradt’s inattention, or his suppression of facts, with respect to the war, are altogether unaccountable. Has this writer, whose object was to collect materials for history, been ignorant that in less than three months three Spanish armies hastened forward to the Pyrenees, before the republican troops had yet made their appearance? That many naval armaments were fitted out within the same time; and, amongst

only repeated the accounts derived from such men, has only read what they have written; and yet M. de Pradt concludes with this exclamation: “Woe to the vanquished whose vanquishers constitute themselves their historians and their judges!”

<sup>3</sup> I say, *having probably forgot who was minister at that period*: but M. de Pradt cannot plead utter ignorance of it; for in the small biography placed at the head of his work, he mentions me, at page 20, as prime minister in 1792. If the omission of the circumstance in the sequel of his Memoirs arises from absence of mind, it evinces a serious proof of inattention on the part of an historian who pretends to judge me with so much severity; if it be wilful forgetfulness, the reader will be enabled to estimate the good faith of my detractor.

others, the expedition destined for Toulon, consisting of twenty sail of the line, four frigates, numberless vessels of war and transports, with a select division of infantry and marines, which formed of itself a fourth army? That a second naval expedition was sent to South America; a third to the islands of the Sardinian dominions;<sup>4</sup> besides reinforcements to the Eastern seas, and a multitude of cruisers, which sailed from our harbours to protect our trade and to attack the enemy wherever he might be found?

M. de Pradt is perfectly silent respecting that immense and costly display of the naval forces of Spain, which were fitted out as soon as war was determined upon.

These simultaneous arrangements were rapidly carried into effect, and were productive of happy results. . . . Treaties of peace were also concluded with England and Portugal.

Such were the occurrences of a few days, from

<sup>4</sup> It was stipulated by an old treaty between the Kings of Spain and Sardinia, that in case of invasion of their respective states, they should afford one another the mutual aid of eight thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. Faithful to all his engagements, but unable to dispense with his land forces, which were needed in Spain, Charles IV. determined to offer to his ally an equivalent; he despatched a squadron under the orders of Don Francisco de Borja, which, amongst other operations, was to recover various islands of the Sardinian dominions, of which the French had taken possession. Those islands were, in fact, re-conquered, and immediately restored to their legitimate sovereign.

the moment of my accession to the ministry! M. de Pradt does not bestow a word upon that immense material of war, created as if by magic; upon those splendid military equipments; those well-stored magazines, which, as long as the war lasted, our armies ever found at hand. He further omits all mention of our hospitals, which were unquestionably, at that time, the most complete, the best organized of any in Europe.

What shall I say of the excellent selection made of the commanders of our land and sea forces? The greater number had been neglected; some, the most distinguished amongst them, had long been kept in utter disgrace under the ministry of Florida Blanca, who took umbrage at their talents, and whose mean and timid policy it had always been to lower the military spirit. Those whom I appointed to serve with the army of operations were neither courtiers, intriguers about the palace, nor importunate place-hunters; I selected our choicest officers wherever I could find them, without distinction of birth, party, or opinions. The military history of that period, agreeing with the testimony of natives and of strangers, has recorded the glorious names of Ricardos, Caro, Cuesta, Cagigal, Crespo, Izquierdo, Arias de Saavedra, La Romana, the gallant Duke d'Ossuna, the brave and rash Count de la Union, the cautious and veteran public servant Count de Colomera; of admirals Langara, Gravina, Alava,

Borja, Aristizabal, the pride of the Spanish navy ; and of that crowd of generals of all arms, amongst whom I shall quote Urrutia, Offaril, Vives, Solano, Escalante, Venegas, Novarro, Taranco, Morla, Mendinueta, Castaños, Someruelos, Amarillas, the Duke de Montellano, the Marquis de Cifuentes, the Baron de Kessel, Escofet, Cornel, Oquendo, Villalba, Adorno, &c. ; and you likewise, my excellent brother, Brigadier Don Diego de Godoy, who so nobly served your country, who added one more distinction to your family, and are now without a country and banished on my account by the unjust government of Ferdinand VII, that ill-fated monarch whose reign has been an uninterrupted series of proscriptions. O ! my brother ; nothing more is left to us for the support of our existence than the scanty remnant of the bounty of Charles IV, who has already paid the debt of nature amidst the sorrows of exile and penury, and whom we are soon likely to follow to the grave.<sup>5</sup>

The renown of a more recent date cannot efface

<sup>5</sup> I shall be excused for recording in this place the brotherly interest I feel for General Don Diego de Godoy, one of those who most distinguished themselves in the province of Roussillon. Passing over his various exploits in the three campaigns of 1793, 1794, and 1795, I shall merely advert to the circumstance that at the battle of Truillas, so glorious for our arms and so fatal to the French, he was the officer who, with two regiments of cavalry, a semi-brigade of carbineers, and a small body of infantry, broke through the principal column of attack,



that which was then achieved ; and the country is still indebted for its later and proud harvest of glory to most of the warriors of that period.

I feel a degree of pride, then, in repeating it : those illustrious warriors were not employed or selected at the caprice of an imbecile and presumptuous court. A government must be judged and characterized by the men it employs. At the period I speak of, independently of the disinterested and patriotic attention bestowed upon the choice of the generals and officers of the army, due credit must be allowed for the anxiety evinced in placing every military and political resource at their disposal. During the war the army was in want of nothing ; all the services were abundantly provided for, and without the slightest restriction ; the generals were left by the court at full liberty to act as occasion might require, and according to their unfettered judgment. Between them and

commanded by General Dagobert, made prisoners a part of that column, and secured the victory to the left wing of our army. The official gazettes, all public and private accounts, have ascribed the honour of this exploit to Don Diego de Godoy, who directed and led the charge. My beloved brother ! the implacable hatred of my enemies may have involved you in my disgrace, have driven you away as an exile from the domestic hearth ; but it never can erase your name from the list of the gallant defenders of the country, where it must ever be inscribed ! What matters to you the disgrace inflicted by a court which has rewarded the most distinguished men of our native country by banishment, a dungeon, or the penalty of death ?

the court there was perfect unity of mind : the moral feeling and the discipline of the army were admirably kept up ; harmony in every measure adopted was the result of a mutual and generous confidence. There existed no rivalry, no petty jealousy, no struggle arising from self-love, because the government made no distinction of persons, but showed honour to merit wherever it displayed itself, and liberally rewarded every brilliant or conspicuous deed of arms.

I am recalling the memory of an epoch the contemporaries of which are yet in sufficient numbers to belie me if I have overcharged the picture ; reference might, moreover, be made to the national archives, the official documents and reports.

After this explanation of facts, I ask M. de Pradt, and all who may have been prejudiced against me by the perusal of his work, whether the minister who gave effect in the manner above described to the will of the monarch deserves to be accused of having paralysed or nullified the action of the war.

We will now afford fresh evidence of M. de Pradt's unjust accusations.

## CHAPTER XVI.

Campaign of 1793.

THE council of war was composed of the general officers who were about to take the command of the several divisions of the army.

After a lengthened discussion of the plans and projects submitted to their examination, it was determined that there should be formed three armies: the one to occupy the frontier of Guipuscoa and Navarre; the other to defend the passes of Arragon; and the third, which was destined to assume the offensive, to enter Rousillon by the province of Catalonia, and from thence to threaten Languedoc, being sheltered and protected by the mountains of Corbières, the chain of which extends from the Pyrenées to the sea. The last plan was not unattended with difficulties, as we had in our front natural and artificial fortifications, which protected the enemy's frontier. But the point was determined by military and political considerations: first, the position of the French in Rousillon gave them a great advantage over us, if, as there were reasons to apprehend, they should be the first to attack, their rear being well secured, whilst Upper Catalonia might easily be invaded; se-

condly, Roussillon being once occupied, it was less difficult to maintain at that point a footing on the French territory, than towards the western Pyrenees, in the open country of the *Terre de labour*, presenting no fortified town, no military position to enable us to preserve the first advantages we might obtain, no means of covering a forced retreat. To these considerations of locality were to be added other powerful arguments. It was necessary to second the projected expedition against the ports in the South of France ; an expedition highly important, not only to draw off and divide the enemy's forces, but especially to take advantage of the disturbances at Marseilles, Lyons, Toulon, and the adjacent country, which had more or less risen against republican tyranny. An invasion on the side of Navarre would not find the same spirit of disaffection amongst the inhabitants. A coup-de-main upon Roussillon might, besides, if effected with rapidity, escape the penetration of the French government, as the attempt could not fail to appear rash on our part, or at least too daring for the first operation of an army so long inactive, and so ill-prepared for warlike operations on a large scale. An imposing display of our forces on the borders of Navarre and Guipuscoa would not fail to attract the notice of the French government ; whereas the army cantoned in the interior of Catalonia only showed

itself by its garrisons, which were barely adequate for the service of the advanced posts.

Such was the plan of the first campaign ; it was accordingly carried into effect, so great a reliance may be placed upon Spanish soldiers led on by a general like Don Antonio Ricardos.

Shortly afterwards, he entered, at the head of four thousand men, the province of Roussillon, in which sixteen thousand Frenchmen were scattered. When the other divisions of our army overtook the troops forming the advanced guard, Ricardos had already turned and possessed himself of the first line of defence of the western Pyrenees : he occupied Ceret ; was opening a military road on the Col de Portell, and removing his artillery to the plain. Those who are not intimately acquainted with the topography of that frontier are unable to estimate the value of so bold a movement. But the officers and soldiers of the Spanish army distinguished themselves by so many brilliant achievements in the course of this campaign, that their last feat obscures, as it were, the preceding one, and we are left to bestow upon all indiscriminate praise. In less than a fortnight, nearly the whole of Cerdagne, in advance of Puycerda, was occupied. A strong detachment stationed at La Jonqui re watched the fortress of Bellegarde. Forced from their position at Arles, and gradually driven back, the enemy were completely routed at the general en-

gement of Masden,<sup>1</sup> and abandoned the three intrenched camps which General Deflers had formed upon the Thuir. Our own army encamped at the Boulou, thereby commanding the *course* of the Tech; the siege of Bellegarde was entered upon, the inhabitants of Argèlès, Elna, and Cornella having submitted and given up their arms, could afford no assistance to the blockaded towns; and all the efforts of General Deflers to supply their wants proved utterly unavailing. The fort of Bains capitulated on the 3rd of June, and that of La Garde two days afterwards; the Upper Vallespir was conquered, and our frontier protected along that line; the castle of Bellegarde,

<sup>1</sup> The battle of Masden was fought on the 18th May, with forces inferior in number to the French. Our troops carried the three entrenched camps which defended the approaches to Perpignan: the enemy's artillery, ammunition, and provisions fell into our power. Our troops had accomplished a march of five leagues, in order to reach the ground where they fought for sixteen hours without intermission: having no horses to drag the cannon abandoned by the French, our soldiers cheerfully performed the task, and brought them to the Boulou, a distance of five post-leagues. Ricardos ordered them to halt at this place, and prepare their evening's meal. The intrepidity of our soldiers in this first general engagement spread so much terror at Perpignan, that the batteries of the town fired upon the French troops which were hurrying to seek shelter within its walls. Nearly a thousand national volunteers refused to continue their service during this campaign, and were ignominiously expelled the army by General Deflers. The civil authorities of Perpignan withdrew to Narbonne, carrying away with them the public records: many inhabitants quitted the town, and sought an asylum in the interior of the country.

half dismantled, surrendered on the 24th, after an obstinate resistance; Ricardos spread his forces along the Thuir, and in spite of the reinforcements which the enemy were receiving from the interior, we occupied anew the camp of Masden; the enemy were defeated in every encounter, and a part of our army took up a position at Truillás. The month of July was approaching; the French were anxious to commemorate by a battle the anniversary of the 14th, and redoubled their preparations in the hopes of winning a victory. Ricardos anticipated their project, chose his own ground, and himself offered them battle. The republican general was fearful of accepting it, and thus allowed the great day to pass away which his troops, after so many reverses, had selected for taking a glorious revenge.

Fresh successes opened to our army the plains of Roussillon as far as the Tet. Seeing the danger which impended over its capital, Deflers attempted to divide our forces by drawing them towards Cerdagne. The fortune of war was, at this point, alternately favourable and adverse to the French and to us; but our progress was not retarded by the advantages obtained by our enemies. All that remained to them in Roussillon were the entrenched camps in front of Perpignan and the position of Peyres Tortes. We stood in need of the latter to enable us to reach Rives-altes, and to rest our left wing upon Estagel. We soon dislodged the French from

Arles and Cabestany, but with heavy loss on both sides, especially at Cabestany, where General Fregeville was taken prisoner. Both attacks were attended with severe loss to us, for the enemy defended themselves with great obstinacy.

*Action of Peyres Tortes.*—In the heat of this engagement, which took place on the 28th, a battalion of the regiment of Navarre, and a few companies of provincial grenadiers, braving a shower of grape-shot, rushed, bayonet in hand, on the French batteries. Victory declared in our favour. The enemy received reinforcements from Salcès on the following morning, renewed the engagement, and forced us to abandon the position we had carried on the preceding day. Our troops fell back in good order upon Masden and Truillás. On this day the gallant General Courten, though attacked by forces four times his own numbers, stood his ground for seventeen hours, succeeded in extricating himself from a fearful conflict, and brought his division back to Truillás. Two republican generals, Joye and Vidal Saint Martin, fell in this desperate engagement. If these details were only to be found in the Spanish accounts, some doubt might be entertained of their veracity ; but they are recorded in the French reports, which are even more lavish in their praises of the valour we displayed : I merely transcribe their official documents.

The French made demonstrations of trying the



chances of another battle, and Ricardos took measures to disconcert their plans; but the enemy's army had been reinforced by ten battalions of old troops of the line, and the Convention had given positive orders to renew the attack. Dagobert had the command in chief of the whole army; the national representatives, Cassagne and Fabre, kept watch over his conduct, and fanned the flame of war; our soldiers were in readiness; our right was at Masden, the centre at Truillás, the left upon the Thuir, the advanced posts at Pontellás. Dagobert had pledged himself to bring the contest to a close by a decisive blow; his object was to force his way through the centre of our army, and thus cut off its retreat. Such was the movement to be operated at the battle of Truillás. The combatants fought hand to hand, and face to face; the engagement was worthy of being compared with the most obstinate and memorable that took place in the northern campaigns during this war. The details of it, which were so honourable to our army, have been published in the French accounts; our very adversaries acknowledged and admired the military skill displayed by Ricardos. From that event may also be dated the fame of so many gallant Spanish officers of all ranks who so quickly improved at the school of that illustrious commander. They won their honours in that immortal fight; the victory was wholly ours; the

lowest soldier had his share in it. It is but just, however, to name as deserving of more special notice the Generals Duke of Ossuna, Count de la Union, Courten, Crespo, Baron de Kessel, and Brigadier Godoy, my excellent brother, who decided and completed the rout of the column of troops of the line commanded by Dagobert, and upon which he had founded his highest expectations. The Thuir overflowed with dead bodies; the field of battle was so strewn with them as to impede the movements of the cavalry. Towards the close of this horrible slaughter, the French fought with a rage bordering on ferocity. Dagobert exhausted all the resources of the military art, and conducted himself with consummate skill; but all was in vain; the old regiments of Vernois, Champagne, Medoc and Boulonnais, the battalions of volunteers of the Gers and the Gard, were nearly annihilated. Dagobert estimates his loss at upwards of six thousand killed and wounded, and admits that ours could not amount to a third of the number. Desertion spread amongst the ranks of the French army; many fugitives took advantage of the night to escape to the mountains. . . . .

Was M. de Pradt ignorant of this historical achievement and of its consequences?

Up to that date the northern powers had also been successful in the war; but when the revolu-

tionary volcano vomited forth from its bosom a million of armed men, the northern star was obscured—Fortune deserted the standard of the coalition, with one exception only, the standard of Spain, which waved triumphant over the territory of the republic.

Let M. de Pradt consult the pages of history, and he will be compelled to admit an acknowledged truth, of far less importance to myself than to the honour of my country. “Insulated in her geographical position at the extremity of Europe, reduced to her own resources, Spain rivalled, in zeal and exertions, every other power in the vast efforts displayed during the campaign of 1793, and experienced none of the reverses which overwhelmed the coalition towards its close.” Let M. de Pradt compare the events which occurred from the north to the west of Europe at corresponding periods. At the famous battle of Hondschoote, fought on the 9th September, sixty thousand English, Hanoverians, Hessians, and Dutch, are defeated by forty thousand Frenchmen commanded by a general of slender talents;<sup>2</sup> whilst nearly at the same time, or a few days afterwards, (the 22nd September,)

<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding this victory, Houchard was accused of infidelity to the republic for having permitted the escape of the Duke of York, which was in fact a matter of perfect astonishment. Houchard might have cut off his communications with Furnes, when nearly the whole British army must have necessarily surrendered.

we won the battle of Truillás, of which I have just spoken. The Prince of Cobourg and the celebrated Clairfait, with an army of 80,000 men, are driven beyond the Sambre on the 16th of October; whilst on the preceding day we had vigorously repelled, before the Boulou, the furious night attack of the French commanded by Turreau, Dagobert's successor in the command;<sup>3</sup> in the engagements fought at Céret

<sup>3</sup> The French army received a reinforcement of 15,000 men during the night after the disaster of Truillás. This powerful aid put a stop to the desertion, which threatened to become general. The French recovered themselves, and took up a position on our left flank. The forces of Ricardos being then greatly inferior in numbers, he fell back on the camp of Boulou; a manœuvre effected with calmness and consummate skill; since, after having held the position of Truillás until the 30th, he quietly brought back all his materiel, notwithstanding the repeated attacks of the enemy's advanced guard; for the French had at heart to avenge their defeat of the 22nd.

Our troops having again taken up their position at the Boulou, had to sustain three general attacks and eleven partial engagements. The army thus harassed, were under arms day and night from the 1st to the 14th of October. The French général, finding all his efforts unavailing, and despairing to contend with advantage against the superior tactics and penetration of Ricardos, resolved to attempt a general assault during the night from the 14th to the 15th at six different points. Fruitless obstinacy! Sensible of his adversary's talents, Ricardos bent his whole attention to unravel his plans, and anticipated them at all points; his presence of mind, his firmness, shone conspicuous on these various occasions, on all which our army covered itself with glory. The following may be taken as a sample. The gallant Colonel Don Francisco Taranco, my distinguished and faithful friend, was defending the important

on the 26th of November; at Villalonga, La Roca, and St. Genis on the 7th of December; at the Col de Banguls<sup>4</sup> on the 14th; and on the

battery of Plá del Rey against a column of 6,000 men consisting of veteran soldiers just arrived from Lorraine and from the legion of the Moselle. Turreau excited them with his voice and marched at their head. Taranco had only 1,500 men under his orders: but, notwithstanding his numerical weakness, he repelled seven successive attacks; lost his battery three times, and as often recovered it; defended himself for an hour and a half, in close fight, with a force reduced to 600 men: driven against the parapet, he still made a vigorous resistance; fortunately the darkness of the night prevented General Turreau's discovering our relative inferiority, and kept him under the delusion that he was contending with a far greater number; at last our troops received at daybreak a reinforcement of 300 men. Revived by this seasonable aid, Taranco rushed upon the French, bayonet in hand; made a frightful havoc amongst them; and compelled Turreau to yield the field of battle with 137 prisoners, amongst whom were the colonel of the legion of the Moselle mortally wounded, an adjutant-general, and seven or eight officers. The slaughter was such that the battery of Plá del Rey was thenceforward called the *Battery of Blood*. These brilliant deeds of arms, besides a thousand others, are not mere narratives of official bulletins; they are historical facts. Spain proved herself worthy of her ancient military renown.

<sup>4</sup> After a long series of fruitless attempts to turn us and take possession of the bridge of Céret, our most important point of communication with Spain, and foreseeing that Ricardos meditated a general attack by sea and land, General Turreau fancied he had now a favourable opportunity for action, and he did not allow it to escape. A violent hurricane, which lasted three days, drove upon the coast the greater part of our vessels intended for this expedition; our bridges upon the Tech were carried away; the roads of Morellás, from Bellegarde to La Jonquiére, were inundated and rendered impassable; all communications with Catalonia were cut off; our army was without

19th, 20th, and 21st at Banguls des Aspres, Portvendres, St. Elme, and Colliouvre, where the enemy left in our possession all their intrenched

forage, and had only two days' rations of bread; the bridge of Céret was alone left to us in case of a retreat, and this bridge was ready to give way from the effects of the increasing inundation: it was, moreover, commanded by the enemy's batteries. In this emergency, Ricardos determined to assume the offensive, and to be the first aggressor. The Count de la Union was directed to take the lead of three columns composed of our choicest troops. The Portuguese division was to maintain three points,—the great redoubt, the bridge, and the town of Céret. Turreau was watching our movement: he rushed upon and carried the redoubt, which the Portuguese abandoned with deplorable weakness. It fortunately happened that the Count de la Union, being compelled to stop half-way on his march, in consequence of the obstruction of a torrent which the sudden rise of waters rendered impassable, was retracing his steps: seeing the enemy's successful advance, he hastened to the spot, expelled him from the redoubt, drove back the French columns which were hurrying to join their comrades, pursued them, conjointly with the Portuguese, who had quickly rallied and were anxious to repair their error, and beat the enemy off to the heights of St. Fereol, which he seized upon as being an important position, calculated to protect the bridge of Céret and to leave the country open to our movements. Our soldiers remained five days under arms: though wet to the skin, with melted cartridges, and with no other weapons than their bayonets, they had, with the courage of lions, carried four batteries in less than an hour; and yet these gallant men had, for the greater part, scarcely recovered from an endemical fever with which the army had been attacked in the camp of Boulou ever since the month of September preceding. The Portuguese had nobly repaired their error. The army was at last enabled to take breath; its left was strengthened; the Vallespir remained in our power; all our communications were now perfectly open, and the soldiers were in a condition to gather fresh laurels.

camps, their artillery, baggage, and magazines, and were compelled to shut themselves up in the town of Perpignan,—M. de Pradt will find, I repeat, that these occurrences, so glorious for Spain, correspond with the events which took place in the north at the date of the 26th December ;<sup>5</sup> that the dreadful encounter of Gersberg, where the Austrians, the Prussians, and the emigrants of the army of Condé abandoned the famous lines of Weissemburg,—the raising the blockade of Landau,—the taking of Lattersburg, of Kaiserslautern, of Gersmuschein, Spire and Worms,—also

<sup>5</sup> The French accounts describe in the gloomiest colours the various disasters of their army, especially those of Banguls des Aspres, where Fabre, the intrepid conventionalist, perished in the fight ; of St. Elme, and in the several intrenchments along their line, which the enemy defended with heroic courage, until the fortresses fell into our power. This series of reverses was ascribed to treachery and to the cupidity of the generals, who were supposed to have sold themselves to Spain ; but I declare upon honour that the imputation is utterly false. The governor of St. Elme was denounced as a traitor by the Convention ; he was accused of having fired upon the French troops : it was assuredly not he who gave orders to fire ; our soldiers, with no other arms than their muskets, their swords, and a hatchet, rushed from rock to rock, under a shower of balls ; impelled by blind courage, they leaped headlong over the palisade and the ditch, broke the chains which secured the draw-bridge, burst open the principal gate, and compelled the garrison to lay down their arms. They immediately rushed to the batteries on the rampart, and fired upon the French, who were hastening to seek shelter within the fort ; nothing could exceed the skill, valour, and obstinacy displayed by the enemy's troops. When the return of milder weather enabled us to resume the offensive,

occurred at the very period when Spain occupied, on the French territory, all the forts and towns I have named, including Bellegarde, the principal key of France in that part of the eastern Pyrenees. Lastly, when the Austrians were withdrawing in all haste from the banks of the Rhine, the Prussians sheltering themselves under the canon of Mentz, and the French triumphantly taking up their winter quarters in the Palatinate, the Spanish army was quietly encamped on the line of the Tech, in the very heart of the province of Roussillon.

Ricardos carried his daring plan into effect in the most brilliant manner: our right was completely extricated, and we took up our winter quarters in perfect safety in the midst of the French territory. The conclusion of the campaign was worthy of its opening. Courage, talent, and a rigid adherence to the plans of the general-in-chief characterized our army. General Doppet replaced General Turreau; he was the fourth whom the republic was opposing to Ricardos, and he had promised to his soldiers the rich spoils of Catalonia. Immortal thanks to those valiant warriors, those worthy Spaniards who, having to contend against the elements and the efforts of a formidable enemy, confounded the boasting of General Doppet, and preserved our hearths from a foreign invasion! The accounts of the gigantic actions fought in this memorable campaign cannot be read without emotion; our soldiers displayed inconceivable boldness in those deep ravines amidst the precipices of Villa Longa, La Roca and Banguls, on the reverse of the Puy de la Calma, at the Vierge des Abeilles, the Col de Suro, the Plá de las Heras, the Puyg de Bercet, on the heights of Corpilá, Belausy and St. Elme, and along that steep chain strewn with intrenchments as far as the Puyg d'Oriol. Every inch of ground was defended by thirty thousand men posted along the



Is M. de Pradt desirous of further proofs, further testimonies to establish the parallel between the campaign of Ricardos and that of the northern powers? Let him open the *Moniteur* of the time. In reporting to the Convention, at the commencement of 1794, the events of the war, Barrère expresses himself as follows :

“ You have learned with enthusiasm, citizens, the conquest of Toulon, the victories of the Rhine, the destruction of the ever-reviving monster of La Vendée : listen now with resignation to the reverses, the losses which treason has inflicted upon us on the side of Perpignan, threatened at this moment by the Spanish forces ; our army has been defeated and is in open rout,

crests of mountains crowned with batteries, besides other batteries at a less elevation, which protected each other by cross-fires. Our soldiers carried everything before them. The last engagement took place on the right and centre of the enemy, near Tresères and Banguls des Aspres, with three brigades of cavalry. My brother had once more the good fortune of deciding the victory. The result of these actions was twelve thousand prisoners, sixteen standards, the park of artillery and the supplies in store at St. Genis, the cannon of upwards of twenty batteries, a multitude of artillery-waggon and of draught horses ; the arsenal of Colliouvres, with eighty-eight pieces of artillery, which formed the defence of that fortress ; thirty vessels laden with flour, forage, articles of military equipment, and provisions of all kinds for the army and the hospitals. Being thus in possession of St. Elme, Portvendres, Puyg d'Oriol, and Colliouvres, the only useful harbour along the coast, after nineteen hours of triumphant fighting, we quietly settled into winter quarters in the French territory. . . . An honour unachieved by any of the coalesced powers.

but the Committee of Public Safety has already adopted the most vigorous measures, &c." <sup>6</sup>

We have thus a campaign which the French themselves admit to have been glorious for our army.

None of the coalesced powers could lay claim to such brilliant successes as those which signalized the Spanish arms in this campaign of 1793, as I have shown by our successes in Roussillon. The war was less animated on the side of the western Pyrenees; for it was part of our plan to maintain in that quarter an attitude of defence.

No portion of our territory was invaded; our left wing crossed the Bidassoa on more than one occasion, and maintained a firm footing in the enemy's country, at a greater or less distance, as circumstances suggested. Our troops were thus afforded the opportunity of distinguishing themselves; the general or partial attempts of the enemy against our frontier proved complete failures, whilst our attacks upon the French territory were at times

<sup>6</sup> We must avouch in this place, to the mutual honour of the Spanish and French armies, that treason had no share whatever in the events of the close of the campaign. It is well known that, in order to excite the public mind, and to persuade the republicans that they were invincible, the government ascribed its reverses to the treachery of the generals, many of whom paid the penalty of death for no other guilt than their having proved incompetent, or rather unsuccessful. It is established by evidence that the forts of St. Elme, Port Vendres, and Collioures were defended with desperate courage, and according to all the rules of art.

crowned with success. I shall merely relate one instance of this fact, taken from the report of a superior French officer, M. de Marcillac, advertising to the attack of Castel Pignon in Upper Navarre.

“The French, to the number of four thousand five hundred men, occupied three ridges of mountains; two of which, being covered with batteries defended by palisadoed intrenchments, protected the third, which was commanded by the fort of Castel Pignon. This position might be considered unassailable; for the backs of those three peaks rising from the basis of steep mountains present numberless indentations; and the only path through which the intrenchments may be arrived at is narrow, and runs along the edge of very deep ravines. Nothing could check the ardour of four thousand Spaniards engaged in this affair of the 9th of June; their courage increased in proportion with the obstacles and dangers they had to encounter at every step: after efforts of bravery wholly incredible to those who are acquainted with the ground on which they were fighting, they carried the first intrenchment, the defence of which was as heroic as the attack. The batteries crowning this mountain assisted the conquerors in obtaining possession of the second peak. But there yet remained the fort of Castel Pignon, the garrison of which was strengthened by the troops driven from the two first positions. Encouraged

by success, and animated by the presence of their general-in-chief,—who commanded in person, and who, though suffering from an attack of gout, which deprived him of the use of his limbs, had himself carried in a sedan-chair to the very foot of the intrenchments, then placed on horseback, and remained thus exposed to the enemy's fire during the whole of the action,—the Spaniards scaled the third mountain, and after four hours of the most obstinate fighting, carried the fort by assault, and pursued the enemy, who escaped to the heights of Oresson, defended by a considerable corps of reserve, which was also unable to resist the impetuosity of the victorious troops. The French general La Gennetière, who commanded this corps, was made prisoner, and the Spaniards encamped in the very tents of the French soldiers.

“Camp-marshal Don Ventura Escalante, major-general of the army, who placed himself on the occasion at the head of the advanced guard, and the Marquis de la Romana, more especially distinguished themselves in this action, which will be handed down to posterity as one of the authentic monuments which attest the courage of the Spanish troops. Worthy descendants of the soldiers of Ferdinand and Isabella, of Charles V. and Philip V., the soldiers of Charles IV. spontaneously proved at Castel Pignon in Navarre, at St. Laurent de Cerdá, at Arles, at the bridge of Céret, at the battle of Masden, at the taking

of Bellegarde, at Thuir, Argèles, Pontellas, Canós, at the battle of Truillás in Roussillon, that valour is hereditary amongst them, and that it only requires to receive a proper direction. Just and worthy appreciators of courage, the French could not resist a feeling of admiration for the conduct of the Spaniards at the engagement of Castel Pignon. They manifested it in the public papers of the period; and the French government had not assuredly in view, at that moment, to heighten the glory of its enemies."<sup>7</sup>

Such is the language of M. de Marcillac, whose work was published at Paris in 1808. Charles IV. was no longer King of Spain at that period: the object was not to pay compliments to the court of Madrid; still less to a monarch fallen, proscribed, and forgotten in his banishment.

Thus, then, a whole campaign, nearly a whole year of warfare was prosperous to our arms, and was maintained with honour and glory along our extensive line of frontier. We remained encamped on the French territory, and masters of the two principal avenues to the Pyrenees; for on the side of Navarre, in spite of efforts persevered in during six months, the enemy never succeeded in forcing us out of our positions at Viriatu, or in compelling us to recross the Bidassoa.

Will M. de Pradt now tell me, that, from the

<sup>7</sup> History of the war between France and Spain in 1793, 1794, and part of 1795; pp. 24, 25, and 26.

remotest part of a palace, a favourite paralysed the successes of the Spanish army, and rendered unavailing the natural courage of the soldier, and the patriotic devotedness manifested by the generals?

Really, since the object of the archbishop was to impute to me the relatively slender share which at a later period fell to the lot of Spain in the general defeat of the coalesced powers, should he not, by way of fair compensation, have also ascribed to me some share in the glorious successes of the preceding campaign? The same hand held the reins of the Spanish government at one and the other period.

Far be from me, however, the foolish vanity of exclusively claiming to myself the good that was achieved: I did not govern alone. All the king's ministers rivalled each other in zeal and fidelity to their sovereign. All co-operated in the success of our arms. No doubt I presided over the council; this is all I can allege in my favour; and M. de Pradt, in his character of historian, was bound to make that honourable mention of my name. In Spain, my bitterest enemies acknowledge my claim to it. Ah! may all the laurels gathered by our brave soldiers remain theirs, and theirs only; I would not pluck from them a single leaf to decorate my brows: what I exclusively claim is, the merit of having sought, found out, and procured employment for those

worthy leaders; they corresponded with my confidence and justified the hopes of the country. I brought forward all those who by their knowledge and talents had distinguished themselves in their profession, and I urged them on to the career of honour. So far from being envious of their fame, I was the first to proclaim it; my friendship was secured to them, and I procured them every species of favours. I impressed every service upon the mind of the monarch, — an inviolable archive in which the memory of each noble deed was faithfully recorded! None, not even those who were in the humble station of common soldiers, had to complain of having been forgotten: the bounty of the court bordered upon prodigality. Great care and attention were, no doubt, bestowed by the government to the object of maintaining a spirit of harmony, of exciting a feeling of enthusiasm amongst the defenders of the country; but we had to deal with the select part of the nation: some were proud of the fame they had inherited from their ancestors; others, of the glory they had personally acquired, and which they were anxious to uphold and improve; we beheld, accordingly, in this newly-created army, the old prowess of our ancient warriors. Let us award them a full meed of justice; they had to combat the wild fanaticism of a nascent republic, — a warlike people hurrying on to battle in countless numbers. . . . In this struggle of giants, the Spanish

army secured advantages which Fortune did not concede to the other coalesced powers; our territory remained unsullied.

Why then such harshness, such affectation of contempt on the part of M. de Pradt? How was the action of the Spanish army paralysed? Was it in the extraordinary creation of so many armies which so nobly performed their duty? Four months had scarcely elapsed since my entrance into the ministry; I found no preparations going forward; my predecessor, Count d'Aranda, had insisted upon maintaining peace at any price. . . . Was any time lost,—was there any neglect evinced in assembling the troops and in providing them with suitable equipments? Assuredly not: whilst the patriotic gifts were collecting, and pending the arrival of the galleons from America, I was unwearied in my exertions to raise money: on the pledge of my word, and at the king's name, private coffers were opened; everything was profusely furnished; arms, horses, military clothing, provisions, stores, and those admirable hospitals which were on a far better footing than any that had yet been seen in Europe. Our wants were so abundantly supplied that Spain never had, within the memory of man, exhibited so prompt, so complete a developement of our national resources.

Was the action of the war paralysed by the dependence of the military leaders, their subser-



viency to plans originating at or circumscribed by the court? All the generals in chief had full powers to act; they had only to carry into effect what they themselves had proposed, and what the court had approved beforehand; they were at liberty to modify their operations according as the rapid and mutable circumstances of the war might suggest. . . . In what then was the action of the armies paralysed? Notwithstanding our inferiority of numbers, we were almost invariably successful; we again raised the white flag, and hoisted it by the side of the Spanish colours, on the forts and in the open country of the French republic, after a whole year of combats fought on both sides with equal obstinacy.

Such are the historical facts, the notorious results which I oppose to the false and calumnious imputations so inconsiderately entertained and repeated by M. de Pradt.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## Expedition of Toulon.

THIS series of successes in the first campaign was only interrupted at one point. Wherever our troops fought without auxiliaries, without extraneous support, they were often victorious: united with the troops of the coalition, they shared the reverses which discord and contending ambitions could not fail to occasion. Should the disgrace of them be borne by us rather than by the Sardinians, the Neapolitans, and the English? Did we err more than they? And, first of all, was it an error to concur in the occupation of Toulon?

No other project entertained up to that moment had held out brighter hopes: the whole of the south was in a ferment; not the royalists only, but the constitutional patriots likewise, who, after having so ardently upheld the rights of the people, were revolted at the tyranny of the *mountain* party. The insurrection of Provence, if seasonably fed and supported, might favour the rising of the federalists of Lyons, Bordeaux,

Brittany, and Normandy, even derive assistance from the indefatigable Vendéans, and eventually overset a sanguinary and turbulent government. But in this case the coalesced powers should have acted with perfect frankness and moderation, and have renounced all projects of invasion. France might then have adopted a system more in accordance with the general wishes,—a middle course, at which the revolution might then have stopped, and which it was ultimately compelled to submit to, after twenty years of political wanderings and of every species of calamities. I call God to witness that the Spanish cabinet never harboured any other thought, and that its political conduct was never directed to the object of oppressing or dismembering France, or of favouring a spirit of revenge or reaction in that country.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It may be objected, that however upright the views of the Spanish cabinet, it should not have fallen into the error of believing that the other powers, such as England, and particularly Austria, would renounce the idea of invading France and dismembering her territory; still less, that the royalists would consent to anything short of the restoration of the old *régime*, or, in other words, of absolute power. Yes; but the public mind had made manifest progress; France had advanced with rapid strides; the political attitude of the whole body of the nation was conspicuous and imposing. For my part, I did not then, nor do I at the present day believe, that any large portion of the federalists would have given themselves up, bound hand and foot, to foreign powers. Those who had just shaken off the yoke of the Convention were far more disposed to join the national troops in an attempt to repel a design upon their

There was unfortunately wanting a leader competent to direct this comprehensive movement in the south, and to bring so many individual opinions to combine to a common object. It also happened that the occupation of Toulon did not take place until after the defeat of the federal army of Provence; added to which, the policy of England rejected the advice of the Spanish generals, whose instructions authorised them to adopt such measures as they might deem calculated to favour the rising in the interior of France. The English preferred being shut up in Toulon, though it was obvious that this town must fall, sooner or later, if the insurgents should be put down. On the other hand, the Toulonese unceasingly urged the adoption of a comprehensive measure; and I moved heaven and earth to induce some of the cabinets to accede to it: the

liberty, from whatever quarter it might be attempted to impose fetters upon them.

In 1793 there was greater vigour or less lassitude than in 1814; and yet, though vanquished at the latter epoch, and her capital in the occupation of the coalesced sovereigns, France was still respected in her principles and in her acquired rights. The reaction of the people of the south, if frankly and openly supported by the allies, would have produced, by means of wise modifications, that temperate monarchy which is the only government adapted to an enlightened, industrious, and powerful nation. What evils would thus have been spared to France herself, to Spain, to the whole world! The cabinet of Charles IV. could only indulge the illusion, which was, however, honourable to its feelings.

plan was to request the immediate presence of the Count de Provence on the spot.

England obstinately refused her concurrence ; her ambition was limited to the object of destroying the port, burning or bringing away a French squadron, and prolonging the troubles of a nation at whose greatness she took umbrage. What will M. de Pradt think of this ? I am not indulging in chimerical suppositions. The conduct of Spain was frank and generous ; no doubt was entertained of her sincerity ; nor did the Toulonese ever raise a complaint against us.

With respect to the pitiful military defence of the town, what charge can be alleged against the Spanish troops ? Their conduct was marked by heroic constancy and spotless honour ! and, alas ! by too much consideration towards allies who abused it, and caused the expedition to fail of its object ! Our only error consisted in having relied upon them, as if they had been impelled by kindred feelings.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding the habitual moderation of the political manifestoes of Spain, the following extract of the declaration of war against Great Britain (7th Oct. 1796) is sufficiently expressive :

“ One of the principal motives which compelled me,” says Charles IV, “ to conclude a peace with the French republic as soon as her government had assumed a regular and consolidated form, was the conduct of England towards us during all the past war, and the well-grounded mistrust I entertained for the future from the experience I had acquired of her bad faith ; this

The loss of the forts of Faron and Malbousquet was not to be attributed to the Spaniards. . . . Those forts having been surrendered to the enemy, the shipping could no longer safely maintain themselves in the road, nor the troops retain possession of the town. Honour to the gallant Mendinueta, who, shut up in the fort of St. Antoine, sustained to the end the honour of the Spanish arms on the fearful night of the 17th December, repelled the French, and gave shelter to the English general, who had been taken by surprise, was driven from Malbousquet, and came to him for protection ! During the whole of the 18th, the Spanish flag waved over the rampart of St. Antoine, which the garrison only quitted on its way to the place of embarkation, when the retreat was deemed indispensable, and was by superior command carried into effect. The forts which were to have protected the retreat had been given up without a struggle, previously to the

bad faith had manifested itself at the most critical moment of the campaign, in the treatment experienced from Admiral Hood by my squadron at Toulon, where he only thought of destroying what he could not carry away." Recalling afterwards to view the further evidence of this feeling on the part of the British cabinet, in its endeavours to remove all chance of making peace with France, the king adds : " I could not disguise from myself its bad faith, in the repugnance it felt at adopting any course calculated to abridge the duration of the war." I make these quotations with a view to confirm the truth of what I have asserted respecting the noble and generous intentions of Spain in that fatal expedition of Toulon.

appointed time;<sup>3</sup> the commanding heights of La Malgue were immediately re-occupied by our troops; and, though burning with indignation, these troops resolved to give the English a lesson of devotedness to their duty; they proudly made way to let them take the lead in embarking; the Italians followed; our soldiers formed the rear-guard, and left the ground at a slow pace, without confusion, without leaving a soldier, an invalid, a wounded or a forlorn inhabitant behind: the regiments of Cordova and Majorca were the last to step into the vessels; Major-general Don Joseph Ago, of distinguished memory, saw the last man of his troops, the last Toulonese safe on board: it was already broad day-light (eight in the morning). That gallant officer then rushed from the mole, after firing a last musket-shot at the enemy.

I crave the indulgence of my readers for having related, in the progress of my narrative, some of the gallant achievements of that expedition. I felt myself called upon to hold up to the young generation of Spaniards the noble example of their predecessors, and was also impelled to speak in defence of my own honour and for my personal justification: under a timid and immoral govern-

<sup>3</sup> The forts of Pommets, St. André, St. Catherine, &c.; this fatal desertion left the royal road open to the enemy's fire; our troops had to take the lower road towards the postern on the right of the Italian gate. This arrangement, and the forming of our troops in order of battle on the left of the citadel, had the effect of simultaneously saving the army and the squadrons.

ment, there can exist no civic virtue, no emulation, no courage, no generous feeling. As a minister at that period, and as the organ of power, I claim a share in all the generous and noble actions which have illustrated it. Whether a confidant, a courtier, a minion, or a favourite, just as it may please M. de Pradt to designate me, I have fulfilled the duty of a loyal subject, of a sincere friend of my king and country. Whoever pays homage to truth—my very enemies—must acknowledge that in the emergency in which I was called upon to contend against the unheard-of dangers that assailed Europe, Spain had nothing to envy in other powers; for none could lay claim to more signal successes—none adhered to more prudent counsels,—none could boast of subjects more devoted to their country.



## CHAPTER XVIII.

Discussion in the Council of State on the subject of continuing the War.

THERE existed in Spain, ever since the commencement of the war, a party small in numbers, and keeping itself aloof, but exercising a certain influence, which beheld with regret the coalition formed against the republic. The general opinion was decidedly in favour of the war; but it was alleged by this party that the bulk of the nation displayed a merely factitious enthusiasm, which was excited by the aristocracy and by churchmen.

These sentiments had spread to a certain extent amongst the middling classes, amongst young lawyers, professors in sciences and *belles lettres*, students, suitors for places in the various branches of the civil career. They were also shared by adepts of a higher rank; some of whom, out of mere pretensions to wit, others imbued with philosophical principles, and many instructed by foreign writers and civilians with whom they had held intercourse abroad, adopted the new ideas,

which filled the world with bright hopes, and, at the same time, with sinister forebodings.

It is but justice to say that none approved the violent strides of the French revolution ; though all readily embraced the theories out of which it had sprung, and viewed with regret a crusade in arms to crush it. Very few of these Utopists ventured to hope that France would effectually resist such mighty and combined efforts. Nevertheless, being attached to their political religion, they were content with expressing their doubts of the issue of the contest ; and, in order to prevent its taking place, they foretold the triumphs of the republic, without relying too much upon their predictions. When those triumphs began to be verified in the North, the party which would be called *liberal* at the present day increased in numbers and in boldness. It now discovered fresh arguments against the war, recalled to remembrance its previous predictions, exaggerated the evils impending over Spain should she persist in her chivalrous policy. I am compelled to introduce in this place, and between the two campaigns, an episode which, in a sense diametrically opposed to that which M. de Pradt has chosen for the text of his imputations against me, has supplied ample matter for other imputations of a quite opposite nature ; for such has been my wayward fate, that, whether I determined upon war when it was forced upon us and unavoid-

able, or whether I sought a peace when the moment was seasonable and it could be obtained without dishonour, my enemies have equally blamed me, without regard to their conflicting and contradictory opinions.

We had entered upon the year 1794. The generals in command of our three armies, who had been summoned to the court in order to come to an understanding respecting the next campaign, had discussed and arranged the plan of operations.

Their decision was submitted to the council of state. The question to be considered was not whether the war should be continued or put an end to, or the mode in which it was to be carried on. All idea of a peace was impossible; the Jacobins would not listen to it. Anarchy was daily increasing in violence. It would have been disgraceful and unavailing to make advances to those who held sway in the Convention, or to expect any from them, especially as Spain, victorious until that moment, could not abandon her allies on the ground of their having met with reverses. . . . But the party which was anxious for peace, or, to speak more correctly, the French party, was not wanting in advocates; a champion ready to support their cause entered the lists, with visor raised, and threw down the gauntlet to whoever might think proper to take it up. . . . The original question of peace or war was started in the council.

Count d'Aranda, upon whose partiality for peace as much praise was bestowed as blame was heaped upon me, for having waged war when honour and necessity alike required it,—the count began by condemning that war, and invoking peace so earnestly as to avow that it were better *to unite with France against the coalesced powers, should her existence be endangered by the attempts of the coalition.*

It seemed, however, to escape him that the French revolution, by its present acts and its openly avowed system, threatened the stability no less than the constitutional principles of all governments, and struck at the heart of all monarchies.

Whatever may have been his opinions on the state of politics under circumstances of so critical a nature, the count presented to the council an elaborate statement in writing: I was called upon to reply, and to oppose to it my own sentiments, which were participated in by the king, the council, and the rest of the ministers. The subjoined account of the discussion will enable the reader to decide between us. It furnishes an exposition of my principles, explains most of the acts of my public life, and affords me the opportunity of refuting the calumnious falsehoods so gratuitously invented by my enemies.

The speech of Count d'Aranda, though ob-

seure<sup>1</sup> and unconnected, may be reduced to the four following propositions.

1st.—The war against France is unjust.

2ndly.—It is impolitic.

3rdly.—It is ruinous, and our forces are too inferior to carry it on.

4thly.—Besides being ruinous, it compromises the very existence of the Spanish monarchy.

1st.—The war is unjust. He attempted to prove it by several theories, by peremptory prin-

<sup>1</sup> Count d'Aranda spoke with more facility and ease than he could write. Gifted with an ardent temperament, full of self-conceit, he grew animated in a discussion. When speaking extempore, his language was even forcible; but his vehemence made him often forget the consideration which was due to his hearers; his angry and loud tone of voice checked his powers of persuasion; his style exhibited the same proud, domineering, though somewhat subdued spirit: nevertheless, his writings were crude and elaborate, the ideas confused and entangled, the locution rough, the reasoning abrupt and incoherent: he could seldom find a word adapted to convey his exact meaning; hence those lengthy circumlocutions and that final obscurity in which he always lost himself.

This opinion of him does not originate with me: Count d'Aranda has always been so described by those who have known him.\*

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\* The Marquis de Caracioli, the Neapolitan ambassador, who had much frequented him in Paris, ingeniously compared his mind to a deep well with a narrow opening; others say, to a bottle containing good liquor, but scarcely allowing it to run out, owing to its narrow neck.

Count d'Aranda was President of the Council of Castile in 1765: called to the ministry in 1792, he made way for the Prince of the Peace towards the close of the same year; was exiled in 1794, and died on his estates in Arragon, in 1798.—E.

ciples. "This war," he said, "attacks the first of all national rights,—their natural and political independence: this right does not depend on the form of their government, or on whatever leaders may rule over them; it is an intrinsic right, inherent in each nation; a government, therefore, which represents a nation, is in possession of that right. Revolutions are by no means of modern date, their origin is extremely remote; they swarm in the history of every people. The right which nations justly claim of modifying and improving their laws is innate, eternal as they. The power of all associations, whether they be monarchical or republican, emanates from God; it is therefore sacred. The only duty or office that devolves upon a state with respect to intervening in the internal dissensions of a neighbouring state, is the office and duty of friendly intervention, as is befitting between equals. All attempts to impose laws, or specific forms of government, by force of arms, is a violation of the natural right, the right of nations; but it would be still more unjust to wage war with the view of imposing upon a nation any individual or any family which has been rejected or set aside by that nation. . . .

"My duty as a true Spaniard and a loyal counsellor of the king being to speak the truth to him according to the suggestions of my conscience, I cannot forbear declaring that the war

against France had not even the foundation of a plausible pretext or of a semblance of justice. Appearances or pretexts cannot be drawn from private interests, or the ties of relationship between princes: it is befitting to maintain those ties and interests when they serve to cement the friendly intercourse between nations; but they must be broken off, as detrimental and injurious, when they only serve to exasperate and divide them. If the natural feeling of relationship, and the pious wish of the Spanish monarch to behold the crown of France, so long borne by his ancestors, restored to its possessor, be entitled to every praise, it is still more praiseworthy to make a heroic sacrifice of his dearest affections to the common law of nations, to the maintenance of peace between Spain and France. There exist, in the natural and political intercourse of nations, rights and interests far more positive and elevated than the personal rights of the two reigning families; in short, the knowledge and respect of those rights, by keeping within the bounds of moderation and justice, reflect much higher glory on a king than he can derive from avenging, at the expense of his people, a family insult, which has been, besides, sufficiently punished by the triumph of our arms."

The count then maintained that the war was impolitic, and he did so principally upon the following grounds:

1st.—This war opened the door to a dangerous principle,—*the interposition of foreign powers in the internal affairs of another nation*: the principle, if once admitted against the French republic, might in turn be retorted against a monarchy, as we have already witnessed in the system adopted by the Convention.

2ndly.—It was imprudent to plunge any deeper in a war of principles, because the cry of liberty vibrated far more loudly in the ears of nations than the antiquated precepts of *submission*, of *vas-salage in virtue of a divine or natural right*.

3rdly.—Besides this double inconvenience, which is an inexhaustible source of future accidents and dangers, the political interest of Spain clashed with a war which would have the effect of favouring the natural enemies of Spain and France. France was the only nation whose interest was truly identified with ours; if that nation be once crushed and dismembered by the northern powers, the Bourbons of Spain and Italy would become insulated, and without support against the attacks of England and Austria.

4thly.—The great work of the *family compact* had been planned and realised to secure our continental and maritime power; this compact was no less important to the positive prosperity of the countries over which the Bourbons held sway, than the very existence of these princes. Kings and governments, be their origin what it may,



were liable to the vicissitudes of fortune ; but nations were imperishable ; their interests underwent no change. Instead of making war against France, and concurring in her ruin, we ought rather to aid and support her against England and Germany : after having been long combated and kept in check by the naval forces of France and Spain, united like twin sisters in a common bond, England was delighting in the idea of seeing them disunited ; thus hoping to destroy, one after another, their navy once so powerful, to exercise thenceforward uncontrolled sway over the two oceans which border our American colonies, and seize upon our commerce. Setting aside all question of family or of principle, the apprehension of such a danger should induce us to renew the alliance between both nations, because personal wrongs or feelings of repugnance ought to yield to the paramount consideration of the national welfare. A king, whose exclusive and noble ambition was directed to the object of securing the happiness of his subjects, should not sacrifice them to the very uncertain hope of restoring his relatives to the throne, or suffer Spain to be ruined in a war which was alike unjust, impolitic, burthensome, and beyond her means of sustaining it.

With regard to our resources for continuing the war, it is notorious that Spain is groaning beneath the weight of an exorbitant debt ; that, in consequence of the enormous expenses of the

preceding reign, the companies formed with the view of giving a fresh stimulus to commerce and to public credit, were either completely ruined or threatened with bankruptcy. The war with France, though favourable to our arms in the first instance, could not be carried on with continued success, because the spirit of independence and liberty with which that nation was animated gave it every advantage over dependent and mercenary soldiers, and the resources of Spain would soon be exhausted ; for she could only rely upon her pecuniary means. In this, however, he was bound to bestow his meed of praise upon a minister who carried on the war without subsidies, and preserved the independence at least of our cabinet ; but he could not pass encomiums upon the excessive confidence of that minister with respect to the zeal which the nation appeared to have manifested on the occasion of the war. The patriotic gifts, however great, served at most to display the honour and loyalty of the Spaniards, but never could cover the expenses of so costly a struggle ; we must not flatter ourselves that such a spirit of enthusiasm would be indefinitely prolonged, because the impulse did not in reality proceed, as in France, from popular fanaticism ; neither did it proceed from a sincere religious enthusiasm, so little in accordance with the spirit of the age,—an enthusiasm which, if it existed at all, was of itself competent to make head against the re-

publican excitement. The catholic zeal hitherto manifested was but a passing flame fanned by the priesthood—an artificial fire which would soon die away for want of nourishment. The government might no doubt rely at this moment upon a species of popular zeal; but this zeal was unaided by those violent means of action which France is enabled to put forward owing to the spoils of other countries, with which she carries on the war. . . . . Should our first successes be followed by defeats, should the ardour of the nation abate, confidence would immediately disappear: no more money could then be raised! What would be the chances of the war, when we consider the prodigious efforts of France, and the swarm of combatants which she sends forth to her frontiers!

The count omitted nothing that could darken the complexion of the picture. “Behold,” he said, “that countless people, whose invincible spirit of liberty manifests itself as in the mighty ages of Greece and Italy! Unequal is the war in which to soldiers who are mere machines, mere passive instruments, France opposes millions of intellectual citizens, inflamed with the love of country!—a war in which nations grown old under the yoke, and bent under the lash of their masters, are attempting to struggle against compact bodies of men grown young, and still drunk with enthusiasm and democratic ideas!—a war, in short, declared against a nation who add

to the power of intelligence, industry, and real wealth, the power of a mighty revolution, and dispose at pleasure of the fortune and the services of all—a character no parallel to which could be found in any other country.”

After thus passing in review and extolling the superiority of France; the general rising already effected of all citizens in a condition to bear arms; the sudden and magic promotion of common soldiers to the rank of generals; the success of troops scarcely yet standing in line, against the most renowned military commanders of Europe—“Suppose,” added the count, “an occurrence which is within the range of possibility, that one of the allied powers should be vanquished and forced to withdraw from the field of battle; the whole weight of the war would then fall upon others—upon the most loyal—upon those most implicated.” The orator here entered upon a variety of minute details: he exposed the ambitious and contradictory views which rendered the union of the several cabinets impossible; their fatal rivalry, the unconnectedness of their contradictory plans, which secured the triumphs of the French armies over a coalition deficient in compactness and regularity of action.

“In the event,” he continued, “of one or two defections, of any decisive reverses in the north, which are equally to be dreaded, Spain, left alone and insulated, will be compelled to contend against an

overwhelming force, which will crush it with its weight; no resource will then be left to us except that of beseeching St. James the apostle to extricate us by a miracle from our embarrassment. According to the natural course of things, nothing can save us from destruction; Spain cannot fail to be invaded and conquered. I know France, and the grounds which new ideas are daily gaining in that country; I know the fiery ardour of the nation. I say, and foretell it with deep regret, if the danger be not averted in time, as I think we yet have it in our power to do; if we do not separate ourselves from the coalition; if at this moment, when fortune still favours our arms, we do not conclude a solid peace, the horses of the French cavalry will sooner or later, perhaps ere long, trample upon the walks of the *Prado*, and quench their thirst at its fountains. I am sensible that my forebodings are gloomy. Will it hence be inferred that I do not justly estimate the national courage and spirit? Ah! let not those feelings be put to a rash test; let not impossibilities be required. The dictates of truth and of prudence are of more value than a rash presumption. Courage alone is not sufficient to conquer a powerful and exasperated foe. Let not the avowal of my gloomy presentiments afflict the heart of his majesty; my loyalty must pay him the tribute of a long experience acquired in the service of three august monarchs,—his ancestor

Philip V, Ferdinand VI. his uncle, and Charles III. his father. Let the purity of my intentions plead my apology for the freedom of my language. God send that Spain may be so fortunate as to avoid the dangers impending over Europe! May the two nations, burying in oblivion a dispute respecting persons and principles, which compromises their dearest interests, renew their old friendship and the basis of their ancient alliance!"

Such was the speech of Count d'Aranda, as far as my memory enables me to recollect it. I shall not be reproached with attempting to diminish anything of its energy. The ideas, the substance are all his own. As to the method, the fitness, the urbanity of his language, I candidly own that I have perhaps been over-scrupulous in strictly adhering to it, in order that I might not be suspected of endeavouring to derogate from its merits.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## CONTINUATION.

Reply to the Speech of Count d'Aranda.

CHARLES IV. had listened to this speech without manifesting the slightest emotion ; his eyes shone with majestic brightness, which seemed to dart a pure and gentle light ; his calm and dignified bearing bespoke the monarch : he soared at that moment above his fellow men. More than one counsellor had shuddered at the count's temerity. Every one trembled, and I more than others, to approach the discussion on the dangerous ground on which the fearless old man had flung it. The king commanded me to speak, and by so doing gave a temporary respite to our colleagues, who felt relieved from an oppressive weight.

I endeavoured, in the first place, to allay the painful impression which the maxims laid down by the count could not fail to produce. For maxims such as these, which are rarely avowed elsewhere, it was the height of rashness to utter within the walls of the council of state.

Their rigorous and peremptory application, so strongly enforced by the count, made it imperative upon me to refute, whilst I endeavoured to soften and explain away what was most objectionable in them. It fortunately happened that my sentiments in regard to peace greatly coincided with his own ; I desired it as much as he ; the only difference between us consisting in his urging its immediate conclusion, whilst I advocated our awaiting a seasonable opportunity for enforcing solid guarantees from France, and for adducing sound motives to warrant our terminating the war, without suddenly deserting the alliance contracted with foreign courts ; in a word, without staining our national character. Accordingly, I indulged a hope that upon calm reflection, and on becoming sensible of my good intentions, the count would explain himself in a more reserved manner than he had done, in order to allay the irritation caused by the novelty of his opinions and his unwarrantable freedom of language. In asserting my own opinion in measured terms, I was cautious not to wound his self-love, and I kept as near to his principles as I consistently could without renouncing mine : though attacked by him, I evinced every respect for his age ; and if he felt mortified at witnessing the triumph of my opinions, he could not, at least, find fault with the manner in which I sought to procure their adoption.



“ If there exist in the world,” I said, “ a place where political theories may be unreservedly discussed, it is assuredly in this assembly, in which the contest of opinions never can be attended with evil consequences. It is important for our present guidance and our future proceedings, that the question under debate be properly understood; that every argument be brought forward, and followed up with perfect candour, on whichever side it be urged, whether its advocate enforce his own sentiments or the views of others. Discussion cannot fail to throw light upon the subject. We will thus be enabled to conciliate diverging opinions; the question will be seen under every aspect: this will be the means of eliciting the truth, to the evidence of which all who respect its dictates will yield assent, and thus secure its triumph.

“ Whatever diversity of ideas may prevail in respect to state affairs, this assembly is animated with one spirit,—a uniform sense of loyalty and love of country. There may be a disparity of opinions amongst us, but we all aim at the same object: mine it is to discuss, and not to reprove; to persuade others, or to yield to the influence of persuasion, well prepared to abandon my own views if it can be proved to me that they are founded in error.

“ On our present determination may depend the fate of Spain, the preservation of the crown,

the honour of the country. Who could presume to render interests so dear to us subservient to a vain caprice of self-love?

“ I aspire after peace, I always desired it ; and Spain stands in need of so valuable a blessing. The country was just beginning to breathe, after the embarrassments and losses entailed upon her by the deplorable five years' war. The government had much to repair, much to accomplish for the reviving of commerce, industry, and credit, and for restoring to circulation the capital which that war, from the apprehensions it excited, had caused to disappear. The present war has destroyed our rising hopes. The resources of the state, as well as private fortunes, will be again compromised. But I appeal to your impartial judgment ; whose will be the fault ? Assuredly the present government cannot be reproached with the misfortunes which other hands have prepared for us. This is neither the time nor the place for recrimination. Human foresight is often deceived by events. . . . What must now be deplored is the fatal consequence of the struggle so unseasonably engaged in with regard to the North American question. Happy would it have been for Spain and France if all the mischief springing out of that war, which alone deserved to be called an *impolitic* one, had been limited to the enormous expenses it occasioned ! But an evil genius has profited by the

occasion to kindle a fire, the first sparks of which are already spreading in all directions. I might have refrained from touching so tender a chord. . . . But our elder has himself quoted the American war as the source of our financial embarrassments; and I am bound to add, that it has been still more fertile in political disasters. Truly fatal war! first link in the chain of misfortunes which the present war is entailing upon us,—with this remarkable difference, however, that the former one was wholly spontaneous and uncalled-for; whereas the latter, in which we are now involved, was neither provoked nor desired by us! It was one of indispensable necessity, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it.

“ Yes, it is a *necessary* war, which is as much as to say that it is a *just* one, for no war is just unless it be necessary. I now come to the question. I shall first prove by the axioms of common right, as it is universally understood, that the present is a just one. Rights and duties, all are equal and reciprocal between nations: the axioms which determine rights are never named apart from those which also fix the limits of duties. If you violate the latter, rights are then devoid of force. Nations are independent of each other: no nation has the right of interfering in the internal affairs of another nation; this is an incontrovertible principle: but it is likewise laid down as an axiom, or well understood, that this principle

*holds so long as the latter nation respects the principle, and refrains from disturbing or injuring its neighbour.* Has France fulfilled this condition of the principle? Behold her popular assembly, her democratic haunts, her incendiary writings, flung at the face of Europe from the first days of the revolution. Is not this intermeddling in the internal affairs of other countries? Is not this encouraging nations to insurrection, outraging their governments, and openly preaching rebellion? Will it be alleged that the right of publishing one's thoughts, orally or in writing, is the right of a free people? Agreed, if you will it; but this must be with respect to its own affairs, not as regards those of others. What has given to France, or to any other nation upon earth, the right to insult other governments, and to breathe discord and sedition amongst them?

"By tolerating such excesses, even if the present government of France be not the original promoter of them, she places herself in a state of hostility towards all others. It matters little whether the attacks against the laws, the repose, the existence, or the social order, whether good or bad, of a neighbouring country, proceed from France or her agents. There are other weapons wielded besides warlike ones against the existence of a state: bitter censure, invective, sarcasm, cutting irony, audacious provocation, are also to be classed as

offences, violations, hostilities far more insulting than actual weapons ; for a war openly waged provokes and meets with more or less resistance, but the moral poison of seduction infuses itself and corrodes in spite of every precaution. Let us be candid : to force a people, by means of an invasion, to receive or submit to any particular form of government :—to disturb a country by urging it into insurrection against the established order of things by means of firebrands, by lighting up the torch of civil war,—are unquestionably acts of intervention in the affairs of a neighbour of an equally pernicious tendency : and this character of interference is infinitely worse and more odious than the other. Will it be asserted, that one has not the right to check and repel a nation or a government which resorts to the latter course ? The simple dictates of reason, the mere interest of natural defence, warrant us in opposing, in punishing, the troublesome incendiaries. Civilians are all agreed as to the right of uniting to combat, under any form he may assume, an enemy who stirs up disturbances and attacks the basis of social order. Such are the principles of eternal justice, founded upon the interests of all, according with the rights of preservation and of legitimate defence, which are the privilege of private individuals, and far more so of society, in which each one has contributed to the common stock his individual strength, his knowledge, his virtues, and placed

them under the fostering care of a government which is to protect him in the peaceful enjoyment of his lawful rights.

“ Such are likewise the principles of human justice, in virtue of which we are waging war, not against France, but against the tyrants who oppress her, and who, abusing her name and power, compel every nation to oppose her.

“ There are other principles, other rules of common right, which we may be allowed to invoke. The French nation is waging war against herself: two parties, the one a popular, the other a royalist party, are tearing her very vitals. Lyons, Toulon, Marseilles, other towns scattered over the country, have avowed the feelings of animosity they bear to the Convention which has reduced them into obedience. From the Gironde to the Loire, along the western coast, from the Loire to Havre, a general wish is expressed for a government tempered by a political law: the royalist spirit of a great part of Brittany, and of the Vendean insurrection, is well known. I can affirm, without being guilty of exaggeration, that three-fourths of France are far from hostile to royalty. The frightful persecution directed against that spirit, the law issued against suspected persons, the dungeons choked with prisoners, the blood rushing in torrents from the guillotine and the fire of grape-shot, fully prove that there are two parties; the one tyrannical and

oppressive, the other oppressed, groaning beneath the yoke, or appealing to arms, either in the interior or along the frontiers of France. This is a civil war with all its horrors. Have not neighbouring governments the right—is it not an act of generosity in them—to support the party which they deem worthy of their assistance? Can it be unjust to afford aid and succour to royalists in a country where the destruction of the throne has caused the instant overflow of crime in every direction? Are we not bound to protect the only party which offers us any guarantee? Is there not, for Spain, an additional motive in the family compact—an actual and a personal treaty in favour of the Bourbons,—an obligatory treaty which is neither abolished nor proscribed? Has not the fallen branch a right to claim the fulfilment of that compact, so long as there remains a possibility of restoring it to the throne?

“There are circumstances, no doubt, however rare in my opinion, in which the positive interests of the nation may overrule the dynastic interest of a reigning house. I have said, and I maintain, that such cases are of rare occurrence. Dynastic or family rights are seldom at variance with the interests of the country. I am unwilling to lay stress upon that or any other opinion; but who will venture to assert that the interest of the house of Bourbon is not identified with that of Spain? The family compact, as I have already

observed, was at once a real and a personal one : on the one hand, it secured the throne to the Bourbons ; it secured, on the other, consideration, a common defence, mutual advantages to every nation subjected to the sway of a member of that august house of France, Italy, and Spain ; all their subjects were united in one and the same family. What have not been the improvements of our country under that noble dynasty ? What strength and splendour were not derived from the alliance of these princes with each other ? This is well known to all, and an undeniable truth. Can we then be placing the rights of that royal family above our own, if we take up arms, when the storm has shivered its trunk, in order to uphold a branch under the shelter of which the Spanish nation has prospered and delights to live ? Have our monarchs so ill deserved of our country ?

“ If it was an act of justice, therefore, to check the crimes of the French government ; if humanity ordered us to succour the oppressed victims of the civil war ; if there exists a compact binding Spain to the family of her princes ; if gratitude, unless it be an empty sound ; if the faith of treaties be not a chimera,—on a proper consideration of the subject, and without departing from the sphere of theories, or from the rules on which a nation may and ought to rest its acts, no man of sense and impartiality will designate the



present as a useless war; still less when it is witnessed with what prudence and circumspection Spain, after having exhausted every honourable means of preserving peace, has finally determined upon the war. For it is only in the full conviction of her justice, of her infringed rights, and of her moderation, that she has so determined.

“ I can affirm it without fear of being belied in Spain, in Europe, or even in France, by any one not blinded by passion,—the present war is not the effect of a caprice of power, of an imprudent burst of enthusiasm, of a desire of revenge, or even of a family interest to be upheld: if we were to suppose, what Castilian pride will never allow, that the interest of the crown is of little importance to us, none will ever be indifferent to what concerns the well-being of the state.

“ That such are the motives which have compelled us to maintain the war, I appeal to Spain herself, who not only wished, but was loudly clamorous for it, and spontaneously tendered us the means of carrying it on. When a war breaks out which originates in mere caprice, or in what is so considered by the nation, the silence of the people, the indifference of public opinion, and oftentimes a general murmuring, warn the cabinet of its imprudence. Even in the case of a just war, the people are always prone to complain; they bless the government which seizes the first opportunity of bringing it to a close without in-

flicting too great a sacrifice upon the national pride. Have we, in the present instance, witnessed such indifference, or heard these murmurings? Assuredly not; for it is too well known, that, to secure the benefits of peace, the government has exerted every means not incompatible with the safety of the country and the dignity of the crown. Whilst we were labouring to obtain that peace, the object of our wishes and of our constant efforts, the people grew indignant at the delay; the whole nation uttered the cry of war without awaiting a signal from the government; no difference was manifested in public opinion, no evidence of fear, no hesitation; grandees and humble peasants, nobles and plebeians, rich and poor, all vied with each other in eagerly depositing their offerings on the steps of the throne; all urged on the war, I repeat it, ere the cabinet, driven to extremity, had suffered its determination to transpire. Are not these acknowledged facts sufficiently indicative of the course we were to follow? Can the whole Spanish nation be wrong? Is this general desire no more than a suggestion emanating from religious fanaticism and from the privileged class?

“Those who still appear to entertain this opinion (and they are few in number) have not closely watched the slow but progressive advance of the public mind. Late events had riveted the attention of all. If the burst of a mighty nation

aiming at reforms in its institutions may, in its origin, have excited apprehensions in a calm observer accustomed to read the future in the history of the past, the greater number did not at first give way to such mistrust, but rather, on the contrary, to pleasing anticipations. They beheld a monarch entering into a bond of union with his people, and endeavouring, in this mutual concord, to remodel the state and fix it upon a liberal and a noble basis. What prospects were not entertained from the concurrence of every virtue, with every talent in the promotion of so splendid an object?

“The illusion was not lasting; it was the dawn of a fine day, but the sky was soon overcast; a violent storm succeeded; the passions let loose soon silenced the voice of reason; France gave herself up to every excess. From that moment our repugnance of such deeds was manifested in a general feeling of horror: this was not yet a war-cry; the good sense of the Spanish people, the prudence of the government, inclined us to respect the independence of our neighbours: no country bordering upon one so prone to war exhibited greater reserve than we did. Other powers had at once recourse to arms, though they were afterwards slow and timid in executing their projects; their early tone of command only added fuel to the fire: Spain acted with more discrimination; her first wish was to pay homage to the sound principles which our neighbours affected to dis-

own ; she offered her mediation ; she even condescended to have recourse to solicitations, and went no farther than to tender advice to her ancient ally, to dissuade her from a crime which would entail disgrace upon her, and be followed by a deluge of evils. Who could have believed it? Those offices of goodwill on the part of a magnanimous and powerful people, anxious to prevent the perpetration of a crime, and setting no other price upon her friendship than the attainment of that object, — those noble exertions were only met with insolent disdain. A ferocious demagogue proposed that war should be declared against us, and his motion was applauded by the sanguinary men who exercise unlimited control over France, and unmercifully prey upon her! The atrocious crime is soon consummated, and anarchy increases by its perpetration. That nothing should be wanting in their arrogant conduct, they intimate to us that we must disarm. . . . . The Spanish monarch is allowed no other alternative than that of treating with cordiality the savage murderer of the chief of his family, and signing a treaty of peace over the corpse of Louis XVI, or of having those ferocious republicans for enemies. . . . . What Spaniard would have hesitated a moment in the choice of his answer? War! war! exclaimed the whole nation ; such was also the resolve of our august sovereign ; but it was not the tumultuous accla-

mation of fanatics or of privileged egotists. . . . It was the true cry of national honour,—the ‘*St. James for ever, and Spain forward*,’ which has at all times been the banner of Castilians hurrying on to glory.

“ I have said enough to prove the justice of this war ; but is there not, besides the sacred law of honour, a right, the first of all, that of self-preservation, of natural defence, of resistance to an enemy who has framed for himself a system of indiscriminately attacking the laws, the manners, the habits, the religious belief, the dearest affections of other people ? who assumes to call in question all established institutions, and attempts by means of terror or of cunning to impose his principles, his errors, his delirium,—in a word, to procure accomplices in the crimes he has been perpetrating ? Good heavens ! what times have we reached ? The philosophy of the age has justly censured the crusades of old, which were undertaken for the sake of religion ; will this so much vaunted philosophy approve the crusade of atheism and anarchy ? What text of divine right, or of the common law of nations, will be invoked in favour of those who trample upon both ? in favour of a government which preaches impiety, sacrilege, spoliation, the ruin of whatever exists, and gives practical effect to its frightful doctrines wherever its insatiable delegates are enabled to penetrate ? Behold their writings, the speeches uttered in

their public assembly,—fatal eruptions of the volcano which daily vomits forth those decrees of rancour and blood, those missions of death and extermination, which are to desolate France and every country adjoining her! Figure to your minds the anguish, the sorrows of the people of Savoy, of the county of Nice, of Belgium, of Germany, of every country which those Vandals have entered as friends or enemies, with a branch of olives or a sword in hand! . . . . . Threatened as we are by such dangers and insults, there exists nowhere a law which forbids our waging war against those disturbers of public tranquillity, whose excesses disgrace the present age, and who, by the horror they inspire, will cause the light of knowledge to be shunned, and prolong the state of degrading ignorance in which so many nations are yet plunged. Shall we allow our children to become slaves, and be reared up in the school of such monsters? I hesitate not to declare that against these monsters alone we are waging war: the question is not to avenge a family quarrel; to impose such or such form of government upon France; to restore, in opposition to the public will, a throne which rebellion has destroyed; or to force the country to receive any particular sovereign for their ruler, who, possessing no right to their confidence, would be powerless to give them a rallying point or to hold the reins of government. Would to Heaven, indeed, that, free

from the yoke which oppresses her, France would herself recall her legitimate princes and be restored, under laws emanating from that exalted family, to her former days of happiness and glory ! There is no knowing what may yet come to pass ! France at the present day—true France—maintains the silence of terror. There is but one determination openly manifested, that of *not being brought under the yoke of foreigners* ; and this is the noble sentiment which, oh heavens ! a handful of tyrants work upon and turn to their own exclusive advantage !

“ But the day is not far distant (I have reasons for anticipating it) when the patriotic zeal of a few citizens, in unison with their personal interest, will overthrow and crush that band of wretches who lacerate and tarnish the honour of France. The day of a salutary re-action is not far distant, when other men, other laws, other political maxims will become more solid guarantees to us ; it will then be possible to open a friendly communication with France. Such should be, in my opinion, the proximate termination of this war, carried on without ambitious views, of a purely defensive character, firmly entered upon, but pursued without obstinacy though not without mature reflection ; a war unsubsidised by foreigners, undertaken at our own expense, which we are ready to bring to an end so soon as the anti-social condition of France shall cease to endanger our honour and safety.

“Is this hope likely to be realised? Shall we have long to wait? The most circumspect plans often evaporate into air; but one thing certain is, that a government such as the one which now vexes and preys upon our neighbours cannot last. France is not a country in which barbarism can become indigenous to the soil; a reaction is infallible. No sooner will it take place, whosoever may gain the ascendancy, than the mere fact of the fall of her present tyrants will impress upon their successors the necessity of adopting an opposite course, and of returning, for their own sakes, to the common law of nations. The important point is to discriminate with judgment, and take advantage of the seasonable moment; on this depends the repose of Europe and the salvation of France. Whatever government shall eventually be established, whether it be republican, monarchical, a mixture of both, or of any other form, provided it will abstain from attacking others, pay deference to the general principles of justice, and offer some guarantee,—we may then let the torrent run on without attempting to impede its course; for to persist, after it shall have returned to its channel, in still carrying on the war, would only be provoking a fresh overflow of its waters. I will not presume to answer for the future proceedings of other cabinets, but I can affirm that Spain is engaged in the general alliance by no other conditions than those which the honour and



safety of our country impose as a law upon us, as it would upon any other government. None can make it imperative upon us to continue the war beyond that limit; any attempt to do so would be alike misplaced and superfluous.

“ This candid exposition of the principles which actuate the ministry shows that so far from being opposed to the restoration of peace, it is ready to claim at the hands of the whole nation the merit of it. Will it be said that the moment has arrived? I dare not venture to believe it. Our military honour is untarnished; but that of the cabinet, which is no less so up to this moment, would be grievously prejudiced were we to desert, without a motive, the cause of our allies, and to treat separately, I shall not say with France well or ill represented, but with tyrants who rule and decimate her; with men devoid of religion, of every divine or human law which could be taken as guarantees for the fulfilment of their engagements. What would be said of us, if, at sight of the horrors which appal the whole world, we appeared freely to sympathise with men sullied with so many crimes, when there existed no overwhelming necessity to compel us to such conduct? Would we not be held as their accomplices, and really be assuming that character? Have they not avowed their enmity to all who disapprove of their acts, and who desire to break off all connexion with them? Have they

revoked the decrees of the 19th of November and 15th of December 1792, in which the declaration to that effect is recorded? Those decrees are still in full force. What government jealous of its self-respect could consent to be a member of such a community? This cannot by any possibility take place. A peace at this moment!—why, do the Jacobins themselves desire it? nothing is further from their thoughts. Are we humbly to solicit it at their hands? Shall Spain exhibit the first, perhaps the only example of having concluded a peace with such men, no matter on which side it may have been solicited or tendered? Let us suppose the cabinet capable of so debasing itself; where shall we find a Spaniard willing to undertake the task of treating with them, and to affix his signature by the side of those of Collot d'Herbois, Couthon, St. Just, or Robespierre? Will ministers of his Catholic Majesty, acting on the behalf of religious and monarchical Spain, authorise by their presence the assassinations which daily embrue Paris with blood? or calmly listen to the insults unceasingly poured forth against the God of heaven and against earthly majesties in their public assemblies, in the streets, and in the open places? Will they, in a word, officially assist at the bacchanalian revels of those wild, infuriated men, who call themselves republicans? Surely not. Let us leave them to themselves; their presence is shunned by every nation.

Shall Spain have a representative in that desolate abode of crime?

“ Let us not then call this war either impolitic or unjust so long as France bends beneath the iron yoke of tyrants, so long as every neighbouring nation is threatened with the same yoke. France is oppressed: the war we are waging to assist her in shaking off a yoke which is disgraceful to her people, and raises against her so many enemies from without, if contrary to every probability she consents to endure such tyranny, and even encourages it,—that war becomes necessary, whatever may be the issue of it. If France should succumb in the struggle, policy will interfere to prevent her becoming the object of foreign ambition, and to maintain the balance of Europe: if this balance should cease to exist, the loss of it would be a far minor evil than that which threatens us at present, and which it behoves us in the first instance to guard against. Should Spain, with a view to prevent France from falling a prey to foreigners, expose herself to the danger of falling a prey to France? of two evils, let us adopt the least, and make others, if possible, bear the penalty of it. To save our neighbours from shipwreck, we must not expose our vessel to the danger of being upset. To obtain a friendship which, when tendered by us, has been disdainfully rejected, let us not, in this emergency, compromise our existence. Such ought to be our political course of conduct.

“ For the rest, the council may be assured that we have not closed our eyes to future events ; we have not neglected our relations with other powers interested in the maintenance of the European equilibrium. With regard to Great Britain, I am the first to acknowledge and deplore the advantages she derives from this war. France and England appear to us at the present day in the light of two evils which it is our fate to have to encounter in opposite directions ; but the fault is not ours ; it has not depended upon us to avert them. The one is a pressing, an immediate danger ; the other is also a serious one, but its progress is slow, and allows us a short respite. Let us apply a remedy to the most urgent ; this is the part of prudence. We may resort to palliatives with a view to neutralise the other, and prevent its gaining ground : the time will come for dealing with it according to its character ; time occasionally brings a remedy in its train.

“ But what if France should be triumphant in a struggle in which success has already dawned on her first warlike attempts? . . . . This, in the long run, is scarcely possible whilst there is an utter absence of regularity in her government,—whilst she fails to adopt laws which can constitute her into a nation ; when this shall have taken place, she instantly becomes our friend. But if, in spite of all, anarchical France should eventually triumph? . . . . Spain would bend to the de-

crees of Providence; but she will not have to reproach herself with a betrayal of the duty imposed on every nation, of looking to their defence and to their self-preservation. Happen what may, I here affirm that any possible event will find the government prepared to meet it: it is alive to whatever may take place; whether the fortune of arms abandon us, whether the allied powers alter their political system, our course of conduct shall remain unchanged. Neither frivolous caprices nor the suggestions of foreigners shall prevent our concluding a peace as soon as it may prove seasonable or of possible attainment.

“The government will not stand alone on the field of battle, or when any opportunity shall present itself for treating. More than one cabinet shares our views, our moderate and conciliating intentions; in every event, those cabinets will harmonise with us; but the king's government, whilst it prefers the blessings of peace to the splendour of victories, is still bound, in my opinion, to brave every danger, even the frowns of fortune, rather than subscribe to treaties which would tarnish its honour.

“I abstain from dwelling on the expenses of the war; it is national in its character; the people eagerly submit to sacrifices which the glory and security of the country imperiously call for. Each one contributes his share at this moment with a profuseness as affecting and honourable

as on the first day. It is a war undertaken for the maintenance of the nation's rights, of its religious creed, of its threatened altars,—for the very existence of the country. In the social overthrow publicly proclaimed by the French, in the stupendous reforms they announce, the national gravity beholds with contempt so many fatal gifts which foreigners would impose upon them. When a people display so lofty a character, they enrich themselves by every gift they offer at their country's shrine; their virtue is ennobled and increased by the offering; theirs is for the state an inexhaustible treasure.

“The French have fallen far short of the Spaniards in patriotic generosity. We shall not be reduced to the necessity of paying our troops with *assignats*; we will not resort to their system of robbing private individuals, of plundering the churches, in order to support our armies. Let others extol to the skies the power, the enthusiasm, of the republicans; there is much, in my view, to be deducted from such an exaggerated picture. I know that, in order to fill up the void of the public coffers, the French government has recourse to confiscations, to forced requisitions, and to the guillotine. Once the terror of the sword shall have ceased, when each one shall be at liberty to express his sentiments, you will soon be enabled to try the test of that republican zeal, and will discover that the dazzling fire is but

apparent, without warmth, like the rapid and fugitive spark emitted from steel when coming into contact with a hard substance. . . . How great is the difference with respect to us! All is with us real, spontaneous truth,—the vigorous expression of a deep, a sublime sentiment, rooted in the old soil of the country, in which all virtues naturally grow and flourish; fidelity to our kings, religious fervour, love of country! Nothing can dry up these three burning sources of Spanish energy.

“As to the dangers to be incurred in the present war, I own the war to be far more serious than the military parades of another epoch, when diplomatists, always closely following the army, after a battle won or lost, met together at a banquet to treat respecting nuptials, or to prepare chivalric feasts. . . . The present rather resembles the old wars of religion; the enthusiasm of the public mind heightens the physical strength. This is a war of principles, of popular interests, of social subversion; a frightful crusade unexampled in history! Science may flourish by the aid of warlike deeds! If the result of a struggle be doubtful, probabilities are in our favour: ours is a just cause; we must leave something to chance. Finally, one of two things will happen: either the faction which at this moment rules paramount in France will be hurled from power, and make way for other men, for another

system holding out the hope of a peaceful, a regular, an encouraging accommodation; or that faction, intoxicated with victory, will pursue its fatal career to the end. In the first, which is the most likely case,—I may add, a case which will infallibly come to pass,—peace is at our gates; we open our arms to greet its approach. In the second case, should the enemy triumph, we must put on the armour of stern courage, and make head against him. I speak under the influence of a deep-rooted conviction: fortune may prove, by turns, favourable and contrary to us; but we cannot succumb, we can never bend to the yoke. Spain fights for her king, her God, her domestic hearths; for the soil of the country which foreigners have never invaded with impunity!"



## CHAPTER XX.

Bitter language of Count d'Aranda.—The King is offended at it.—The sitting of the Council is adjourned.—The Count's disgrace.—My conduct towards him.

AMONGST the many onerous duties of the office of prime minister, there is one for which nothing can make amends. Whatever may be his loyalty and the constancy of his endeavours to accomplish the good he has in view, its attainment generally depends upon secrecy; the public must be ignorant of the object of the measures adopted by the government,<sup>1</sup> for the slightest indiscretion may occasion their failure. Nay, when they have actually been carried into effect, it is often requisite to withhold, for a long time at least, a knowledge of the real motives in which they have originated, and of the means employed for their accomplishment.

To this unavoidable necessity the man in power

<sup>1</sup> The Prince here alludes to a monarchical or absolute government, such as that of Spain at the period in question. A representative government must, on the contrary, seek and obtain its support from that publicity which is viewed by absolute power as a hindrance to its measures.—E.

must submit: the field is therefore open to his enemies, who calumniate him beforehand; and history at last adopts the most unjust imputations as truths, in the absence of more correct information. No part of my life, beset as it has always been by difficulties of more or less magnitude, was ever free from this painful necessity: I shall occasionally have to allude to it in these Memoirs. I may quote the following instance, with reference to the discussion provoked by Count d'Aranda.

It has been asserted that this old counsellor of state recommended peace; that I, an inexperienced young man, insisted upon war; and that the count fell a victim to his philanthropic vote. Those who beheld and deplored his disgrace are not aware of any other motive for it. They knew that a discussion had arisen in the council between Count d'Aranda and the Duke de la Al-cudia; they were utterly ignorant of the arguments urged by either. I remained a minister, and at the summit of power; he was exiled, and his friends laid his downfall to my charge. In the mean while, what had occurred within the walls of the council necessarily remained unknown to all but its members: the contest was not of a nature to be made public: we were all strictly forbidden to mention the subject, under pain of failing in our duty and betraying the secret of the state.

How much this compulsory reserve has appeared to warrant honourable men in dealing in the most calumnious imputations!

To what cause was the count's disgrace to be attributed?—to the violence of his temper, the irascibility of his self-love. The most undeniable, the most self-evident truths must be clothed in moderate language, even in countries which enjoy a freedom of discussion: they stand in need of being cautiously and clearly developed, if we wish them to be heard without alarm. . . . This gentle and salutary circumspection is far more necessary in an absolute monarchy, where the person of the monarch is the object of a religious, even a superstitious respect. . . . What shall I say? In a tempered monarchy, does not the king, by general and understood assent, represent also the majesty of the people? Here my readers have to pronounce,—first, between my principles and those laid down by the count; secondly, whether he urged his principles with becoming moderation; thirdly, whether in my refutation I avowed myself his rival or his enemy. I could not possibly acknowledge him to be in the right: entertaining, as I did, a contrary impression, I was bound to contradict him,—not in order to flatter the king, who no doubt claimed our respect, but held a debasing adulation in abhorrence. I contradicted the count, not to assume a tone of importance: I was too well aware that

my downfall was unavoidable in the event of fortune proving adverse to our arms, as it had already deserted the standard of the northern powers. I combated the count's doctrines, I repeat it, because I differed with him in opinion, though persuaded that if my views should prevail, I was preparing for myself those anxieties and cares from which a peace would have preserved me. I had unquestionably the right, though I did not abuse it, of combating the advice of my colleague; I had abundance of reasons to justify my views, but sacrificed part of my strength in order to give him the benefit of such share as might in fairness be allowed to him. I far exceeded the limits of my duty by revealing with perfect candour the intentions of the government: I hinted at a prospect of settling the disputed question in a manner which made my views appear to approximate to those of the count: I did not even hesitate in frankly and openly meeting him half-way towards conciliating his good-will; but, so far from encouraging, he rejected my advances. He was no doubt quite at liberty to do so; but it behoved him to reply to my arguments, to soften down his principles or explain away what was repugnant in them: this was his right, and I had afforded him a favourable opportunity to exercise it; but self-love had obscured his sight.

The fact is, that when I developed my opinion

and the impressions of the government, several members of the council, and the king himself, gave evidence of their approbation by signs which were almost involuntary, but were nevertheless the spontaneous tokens of a conviction suddenly felt or of a conformity of ideas. Without betraying the slightest displeasure, but with an air of calm satisfaction, Charles IV, as soon as I had ceased to speak, turned towards the count as if to invite him to resume the subject. It occurred to the whole council that this circumstance was of fortunate omen, and placed it in his power to soften and moderate the asperity of his language and the rigour of his political axioms.

The contrary came to pass: visibly mortified, and assuming an offended tone, ill suited to his age, and to his position in the presence of the monarch, whose exalted station claimed more respect and circumspection at his hands, the count uttered these words, which are still fresh in my recollection:—"For my part, sire, I have nothing to add or to expunge from what I have stated both orally and in writing. It were easy for me to refute the arguments, far more obsequious than solid, with which it has been attempted to support the course of war. But what would be the use of it? All I could say would be in vain: your majesty has bestowed unequivocal signs of approbation upon the address of your minister. Who would venture to displease your majesty by giving utterance to arguments of a contrary tendency?"

One of the counsellors endeavoured to interfere, in order, no doubt, to cut short an explanation which was assuming a character of acrimony; but the king broke up the sitting. "Enough for to-day," said he; and he immediately proceeded towards his cabinet, traversing with a quick step the hall of the council in which we still occupied our respective places. As he passed near the count, the latter lisped a few words, which I was unable to collect: they were, probably, words of apology. . . . . We all heard the king's reply: "In your intercourse with my father you were always headstrong, and wanting in due respect; but you never went so far as to insult him in the midst of his council."

What followed is known to all the world. Many persons were witnesses of my efforts to induce the king to pardon this unfortunate sally, in consideration of the count's age. Biographers have scarcely alluded to my good offices on behalf of the noble exile; neither has it been recorded that as soon as his disgrace became known, the tribunal of the Holy Inquisition fancied it had discovered an opportune moment for sifting the documents in which the count figured so conspicuously in the celebrated *Olavide* proceedings, and had the presumption to demand the surrender to it of this new victim. Had I really been his enemy, what more favourable occasion could I desire than that of consigning to others the task of effecting the count's ruin, without ap-

pearing to take any part in it? So far from adopting this course, I claim the merit of having rescued the count from the dreadful affront which awaited him. He lived and died without being aware that he was indebted to me for this good office. A civil procedure, or rather the semblance of one, was instituted by way of gratifying the first moment of irritation of Charles IV ; a good and clement king, but the more jealous of the respect of his subjects, as he prided himself in evincing courtesy towards all. I used every personal exertion towards the judge-delegate, in order that he might overlook in his report the count's philosophical opinions. The judge consented to my request : several of his enemies had come forward to volunteer their testimony against him ; they were not attended to. Being thus rescued from every imputation with regard to his opinions, there only remained the charge of want of respect to the king, a fault not to be palliated. The severity of the sovereign was satisfied with the banishment of the offender to the Alhambra of Grenada. . . . . Abbé Muriel has departed from the truth in asserting that the count met with rigorous treatment in his exile. Every inhabitant of Grenada, if appealed to, would disprove the assertion. In consequence of the orders I had previously issued, Count d'Aranda was less a prisoner than a guest in the palace of the Moorish kings. Its delightful gardens and

beautiful walks were thrown open to him; no guard or sentry was placed as a check upon his liberty. He was permitted to receive every visitor he thought proper to invite; nor was he deprived for a moment of the means of communication, or of the revenues of his estates, on which it never was intended to lay hands. He preserved all his honours; and I exerted myself in the mean while to procure his release from banishment. I succeeded, after a short time, in obtaining an authority for his residing on his estates in Arragon, his native country. Another minister might have felt some degree of uneasiness at the count's character and principles, especially at a period when his presence in the midst of his vassals and on the French frontier appeared not unattended with danger. I disregarded various insinuations made to me on the subject, and had the satisfaction of exerting in his favour all the influence which my position enabled me to command. However, he still persisted to the last in bearing me a rancorous enmity, which he even carried to the tomb!

Those who commiserated the last disgrace of the count in 1794, were well aware it was not the first that had befallen him; the lively sympathy of his friends having been put to the test on more than one previous occasion: first, under the reign of Ferdinand VI, the chief command of the artillery and engineers was taken away from Count



d'Aranda, and he was removed from Madrid under the pretext of a diplomatic mission to Poland: under the reign of Charles III, he exhausted the patience of this excellent prince by the haughty and exclusive ascendancy which he claimed to exercise over his mind, and he lost by such conduct the presidency of the council: Grimaldi replaced him in the king's favour; and in order to get rid of his presence, he was sent into exile under the title of ambassador to Paris. His third mishap occurred during the administration of Florida Blanca, who had him recalled from the court of France, and buried, for a length of years, in the Pantheon of the council of state.<sup>2</sup> Can this have always been the work of envy, or was it not rather the count's fault? Who has not heard of his harshness of temper, of his Arragonese obstinacy,<sup>3</sup> of the irascibility of his self-love, of his intolerable philosophical pretensions? What friends was he likely to secure by that proud disdain of the capacity of others, those constant sallies, that offensive language, that want of consideration which never failed to mortify all who came in contact with

<sup>2</sup> In Spain, counsellors of state might be assimilated to our French ministers of state. H. C. M. neither convoked them at fixed periods, nor all without exception. They were like invalids, who might be again called upon to perform temporary service. This is all: the title was no doubt highly honourable, but the office was nearly divested of every function.—E.

<sup>3</sup> To give an idea of the proverbial obstinacy of an Arragonese, he is represented attempting to drive in a nail with his forehead.—E.

him? He praised toleration, though no one ever displayed less towards those who had the courage to differ from him. It is very far from my intention to deny or undervalue the actions or good qualities which entitle him to praise; but I have no apprehension of being belied by those who have had the means of forming a just estimate of his worth. Count d'Aranda evinced more empiricism than sound learning. No one will ever deny him the possession of extensive knowledge, which he exhibited more particularly in his younger days; it was, however, a crude and shallow knowledge. Connected with the most distinguished literary Frenchmen of the middle of the last century, welcomed by writers who caressed princes and nobles with a view to enlist them under the banners of the *Encyclopædia*, anxious to figure at any price amongst the modern sages, (for military renown was not within his reach), he treasured up with little discernment whatever came from that source, whether good, bad, or indifferent, and proved himself a proselyte of greater zeal than discretion; retailed the doctrines of the school; and being divested of religious prejudices, though swayed by philosophical enthusiasm, he could only lay claim to the inferior merit of a sectarian attachment.

If this be deemed too severe a judgment, let us listen to Don André Muriel, a great panegyrist of Count d'Aranda, who, in note lxvi. p. 27, of his

translation of the sixth volume of Coxe's work, speaks of him as follows :

“Count d'Aranda was neither a man of genius nor a great man ; but he was of an independent mind and possessed extraordinary firmness of character. This was his chief merit. It was fortunate for Spain that he applied to the reform of abuses those qualities which are so valuable in a statesman. His country was indebted to him for important improvements in the social system ; however, it is but just to acknowledge that he was powerfully seconded by such men as Campomanès and Florida Blanca, on whom devolved the internal administration of the kingdom. Both were *Fiscales* (Attorneys-General) of the Council of Castile, from which emanated, at that period, the impulse given to reforms. It is well known that, during his stay in Paris, Count d'Aranda had contracted a close friendship with the authors of the Encyclopædia, from whose intercourse he derived the ardent longing for innovations which tormented him. His notions upon many subjects were sound and correct, but tinged with great exaggeration upon others. Amidst the crowd of new ideas propagated by the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, it was not always an easy task to discriminate the truth from the mass of more or less paradoxical theories. The count's understanding did not keep pace with his energetic character. The Marquis de Caraccioli, who

had much frequented him in Paris, ingeniously compared his mind to a deep well with a narrow opening.”\*#

Peace to the ashes of the dead ! exclaim my

\* It is remarkable that Abbé Muriel presents this note as his own, whereas he has literally copied it from the *Universal Biography of Contemporaries*, a work published previously to the translation of Coxe's work. The plagiarism is of little consequence ; suffice it that M. Muriel has adopted the ideas and the text of the article. He assents to the opinion of the biographers, and lays claim to it, doubtless from a conviction of its correctness.

\* Others have said, “ to a bottle containing good liquor, but scarcely allowing it to run out, owing to its narrow neck.” Making the most of the expression, it conveys but scanty praise. The qualification which invariably follows a compliment shows that M. Muriel, who is a man of talent, is also a churchman ; for he gives sufficient evidence of Jesuitism. There is far more rigidity and candour in the sketch furnished by the Prince of the Peace ; he has drawn Count d'Aranda in full face : Bourgoing, the *Biography of Contemporaries*, and M. Muriel, have only given us his profile. Their representation of the count proves, in spite of all their circumspection, that the portrait drawn by the Prince of the Peace must be a good likeness.

The biography of the brothers Michaud may be referred to on the same subject. The article is written by M. Bourgoing, who had been intimately acquainted with Count d'Aranda, and who, notwithstanding his benevolence towards every one, speaks of him in nearly the same terms. However, he is mistaken in placing under the reign of Charles III. the count's mission to Poland, where he remained seven years. Ferdinand VI. only died in 1759. Aranda had already been recalled to Spain, where Charles III. had an opportunity of employing him, after his accession to the crown, first as Captain-general of Valencia in 1762 or 1763 ; and afterwards as President of the Council in 1765, about the period of the expulsion of the Jesuits, which took place in 1767.—E.

readers. I readily assent to the observation. But I also beseech that the peace of the living may not be disturbed ; that the bones of those who are no longer of this world may not be constantly flung at their heads.

## CHAPTER XXI.

Calumny published by Don André Muriel. — Observations.

I must dwell a short time longer on this episode, the historical portion of which has just been detailed at sufficient length ; for I feel bound to refute a scandalous calumny.

As a sequel to the note I have quoted at foot of the preceding chapter, and which is a literal extract, as I have observed, from a biographical article, Don André Muriel adds the following remarks, which are unquestionably his own :

“ Count d’Aranda replaced Florida Blanca in the ministry of foreign affairs when the latter was dismissed from office. His administration proved as it were a stepping-stone to that of the young Duke d’Alcudia, who was, in fact, soon appointed minister. Reverting to his place in the council of state, where the conduct to be held towards France, then tormented by the revolutionary storm,<sup>1</sup> was under discussion, the count maintained that there would be danger in openly declaring against that nation, whilst the public

<sup>1</sup> The same phrase will presently be found repeated in inverted commas.

mind was under so violent an excitement: The Duke d'Alcudia was of a contrary opinion. In the heat of the discussion, he dropped some unguarded expressions respecting the count, intimating that age had frozen his zeal, and rendered him unapt to advocate a bold line of conduct. Aranda reminded the favourite of his youth, and of his inexperience in such matters. The count was shortly afterwards banished to Grenada, and confined in the castle of the Alhambra, where he was not treated with the attentions to which his exalted character entitled him.<sup>2</sup> This excessive rigour was relaxed at a later period, and he received permission to repair to Arragon, where he died in 1794."<sup>3</sup>

M. Muriel here confounds periods, and merely echoes the reports propagated respecting the causes which led to Count d'Aranda's disgrace. We will at once overlook the silly and conceited affirmation that the count was only called to the ministry as a stepping-stone to my appointment, and with the view to keep the place for a moment in reserve for me; as if the king, whose will was absolute, stood in need of any such circumspection. We will also forgive M. Muriel's false assertion as to the pretended inattention evinced

<sup>2</sup> This false assertion has been disproved in the preceding chapter.

<sup>3</sup> Muriel is wrong in this date, as in so many other circumstances. Count d'Aranda died on the 9th of January 1798, at the age of 78 years and a few months.

towards the Count d'Aranda in his banishment. These inaccuracies only prove, after all, the manifest intention of assailing my character. What follows is of a far more serious nature.

He alleges that certain documents have been supplied to him from Madrid,—that weapons against me have been put into his hands. He who had hitherto laid claim to impartiality; who, unbiassed by impressions favourable or otherwise, confined himself to repeating what he had heard; suddenly discovers an opportunity *to flatter the reigning power*. He is at once transformed into another man; the credit of his gown, the duties of an historian, respect for public opinion, common sense, sound criticism,—everything is disregarded. The absent is the only guilty man in his eyes; and yet that unhappy absent is still of this earth, though he maintains an absolute silence, and has abstained during so many years from uttering a word to disarm the voice of calumny.

“We avail ourselves of this occasion,” continues the worthy ecclesiastic, “to rectify what has been stated at page 129 of the first volume, as to the cause of Count d'Aranda's exile from Madrid to Grenada in 1794. Original and authentic documents, which have been confided to us since that volume was published, place it in our power to furnish positive information on the subject.”<sup>4</sup> Thus promises and affirms Don André Muriel.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. VI. additional chapter iii. p. 60.



What are then those documents? Their number is, it appears, limited to one,—“A Narrative written by Count d’Aranda himself.” Who has supplied this document? M. Melgarejo, lately created Duke of San Fernando, who, having forfeited the good graces of his master in 1823, was endeavouring to recover them by fresh services! During the reign of Ferdinand VII, the court of Madrid maintained political travelling clerks in various quarters, in Paris, and especially in London, in order to watch the movements of emigrants of all opinions, and tamper with all writers whose pens might have laid aside all restraint on the subject of the Spanish government. These emissaries were to enter into arrangements with newspaper writers, and with concoctors of biographies or histories, who should lavish as much praise as possible upon the existing reign, and at all events be unsparing in their aspersions on past times, especially on the preceding reign and on the unfortunate man whose name was wielded as the pretext for a parrieidal rebellion. Those manoeuvres are of public notoriety, and were well rewarded. The man who thus kept in pay the detractors of his father and mine,—he who was principally interested in that infamous and unnatural speculation,—fed as long as he lived upon this personal rancour; parched as he was with a thirst of implacable hatred, a hatred produced by remorse. Should any one ask me what profit

Father Muriel derived from the insults he has heaped upon me in his additional notes, I reply by referring to what is manifest to all. Whether an emigrant or a refugee of an earlier date, and under more serious circumstances than Melgarejo, his provider of documents, he was anxious, as may well be supposed, to be reinstated into favour. In his work he heaps contumelious reproaches upon me, and worse than that, upon his first, his excellent sovereign Charles IV. Accordingly Ferdinand VII. has created him a knight of the royal and distinguished order of Charles III.

This stands in need of no commentary. But what do we find after all in the posthumous written narrative ascribed to Count d'Aranda himself? Let us set aside the vulgar rumours, the coarse falsehoods, the perfidious insinuations so unworthy of a grandee of Spain of the old stamp, and so derogatory of the respect due to the august personages designated in that written document, the exaggerated praises which the count either bestows or is supposed to bestow upon himself. Of all the invectives which he hurls at my head, one imputation only has deeply affected me. After reporting in an incorrect and unconnected manner the speech delivered by Count d'Aranda, the writer pretends that instead of replying to his objections, or attempting to refute him with arguments, I assumed a haughty tone, and denounced him as a dangerous man, urging

that he should be put upon his trial along with all those who met together and professed the count's doctrines. An imposture so revolting, so gratuitously invented with a view to tarnish the generous and conciliating disposition I had displayed throughout the discussion,—so base an imposture has inflicted, I acknowledge it, a deep wound upon my feelings. Never in my life did I wield the weapon of persecution: I have never persecuted, or suffered others to persecute, as long as it was in my power to prevent it: my bitterest enemies have never raised against me the charge of intolerance. The reign of Charles IV. (I claim this as a personal title of honour) was not a reign marked by acts of rigour, of imprisonment, of criminal procedure, of torture for political opinions. With respect to religious opinions, although the Inquisition was still in existence, and was so against my will, the reign of Charles IV. was the most indulgent, the most gentle of any upon record in Spanish history. No more pious martyrdoms or holy piles were seen during this reign. . . . My principles, my system, my conviction, enjoined me to respect the human thought, to win over by persuasion the public mind; thus it is that I had the good fortune to maintain internal tranquillity in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in both hemispheres as long as I held the reins of administration.

No! never did I raise the trap of terror over my beloved country. That terror which withers up the soul, the denunciations of informers, civil discords, chains, gibbets, all those scourges of more recent growth, are owing to my successors, my enemies, who, in acquiring possession of power, have inflicted them upon unhappy Spain. Will Abbé Muriel, who is my contemporary, have the boldness to deny the fact?

However, let us revert to the document, the pretended narrative of Count d'Aranda. What proofs or indications of its authenticity do we find in it? Were the very handwriting of the count held up to my view, it would be repugnant to my feelings to believe him the author of the work. The revolting falsehoods, the contradictions to be met with in every line of the passages quoted by M. Muriel; the ignorance of the most notorious events of the period; the tone, the style of writing, so little in accordance with what Count d'Aranda is known to have said and written,—everything leads to the supposition that the *authentic* narrative, so far from emanating from him, has been fabricated by some person wholly ignorant of what actually occurred. I feel that I am paying the count a compliment in disbelieving his authorship; for, if he ever wrote anything respecting the event in question, another pen than his must have been employed in arranging and perverting the text.

Let us examine the passages which induce me to suppose the narrative to have been forged or perverted.

1st. "France was then tormented by the revolutionary storm." (The same phrase had already been inserted word for word in the note to the fifth volume.)<sup>5</sup> "All the cabinets of Europe were preparing to wage war against her. The King of Spain, allied by the ties of blood to the reigning family which had just been sacrificed, placed in the vicinity of a volcano which threatened to swallow up his kingdom, was deliberating on the part he was called upon to act under circumstances of so critical a nature. Count d'Aranda was of opinion that Spain should not involve herself in a war against France; but that it behoved her, nevertheless, to arm, and be in readiness to engage, if necessary, in the conflict. This appeared to him the only attitude consonant with prudence, situated as the country was at a distance from the other powers, and unable to derive any assistance from them in her military operations: future events would point out the conduct to be adopted towards foreign nations; for by organising large armies with a view to the protection of the country from invasion, favourable opportunities would infallibly arise either for acting in concert with the allied

<sup>5</sup> M. Muriel affirms that the volume was printed previously to the narrative being communicated to him.

powers, or for entering upon an advantageous negotiation with France, if her interest should induce her to procure, at the cost of some sacrifices, the neutrality of the cabinet of Madrid. This prudent advice did not predominate; the party anxious for war obtained the ascendancy."<sup>6</sup>

These few lines afford evidence that the author was ignorant of the details of the facts which he relates. What then could have been Count d'Aranda's wish, according to the narrative in question? That Spain should not involve herself in a war; but that she should arm, and be in readiness to engage, if necessary, in the conflict. What else did Spain actually do? The count was also desirous that large armies should be organised; but he had never prepared himself for this emergency, and the task of raising those armies wholly devolved upon myself.

He recommended that we should await future events. . . . What! . . . Did not Spain remain quiet until after the catastrophe of Louis XVI? A month had already elapsed since that tragical execution; the French chargé d'affaires was still in Madrid! he had not received intimation to depart, for M. Bourgoing himself applied for his passports.

He recommends, in fine, that we should pause in expectation that the interest of France may

<sup>6</sup> See the previous quotation, pages 60 and 61.

induce her to procure, at the cost of some sacrifices, the neutrality of our cabinet.

But Spain was acting a neutral part at a time when, instead of consenting to sacrifices with a view to the continuance of her neutrality, France imperiously and menacingly demanded a formal treaty, and, in addition to this, a disarming on our part, without a reciprocal proceeding on the part of the republic. In consideration of what was due, in the first place, to her own honour, and secondly to her safety, Spain hesitated to sign this insulting and unequal treaty: whilst we were still maintaining an actual neutrality, the republic declared war; the conflict was thus forced upon us.

Whether the count gave any other advice; whether in the emergency of impending events he still insisted upon a peace, and upon the country's disgrace; I am unable to say, for the narrative is silent on the subject.

How can the author of that production affirm that the war was resolved upon in spite of Count d'Aranda's advice? And if the count be the real author of it, how are we to explain the omission of so many essential particulars with which he could not fail to be acquainted; such as, the negotiation begun by himself, and by me followed up; the mediation or friendly intervention of Charles IV; the contempt which it met; the insults heaped upon him in return? Could the

count have written with such bad faith as to have intentionally omitted facts of so much importance? Is it not fairer to suppose that the narrative was fabricated and prepared at a subsequent period, and that its compiler was ignorant of what had taken place.

We have said enough on that point. When M. Muriel quotes from the speech of Count d'Aranda, he selects the following phrases :

" If it could not fail to be more pleasing for the King of Spain to behold a prince of his own dynasty at the head of the French government, this consideration, nevertheless, could not have such powerful weight as to induce him to compromise the safety of the state; an event of certain occurrence if reverses should be experienced, which were not unlikely to befall us, so great was the neglect evinced in making suitable preparations for the emergency of a war."<sup>7</sup>

Can this statement proceed from the pen of Count d'Aranda? Against whom is it directed? probably not against himself. Can he have intended to praise me? for I was the person who, having replaced him in the ministry, and finding no preparation made for war, actually organized in a short space of time the three armies of Navarre, Arragon, and Catalonia. Is it not extraordinary that the author of this narrative, in attempting to advert to facts of which he was igno-

<sup>7</sup> Pages 62 and 63.



rant, should have practised a deception upon the count; in other words, that he should have pulled down his statue, and raised up mine on its pedestal?

2ndly. "The preceding campaign was an unfortunate one."<sup>8</sup> Quite the reverse; that, our first campaign, was alike successful and honourable to our arms. Who can have had the boldness to deny the fact?—not the count assuredly. How could he have dared so to express himself at the council board without being immediately contradicted by all his colleagues? No: the falsehood does not proceed from him; but from the anonymous author of the narrative, who, incorrectly informed upon every point, has confounded the first campaign, so glorious to our arms, with the second, in which such serious reverses befell them.

Count d'Aranda is shortly afterwards made to say, in the same page:

"A great number of those new soldiers voluntarily enlisted, instigated to do so by the sermons preached from the pulpits, or by the vanity of having their names inserted in the official gazette."<sup>9</sup> But their aptitude for service is by no

<sup>8</sup> Page 83.

<sup>9</sup> The names of soldiers who voluntarily enlisted were not inserted in the gazette; though the author of the narrative pretends they were so. A reference to the gazettes of the time will show that they only notified the number of volunteers of each town or village.

means in keeping with their numbers. In proportion as they leave their towns or villages, and spend their enlistment money, their ardour and enthusiasm become abated."

I can never sufficiently deny this assertion; the count's speech assuredly never contained such an insult towards our gallant youths who won signal victories and could so ably wield their bayonets. It is impossible such language should have been held, at variance as it is with recent and notorious facts, which peremptorily refuted the perfidious insinuations ascribed to Count d'Aranda. He merely spoke in a conjectural sense: it was to be apprehended, in his opinion, that the zeal hitherto manifested should abate, and our resources prove inadequate to the struggle. It is rather singular that the task should devolve upon me of defending him from the officious awkwardness of his friends.

3rdly. The following silly observation is also imputed to him in the same page: "The French are well acquainted with our frontiers, and will profit by this knowledge to attack and invade us." It is obvious that each nation is well acquainted with her own frontier, and is thus enabled to attack her neighbours, should her means be adequate to the attempt. The French, therefore, having the advantage of being acquainted with the Spanish frontier, we must tremble for fear of their profiting by such knowledge to invade us. This is strictly the sense and bearing of the phrase. Were such an

argument to be actually found in the original statement, the author of the note ought, in mercy, to have suppressed it; for it is perfect nonsense, and the translator thinks that by inserting it in his note he has been bestowing praise upon the count! Weak, short-sighted judgment!

We limit ourselves to the few passages above quoted. Those who may desire to read the whole note, will find in it other silly remarks, and a mass of contradictions and ill-assorted reasonings, clothed in a French diction by no means creditable to M. Muriel's acquaintance with the language. Neither the logic nor the style of Count d'Aranda would ever have won him admiration; but so long as I have not actually seen his handwriting, I will not do him the injustice to ascribe such a rhapsody to his pen. The gross falsehoods to be met with in every line add to my disbelief. With respect to the facts which are related with a view to vilify me, I see nothing in them but impostures swept up from the streets, with the exception of the calumny, unworthy of every writer having any respect for himself,—the most cruel of all calumnies,—that of charging me with having replied to the count's speech by a denunciation, and urged his being put upon trial for his political opinions. Be the author of the infamous assertion who he may, I am content to rejoin, like the Latin orator: *mentiris, &c.*<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> It is no great recommendation for a document that it should be found in the manuscript collection of Duke Melgarejo;

If the authorship be not to be ascribed to Count d'Aranda, it would be curious to trace it back to its real source. For the rest, be the author of this pretended narrative who he may, I am warranted in complaining of the levity and want of discernment of Abbé Muriel, who by the addition of such a document has disfigured Coxe's valuable work. If the manuscript was only a copy, the nature of the text should have raised doubts in the translator's mind respecting its authenticity; if it was an original in the count's handwriting, surely Abbé Muriel has too much penetration not to have detected its errors and contradictions: why, then, in his character of historian, engaged or interested in the task of publishing the work, has he not accompanied it with explanatory notes, which would have manifested his good faith, or at least have saved the credit of his judgment? He has acted a different part, and has published his narrative, which is the evident, however lame, production of an enemy obstinately bent against me. This circumstance alone, had the compilation been ever so good, should have awakened his suspicions; whereas

whoever is satisfied with such a guarantee runs the risk of propagating a falsehood. In short, if the narrative has been actually written by Count d'Aranda, I refute it by mine, which claims an equal right to be attended to; the rather so, as it is in perfect conformity with the well-known occurrences of the epoch in question, whereas the other is almost invariably in contradiction with the same occurrences.

he has not hesitated in eagerly laying hold of it. He has received, embellished, and reproduced it as an authentic document, as information to be relied on, as a rectification of errors. He has identified himself with my aggressor;—was I not warranted in complaining of him, and in refuting his assertions?

## CHAPTER XXII.

Second Campaign—1794.

WE are entering upon a new series of events: my adversaries will hope to find me weaker on this ground, because, Fortune having proved contrary at all points to the armies of the coalition; Spain came in for her share of the common calamity. Thus, will it be said, were accomplished the predictions of Count d'Aranda, whose object was to preserve his country from the dangers that threatened it. The events, in fact, justified, at least in part, the count's forebodings. We experienced reverses; nevertheless ours, comparatively speaking, were not the most disastrous. Though we always calculated upon the possibility of their occurrence, it was consistent with the dignity of the country not to be alarmed beforehand. Spain could not, in this conjuncture, withdraw herself from the struggle without compromising her ancient and distinguished fame; for no loss in the materiel of our resources could be put in competition with the loss of national honour. We doubtless suffered reverses, but they spared us from more fearful ones; witness Genoa, Venice,

Switzerland, whose timid policy manifested a preference for peace at any price. Betrayed by Fortune, we proved to France that Spain could be unfortunate in war without, therefore, submitting to ignominious conditions; without trembling before an enemy, however powerful; without bending to the yoke of foreigners. Was our determination the offspring of mere temerity? Was it a mistaken point of honour which drove us to arms with a view to secure the repose of Europe? Were we so unreasonable in looking forward to a more favourable result from our efforts united with those of the several allied powers? The plans, the formidable armaments preparing in Flanders, were well known: it was equally well known that the army of Pichegru, composed in great part of young soldiers, ill equipped and destitute of everything, was threatened with impending destruction from the overwhelming masses of hostile forces, greatly superior to it in numbers. La Vendée, a giant with a thousand arms, was stirring amidst the western provinces of France: the Austro-Sardinian army, strengthened by daily reinforcements, was descending from the summit of the Alps, and about to fall upon the south: on our side, the frontiers of Arragon, Navarre, and Biscay were protected; our left was firmly established in the French territory, and the army of Catalonia also occupied the soil of the republic, and defended the two banks of the Tech, by a

well-defended line of posts extending to the sea ; forty thousand volunteers were marching forward to fill up the skeletons of our old regiments ; the materiel of the army was undergoing repair, and increasing in a surprising manner ; the zeal of the Spaniards responded to the impulse given by the government ; Portugal promised to send a fresh supply of troops to our aid. Accordingly, I repeat it, there was nothing rash in our system, supported as we were on all sides by such a combination of means for maintaining the war. In this state of affairs, to have deserted the common alliance, in order to treat with men who disgraced France and their age by a frightful mania of general subversion, would have been, beyond a doubt, an act of cruelty and cowardice which no terms of reproach could adequately qualify. . . . I was, moreover, informed, by means of a correspondence on which I could rely, that the sway of those disturbers of the general tranquillity was drawing to a close ; that public opinion was fermenting in France, and would soon pronounce itself against the promoters of anarchy ; in a word, that a reaction was on the point of breaking out : the least check they might experience in the campaign ready to open could not fail to bring about, in the interior of the country, that salutary crisis. What Spaniard, what man of courage, what minister of his sovereign, even amongst those who differed with me in opinion, would



have dared, circumstanced as I was, to adopt another line of conduct? Who would have ventured to brave the general opinion of Spain, and of all Europe?

I may be told that this argument is not founded in reason; "that the success not having corresponded with the efforts and mighty preparations of the allied powers, the war was impolitic, the coalition a folly, and that the Duke de l'Alcudia committed a grave error in supporting that system and in persisting in the war."

Such is the ordinary logic of those who judge after the event, and only blame or approve according to the success or failure of the undertaking. But is it not unjust to attribute to me the fault of the share which fell to the lot of Spain in a common disgrace, from which all the other powers suffered in a far greater degree than we did? "If Spain bore her share of the disgrace," allege my adversaries, "I alone, being the king's minister, ought to be held responsible for it." Were not the ministers of England, Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sardinia, and afterwards those of Naples and of the whole of Italy, as culpable as myself? I may add, that if, by a natural consequence, the magnitude of the error is to be estimated by the losses experienced by each of those states, I am the least reprehensible of all, since Spain, after having suffered less than any of those powers, was the only

nation which eventually succeeded in securing the integrity of her territory. It does not fall within my province to discuss the merits of others; my object is to defend myself, and to show the character of distributive justice exhibited by my merciless detractors. Since all were involved in the heavy calamity of that period, it is an act of signal malevolence to impute to me only the share of it which befell Spain. Did it depend upon me that victory should not occasionally desert our banners? Was it my fault, or that of the worthy officers selected by the government to command our troops, if the issue of the second campaign was less glorious than the first? Did the government neglect any means of upholding the moral character, the spirit of emulation, the courage of the army? Provisions, ammunition, succours of every kind, rewards,—were not these eagerly and abundantly provided? Did court favour influence the nomination of chiefs destitute of military renown or unworthy the confidence of the soldiers? and having at their disposal all the information and means of instruction which the government always hastened to furnish for their guidance,—were those brave generals crippled or opposed in their operations by arbitrary orders? Were they not always at liberty to act according to circumstances, to their practical knowledge, to their best judgment? Was there one who com-

plained, or was warranted in complaining, of restrictions, of caprices, of obstacles emanating from the court? Never, on the contrary, was more frankness displayed, or more unfettered or open intercourse kept up, between a government and the chiefs invested with its confidence? . . . . . Everything was prepared, arranged, and carried by common accord into effect. If, notwithstanding so many grounds of confidence, our arms were not so successful as they had previously been, this unforeseen change of fortune could only be ascribed to the general, irresistible cause which produced in all quarters similar effects. Of all the coalesced powers which concurred in the war, none displayed more prudence or skill; none, assuredly, proved less unfortunate than we.

We maintained our banners on the soil of the republic for a period of six months longer than any other power. Our first check, at the beginning of May,<sup>1</sup> had been preceded, in the pre-

<sup>1</sup> The loss of the camp of Boulou and of the lines of the Tech. The army had been deprived of her distinguished general-in-chief on the 3rd March preceding: it became necessary to replace him by an officer whom Ricardos had in his last moments recommended for his successor,—Count O'Reilly, his old companion in arms, whose glory he had shared on his first entering the military career, as he afterwards shared his disgrace under the administrations of Llerena and of Florida Blanca. O'Reilly took his departure for the army of Catalonia, but, like Ricardos, he was carried off by a sudden illness which attacked him on the journey. The command next devolved, as a matter of right, upon Count de la Union, who,

vious April, by the defeat of Clairfait in the north, at the mills of Cassel, which was followed by the loss of Menin; in Italy, by that of Oneille, Garessio, Ormea, Saorgio, Bocabigliera, San Martin, Montevalesano, and Little St. Bernard. Eighteen days afterwards was fought the obstinate battle of Turcoing, where the Duke of York owed his safety to the swiftness of his horse, and the Prince of Cobourg was thrown into complete rout: the Emperor of Germany

having already distinguished himself under the orders of the latter, gave the fairest promises of success.

General Dugommier had likewise been recently called to the command of the republican army. He succeeded early in April, by feigned attacks, in detaching large forces from the centre of our army; and made, on the 1st of May, a general attack. After an engagement of six hours' duration, and a considerable loss, he took possession of the great redoubts of La Trompette and Montesquieu, the main defences of the camp of Boulou. Don Ildefonso Avias, at La Trompette, and Don Francisco Xavier Venegas, at Montesquieu, notwithstanding the slender means at their disposal, fought with desperate valour. The latter, ere he quitted the redoubt, had already received two serious wounds, and was carried off the ground in the arms of his soldiers. The line being thus forced, not a moment was to be lost; but Dugommier being already in possession of the causeway of Bellegarde, the only means of retreat left was by the narrow and difficult road of Morallès. We abandoned a great part of our artillery, and had much difficulty in saving some of our camp-equipage and the military chest.

The detachments which, to the number of eight hundred men, occupied the advanced posts of Plá del Rey, were taken prisoners: we succeeded, however, in removing our wounded. General La Union, by his extraordinary activity and prudent arrangements, succeeded at last in rallying the army, took up a position in front of Figueiras, and covered that fortress.

had hoped that his presence would revive the ardour of his troops, and, from the high summit of the hills of ———, he had the mortification to witness their total defeat. Thus it was that the formidable plan combined in Tournay, which was to terminate the campaign at a blow, vanished into smoke.

During these successive disasters in Flanders, our garrisons in the forts of St. Elme, Portvendre, and Colliouvre were determined to make a stout resistance to the enemy. Besieged by Dugommier, who being in possession of all the surrounding passes intercepted every egress, these gallant men only relinquished their post after having vindicated the honour of our arms. These three points were occupied by scarcely eight thousand men; and the fierce Dugommier, at the head of thirty thousand men, was constantly summoning them to surrender. In order to approach the small fort of St. Elme, he had to open, mostly through the rock, a road of two leagues in extent, for the purpose of bringing up heavy artillery. Be it remarked that our soldiers had carried the fort by storm, with no other weapons than their swords and bayonets. In the night of the 16th of May, the handful of brave men who defended St. Elme, had the boldness to make a sortie and attack the French on the peak of ———, where Dugommier was present. This movement was so suddenly effected, that the republican general,

taken by surprise and wounded, had the greatest difficulty in effecting his escape. He was saved by his grenadiers, many of whom were killed by his side. Our soldiers, after spiking two guns, returned to the fort with scarcely any loss. At last the breach was opened; the garrison still refused to capitulate. Finding, however, that it was impossible to maintain itself any longer in the midst of those ruins, and under a continual shower of grape-shot, it determined to abandon the fort. The garrison of Portvendre being no longer protected by St. Elme, which formed its only defence, also retreated upon Colliouvre. The latter place, being commanded by Portvendre and St. Elme, and completely blockaded on all sides, could not resist a serious attack. There was no other alternative but to capitulate, or to effect a retreat by sea; but the very elements were against us. The squadron which had sailed from Rosas under the command of Admiral Gravina, was beat off by the storm, and unable at this critical moment to approach the harbour. There was no course left but that of surrender. The capitulation was as honourable as it deserved to be; the garrison obtained all the honours of war, with leave to return to Spain by land, under condition of its being exchanged for an equal number of French soldiers, prisoners of war. Previously to signing the capitulation, and in spite of a dreadful bombardment which battered the place by sea and land,

General Don Eugenio Navarro persisted in holding out two days longer, with a view to procure the escape of a corps of French emigrants who had already been doomed to death by the laws of the republic. He took advantage of a favourable night to embark in fishing boats those noble remains of the Legion of the Queen, who were safely removed to Rosas.\*

This extended line of frontier was, for two months longer, the theatre of repeated engagements, some prosperous, others unsuccessful, which neither procured to the French nor to us the acquisition of a single mile of ground. The enemy's forces were, nevertheless, superior in numbers, and daily increasing.

On the 1st of August, the French occupied Fuenterrabia on the side of the Western Pyrenees. The actions in the valley of Bastan and of St. Martial proved disastrous to our arms, but the enemy dearly purchased their victory. The openings of Arizcun, and the Peak of the Commissary, defended to the last extremity by the valiant Gagigal; witnessed the hostile columns alternately driven back and advancing, with a

\* Lieutenant-colonel Don Francisco Amorós, who had just distinguished himself in the brilliant and daring sortie of St. Elme, conceived the idea of this embarkation, and carried it into effect with equal intrepidity and skill. The honour of saving that brave legion may be wholly ascribed to him. M. Amorós is well known in Paris, and is a colonel in the service of France at the present day.

heavy loss of men on each occasion. Our retreat reflected honour on the regiments of Ultonia, the Walloon guards, and the provincial guards of Tuy, which, being supported by some squadrons of the regiments of Farnese and Montija, and of the brigade of Ubeda, arrested the progress of the enemy. Whilst those regiments were covering themselves with glory in the critical position in which they were placed, the order to set fire to the powder magazines of Oyarzun was executed with such precipitation that they blew up at the moment the troops were passing near them. Many persons were killed by the explosion. Notwithstanding this frightful accident, our brave soldiers calmly filed off, strictly preserving their ranks, and baffled every attempt of the enemy. This signal trait of firmness and of military discipline was recorded by an appropriate inscription on the banners of the different corps.

I have spoken of our misfortunes and of the losses we experienced to the end of July or middle of August. Were the allies more successful in the north? Ever since the month of June, each day had proved fatal to their arms: witness the defeat of Clairfait at Hoogstedt on the 13th; the surrender of Ypres on the 18th; that of Charleroi on the 21st; the battle of Fleurus on the 26th, which again opened Belgium to the French, and added stability to the republic; the taking of Ostend on the 1st of July, of Louvain and Mech,



lin on the 15th, of Landrecies on the 16th,—on the same day the Austrians abandoned Namur, without waiting the arrival of the French: Neuport was occupied on the 19th, and Antwerp and Liege on the 27th; lastly, on the 28th, the republicans took possession of the island of Cadsand and all its dependencies. Let a comparison be now drawn between our losses and those of the coalition!

In the month of August, after the surrender of Fuentèrabia, a fortress of the third order, we had to deplore the disgraceful act of treachery by which St. Sebastian was delivered up to the enemy: Tolosa, an open town, but the capital of Guipuscoa, was abandoned almost immediately afterwards. Such were the successes of the French arms in that quarter. The enemy contented himself with taking up a military position in order to preserve his recent acquisitions, and to distribute from thence various detachments around his camp. . . . Biscay rose up in a body; and the French did not obtain a single inch of ground beyond what they had secured by cunning, and not by force of arms.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The capture of St. Sebastian was not a military exploit. Pinet, the conventionalist, succeeded in seducing certain inhabitants of Guipuscoa, by promising to raise their province into an independent republic. These credulous men surrendered the town, notwithstanding the readiness of the garrison to hold out with the means at their command, which were amply adequate, for a time at least, to prevent its fall.

The alcalde Michelena, of infamous memory, and a few notable citizens of St. Sebastian, bewildered with the hope of a

Our army in the eastern Pyrenees having been reorganised, was encamped in front of Figueiras ; it had not only re-established its line of defence, but, being strengthened by reinforcements, had resumed the offensive. Various attacks of advanced posts took place in June and July ; in these we often had the advantage, particularly at Olers, at the Hermitage del Roble, in the plain of the Llobregat, at Villarnadal and Basagorda, at the Camp del Principe, in Cerdagne, at Massarach, St. Clement, Mollet, and other places.

In August, the Spanish army made a general attack from Campredon to the sea, in order to break the enemy's line, and force its way to Bellegarde. This movement took the French wholly by surprise : after having carried St. Laurent de la Muga, an important position, we remained there a few hours, expecting the column which

chimerical liberty, so different from what they enjoyed under their ancient laws and privileges, proved faithless to their country. However, their crime soon met its reward : anticipating that Pinet's promises were about to be realized, they had assembled at Guetaria in the character of deputies from the province ; the ferocious representative of the French people had them arrested and brought to trial as rebels ; several were handed over to the executioner ; others were left to the remorse of their own conscience, which must have ever afterwards reproached them with having betrayed their country, and opened to the enemy a basis of occupation without which he never would have dared to establish himself on the Spanish territory. . . . The Guipuscoans abandoned their hearths to escape the presence of the French, and to join the gallant bands which were in arms in the provinces of Biscay and Navarre.

was to turn the position and facilitate or complete our success. Unforeseen delays, and the reinforcements received by the enemy, compelled us to abandon the conquered ground; and the half-won victory thus escaped from our grasp. Our troops retreated in good order; the loss of the French was severe; the republican General Mirabel, who had brought the reinforcement and restored the fight, lost his life on the occasion, as well as several superior officers; Generals Lemoine, Sauret, and the celebrated Augereau were mentioned amongst the wounded officers. The conflict which took place in the pass of Teradas was courageously maintained by Courten, and fought at the bayonet's point. Generals Belvis and Taranco covered themselves with glory at Canta . . . on the same day. Two days afterwards, General Dugommier, apprehending a renewed attack, abandoned St. Laurent, La Madeleine, and the height of Teradas. Count de la Union caused those three points to be occupied; and it is to be regretted that he did not moderate his ardour, or display greater military tact in operating this excentric movement.\*

\* All subsequent actions, until the middle of November, were of a partial nature, and frequently in our favour, such as at Capmany, and in the gorges of ——. The action at Mouroig might have proved fatal to us. The advanced posts which occupied the heights were carried away by their zeal, and kept up an irregular firing with a French battalion stationed on the parallel slope; a panic seized those scouts, and extended to the

Whilst affairs were taking this turn on the side of Spain, what, I must persist in asking it,—what were the proceedings of the northern coalition?

Treves was captured on the 8th of August, and Quesnoi on the 16th; the fort de l'Ecluse was wrested from the Dutch on the 25th; Valenciennes was retaken on the 27th, and on the 29th the town of Condé, which was the last remaining stronghold of the allies on the French frontier.

Of all the powers of the coalition, Spain was the only one that, thanks to the excellent spirit with which her troops were animated, still held in her possession, as a glorious proof of her old war-like tenacity, and retained for three weeks longer, one of the principal frontier towns of France!

The fort of St. Elme, Portvendre, and Colliouvre

attacking column. General Taranco, who marched at its head, was left alone with his staff and the superior officers: the enemy, who had only sought to defend himself, took advantage of this disorder, and fell upon the flank of the column. Count de la Union no sooner saw the danger than he quickly sent forward Don Diego, my brother, with the reserve; the charge was so sudden that the French, apprehending the flight of our troops to be a mere feint to draw them into a snare, and struck in turn with the like panic, retreated with a precipitation which baffled our pursuit. Count de la Union determined to make an example of the authors of this rash enterprise; he ordered that they should be deprived of their uniforms and perform duty apart from the rest of the army, until, by giving proofs of better subordination, they should have repaired their error. This punishment was of short duration; they recovered the esteem of their companions in arms by dint of daily exploits, and many of them even obtained well-merited rewards for their conduct.

had fallen ; Bellegarde still remained in our hands. During the fifteen months of its occupation by our troops, it had been put in repair, and the exterior works greatly augmented : whether it was with the view of avoiding the effusion of blood which must have attended a hasty attack, or of recovering possession of the town whilst still in good condition, General Dugommier only thought of closely blockading it. Bellegarde was surrounded by a numerous army, whose operations were protected by a detached corps of eight thousand men. Count de la Union made several attempts to force his way to Bellegarde, but in vain. All communication and intercourse were effectually shut out, and the garrison was completely ignorant of what was occurring without the walls. It found itself surrounded by a circle of iron, and, as it were, by an armed solitude ; a state of solitariness the more appalling, as the soldier's courage is then tried by a severer test than when called upon to brave the dangers of a field of battle.

Hunger and sickness tried the constancy of the Spaniards. Ever since the end of July, the ration of meat, which was in a state of putrefaction, was reduced to a quarter of a pound. All means of prolonging this patriotic fasting were exhausted ; the most unclean animals had been used as the soldiers' food ; nothing was left. June, July, and the first half of August had elapsed. At last, on the 18th of August, it became necessary to

surrender. The distinguished Marquis de Vallesanctorum was governor of the place.

The National Convention decreed that the taking of Bellegarde should be celebrated by a public rejoicing. It was the last point of the French territory which had been occupied by foreign forces! Spain at least achieved this honourable distinction, amidst the general despondency which pervaded the coalition.

Landrecies had held out a fortnight, Quesnoi twenty-four days, Valenciennes nine, Condé no more than three; whereas Bellegarde only surrendered after a siege of three months, though it had less prospect than any other town of being supplied with provisions, or of the blockade being raised. Spain was thus the last of all the coalesced powers which gave up the contest.

This was the extreme limit of our losses from the commencement of September until the middle of the following month: whilst the English, after the defeat of their advanced-guard at Boxten on the 16th September, were precipitately abandoning the right bank of the Maese, leaving unprotected the important fortresses of Breda, Bois-le-duc, and Bergen-op-Zoom; whilst the Austrians, attacked at Eyneux, at Aspremon, and in the strong position of La Chartreuse, were falling back in disorder upon Juliers: whilst, on the 22nd of the same month, Jourdan was taking possession of Aix-la-Chapelle, and General du

Merbiou, on the side of Italy, was beating the Austro-Sardinians at Cairo on the 21st; and whilst, ten days afterwards, the formidable camp of Juliers was forced at Aldenhoben, the garrison of Juliers was surrendering at discretion, Macdonald was carrying the fort of Orthen on the 27th, and Crévecœur, and soon afterwards Bois-le-duc, were signing terms of capitulation.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

Continuation.—Second Campaign, 1794.

THE signal victories achieved by the republic over the northern armies could not fail to kindle a spirit of emulation in the French troops which were waging war on the frontiers of Spain.

This spirit was kept alive by the government, who unceasingly stimulated their self-love and courage. "When," said the government, "are you to announce to us the taking of fortified places and of provinces, instead of wasting your efforts in marches and countermarches which lead to no result; in the attacks of heights and redoubts, where, conquerors and conquered by turns, neither party go beyond the petty circle of a few miles in circumference?"

On the other hand, the decided advantages obtained over the armies of the coalition enabled the French government to send copious reinforcements to the republican phalanxes of the Pyrenees.

Towards the middle of October, the enemy's forces, which were spread over the provinces of



Guipuscoa and Navarre, independently of the Basque Frank companies, consisted of sixty-six battalions of regular infantry, for the most part veteran soldiers,<sup>1</sup> four thousand cavalry, and three brigades of artillery.

General Muller was replaced by Moncey, who received orders to invade the Basque provinces, occupy Navarre, seize upon Pampeluna, and transfer his camp to the banks of the Ebro. Nothing short of this would satisfy the republic!

Our army was deficient in numbers, but brave and well-disciplined; we maintained a strong line from the valley of Roncal to the Deva. Moncey, a general of consummate skill, was desirous of concentrating his forces and of making preparations for well-sustained attacks, in order to strike decisive blows without leaving the result to chance. Fortunately for us, the proconsuls entertained very different notions of war; they only dreamed of general attacks in flank or in front along the whole line. These men, unskilled in military tactics, calculated upon separating our army into two bodies, beating the one, turning the other, and, in the confusion of vic-

<sup>1</sup> A column of that army, called the *infernal* column, had acquired general notoriety at the period in question: it chiefly consisted of veterans seasoned in the campaigns of La Vendée. There were also two complete regiments, the fifty-seventh and seventy-second, belonging to the celebrated garrison of Mentz. The new recruits were distributed amongst the old skeletons of regiments which had been brought down from the north.

tory, suddenly marching upon Pampeluna, which was to surrender without resistance to their arms.

What was the result of so rash a plan? The representatives were convinced that they were about to bring the war to a close at a single blow. During two whole days of fighting, the 16th and 17th October, blood flowed in torrents, without their deriving any other advantage than that of occupying for a moment the valley of Roncesvalles, and pulling down an ancient monument.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This monument was an old time-worn pyramid, which popular tradition venerated as a remembrance of the true or fabulous defeat of Charlemagne's army. The commissioners of the Convention entered upon serious researches to discover Rolando's club, and the slippers which Archbishop Turpin had left behind when he pulled them off as impediments to his flight. It was found impossible to send those trophies to Paris, however great was the desire to do homage to the Convention by presenting those relics of by-gone days, as is manifested by the strange bulletin which I textually subjoin:

"Citizens, the army of the western Pyrenees, by obtaining a signal victory over the Spaniards, has avenged an old insult inflicted on the French nation. Our ancestors, in the days of Charlemagne, were defeated in the plain of Roncesvalles. In memory of that event, the proud Spaniard had erected a pyramid on the field of battle. Defeated in turn, on the same spot, by the French republicans, he has, with his own blood, effaced all traces of it. Nothing was left but the frail edifice, which has been instantly demolished. The banner of the republic now waves where floated the standard of kingly pride, and the fostering tree of liberty has replaced the destructive club of the tyrant. The inauguration was followed by an affecting and warlike music. The shades of our forefathers have been comforted, and the army of the republic has sworn to conquer

This ephemeral triumph cost France at least three thousand men. All the troops behaved well: there were even displayed some signal traits of valour and ability. Every bayonet was engaged, and the retreat was fully equivalent to a victory. The enemy completely failed in the plan which he had meditated; our army and Pampeluna were saved.<sup>3</sup>

Apprehensive of the danger which his troops might incur from a general engagement, Moncey insisted upon the necessity of their concentration. Colomera, our general, who was prepared to give him a warm reception, watched all his motions, and sought by affected delays to make him exhaust his resources, whilst he himself strictly maintained a defensive attitude. He knew the French army to be ill supplied. We had reached

for the glory of the French name of all ages, and for the happiness of the country."

This whimsical document, worthy of the hero of Cervantes, bears the signatures of the conventionalists, Baudot and Garaut. In truth, the valour and military glory of the French stood not in need of this paltry garland being added to so many laurels. It was a poor amends for so much effusion of blood! but the representatives wished to spread a lustre over a foiled enterprise.

<sup>3</sup> The honour of that retreat is mainly owing to the military talents and to the presence of mind of Lieutenant-general the Duke of Ossuna, with whom the praise must be shared by the worthy commandant of Orbaletya, the Marquis de la Cañada Ibanes. The division commanded by General Cagigal performed prodigies of valour. The French General Castelparg was completely routed.

the 26th November; winter was fast approaching; the campaign could not be much longer prolonged. The representatives of the people, ever impatient of delays, compelled Moncey to attack us a second time, so eagerly were they bent upon the conquest of Pampeluna. On this occasion, the left wing of the French was defeated at Ortiz, Soranzon, Olaya, and Haiz; another division was on the point of being cut off, when Moncey ordered a retreat; and, with a view to conceal his disappointment, he attempted a diversion, which answered, for a few hours, his expectations. He executed his retrograde movement under cover of the night, and in perfect silence. Nearly the whole of his sick, who were very numerous, were left behind in the different villages. On the 29th November our troops resumed their old positions; the right at the Aldudes, at Orbaceyta and Eguy; the centre towards Ulzama, in a northern direction; the left at Lucumberry and Amaiz. The French took up their cantonments in the part of Guipuscoa of which they had obtained possession, in the valley of Bastan, and at St. Jean Pié de Port.

Thus ended the campaign in that quarter. Our arms were less fortunate in Roussillon and Catalonia. Fully confiding in the redoubts which protected his whole line from St. Laurent de la Muga to the sea, Count de la Union was making preparations for an offensive movement, at the very

time when Dugommier was forming the project of forestalling him. It unfortunately happened that La Union, who was always dreaming of fresh redoubts, and wished to take in every position which he deemed likely to prove of advantage to us, scattered his troops, which, though numerous, were inadequate to the object of strengthening so many points of defence. Dugommier perceived the error into which our general had fallen; he determined to avail himself of it, regardless of the sacrifices which might be consequent upon the attempt.

The engagement was obstinately contested, and lasted three days. The Spanish and French generals here met their fate. The first attempt, on the 17th November, was made upon our left, and proved favourable to the enemy; but he was defeated at the centre of our line and driven back to his entrenchments of Cantalloba and Espolla. Night put an end to the conflict, which had lasted since daybreak.

The attack was renewed on the 18th: Dugommier was killed at the beginning of the engagement, whilst watching from the summit of the Black Mountain the movements of our left. The bursting of a howitzer terminated his glorious career.\* The battle continued to rage with un-

\*The death of this general was not the mere effect of chance. The general of artillery, Autran de la Torre, was visiting the batteries of the left wing. On reaching the battery of La Salud,

abated obstinacy ; our centre, our right, and part of our left, resolutely defended themselves. The enemy, wearied at thus fruitlessly attacking the front and flanks of our first line, determined to try their chance upon our second line, and succeeded in turning, from a distant point, one of our great redoubts, which was supposed to be proof against every attack. Night suspended all operations ; the advantage on our side was less signal than that of the preceding day ; nevertheless, victory had not yet declared for either of the contending armies.

The 19th was a day of inactivity. Both armies stood greatly in need of rest, and the number of dead to be interred was considerable. It was thought for a moment that the enemy had abandoned his attempt. Count de la Union intending to renew the battle, concentrated all his forces, regardless of the danger he was incurring of being

he perceived on the Black Mountain a knot of cavalry which seemed to be watching our position. The intervening distance was about fifteen hundred toises. Don Benito de Ulloa, a distinguished captain of artillery, proposed to the general to throw an eight-inch grenade among the group of Frenchmen ; for he felt convinced that, considering the opening of the angle and the charge which a piece of that bore would admit of, the grenade might reach its destination. It was the first we were about to fire towards that point, and it burst in the very centre of the group. A few hours afterwards, a deserter from the enemy's camp came to announce the death of General Dugommier. This intelligence infused fresh ardour and confidence into our soldiers.

turned by his left. Full of ardour and of confidence in his troops, the idea of a retrograde movement never occurred to his mind; it would have appeared degrading to his honour. Prudence, however, should have suggested that movement, by which the second line afforded protection to his army, without endangering the safety of Figueiras.

On the 20th, at day-break, General Perignon, the successor of Dugommier, renewed his attack on the centre, whilst other columns turned our batteries by our extreme left, and carried them all in succession. Victory had declared in favour of the French. Count de la Union rushed forward, placed himself at the head of the troops of the centre, and died fighting like a common soldier. Our troops stood for some time longer the enemy's onset, in order to check his advance and maintain some of the positions; but no effort of valour could avail. The batteries del Roble and of the camp of Llers having been carried, no other resource was left but that of a speedy retreat. It was alike perilous and difficult of accomplishment. The enemy, already in possession of the Pic d'Oréal, intercepted the road of Figueiras. Our army, thus broken, only rallied at Bascara, a position between that place and Gerona, four leagues in its rear. To crown our misfortunes, the fortress of Figueiras surrendered to the French. The great strength of that citadel is well known;

it was abundantly provided, and contained a garrison of upwards of ten thousand men. It is doubtful whether we are to ascribe this disaster to frenzy, panic, or treachery. The council of war before whom were arraigned the authors of this scandalous act of cowardice, pronounced sentence of death against the commandant of the fortress and three other superior officers.<sup>5</sup> The clemency of Charles IV. induced him to entertain the doubts suggested as to the real character of the crime, and he commuted the capital punishment; the four delinquents were sentenced to degradation, banished for ever his majesty's dominions, and their conduct was declared to have been criminal and ignominious.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Brigadier-general Torres, Messrs. Keating, Ortuzar, and Alende, superior officers of engineers and artillery.

<sup>6</sup> The French general Perignon, when ambassador in Spain at a later period, affirmed to me upon his honour that the surrender of the fortress was neither owing to venality nor treachery, but simply to the terror caused by the occurrences of the 20th; a terror heightened by the exaggerated reports of the fugitives, by the capture of the entrenchments adjoining the place, and the great display which he affected to make of his victorious army in order to intimidate the besieged, as well as to the effect of his reiterated threats of giving the assault and putting every man to the sword. "But," I observed to him, "upwards of two hundred pieces of heavy artillery crowned the ramparts; the fortress was supplied with ten thousand quintals of powder, an immense quantity of ammunition, as well as of provisions, such as flour, salt meat, vegetables, wine and brandy, cisterns full of water, a complete pharmacy, every article not only of necessity but of comfort, and ten thousand men to defend its walls! What



This disaster was soon repaired by the strong and prudent measures subsequently adopted. Such was not the case in the north, where far weightier occurrences were on the eve of taking place. Irreparable losses had marked the campaign.

On the 19th November, the advanced guard of the English army was driven by Pichegru from the dikes of Ondwatering, whilst Jourdan, after having beaten a division of the Austrian army, made his entry into Bonn and afterwards into Cologne, forced the lines before Coblenz on the 23rd, and took possession of that town. Three days afterwards, General Laurent, under the orders of Moreau, compelled Venloo to capitulate:

was wanting to enable them to sustain a siege of many months?" "One deficiency only existed," replied the ambassador; "the commandant of the place and his council had lost their senses. They were frightened by the threat of an assault which was impracticable, but which they had the weakness to think otherwise. I must add," said Perignon, "that in consequence of the mode of warfare we have adopted, the fall of Figueiras is not the first or the only occurrence of the kind in this campaign. The taking of Namur, Antwerp, Juliers, and Venloo are events still more unaccountable. The garrison of the latter place was superior, or at least equal in numbers, to the troops which threatened to lay siege to it with no other weapons than their muskets. One hundred and fifty pieces of artillery defended the ramparts of Venloo; its stores and arsenals were filled with provisions and ammunitions of war. That which in our new tactics has secured more than one victory to our arms, and holds out a promise of many others, is the secret or talent of striking terror into our enemies."

Desaix and Meunier had already taken Worms, Kirtchien, Altré, and Oppenheim. At the end of October the French were masters of the left bank of the Rhine from Bâle to Coblentz. There only remained Mentz, Rheinfelts, and Luxembourg to impede their undisputed possession of the river. On the first threat of a siege, on the 2nd of October, the Austrians abandoned to General Laurent the second of those places, the important town of Rheinfelts.<sup>7</sup> Kleber forced the Prince of Hesse on the 4th of November to give up Maestricht, one of the keys of Holland.<sup>8</sup> On the 6th of the same month, General Souham took possession of Nimeguen, within view of thirty thousand English troops encamped on the opposite bank of the Wahab.<sup>9</sup> Each successive day was marked by a fresh triumph; each engagement

<sup>7</sup> This fortress, so important from its natural position and the works of art which had been added to it, independently of its very numerous garrison, was defended by a line of batteries on the right bank of the Rhine, and had her communication secured on that side by a large bridge of boats. The commandant who surrendered it was tried and condemned by a council of war.

<sup>8</sup> The French found in it three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, chiefly brass cannons, twenty thousand quintals of powder, a well provided arsenal, ample stores, &c.

<sup>9</sup> The French artillery began to fire upon the flying bridge forming the communication between the town and the English army. The affrighted garrison, as soon as the night had set in, hastened to repair the bridge and quitted the town, leaving to the Dutch the care of defending it. The latter, mistrusting their means of resistance, attempted to withdraw at break of

proved a victory for the French arms. Their march was not arrested by the winter; on the contrary, the ice afforded them a means of passage, and the whole of Holland was conquered. Unable to witness any longer the sight of demoralised troops, the Duke of York resigned the command to Generals Walmoden and Harcourt. The stadtholder sued in vain for peace or an armistice. Compelled to withdraw from Gorcum, his last remaining hope, he took leave of his dominions and embarked for England.

The King of Prussia, feeling wearied of this disastrous war, seriously meditated to bring it to a close. Several princes of the empire openly manifested a wish for the termination of a scourge which desolated Germany, and might endanger their own existence. Austria alone, notwithstanding her enormous losses, still acted in concurrence with the English, and endeavoured to draw closer the ties of the coalition which the force of circumstances had broken asunder.

day; they fled to the boats whilst the French were rushing to the ramparts. The English, though under protection of their camp, and beyond the reach of danger, became so alarmed that they fired upon the boats loaded with Dutch soldiers. Observing this frightful misunderstanding, and more humane towards his enemies than the English proved themselves towards their allies, Souham exclusively directed his fire against the English; he even despatched several light boats from his own side of the river to save the fugitives from unavoidable death.

Disasters such as these throw our unfortunate surrender of Figueras into the shade.

Spain was not, assuredly, the first to break off those ties which were now bearing with increased weight upon her. The misfortunes of her allies, and her own, had not had the effect of discouraging her. But the moment for our concluding a peace had not yet arrived, so long as the coalition was kept up, so long as France should not manifest the wish to conclude a solid and honourable peace, guaranteed by the conviction of our strength; for it was incumbent upon Spain not to sue for it in a suppliant tone, nor to enter uninvited upon the subject. Fresh efforts and still greater sacrifices were made to carry on the third campaign.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

Third Campaign ; 1795, up to the end of June in that year.

THIS campaign has been exhibited under the gloomiest colours by some whose judgment was blinded by their hatred against me ; by others, either ill-informed, or who had lost the recollection of events which had occurred almost within their immediate view.

Nevertheless, it was the most vigorously contested of any ; it exhibited splendid instances of courage and constancy, arrested the torrent of invasion, and gave evidence to France that Spain could never become a conquered country. All that I have said, all I have further to say regarding this subject, are positive facts, bearing the impress of truth, and beyond the reach of contradiction, though denied or unacknowledged by men who basely sacrifice the honour and glory of their country to their own selfish passions. These facts are less borne out by the official reports to the government than by the still more explicit accounts of foreigners, especially of Frenchmen,—unexceptionable witnesses when speaking in our

favour. I am therefore asserting the honour of the Spanish nation rather than my own. My enemies may vent their rage against me with impunity ; but let them beware of impugning the national character.

The French coveted for their winter quarters the mild and cheerful district through which the Ebro bends its course. Entrenched on the banks of the Uriola, Moncey had gathered his whole army within a very limited space of ground, feeling always apprehensive of a movement which might cut off his main communication with France. Thus situated, he endured with fortitude a cruel famine, and the still more cruel disease which consumed his battalions.<sup>1</sup> Completely blockaded on the sea-side, shut up within his entrenchments on the side of Spain, indifferently supplied by the contractors employed by the republic, which laid it down as a rule that the army should be subsisted from the invaded territory, the general had the mortification of seeing his soldiers reduced to a half ration of rice or potatoes for their only food, whether in camp or in hospital ! What was then the impediment to his quitting his lines and breathing more freely ? What prevented his abandoning that

<sup>1</sup> It is affirmed that the typhus fever prevailing in the French army, thus collected in a small space, carried off 30,000 men. The natives suffered greatly from it ; but Moncey's troops suffered still more. This was to be expected.

insalubrious spot and taking up positions in all respects more advantageous to him? Can it be that the half-naked republicans, who were at that time effecting the conquest of Holland, were arrested by the snow and frost of Spain? Can it also be alleged that the winter prevented our continuing to fight at the other extremity of the Pyrenees? Honour and glory to the army of Navarre and Guipuscoa, which compelled the French to this patient endurance, and checked the ardour of the strongest army that had hitherto threatened our frontiers!

At the beginning of March 1795, the enemy's forces, reduced to half their original strength, were thus dying away, and appeared to be besieged in their own camp. They were joined by fresh reinforcements three months afterwards. . . . All France was indignant at this state of continued inactivity, whilst we were contemplating to avail ourselves of the return of a milder season to assume the offensive; our troops were full of life and vigour.<sup>2</sup> Perceiving the disadvantage of

<sup>2</sup> Count de Colomera, the successor of General Caro, was blamed by many for this long procrastination; his reply was that he had spared the lives and the health of his troops during the unfavourable season. The government left him, and every other general in command, full power to act according to circumstances and the suggestions of his own judgment. Colomera preferred allowing the hostile army to consume itself in its struggles against famine and the typhus fever, which were gradually destroying it: nevertheless, he was preparing to strike a decisive blow, which the impatience of our soldiers, less

being attacked, and always uneasy respecting his communications with France, Moncey formed the resolution to forestal us. The epidemic disorder had abated : two columns of his best troops were advancing towards Azcarate, on the first day of the equinox ; they were both vigorously driven back, were closely pursued in their retreat, and experienced a severe loss.

On the 11th of April, a more serious attack was renewed against our left ; this led to a fresh defeat of the enemy at every point of attack,<sup>3</sup> and two French generals of brigade fell into our hands.

influenced by prudential considerations, was endeavouring to anticipate. Had the reinforcements received by Moncey been delayed a few days longer, every one would have applauded the prudent slowness of the Spanish general. It is however to be observed that the state of the roads did not admit of the removal of the artillery at that season ; that any operation would have had a multitude of obstacles to encounter ; and that by merely blockading the enemy, without hazarding any movement, he preserved his army and the country from a contagious disorder, and inflicted upon the enemy a loss far more serious than they could have experienced by his defeating them in an attack, the result of which must have been doubtful. However, whether the count felt offended at murmurs which were grating to him, or was influenced by his advanced age and enfeebled state of health, as he represented it to the king, he beseeched his majesty to accept his resignation. The Prince of Castel Franco, commander-in-chief of the army of Arragon, was named to replace him, and retained the double command of his former army and of those of Navarre and Guipuscoa.

<sup>3</sup> Pagachoeta, Elguibar, and Sassola. . . . . The first of these attacks exhibited a characteristic trait of religious enthusiasm, well calculated to contend with republican fanaticism. Our troops were falling back, and the enemy advancing to the



The French persisted, for two months, in their attacks upon our left, and with as little success as on previous occasions. The position of Muchiruchu was twice taken and retaken; the engagement on the 23rd of May lasted several hours, without any decisive result on either side. At the beginning of June our army occupied the same positions as at the opening of the campaign.

The struggle was still more obstinately maintained in the eastern Pyrenees. The only loss we experienced was that of the fortress of Rosas; doubtless a grievous loss, but mitigated to our feelings by the courageous resistance of the besieged. The Spaniards have had no occasion to proclaim it—the French themselves have borne testimony to their heroic defence. From the end of November to the 3rd of February, the day on which Rosas was evacuated, the besiegers and the besieged exhausted all the resources of art in the attack and defence of the place.\* The

heights they had abandoned: we received on a sudden the unexpected reinforcement of a brigade of five hundred volunteers of the general rising of Biscay; they were commanded by their rector, Don Antonio Achutegui, who marched at their head in his full sacerdotal vestments; their banner represented the image of the Blessed Virgin (our Lady of the Rosary): the mountains re-echoed the sounds of voices singing, on the one side, the Litany of the Saints, and on the other, the Marsellais Hymn. The courage of our soldiers revived at the sight; and, with the aid of their pious auxiliaries, they succeeded in driving back the French, and taking five hundred prisoners.

\* General Domingo Izquierdo was the governor of Rosas; the artillery had opened upon the fortress on the 28th of No-

French had much less to suffer from the inclemency of the season, which often paralysed the operations of our squadron. After having irreproachably fulfilled all its duties, the brave garrison voluntarily withdrew from the ruins of Rosas, and embarked for the purpose of joining and reinforcing the troops on the line of the Fluvia: this was an addition of five thousand able soldiers to our numerical strength.

This river was the limit interposed by General Urrutia between the republican army and our own. The same representatives of the people who, in the preceding campaign, had ordered Moncey to encamp on the banks of the Ebro, were also insisting that Perignon should move upon Tolosa without stopping in his progress. In every other direction Fortune appeared to await

vember; the besieging army amounted to upwards of twenty thousand men, commanded by General Perignon. The only fortification of Rosas consisted in a double enclosure without ditches, covered ways, or glacis. The garrison made several sorties; and although the breach had been effected at the little fort of La Trinidad, and in the very body of the place, the garrison persisted in holding out a few days longer. . . . Eleven batteries, one of them mounting twenty pieces of cannon, had kept up an incessant fire ever since the last days of January. Forty thousand cannon-balls, shells, or grenades, fell upon the town; and were answered by 13,633 balls, 3602 shells, and 1297 grenades. Our gun-boats, which were enabled to approach the coast when the weather was favourable, fired 4763 balls, 2736 shells, and 2793 grenades. The shells discharged against the French were fired from an elevation of 193 feet above the level of the place.

in submission the command of those haughty proconsuls. In Spain only, the car of Victory became occasionally entangled. Perignon attempted in vain to accelerate its motion ; it never succeeded in passing beyond the boundary of the Fluvia.

I should exceed the limits I have prescribed to myself, were I to relate the many splendid achievements of our army of Catalonia. Officers and soldiers of the line, volunteers, natives of the country, all distinguished themselves alike from the commencement to the end of the third campaign.<sup>5</sup> More successful as a commander-in-chief

<sup>5</sup> The history of Charles IV. will transmit to posterity a multitude of names unjustly buried in oblivion ; I do not merely allude to general officers, but to officers of all ranks, and to common soldiers, who nobly devoted themselves to the service of their country. Volumes might be filled with the narrative of their deeds, worthy of the most brilliant epoch of Greece or of Rome. I will merely select one instance amongst many.

Don Manuel Joseph Pineda, a captain of infantry, volunteered to take advantage of a dark and tempestuous night of the month of January, to surprise and destroy the reserve park of General Augereau, stationed at the Plà del Coto, between Bellegarde and Figueiras, five leagues in the rear of the French line. He took with him, for this bold coup-de-main, about a thousand volunteers of a Catalonian battalion, and two hundred *somatenes* (armed peasants). This second Leonidas partook of a farewell supper with his chiefs ; and, after a patriotic toast in honour of the king and of Spain, commenced his march with his brave companions in arms. He crossed the Muga, with water up to his waist, passed over defiles and precipices, reached by unknown and frightful roads the park of reserve, and fell suddenly upon the enemy. The French commander was killed.

than as a general of division, Urrutia, and especially the chief of his staff, Don Gonsalvo O'ffarril, displayed conspicuous talents. The lines of attack and defence which they established resisted all attempts of General Perignon, and of Schérer, his successor in the command, to force them. They were successfully maintained against every aggression.

The army was always in readiness to defend itself, or move forward. The contest continued without intermission during the whole month.

Whilst part of our soldiers were putting to the sword all who offered resistance, the others spiked the cannons, and set everything on fire. The heroic Pineda received a mortal wound; the second in command took prisoners all who had escaped the bayonet, and completed the enterprise of his chief, whilst the alarm was spreading, and the neighbouring camp was sending troops in all directions at random. This camp contained ten thousand French, and not Moorish, soldiers. At the epoch of the Cid, such an exploit would have been held as a miracle; but at the time I speak of, they were the soldiers and officers of Charles IV. About fifty of these Spanish Spartans perished in the attempt; the others returned in safety to their standards, bringing with them a French captain of artillery and other living trophies of their glorious expedition.

Amongst the multitude of memorable deeds, we must not omit the bold and persevering incursions of the miquelets and somatenes, furnished by the principality of Catalonia. These detached corps, always in motion, eluding all pursuit by their swiftness, were constantly harassing the division of the camp of Figueiras. Their partial attacks and perpetual surprises allowed the enemy no rest. These indefatigable rovers penetrated as far as French Cerdagne. Their boldness and their exploits were the theme of every praise. These deeds are all forgotten at the present day.

We occasionally had to fight general battles, which were sometimes unsuccessful, often prosperous to our arms. A circumstance worthy of remark is, that the two armies appeared to agree in taking their respective turns for attacking, and persevered in this regular course of conflict. If Urrutia assumed on one day the offensive, Perignon, or Schérer after him, never failed to renew the attack on the following day. The intermediate ground seemed to be a field for warlike exercises, in which each party by turns made its appearance. It was not, however, a mere representation of a fight; much effusion of blood occurred in these encounters. The position of Bascara, situated at an equal distance from two points of departure, alternately fell in our power and in that of the enemy, and was the theatre of this obstinate struggle. It may be averred, that the French and Spaniards recovered in these dreadful conflicts the lost practice of entertaining for each other a mutual esteem. Their strength and courage being equally balanced, the war was carried on by both parties with a kind of national dignity, with reciprocal ardour, but without angry animosity or provocation. Each one respected the standard of his opponent whatever might be its colours or its emblems. From this loyal and chivalrous turn, which a war commenced under different auspices had now assumed, it was easy to foresee that the ancient friendship would soon be revived between them.

Accordingly, the dawn of spring brought us the reports of an approaching reconciliation : they proceeded from the enemy's camp. In fact, from what was occurring in Europe, and from the new political turn which France had adopted, the time had arrived for listening to any proposal leading to an honourable peace, provided it held out, with the prospect of a happier futurity, a reasonable guarantee of its duration.

## CHAPTER XXV.

Negotiations for Peace.—Definitive Treaty of Bâle on the 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1795.—Last events of the Campaign until the termination of the war.

It will be in the recollection of my readers, that in the discussion which took place in the Council of State in 1794, as related in chapters xvii, xviii, and xix, of these Memoirs, respecting the continuance or termination of the war, I made the following, amongst other observations :

“ The day of a salutary reaction is not far distant, when other men, other laws, other political maxims, will become more solid guarantees to us. It will then be possible to open a friendly communication with France. Such should be, in my opinion, the proximate termination of this war, carried on without ambitious views, of a purely defensive character, firmly entered upon, but pursued without obstinacy, though not without mature reflection ; a war unsubsidized by foreigners, undertaken at our own expense, which we are ready to bring to an end so soon as the anti-social condition of France shall cease to endanger our honour and safety.”

I further added :

“ Happen what may, I here affirm, that any possible event will find the government prepared to meet it ; it is alive to whatever may take place ; whether the fortune of arms prove faithless to us, whether the allied powers alter their political system, ours shall remain unchanged. Neither frivolous caprices, nor the suggestions of foreigners, shall prevent our concluding a peace as soon as it may prove seasonable or of possible attainment. The government will not stand alone on the field of battle, or when any opportunity shall present itself for treating. More than one cabinet shares our views, our moderate and conciliating intentions. In any event, those cabinets will harmonise with us ; but the king’s government, whilst it prefers the blessings of peace to the splendour of victories, is still bound, in my opinion, to brave every danger, even the frowns of fortune, rather than subscribe to treaties which would tarnish its honour.”

No event has obtained more celebrity than that of the famous 9th Thermidor, second year of the French republic (27th July 1794). The factions, whose doctrines had alarmed Europe, witnessed the downfall of their leaders on that memorable day, and the disappearance of a fatal ochlocracy, which was never to return. Exulting in her strength, and victorious over her foreign enemies, France viewed with feelings of indignation that



civilized nations should, by an affected estrangement, visit upon her the crimes perpetrated, not by herself, but by the sanguinary men who had brought disgrace upon her.

The party which had gained the ascendancy felt the want of a reconciliation with foreign governments, which all France so eagerly desired.

The revolution, moreover, might be considered as an event actually accomplished, and rendered legitimate by the power of cannon, the last argument of nations. Public opinion had improved ; the recent crisis had instilled more rational views. Were we to oppose their developement ? France had tolerated the tyranny under which she had groaned, with no other object than to save the national independence. Freed from the rule of her tyrants, and restored to sounder doctrines, nothing but the apprehension of losing what she had so recently conquered could have revived the reign of terror, and brought back to the political stage the men who had organised it. Placed between a domestic and a foreign yoke, the nation had shown its preference for the former. So long as neighbouring nations ran the risk of being led away by the contagious example of revolutionary excesses ; so long as the perpetrators of those unheard-of crimes endeavoured to secure accomplices in all directions by propagating their baneful doctrines ; so long as they were bent upon imposing by force of arms a European dictatorship, the coalition was assuredly an act of duty

incumbent upon the powers composing it ; it was alike just and necessary.

However, France had since returned to a more rational path ; she had with her own hands hurled from power the men who wielded it as an instrument for disturbing the whole world ; she had vowed to destruction the remnants of that savage faction, and was bent upon modifying the seditious theories, the dangerous application of which to all had now become manifest to her. From this moment it behoved the coalition to suspend its operations, and await the effects of so fortunate a reaction. Having no longer to contend against foreign enemies, France could turn all her efforts against her internal ones : the instinct of order, the desire for the return of the reign of justice, the lassitude of anarchy, the sense of religion, which never dies, the power of old habits, the impressive and recent lessons of experience,—everything showed her tendency to return to a monarchical authority, resting upon solid and well-considered bases calculated to put an end to past agitations and calamities. At no period of the revolution had royalty numbered so many partisans ; all the prisons were empty ; the liberty to complain was no longer fettered ; the extent of the evils from which France had just emerged was manifest to her ; she deplored the loss of a million of victims who had fallen a sacrifice to such weighty misfortunes ; and the impression they had left

led every one to consider a monarchical restoration as the only means of preventing their return.

But the governments which had been unanimous on the question of waging war, could never be brought to agree on the subject of concluding a peace; for the advantages and losses of the struggle in which they had embarked were not equally balanced. To a contest of principles succeeded that of interests, which was marked by still greater animosity. France had acquired important possessions, which her glory as well as considerations of safety prompted her to retain. The self-love and the interest of the vanquished required their restitution. This complicated position was the means of protracting the war, and the republic derived fresh strength and life from its continuance.

Amidst so many obstacles, and in spite of the conflict of passions, a sovereign of the first order determined upon bringing the war to a conclusion. He who had first embarked in it, because he had deemed it unavoidable, hesitated not to desist from his views when he found that the enemy alone derived advantage from the struggle. Frederick William, King of Prussia, felt that his honour and the interest of his subjects authorised his signing a treaty of peace with the French, even at the cost of some sacrifices.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The peace with Prussia was signed at Bâle on the 5th April 1795. Frederick William consented that, until a general peace

This unexpected event was the cause of greater rejoicings in France than a victory itself. It instilled in the public mind a still greater desire for the adoption of a moderate system of policy. When Reubel came to announce to the National Convention the first treaty concluded between a monarch and the republic, he expressed himself as follows:

“Citizens representatives, you are on the eve of reaping the fruits of your wise principles: governed by tyrants and lacerated by factions, the republic drew down upon herself the hostility of all the powers, who seemed to have vowed her destruction. Behold them now returning to a friendlier feeling. They adopt the course of peace as soon as you give evidence to the whole world that justice and humanity are henceforward to be the rule of your conduct.”

The princes of the empire urged the Emperor to open negotiations. Notwithstanding the opposition of Austria, several accepted the mediation of Prussia, being desirous of entering into direct treaty with France.\* These were the events

should be concluded with the empire, France should retain possession of all his provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, which her arms had conquered.

\* The following is the list of their ministers assembled at Bâle in July and August. Count de Lehrbach for the Emperor, Baron Hardenberg for the princes of the empire, M. de Bergneuve for the palatine branches of Saltzbach and Birkensfelt, M. Vaitz for Hesse-Cassel, M. de Meisner for Bruns-

occurring in Europe at the time when Spain was invited to lay down her arms. The general opinion amongst us was in favour of peace; such a peace, of course, as would leave the honour of the crown unsullied, and the security of the state uninjured. A peace thus tendered to Spain, who was not the first to accept it, was flattering to Castilian pride. There remained, however, the enactment of a condition, the most important of all, to the effect "that France should not stipulate for any sacrifice on our part." The republic had at first insisted upon retaining, until a general peace, the four fortified places which she held in her power: she received a negative answer. We were then asked what were our intentions. "To continue the war, submit to fresh sacrifices, and rise in a body if circumstances required it." This led to fresh proposals on the part of France. "On what bases would H. C. M. treat with the republic?" "On such as we hope to obtain by force of arms; that is to say, on the absolute integrity of our territory, and on the restitution

wick, Count Diodati for Mecklenburg-Strelitz, M. Keppler for Hesse-Darmstadt, and Counsellors Lung and Grenham for Lemmingen-Durckheim. The Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, being unwilling to submit to the delays of diplomacy, separately signed, on his own account, and to the Emperor's great regret, a private treaty of peace and alliance with the republic; leaving to France the fortress of Rheinfelt, the town of St. G  ar, and some other districts on the left bank of the Rhine, until a peace should be concluded with the empire.

of whatever portion has been invaded, without exception of the smallest hamlet." Adhering to that loyal perseverance in the good offices of humanity and relationship which had marked our conduct previously to the declaration of war, we annexed to this double condition, "That in the event of the negotiations being followed up, and of the republic being acknowledged by Spain, our government could not refrain from requiring that the French government should be guided, as became a great nation, by principles of generosity and justice towards the innocent orphans who were groaning in the prison of the Temple."<sup>3</sup>

The first effect of this answer was to produce great irritation in the minds of the majority of those who were at the head of the republican government. The most urgent orders were instantly sent off, directing the march of all the disposable troops in

<sup>3</sup> Such was, on all occasions, the loyalty of Charles IV. and of the Spanish cabinet towards the royal family of France. The Duke d'Havr  has had repeated proofs of it. This consistent, frank, and disinterested conduct was manifested as long as the war in which we were engaged did not present an insuperable obstacle to the prospect of succeeding in our interference. If the wishes and efforts of Spain were not crowned with happier results, the blame of it attaches to those who showed a preference for the subsidies and the support of England. Having recorded in this place this forgotten incident, which is now devoid of interest, I shall merely add, that having, at the period of the restoration of the elder branch of the Bourbons, repaired to France, a wanderer without a country, not one member of the royal family condescended to honour me with a sign of remembrance.

the south; the armies of the Pyrenees were reinforced, and the war was on the point of being renewed with increased vigour: five generals and many superior officers of Moncey's army were dismissed from their command; this operated as a warning to the lukewarm as well as to the inactive. In the eastern Pyrenees, Perignon himself, who had rendered such signal services, was replaced, very fortunately for Spain; for his successor, General Schérer, proved far inferior to him in talents. The leaders of the republic could not conceive how the French armies could be so tardy in earning triumphs, or fail to carry every day by storm towns, provinces, many leagues of country; having, as they conceived, no other difficulty to contend with than the trouble of overtaking the fugitives, or of making long and fatiguing marches.

On the part of Spain, fresh reinforcements and immense supplies of provisions and ammunition were directed to the frontier. Catalonia sent forth thousands of miquelets; the kingdom of Valencia furnished intrepid velites of unrivalled swiftness; Arragon her formidable mountaineers, so hardy, so quick in the use of their bayonets, which are always at their side. A corps of reserve from Old Castile, consisting of soldiers who had, for a twelve-month past, been trained to every military evolution, had already reached the banks of the Ebro.

3 squadrons, one of which swept the coast of

Cantabria, the other that of the Mediterranean, protected the operations of our two armies, and completed our system of defence.

It is not irrelevant to observe, that in the midst of these preparations, which appeared to remove all hope of accommodation, the two illustrious orphans, whose name had been pronounced by Spain in the last negotiations for peace, began to be treated with diminished rigour, and even with some degree of kindness, by the French government. The unhappy dauphin received, though too late, the visit of the celebrated Dussault; but his painful existence was at least softened during the short period he had yet to live: his august sister, less unfortunate than he, had received, ever since the month of May, those attentions and consolations which had hitherto been so unfeelingly denied her. The news of this favourable change was circulated with much display. The newspapers written under the influence of the French government no longer teemed with invectives against Spain; they even contained articles which might be called flattering to us. At last, at the end of a few days, citizen Bourgoing was entrusted with the mission of opening a conference with us on the frontier respecting a peace between the two nations. This old admirer of the Spanish nation addressed letters to me full of candour and frankness. His honourable character, his moderate principles, his well-known sense of jus-



tice, inspired me with the utmost confidence. His communications were clear and positive, such in fact as he would not have ventured upon without special authority. In one of his numerous letters he went so far as to annex an original one written by Tallien, at that time a highly influential member of the Committee of Public Safety, directing him to inform me\* "that, if I earnestly desired peace, the violence of certain individuals would be no obstacle to it; every onerous condition would be removed; the present was a favourable time, because weighty political reasons, which might vary from one moment to another, were now urging France to make peace with Spain; a good understanding might easily be brought about; full power to treat with the minister his Catholic Majesty might name had just been given to citizen Barthelemy, as well as ample instructions, which were alike advantageous and honourable to both nations.<sup>5</sup> Besides their mutual

\* The political motive which then gave rise to the wish manifested by Tallien of concluding a peace with us, (though he merely hinted at it,) was no doubt the apprehension entertained of the English expedition, which then threatened the western coast. The result of it was seen, at a later period, in the frightful disaster which befell the emigrants who landed at Quiberon. It cannot be alleged that the negotiations with Spain facilitated or promoted the success of the republic; at the moment when that signal catastrophe occurred (the 20th of July), our troops were fighting against those of France with greater animosity than at any other period of the war.

<sup>5</sup> The date of the full powers in virtue of which M. Barthe-

political interests, private feelings and personal attachments, which might easily be understood without further explanation on his part,<sup>6</sup> led him to the adoption of this step. M. Bourgoing was to communicate with me in his name, and to urge me not to interpose unnecessary delays: from his certain knowledge of the sentiments entertained by the government, the republic would never disturb the internal tranquillity of those states with which she might conclude a peace; still less the repose of Spain, whose friendship

lemy was empowered to treat, is the twenty-first Floreal, corresponding with the 10th of May, two months before the date of the full powers granted by Spain, which were of the 2nd of July only.

<sup>6</sup> Theresa Cabarrus, formerly Madame de Fontenay, afterwards better known under the name of Madame Tallien, now Princess of Chimay. No historian of the French revolution could refrain from paying her a tribute of praise. To her happy influence is mainly to be ascribed the event of the ninth Thermidor, which broke the axe in Robespierre's hands. In the interior of a prison, from whence she was shortly to proceed to the scaffold, she formed the plan of saving her life, and those of three hundred thousand victims devoted to the same fate. Her talents, the energy of her character, her perseverance in so noble a design, were rewarded with that glorious result. Never did the graces or the power of the fair sex win so sweet, so sincerely applauded a triumph. This celebrated woman had not forgotten her native country, neither was she a stranger to the treaty of which Tallien had sketched the preliminaries. I feel pleasure in acknowledging that she contributed to the restoration of peace between two great nations, Spain and France; the one proud of having given her birth, the other of having adopted her.

was essential to the tranquillity and welfare of France."

Tallien spoke the truth ; his letter was written in perfect sincerity : the French government assented at last to the bases proposed by Spain, the *status quo ante bellum*, without, however, renouncing the idea of obtaining for France an indemnity in return for the restitution of the fortresses occupied by her troops. " It is easy to adopt in that respect," said M. Bourgoing, " those means which, without being oppressive to Spain, will be amicably treated of in subsequent conferences, and will offer a species of compensation to France, rather as a pledge of friendship and good will on your part, than as a sacrifice imposed by the republic."

To this well-meant and guarded overture, I replied by a note equally courteous, but still more explicit. I began by declaring " that the Spanish cabinet was ready to sign a treaty of peace in the joint interest of the contracting parties, and consequently a durable one. The pretensions on either side should therefore be clearly laid down." I added, " that in order to open conferences calculated to produce a decisive result, it was proper to determine beforehand the bases of them, without leaving anything in doubt, and as it were to the effect of chance ; so that the two governments being thus agreed, they might convey to their respective plenipotentiaries instruc-

tions dictated in the same conciliatory spirit ; this was the best mode of avoiding delays and of cutting short the scourge of war."

The French government was not behindhand in earnestness ; it transmitted to me the declaration called for, and proposed as a friendly, an only condition, by way of indemnity for the restoration of the fortified towns and districts occupied by her troops,—the surrender of the Spanish part of the island of St. Domingo.

This fraction of our colonial possessions was not only useless to Spain, but burthensome in its then existing condition, whereas it might assist the republic in extending and consolidating her relations in the archipelago of the Antilles.

The proposal was submitted to the council of state, which unanimously acknowledged its admissible character ; the more so as the insurrection in that island, and the settled anarchy into which it had lapsed, condemned the titular possessor of it to every kind of losses and sacrifices. The king readily confirmed the vote of the council ; and on the 2nd of July, full powers to conclude a peace on the part of Spain were sent to an old and distinguished minister plenipotentiary, Don Domingo Yriarte, formerly ambassador in Poland, and residing at that moment in Berlin or Vienna. This choice was pointed out as well by Yriarte's tried talents in similar negotiations, as by the ancient friendly intercourse subsisting between

him and the minister vested with powers from the French government.

In order to avoid any delay, two couriers were sent off with the same despatches in duplicate, and a strict order to make inquiries on the road, and to travel without stopping until they should overtake the new plenipotentiary. It unfortunately happened that he was neither to be found at Vienna, at Berlin, nor in any part of Germany. This disappointment gave rise to some doubts in France as to the sincerity of our wish to conclude the peace; for these delays, the cause of which was unforeseen, did not indicate much alacrity to open the conference agreed upon. English diplomacy was on the alert; no news from Yriarte! Tallien on a mission to Brittany!—the war was accordingly protracted for upwards of a month longer. Yriarte was at last found in Venice, and instantly proceeded to Bâle: peace was signed on the 22nd July, and forthwith ratified by the republic on the 1st, and by Spain on the 4th of August.

Meanwhile, the concluding engagements of the war were vigorously contested. On the side of Catalonia, Schérer lost the hard fought battle of Pontòs.<sup>7</sup> Partial combats were daily renewed, and

<sup>7</sup> In no other action of the three campaigns were displayed so determined a courage and firmness on the part of our troops as at the battle of Pontòs. Generals Cuesta, Offarill, Vives, La Romana, Arias, Laburia, Cornel, Godoy, Autran, Mendinueta,

our troops were gaining ground. Rosas, blockaded by our squadron, suffered a dreadful bombardment; Schérer's troops, which defended the place, experienced every difficulty in repelling the continued assaults. Towards the end of July, the enemy was driven from the Cerdagne; Belver surrendered to our troops; three thousand prisoners, including two general officers, a whole park of artillery, and abundant supplies, were the price of Cuesta's bold expedition. This general, whose merit was above all praise, was preparing to attack Mont Louis when the news of peace spread on a sudden in the two camps: harassed by this lengthened struggle, the soldiers laid down their arms, and hastened on both sides to greet each other with cordial congratulations.

At the other extremity of the Pyrenees, the war was still more vigorously carried on, but proved less successful to the Spanish arms. Nevertheless, Fortune was not altogether opposed to us. The skill of our generals constantly baffled Moncey's obstinate purpose of falling upon Pampeluna.<sup>a</sup> It was an object of the highest importance

Iturrigaray, Guernica, Ordoñez, Cagigal, Taranco, St. Hilaire, Moncada, Perlasca, Aguirre, San Juan, as well as a multitude of officers of all ranks, and of common soldiers, greatly distinguished themselves. See the report of Urrutia, the commander in chief, in the Madrid Gazette of the 3rd July 1795.

<sup>a</sup> The two generals, Crespo and Filangieri, manœuvred with admirable skill. By the accuracy and promptness of their strategic movements, they covered by turns the approaches of

for us to prevent at all costs the siege of that fortress. Our anxiety on this point afforded the French general the glory of taking Vittoria and Bilboa during the first fortnight of July. A column of three thousand men advanced even as far as the Ebro, and occupied for a few hours the castle of Miranda. They were expelled by the Castilians on the same day, 24th July. The temerity of Miollis, who had made this bold attack, cost him a great number of prisoners and many slain; amongst the latter the gallant Mauras, commander of the Mountain Chasseurs, and other officers, who had fancied that Castile was defenceless and open to inroad.

This is, accordingly, the proper place for refuting an error which was at first credited without inquiry, and was warmly propagated by my enemies. It has been asserted as a positive fact that "the French army had crossed the Ebro, had maintained itself on its banks, and that, threatening from thence the province of Castile, it had alarmed the court of Madrid and compelled it to sue for peace."

Pampeluna and the frontier of Castile. Moncey often indulged the hope that he had turned or cut off both divisions, a hope which gave way to the apprehension lest he himself should be turned or cut off. In the last days of the war, the Prince of Castel-Franco was collecting all his forces in Navarre in order to attack the enemy's rear, by placing himself between Moncey, then engaged in the province of Alava, and the fortified posts which protected his rear on the Bidassoa. Moncey was precipitately hurrying back to face this new danger, when he received the intelligence that peace was concluded.

The column of three thousand men which penetrated as far as Miranda had no other object, in obedience to General Moncey's instructions, than to draw our attention to that quarter, and thus favour his attempt upon Pampeluna. This is the first answer I make to the charge; my second answer is of a more explicit nature. Let us compare dates. The peace was signed at Bâle on the 22nd of July; the excursion of Miollis towards the Ebro only took place two days afterwards, the 24th of that month!

What reply can be made to this comparison of dates? It might with equal truth be asserted that France concluded the peace because the Spanish army threatened Mont Louis in the last days of July, and effected an opening towards the frontier of Roussillon.



## CHAPTER XXVI.

## RECAPITULATION.

I HAVE related facts which all contemporaries have witnessed and avouched, and which are now of the dominion of history.

I must again bring under the reader's notice the insulting and calumnious tirade of the venerable Archbishop of Mechlin, who has so little respected truth and the rules of courtesy in his Memoirs on the Revolution of Spain.

“ But it is not enough that a war should be undertaken to avenge the laws of honour and justice; its operations should be directed with consummate knowledge; and the want of it proved a stumbling-block to the success of the Spanish arms. *The same hand which paralysed the action of Spain in time of peace, paralysed its action during war.* From the remotest part of the palace, a favourite assumed to direct the armies, as he governed the court; but as there is a wide contrast between them, and as an enemy, said Frederick, is no courtier, failure was the necessary consequence. The innate bravery of the soldiers,

the devotedness of their commanders, were alike ineffectual, and the enemy penetrated into the very heart of Spain. The government entered into negotiations, and it is well known what are treaties by which the vanquished seek protection against a reverse which is perhaps irretrievable. The French had crossed the Ebro, and were marching upon Madrid. They were arrested by the signing of a peace of which the favourite assumed the name ; thereby displaying even more folly than arrogance, and decking himself with a title recalling the public misfortunes, in contrast with other countries, where men are decked with titles which recall their prosperity and glory."

Such was the language of M. de Pradt. I leave it to my readers to qualify the merit of a writer who has prostituted his pen by echoing such malevolent and false imputations.

M. de Pradt is succeeded by another churchman, but a mere acolyte of the archbishop, M. Muriel, a Spanish priest, with whom I have yet some account to settle.

This compiler so completely disregards historical truth and the glory of his country, that in his analysis of the pretended manuscript of Count d'Aranda, already noticed, he writes as follows :

" The disasters which soon befell our arms warranted but too well the apprehensions of that talented statesman (Count d'Aranda). Spain was unable to arrest the progress of the French troops,

which had reached the Ebro, and threatened to march upon the capital; and she found her only resource in submitting to a disgraceful peace, shortly afterwards followed by a still more disgraceful alliance with the so much detested revolution. The counsels of Count d'Aranda, which had caused him to be prosecuted, became, too late, the compass of the government, when it was no longer time to derive advantage from them."<sup>1</sup>

The above words contain as many falsehoods, which betray the bad faith of the writer, and the bitterness which dictated them. It has already been seen that the progress of the French was, arrested by our troops on the very banks of the Ebro, and that, at the moment when General Miollis ventured upon an unsuccessful attack, the peace of Bâle had already been signed.

With respect to the epithet *disgraceful*, I will presently give the very text of the seventeen articles of the treaty. It is proved beyond a doubt that peace was proposed and sought by France; the full powers of the republic were despatched on the 10th of May, whereas those of Charles IV. are only dated the 2nd of July.<sup>2</sup> Since that peace

<sup>1</sup> Spain, under the Kings of the House of Bourbon, vol. vi. additional chapter iii. pages 69 and 70.

<sup>2</sup> Those who feel desirous to read the text and date of the full powers given to both plenipotentiaries, may consult the first volume of the Collection of the Pragmatics, Notes, Royal Decrees, &c. of the reign of Charles IV, 3rd edition, pages 497, 498, and 499.

has, to M. Muriel, appeared so disgraceful, by what name will he qualify the treaties then or subsequently signed by other powers? He will no doubt inform us what advantageous treaties were obtained by those who, like us, came to an understanding with the French republic.

Three other powers, Prussia, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and Holland, concluded a peace in the same year. The first and second ceded to France the country she had invaded on the left bank of the Rhine; the Prince of Orange, though he had still an army on foot, and could rely on the auxiliary forces of Great Britain, sued for peace, offered to the conqueror eighty millions of florins, and was not attended to. Holland, soon afterwards, opened her arms to France, adopted her principles and mode of government, and was nevertheless compelled to surrender to the republic a large portion of her provinces, the towns of Graves, Bois-le-duc, and Bergen-op-Zoom, with an indemnity of one hundred millions of florins. We will say nothing of the burdensome conditions imposed, in the following year, on all the princes of Italy; nor of those which, at the close of six campaigns, and when the enemy was at a distance of thirty leagues from her capital, Austria was condemned to submit to, at Campo-formio in the first instance, and afterwards at Luneville. . . .

These disastrous events are known to all: I regret being compelled to revive the recollection

of them; but who could repress a feeling of indignation at hearing the character of *disgraceful* applied to a peace which we accepted with arms in our hands, and the leading clause of which we ourselves dictated? . . . . .

Spain had continued the conflict after the signature of that peace,—that glorious peace I may call it,—for which we had not to sacrifice a single hamlet, an inch of ground within our hallowed frontiers! Where is its disgraceful feature? Did we enter into a covenant with the French revolution, as Abbé Muriel so shamefully reproaches us with having done? No; Spain did not truckle to the principles or to the men of the reign of anarchy. She would in reality have stooped to the revolution, had she followed the advice of the indiscreet old man in whose praise Abbé Muriel is so lavish; Spain would then have contracted an alliance with the monsters who, the year before, inspired Europe with such well-grounded apprehensions.<sup>3</sup> I treated with France restored to

<sup>3</sup> I have no occasion to prove that such was Count d'Aranda's advice. Abbé Muriel, in his summary of the speech of that state counsellor, ascribes to him the following language. Vol. vi. page 65.

“There exists amongst nations an intercourse of a more elevated order, and of higher interest to them than that of reigning families. *At no time was it more incumbent upon Spain than at present to form an intimate union with France* (March 1794); for the very reason that other powers may avail themselves of their disunion to dictate laws to both,—an object wholly unattainable,

sounder doctrines, already affording symptoms of a moral restoration ; with that government which the several cabinets of Europe soon acknowledged in succession, for they all concluded a peace : we were neither the first to pave the way, nor the last to follow the example of others.

At the period when the count proposed a union with France, she stood alone and without allies ; the whole world shuddered at her contact. . . . . When I treated with her, Prussia, Sweden, Tuscany, Switzerland, Venice, had taken the lead in sending their ambassadors. The representative of the Emperor of Germany was also at Bâle, and the diet of Ratisbon strongly urged the head of the empire to come to terms with the republic. . . . . Had those governments and princes absolved the revolution of its errors and of its crimes ? Assuredly not ; but the question was decided. France had acquired, sword in hand, the right of taking her place amongst nations, and of being respected by them. The governments and sovereign princes acknowledged

if they could always remain, as they have at all times been, closely united."

Although the pretended manuscript contains many errors and falsehoods, it is true that the count uttered these words as they are ascribed to him by his apologist. It is also true that I fully concurred with him in admitting the importance of a close union between France and Spain ; but I added that, in the state of wild frenzy exhibited by our neighbours, such an union was alike impossible and unbecoming.

an accomplished fact. Had they erred in keeping up the war? They had not; for it was undertaken in defence of their rights, their religious creeds, their existence, which were alike threatened. They had acted in virtue of the natural right of self-preservation. Fortune having betrayed their efforts, the same right authorised them to make peace. In suits of this kind, "jurisprudence hangs upon the fate of battles; reason is silent before might. Such is the supreme law."

Was it requisite that I should recall to mind these trivial truths in order to reply to the unjust provocation of an obscure priest, whose intellect appears too shallow to comprehend them? But the candid reader is easily led astray; it is proper to warn him against the faithlessness of the guide whom he follows; and I must not leave unnoticed this last phrase of Abbé Muriel: "The counsels of Count d'Aranda, which had caused him to be prosecuted, became, too late, the compass of the government, when it was no longer time to derive advantage from them."

I know not whether these words display more perfidiousness than ignorance and gross error. I have elsewhere related, that the marks of indignation evinced by Charles IV. against Count d'Aranda were provoked by a direct insult. The king felt his dignity wounded by the count's daring language. As to the advice given by the latter, that we should make peace with the men

of blood who ruled over France, such pusillanimity was rejected by all. The idea of treating for peace as soon as more propitious circumstances might enable us to do so with honour and safety,—such an idea, I repeat it, was mine, and not the count's. The whole council agreed with me in opinion, and our united advice prevailed. The government had no other *compass* to guide it.

The question is, whether peace came too late? I request every impartial man to say whether it was possible to think of it at an earlier period; to select a more favourable opportunity? whether a single stipulation was omitted in the negotiation, which the honour or interest of Spain called for? whether there ever existed a more equally balanced, a more candid or just treaty, than that of the 22nd July, concluded, I may say, at the request of France.

I can better than any one aver the fact; I who, more than others, was called upon by duty and by a sense of honour to weigh with intense anxiety the events and circumstances which led to it. This negotiation could not have been brought to a successful close at an earlier or at a later moment; a single proof will demonstrate the fact. For a long series of years, no treaty concluded previously to or after the treaty signed at Bâle, on the part of Spain, ever proved more advantageous, more honourable, to any nation or go-



vernment. The task of comparison is an easy one ; it may be seen whether I exaggerate : and yet Abbé Muriel presumes to style it a *disgraceful* treaty !

The abbé is in Paris. My observations are addressed to him. Let him reply to them.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

## Treaty of Bâle.

WERE the glory acquired in those three campaigns, and the noble bearing assumed in the negotiations for peace, belied by the conditions of the treaty? The following terms of it will be my answer :

“ His Catholic Majesty and the French republic feeling equally animated with a desire to put an end to the calamities of the war; intimately convinced that their mutual interests require the renewal of a friendly understanding between the two nations by means of a solid and lasting peace; and anxious to restore the happy harmony which formed for so long a time the basis of the mutual intercourse of both countries, have appointed for this important negotiation, namely :

“ On the part of H. C. M. his minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to the King and republic of Poland, Don Domingo Yriarte, knight of the royal order of Charles III :

“ And on the part of the French republic, Citizen François Barthelemy, her ambassador in Switzerland :

“ Who, after having exchanged their full powers, have stipulated the following articles :

“ 1st.—There shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding between the King of Spain and the French republic :

“ 2nd.—All hostilities shall cease in consequence, between the two contending powers, *from the moment of the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty* ; from which date the said powers shall not in any manner, or under any pretext whatever, furnish against one another any assistance or supplies of men, horses, provisions, money, warlike ammunition, ships of war, &c.

“ 3rd.—The two contracting powers shall not allow the transit through their territory of troops hostile to either.

“ 4th.—The French republic restores to the King of Spain all her conquests over the states and dominions of H. M. arising out of the present war : the fortresses and districts now under occupation shall be evacuated by the French troops within the fortnight following the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

“ 5th.—The fortresses above-mentioned shall be restored to Spain, with the artillery, warlike ammunition, and every article belonging to the service of the said fortresses, such as they shall be found at the moment of the signing of the present treaty.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I request my readers will take the trouble to compare this article with the sixth article of the treaty of Luneville, by which,

**“6th.—The contributions, deliveries, requisitions, and all obligations of the like nature, which have been imposed during the war, shall cease, as a matter of course, after the signing of the present treaty.**

after having fixed the demarcation of the frontiers between the French republic and the Germanic empire by the Talweg of the Rhine, it was stipulated as follows: “The French republic formally renounces all possession whatever over the right bank of the Rhine: she consents to restore to their legitimate owners the towns of Dusseldorff, Ehrenbreistein, Philipsburg, the fort of Cassel, and the fortifications before Mentz, the fort of Kell, and Vieux-Brissac; under the express condition that those towns and forts shall remain in the state in which they may be found at the moment of the evacuation.” What is the object of this article? That of demolishing and rendering useless the places which were to be restored, whilst negotiations were still pending, and the exchange of ratifications was experiencing some delay. The orders given in consequence led to the complete dismantling and levelling of the fortifications of Philipsburg and Ehrenbreistein. The same occurred in Italy with respect to the works of Porto-Legnano, and the castles of Verona; in short, all the fortified places which the French engaged to surrender were delivered up in a dismantled state.

In Spain, on the contrary, not only were our fortresses restored to us uninjured, but many in excellent repair: Rosas rebuilt; all stored and provisioned, and in the state in which they happened to be on the 22nd July, the day on which the treaty was signed. The good faith and friendly disposition evinced by the republic on the occasion of their surrender are well established by her designedly omitting to determine the precise date on which the treaty should be concluded and ratified. The result of leaving this point in doubt was, that, until the double ratification, it was impossible to remove any of the objects composing the materiel of the service of those places in the state in which they had been placed by the French with the intention of resisting our attacks.

“The arrears owing at that period, or engagements contracted in respect to the war, shall be declared void and null ; and any portion that may have been delivered or required after the above-mentioned period shall be restored in kind, or its equivalent in money reimbursed.\*

“7th.—Commissioners shall be appointed on the part of each to draw up a treaty fixing the limits between the two countries ; and they shall, as far as possible, adopt for basis, in respect of the ground which had been the subject of contest previously to the present war, the crest of the mountains which separate the double fall of waters, the one on the side of Spain, the other on that of France.<sup>3</sup>

\* This article was conceded and fully carried into effect in favour of Spain only. It will be proper to compare it with the eighteenth article of the peace of Luneville. “The requisitions, contributions, warlike supplies, &c. were only to cease after the ratification of the treaty, which could not fail to take up much time, since each member of the empire was to concur in the ratification. With respect, moreover, to the payment of arrears of contributions, requisitions, bonds, &c. no portion of the territory intended to be restored was to be evacuated by the republican troops until after the actual recovery of all sums due to them without any exception.” To the prolonged occupation until full payment of all debts, must be added the executions and processes, carried on with such unrelenting rigour that the inhabitants of the Tyrol rose up in arms, and gave reason to apprehend, for a moment, the breaking out of a popular war in that province. Moreau exercised the greatest severity in repressing the discontent. All arrears were paid up.

<sup>3</sup> The object of this article was to put an end to a multitude of reciprocal encroachments, the perpetual cause of quarrels

“8th.—After the lapse of a month, dating from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, neither of the two powers shall be at liberty to keep up along its frontier a greater number of troops than what actually existed in garrison before the present war.\*

“9th.—In consideration of the surrender stipulated in Article 4, the King of Spain, for himself and his successors, cedes and transfers to the French republic, in full property, the Spanish part of St. Domingo in the Antilles.

“One month after the date of the official announcement in that island of the ratification of the present treaty, the Spanish troops shall be prepared to evacuate the places, harbours, and other settlements they occupy, in order that they may be delivered up to the French troops when they present themselves to claim possession.

“The places, harbours, and settlements above

between the inhabitants of both frontiers. The simple rule of the division marked out by the fall of waters on opposite sides determined all doubts, as well as the question of property, upon which it had hitherto been found impossible to come to an understanding.

\* In what other treaty of peace between the republic and the rest of the belligerent powers, have we seen this condition laid down, by which each party relied on the good faith of its neighbour, without endeavouring to claim for itself the balance of securities? By this article, the republic relinquishes its old pretension to maintain along the French coast a greater number of troops than was stipulated on the part of Spain, under the pretext that France had to guard herself against expeditions from England.

mentioned shall be ceded to the French republic, with the artillery, warlike ammunition, and articles requisite for their defence, such as they may exist at the moment when the official news of the present treaty shall be known in St. Domingo.

“ The inhabitants of the Spanish portion who, through motives of personal interest or any other cause, may be desirous of removing with their property to the other possessions of H. C. M., shall do so within the space of a year from the date of the present treaty.

“ The generals and commanding officers of both nations shall mutually agree upon the measures to be adopted for the execution of this article.<sup>5</sup>

“ 10th.—All effects, revenues, or property of any kind which may have been sequestered, seized, or confiscated on occasion of the war between H. C. M. and the French republic, shall be restored to the individual owners, of each nation respectively. Justice shall be fairly administered in all that relates to the private claims which those individuals might have in the respective dominions of the contracting powers.

<sup>5</sup> The acquisition of this part of the island of St. Domingo was so insignificant that the republic neglected to take possession of it until four years afterwards: even then it was not an act of the republic, but of Toussaint Louverture, who accelerated the measure, without awaiting the orders of the French government, to whom the commissioner Roume had addressed a report on the subject.

“ 11th.—All intercourse and commercial relations between France and Spain shall be re-established upon the same footing as before, until a new treaty of commerce shall have been drawn up.<sup>6</sup>

“ Spanish merchants may resume their commercial enterprises in France, or form new ones in that country if they so desire it, provided they conform, like others, to the established laws.

“ French merchants shall enjoy the same privilege in Spain, under the same conditions.

“ 12th.— All prisoners made on both sides since the commencement of the war, without regard to the difference of numbers or of ranks, including seafaring men captured from Spanish or French vessels, or in any other way; every individual, without exception, who may be detained in Spain or in France in consequence of the war; shall be set at liberty within two months at farthest after the ratification of the present treaty: no demand or difficulty shall be set up on either side, to impede them: each one, however, shall be

<sup>6</sup> It is worthy of remark, that this treaty did not even procure to France certain advantages which are usually stipulated in negotiations of the like nature. “ *All on the same footing as before.*” This treaty is important in another respect; for it omits to notice our commercial or friendly relations with England or any other power then at war with the republic. Such was the over-anxious good feeling of the republic towards us. Can any other treaty of peace be cited in which France has proved herself equally tractable and accommodating?



required to discharge the private debts he may have contracted during his captivity. The same clause shall apply to the sick and wounded so soon as they are restored to health.

“ Commissioners of each nation shall forthwith be appointed for the execution of this article.

“ 13th.—The Portuguese prisoners, forming part of the troops of that nation who have served either in the armies or in the fleets of H. C. M., are comprehended in this exchange.

“ The same clause shall apply to the French taken prisoners by the Portuguese troops in question.

“ 14th.—The same peace, friendship, and good understanding which are stipulated in this treaty between Spain and France, shall also subsist between the King of Spain and the United Provinces in alliance with France.<sup>7</sup>

“ 15th.—The French republic, being desirous of affording a proof of her friendly deference towards H. C. M., accepts his mediation in favour of the Queen of Portugal, the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, the Infant Duke of Parma and the other states of Italy, with a view to the restora-

<sup>7</sup> Our friendly relations with Holland had experienced no interruption. They had even been drawn closer on the 14th of May 1795, after a negotiation entered upon between the cabinet confided to my care and the government of the States General. M. Vander-goëns, their minister plenipotentiary entrusted with this mission, had found every facility of access to me in the furtherance of his object.

tion of peace between the republic and each of those princes and states.

“16th.—The French republic, aware of the interest which H. C. M. takes in the general pacification of Europe, will likewise accept his good offices in favour of the belligerent powers who shall apply to the King of Spain to open negotiations with the French government.”<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The new directors of the French government having at heart to win over public opinion, adopted, in good earnest, the idea of reconciling France with the other governments of Europe. This gave rise to the studied courtesy of offering to the King of Spain and to the sovereign of Prussia the honourable part of *mediators*.

Can it be supposed that the two monarchs degraded themselves by accepting this part? No rational man can withhold his approbation, and even his praise, of such an act of condescension. It has been published to the world that the King of Prussia had no other object in view than to acquire a certain degree of influence and ascendancy over the Germanic body. If so, I should still sincerely congratulate him for his conduct; since that course of policy had also for object his own preservation amidst the dangers which threatened the empire. With respect to Spain, I may aver that the cabinets of Madrid and Berlin came to a frank understanding, and were fully agreed on these points: “that the return of France to sounder doctrines, to a better system of government, might be promoted by a general peace; that the military enthusiasm becoming gradually allayed, the nation would direct its attention more exclusively to her domestic interests; and that this might be the first step towards a return to monarchy.” The only difficulty arose from the circumstance that Austria, having experienced heavy losses, repelled all idea of a peace which did not stipulate, as the first condition, the restoration of her provinces; and that England fed the hopes of Austria, and offered her aid and support if she continued the struggle. Those two powers persisted in a war

“ 17th.—The present treaty shall only have effect after the ratification of the contracting parties ; and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a month from this day, and sooner if possible.

“ In faith of which, we the undersigned, plenipotentiaries of H. C. M. and of the French republic, have signed, in virtue of our full powers, the present treaty of peace and friendship, to which we here affix our respective seals.

“ Done at Bâle, the 22nd July 1795, or 4th Thermidor, third year of the French republic.

(L.S.) DOMINGO DE YRIARTE.

(L.S.) FRANÇOIS BARTHELEMY.

Such was that treaty, which, if it had been concluded between high-minded sovereigns, united which was attended with such fatal consequences : 1st. it strengthened the republic ; 2ndly, it aggravated the losses of Austria ; 3rdly, it called forth a man whose high capacity and unbounded ambition might have remained buried in obscurity, like so many others which fail to come to light owing to the absence of circumstances favourable to their developement. The continuance of the war brought upon the political stage a man who was destined to astonish and overturn the world !

Giving to these observations their due weight, will any one venture to blame the wise and cautious policy adopted by Spain, Prussia, and various other princes of the empire ? I deny that personal interest was the only motive which influenced them in favour of peace ; their determination arose from an anticipation of incalculable dangers, and of a futurity big with storms, from a policy eminently conservative in its effects as well as in its intentions. If such policy failed to be properly appreciated at that period, subsequent events have sufficiently justified it : history will pronounce upon its merits.

by close ties of relationship, could not have been more equal in its provisions, or more equitably drawn up. At that period, the republic proved far less indulgent towards every other power; neither did she become more so in the sequel. We had to submit to no sacrifice, unless it be attempted to qualify as such the cession of the Spanish part of the island of St. Domingo; a land of malediction for the whites! a perfect cancer, which will eat up every European power that may henceforward persist in disputing to the Blacks that fatal possession! The principal Spanish colonists had already abandoned it. It was a burdensome weight upon the mother country: many of its parishes had already fallen under the yoke of the revolted slaves. Bonaparte himself was unable to arrest the conflagration. After making prodigious efforts, incurring enormous expenses and an incalculable loss of men, he was forced to relinquish the fatal colony to its ferocious possessors. Far better had it been to have abandoned it at an earlier period.

If we except that concession, the insignificance of which may now be appreciated, all the conditions of the treaty were in favour of Spain: no secret articles, no pecuniary sacrifices, no indemnities, no secret gratifications, such as have occurred in so many other transactions with France. I defy my enemies to prove that the peace was not such as I represent it, or that I have suppressed

any of its clauses. During the long time that has since elapsed, every facility has been afforded of searching the archives of every cabinet. There exists no reserved case in respect of this treaty.

How does it happen, will it be said, that France, so greedy, so unbending in her armed negotiations, should have proved so easy, so gracious towards Spain? I reply, that her conduct affords evidence of the good opinion created by the firm attitude displayed by the government and the nation in a struggle of three years' duration. But we must also recall to mind other claims which France was the first to acknowledge—our loyalty and the rectitude of our intentions. Spain manifested no private ambition; she avowed her respect for the integrity of the French territory; never displayed a feeling of animosity towards France; and merely combated an anarchical power, which France herself abhorred, and succeeded at last in destroying.

If no other nation so effectually resisted the gigantic forces of the republic; if no other power can point to successes more glorious or to losses less severe than ours; if, after two years of warfare, France had scarcely invaded a few leagues of our territory; if, when the danger was the most urgent, the courage of our armies rose in proportion with it; if in this crisis Spain, always loyal and disinterested, never for a moment entertained the thought of aggrandising herself at the ex-

pense of France ; if she disdained the subsidies and aid of all foreign nations ; if she adopted no other than her own peculiar policy ; if she kept all her actions under due control ; if she proved herself a formidable adversary, a true and sincere friend,—was it not natural that France, on the other hand, should respect a people whose heroic constancy was not dejected by the reverses which befell them in this obstinate struggle ? Was it not consistent with justice that France should evince her sympathy for a people who in the heat of the contest never forgot that the French nation was their ancient friend and ally ? Such was that war, such that peace, in both which Spain obtained greater advantages than any other power of the coalition ; a war in which our soldiers forfeited none of their old and brilliant renown ; an honourable peace, which was the reward of countless deeds of valour and of a wise and dignified policy.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

## Testimony of French Writers.

I AM not led by purely personal considerations when I impose upon myself the task of writing my justification on the subject of the war and peace: the national honour is as dear to me as my own. To those who have affected to undervalue the glory of our common country, (how could such deplorable folly enter the minds of Spaniards!) I oppose the testimony of foreign, especially of French writers, who are the more entitled to credit when they speak in our favour, as they were our adversaries in the contest, and might naturally feel inclined to describe it as redounding to their advantage. I subjoin a few lines taken from M. Lacretelle's History of France during the eighteenth century, vol. xii. b. 23rd, p. 230, and succeeding ones:

“ The French government, that is to say, the Committee of Public Safety, appointed by the Convention and revived by the decree of the 9th Thermidor, was the first to mention the subject of a peace with Spain. Its ambition, how-

ever great, was not altogether boundless. . . . In spite, moreover, of the victories achieved, the conquest of the Spanish dominions still struck every imagination as too gigantic a project: no such chimerical hope was entertained as that a party might on a sudden be kindled in Spain, which should proclaim itself, as in Holland, the ally of the conquerors. Several fortified towns were yet unbesieged, and the Spaniards had displayed unbending firmness in the greater part of the sieges they had hitherto sustained. Numberless dangers awaited the French armies in the ill-cultivated and almost barren provinces they would have to traverse. Lastly, the generals were unsparing in their praises of the valour of the Spanish soldiers; and this valour, stimulated by despair, and roused by the influence of every religious feeling, might operate wonders.

“Under the influence of these motives, the French government commissioned M. Bourgoing formerly ambassador in Spain, to address letters to MM. d'Ocariz and Yriarte, which might lead to a negotiation redounding to the advantage of Spain. The cabinet of Madrid received those overtures with the characteristic national phlegm. The Duke d'Alcudia (afterwards Prince of the Peace) coupled imposing military movements with the negotiations about to be opened. It was, perhaps, with a view of dissembling the desire that was felt for peace, the acknowledgment



of which is always irksome to the vanquished, that he adopted a mode of negotiation which could not fail to produce tardy results."

M. Lacretelle next adverts to the appointment of Yriarte, then absent from Spain; our ignorance of the place where the new minister plenipotentiary was to be found; the perplexity of the couriers sent in search of him.

"The perplexity of a courier, who vainly sought him at Vienna and Berlin, and found him at last in Venice, prolonged the scourge of war between two nations weary of combating each other. The French government appeared as much annoyed and uneasy as the court of Madrid at these unexpected delays.

"Another negotiation was opened between General Servan and the Marquis d'Iranda, at the foot of the Pyrenees. But the Spaniards exerted, in this interval, the greatest efforts to repel the French from their territory. They had the boldness to appear before Rosas; and, combining their land and sea attacks, were on the point of forcing their way into the town. They had already commenced its bombardment; but were at last compelled to relinquish their attempt, though not without exciting the admiration of the French at a courage which reverses had but raised to a higher pitch. They advanced with no less impetuosity against the army of the western Pyrenees, and succeeded, at first, in driving

it from the heights of Pampeluna. Our army, however, soon regained possession of them;<sup>1</sup> but the confidence and energy of the Spaniards rising with the danger, they maintained themselves between the two armies which bore upon them, and already meditated a bold diversion in the French territory."

Thus much we have extracted from M. Lacretelle. Let us now turn to M. de Marcillac. "At the period of the signing of peace, the army of Navarre, notwithstanding the reverses of the campaign of 1794, was in the finest condition,

<sup>1</sup> This observation of M. Lacretelle is not altogether correct. In order to attack Pampeluna, Moncey had first to carry the position of Erice, which was occupied by the left of our army. He had, moreover, to possess himself of the entrance of the defiles of Ollareguy, and especially of the post or plateau of La Meceta, where the defile becomes considerably narrower.

On the 22nd July, the enemy encountered a vigorous resistance, and was driven back with severe loss. This defence redounded to the glory of the two battalions of the regiment of Africa, commanded by Don Agustin Goyeneta, who died in the field of honour, as well as Lieutenant-colonel Don Joseph Gonzales de Acufia, his second in command. The banners of the regiment obtained a special decoration in memory of that exploit. After the check experienced by General Moncey, our left, having been adequately reinforced, was not content with keeping the position covering Pampeluna, but made a movement in advance, in order to cut off the portion of the French army stationed in Alava and Biscay. Intelligence of the peace reached them at that moment. Moncey was fortifying in haste his positions of Dofia Maria and Izlar, in front of the Bidassoa, with a view to keep our troops of Navarre in check. The war had already terminated.

well organized, and, from the reinforcements it had received, was superior in numbers to the French. If it had been more concentrated; if, collecting in Navarre a considerable body of troops, the Prince of Castel Franco had proceeded at once to the province of Guipuscoa, masking the position of Doña Maria, in advance of the Bidassoa, the French army in Alava and Biscay would then have been compelled to fall back in order to avoid being cut off, and would have had to take up a permanent position in the intrenched camp of Ernany. I cannot say whether this plan was adopted by the Spanish, but he appears to have been forestalled by the French general. Neither commander suspected, that, whilst they were planning the success of their operations, H. C. M. was intent upon procuring to his subjects a solid and durable peace, and was sacrificing the prospects of triumph indulged in by his armies to the repose of the nation committed to his care.”<sup>2</sup>

The same author relates in the following language the recent military events in the eastern Pyrenees:

“General Urrutia, probably not aware that a peace was under discussion at Bâle, sought to resume the offensive. It is reasonable to suppose that he was planning an invasion of the county of

<sup>2</sup> History of the War between France and Spain in 1793, 1794, and part of 1795; by M. de Marcillac; pp. 109 and 111.

Foix ; for he detached, in the beginning of July, the Camp-marshal La Cuesta with a strong division of the army, which was in advance of Gerona, and ordered him to compel the evacuation of the part of Spanish Catalonia which was occupied by the French troops. Passing by the Col de Moyans, this general attacked the French camps before the Seu d'Urgel and Puycerda. They were carried notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance, and the troops of the camp of Puycerda retreated into the town. La Cuesta summoned the commandant to surrender ; but the latter having refused, the general ordered the assault. After a sharp firing of two hours, the Spaniards gave the assault, carried the place, and had the humanity to make the garrison prisoners of war ; the two generals who commanded it were also taken prisoners. The post of Belver surrendered on the day after the taking of Puycerda ; and by that capture the Spanish general had it in his power to annoy the enemy's territory, and to combine such comprehensive movements as might have compelled the French army of the Lam-pourdan to evacuate that conquest, and withdraw to the other side of the Pyrenees for the purpose of resisting the threatened invasion of the Roussillon.”<sup>3</sup>

I also subjoin a passage from M. Thiers' work :  
“ Peace was signed at Bâle on the 22nd of July, at

<sup>3</sup> Pages 336 and 337.

the very moment of the disasters of Quiberon. The conditions of it were, the restitution of all our conquests in Spain, and the cession to the republic of the Spanish part of St. Domingo ; a gratuitous concession on the part of Spain, for St. Domingo, in reality, no longer belonged to any one.”<sup>4</sup>

Lastly, I quote the work entitled “Victories, Conquests, Disasters, Reverses, &c. of the French from 1792 to 1815.” The principal authors of this work were military men, most of them eye-witnesses of the facts they have related. Every page containing allusions to the Spanish armies, bestows encomiums upon them, which occasionally partake of enthusiasm ; they take a pleasure in acknowledging the courage of the soldiers and the skill of many of our general officers. On the subject of the peace they carry their praise to a degree bordering upon flattery. I transcribe their own language :

“The news of the peace concluded at Bâle reached the two armies, and reconciled two nations which had waged an obstinate war against each other with a bravery and resources nearly balanced. But it will no doubt be a subject of wonder to all who have formed an accurate notion of the haughtiness and pride of the Committee of Public Safety, that the first overture for peace was made by that republican government which had lately vowed destruction to every crowned head. We

<sup>4</sup> Volume iv. chapter xi. p. 246.

have already had occasion to account for this singular phenomenon ; it arose out of the memorable revolution of the 9th Thermidor (23rd July 1794). Those exaggerated and demagogic ideas which appeared to be the sole rule of conduct of the republicans of the *Mountain*, had suddenly given way to an unexpected spirit of moderation, which the Thermidorians skilfully wielded to bring round to their side the countless multitude of peacefully disposed Frenchmen who had timidly embraced the cause of the revolution. The attempts made by the government to bring about the pacification of La Vendée were the first fruit of that moderation ; peace with Prussia and Holland might be considered as the second ; the third was naturally to be seen in the termination of hostilities with Spain. Nevertheless, several members of the Convention, and even of the Committee of Public Safety established after the 9th Thermidor, were still tormented with that republican fever which thirsted after a war against royalty wherever it might be found, and vehemently opposed the project of concluding a peace with Spain, as they had already done when the treaty of peace with Prussia was under discussion ; but the majority, which inclined to moderate measures, carried their point. . . . However brilliant, moreover, were the victories won, the republicans felt alarmed at the idea of attempting to conquer the Spanish dominions : they recollected that ever since the

period of the Romans, the Spanish nation had always fought with despair in defence of their national independence, and had rarely succumbed to the temporary yoke of foreign invaders. These considerations are creditable to the loyal and humane feelings of the then existing governments. Alas ! if at a later period a man more powerful than they had entertained the same dread of exasperating that generous and enthusiastic people, our country would probably not have to deplore at the present day those heavy disasters which have for a time obscured her glory.

“The court of Spain, on the other hand,” (add the same writers,) exhausted by the efforts it had made, and being divested of the means of renewing them,<sup>5</sup> had to apprehend lest the French republic, taking advantage of her foreign and domestic conquests, might suddenly invade the Spanish territory with forces so overwhelming as to crush all resistance. Already in possession of part of the frontiers, and of the country most dif-

<sup>5</sup> Let us not forget that this is the language of foreigners. If the war had continued, it would have called for further and still greater sacrifices ; but our zeal would have proved adequate to the emergency. We had carried on the three campaigns with our own unaided resources ; large sums of money had been required : however, Spain had not yet been reduced to the extremity of paying her soldiers with paper notes, in imitation of the example of France. It proved a fortunate circumstance in this war that it was a national, not a cabinet one ; and in Spain, more than in any other country, the resources for carrying on a national war are inexhaustible.

ficult of access, the French, whose last successes had brought them nearer to Pampeluna, might seize upon that capital of Navarre, and by this means open an easy road for invading the two Castiles and Arragon: in order to uphold the throne, it would have become necessary to call the whole nation to arms, and kindle a war the results of which were incalculable, and which, by occasioning a collision with the French, might produce on the public mind a moral revolution quite as dangerous as the invasion itself.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Such was, in fact, one of the motives which determined the council of state to vote unanimously in favour of peace. This was likewise my opinion: not that we had to dread the least change in the minds or sentiments of the immense majority of the nation; the danger was, for the moment at least, of quite a different character. The history of past times, the evidence of our own days, warned us not to be insensible to the power and resources of *minorities* when resting for support upon foreign aid, especially when those minorities succeed in drawing to their side the popular masses, the disaffected, the idle and profligate, by stirring up the passion for change,—a powerful lever which the French Propaganda never failed to wield for the purpose of disturbing every country into which their armies penetrated! In Spain, this minority gave slight indications of its existence: it was indeed scarcely perceptible, though capable, nevertheless, of doing much mischief; for, independently of the revolutionary example set by our neighbours, the annals of our own country could, without going so far back as the old monarchy of the Goths, occasionally supply us with some dangerous examples, such as the deposition or dethroning of King Henry IV; the holy league of the Commons of Castile and the brotherhood of Valencia under the reign of Charles V; the traditional prestige of the ancient constitutions of Arragon; the troubles of that kingdom under Philip II; the ever-painful



“No sooner had both nations discovered that their mutual interest recommended a cessation of hostilities, than every other arrangement became

remembrance of its liberties crushed by the monarch.\* The public mind was in a state of ferment; clandestine projects were even meditated and planned; in June 1795, an intercepted correspondence apprised the government that the French were not wholly unsuccessful in their efforts at making proselytes on many important points; the first indications soon assumed the character of positive proofs. Secret juntas were discovered, which were engaged in forming democratic plans; all aimed at the same object, though each had its own favourite system. They debated as to the adoption of a single Iberian republic, or of as many republics as there were provinces. Opinions only differed on those two questions. The French, for the better attainment of their object, recommended a subdivision into federal states. One of these juntas, the most active of all, held its meetings at a convent, and the principal members of the club were monks.† The contagion was gaining ground. When the French threatened to cross the Ebro, the secret society of Burgos had already prepared to send a deputation for the purpose of fraternising with them. . . . . In Madrid itself, young men belonging to distinguished families ‡ had the boldness to present themselves with caps of liberty at one of the principal theatres; ladies of the highest nobility § affected to appear in public adorned with tri-coloured ribbons. . . . . Great were the calamities impending over us if the continuance of the war amidst such a conflict of principles, opinions, and interests, had caused a democratic revolution to break out! How easy it would then have been for the republicans to direct and take advantage of the movement!

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\* Philip II. Death of the chief judge Lanuza, &c.

† At the capuchin convent at Xadraque.

‡ Amongst others, the brothers Acuña, the Marquis d'Escalona, now Marquis de Bedmar.

§ The Duchess of Ossuna, and other ladies of the same rank.

easy of accomplishment. Nevertheless, an accidental occurrence greatly delayed the definitive conclusion of the treaty of peace. The Spanish government, having acceded to the first proposals of accommodation made to it in the name of the Committee of Public Safety by M. Bourgoing, formerly ambassador at Madrid,<sup>7</sup> thought it right to open a communication with M. Barthelemy, the then ambassador of the republic to the thirteen Swiss cantons, who, by his personal merit and diplomatic talents, and especially by the treaty concluded with the King of Prussia at Bâle through his exertions, enjoyed the highest consideration in foreign countries. M. d'Yriarte, whom the court of Spain intended to entrust with its full powers, was on terms of friendly intercourse with him. When ambassador to the republic of Poland, M. d'Yriarte had witnessed the final overthrow of the Polish nation; and ever since the partition of that unhappy kingdom between the three sovereigns who had taken up arms for the purpose of crushing it; the Spanish diplomatist had been travelling in Europe under the incognito of a private individual. After pro-

<sup>7</sup> The authors of this work had previously noticed in the same volume iv. chapter x. page 32, the first conference between General Servan and the Marquis d'Iranda on the subject of peace. These conferences were broken off, as I have already mentioned, because the French set up a claim, in the first instance, to retain possession of the fortresses in their power until a general peace.

ceeding to Austria and Berlin in search of M. d'Yriarte, a courier found him at Venice, and announced the new dignity conferred upon him by his government. Yriarte took his departure in all haste for his destination. However, pending the delay in discovering his place of residence, hostilities were still carried on ; and French and Spanish blood, thus shed to no purpose, sufficiently attested that the cabinet of Madrid had not yet adopted a fixed determination."

## CHAPTER XXIX.

Reply to those who have questioned the propriety of the Peace with France at the period when it was concluded.

IN the year 1806, Napoleon had thrown aside the mask. Infatuated with the idea of his Western Empire, his first object was to set aside the Bourbons, and seize their vacant thrones. I then deemed the opportunity a favourable one for protecting the Spanish dynasty from the dangers which threatened it; but my efforts were paralysed by men who proved faithless to their sovereign and country. They denounced to Napoleon the cabinet of Charles IV. as hostile to him. They sought a foreign protection, with a view to attain their object and overturn the throne. On the approach of danger they deprived Charles IV. of every means of defence. After stripping the father of his diadem, they hurried away the son to the ambuscade laid for him at Bayonne; delivered him up to the ravisher's mercy; and left the country without a chief, without a guide, like an orphan suddenly deprived of his natural protectors.

How could the multitude, fascinated and convulsed by dark manœuvres, penetrate the mystery of those perfidious machinations? It was easy to lay every wrong, every error, to my charge, whilst, gagged and loaded with irons, I could neither breathe nor refute the calumny!

Finding themselves thus at liberty to attack me with impunity, my detractors began by pointing to the glorious treaty of Bâle, signed thirteen years before, as the first *misdeed* of my political life. This treaty was, in their judgment, the source of every evil, even of the recent catastrophe, which the dastardly and senseless conspirators had alone drawn down upon the royal family and upon the country.

I shall soon have to advert in greater detail, and in its proper place, to that handful of intriguers and traitors. I reserve them for my triumphal car, after I shall have branded them with infamy. My innocence and their iniquity shall appear conspicuous to my country and to foreign nations: the question shall be fully cleared up. Let us first remove the vulgar imputations which were but the forerunners of the last and most serious charge.

Reverting to the subject of the peace of Bâle, what other conduct could Spain have pursued? The coalition was dissolved; the King of Prussia had withdrawn from it; many princes of the empire adhered to his policy, and embraced, along

with him, the system of neutrality; the other princes manifested the same disposition; all were anxious for peace, and the diet urged Austria by their unanimous decision to come to a treaty with the republic.<sup>1</sup>

I omit for the present the weighty political reasons which recommended the termination of the war, and will even suppose that under certain circumstances it might have been proper to carry it on. . . . Let us consider the question: Holland, formerly hostile to France, had become her ally; Prussia, and most of the princes of the empire, had deserted the coalition; the intentions of Austria were not known, nor was it possible to ascertain them.

Was Spain to stand alone against France victorious in every quarter; was she to allow the favourable opportunity to escape; was she to bear the whole weight of the war, and expose herself to the necessity of signing, at a later period, a peace imposed upon her by force of arms, and therefore a disgraceful one? . . . What would thenceforward have been the object of all our

<sup>1</sup> The secession of the King of Prussia was instantly followed by that of the Landgraves of Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Durlach, Wirtemberg, Anspach, Bayreuth, and other princes of Swabia and Franconia. Amongst those princes ranked the King of Sweden as Duke of Pomerania, the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein, and even the King of England as Elector of Hanover.

sacrifices? Was it any longer a question of compelling France to alter her form of government? Far from it: Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Tuscany, Switzerland, Genoa, Venice, the Ottoman Porte, had acknowledged the republic; Austria herself and the whole empire were prepared to acknowledge her if she consented to relinquish her conquests. This is so true that every subsequent discussion was one of interests, and no longer of principles or of the form of government to be adopted. What motive could then induce Spain to continue the war? Was it her duty to fight for the purpose of compelling France to repair the losses of Austria and of the empire? What power would have engaged to indemnify us for our own losses, which might also have proved considerable? Russia at least, whilst she carried on a war of ukases and of distant threats—Austria and Prussia, whilst they only employed part of their forces in the struggle—had partitioned Poland between them; whereas Spain was fighting without any compensation, and alone, of all the coalesced powers, without private or personal ambition. What aid had ever been tendered to us? What proof did we ever receive that we had been thought of? Each power, it will be said, had enough to engage its undivided attention. But why should Spain obstinately persist in this dangerous struggle, which was productive of a result different from what had been

anticipated? for the war obviously strengthened the republic instead of weakening it.

I must repeat what I have already affirmed,—the continuance of this war proved most fatal to Europe! The republic was already tottering; it was sinking under its own weight; its foundations were giving way; the popular feeling was adverse to it; it was repugnant to the national manners; its first essay in the career of crime had excited the hatred and execration of all; the immense majority of Frenchmen would have preferred a wisely constituted monarchy; those amongst the republicans who were candid and sincere were disabused of their vain theories, and gradually approximating to monarchical forms of government. What was the tendency of public opinion in Paris and in the provinces, after the stormy days of April and May, especially after the 5th October (13th Vendemiaire) 1795? How near we were witnessing the downfall of the republic! Had one of the French princes then presented himself with no other retinue than a few enlightened royalists; had the Count de Provence, for instance, appeared in some province favourable to his cause, and proclaimed his compact, which conciliated the old with the newly created interests; the restoration would have been accomplished.\* But England had not yet attained the

\* So long as there existed a chance or a probability of success, Spain defended in earnest the cause of the French princes;



object of her profound policy; France, in her estimation, was not sufficiently exhausted or degraded to be so soon restored to her legitimate kings. To complete the measure of her misfortunes, the republican government obstinately persisted in maintaining her conquests over Austria and the empire. Every means of conciliation were exhausted. . . . . The triple alliance of

Spain alone supported them, and exerted her efforts, in vain, to recall them to some point of the French territory. The Count de Provence (afterwards Louis XVIII.), sensible of the loyal intentions of our cabinet, and grateful for the large sums of money occasionally supplied to him, addressed many letters to me on the subject; in one of them he candidly explained the equivocal and painful position to which certain cabinets appeared determined to bind him. When he expressed the intention of coming to Spain in accordance with the wish of Charles IV, who was preparing for his unfortunate cousin a reception worthy of both, the dark intrigues of England opposed every obstacle to this project.

M. Thiers seems inclined to do justice to the friendly disposition of Spain, when he speaks of the emigrants in the following language: "They admitted that they could no longer place solid reliance upon any power except Spain; that the King of Spain was the only true relative and sincere ally of the French royal family; that from him alone they could entertain any hopes. Austria had no sooner obtained possession of Valenciennes and Condé, than she hoisted her own standard, the sight of which alarmed the French for the integrity of the national soil; Prussia had kept none of her promises; Pitt was designated by no other name than that of the *perfidious Englishman*, whose guineas were found acceptable, but whom it would afterwards be justifiable to deceive, should an opportunity offer," &c. History of the Revolution, vol. vii. page 110.

Austria, Russia, and Great Britain, rekindled the war, and drew off to foreign countries the conflagration of which the interior of France would, otherwise, have exclusively felt the effects.

A government defective in its form, but more tractable, more easy of access than the Convention in her last paroxysms, succeeded in rallying the army; and, if it failed to conciliate all France, was supported by that numerous class which is always at hand to represent the will of the usually passive masses of the community. The slumbering factions might have still revived; it was the part of prudence, therefore, to avoid exciting or provoking them by warlike menaces. The opposition from without should have been of a purely political nature, for the French are attracted by the allurements of glory, as iron is attracted by the loadstone; and if a government which had cast off what was most obnoxious in its forms should succeed in obtaining the support of victories, nothing was left for Europe but to resign itself to the consequences. There was no possibility of foreseeing where the conflagration would stop. The new revolutionary planet exhibited no encouraging signs. The storm accordingly broke out; all apprehensions, all the calculations of statesmen, fell short of the frightful reality. From those overwhelming misfortunes and dangers Spain was preserved by the treaty of Bâle.

The youthful Bonaparte, until then scarcely

known, and almost a stranger to France, was at once called upon to draw his sword in defence of that decaying Convention for which he felt no sincere attachment or esteem. He swept the streets of Paris with cannon-shot. His first embroidered uniform was stained with the blood of his fellow-citizens. Become the object of public aversion after an exploit of so repulsive a character, he never could have calculated upon a single electoral vote in the assemblies of his country. He was selected to wage her wars under the fine sky of Italy. Fortune here consorted with talent. He who had only tried his character and courage in a bold attempt against the citizens of the banks of the Seine, suddenly sprang up into the hero of his age ; a devastating hero, whose glory proved so costly to the whole world, and especially to France ; a child of the revolution of which he usurped the inheritance, or, as he has been already designated, the revolution personified.

A warrior in the most eminent degree, instinctively hostile to liberty, he did not disdain the juggling which demagogic charlatans had already resorted to. Italy was as much conquered by his intrigues as by his victories. Unfortunate people ! Whilst the great captain defeated and dispersed the five armies of Austria, the political conjurer skilfully set all the springs of the *propaganda* in motion. He affected sentiments which were alien

to him. Equally popular and eloquent, he courted at once the sciences, the fine arts, and the multitude; the thunderbolt hurled from his hands only struck the highest in the social scale; a liberator of the oppressed, he found partisans in all directions. . . . In a short time, republics alone existed from the summit of the Chiavenna to the meeting of the Po and the Oglio.

"People of Italy!" he exclaimed, "the French army comes to break your chains asunder; the French people are the friends of all nations. Hasten to our standards; your religion, your property, your manners shall be respected; we wage war like generous friends; our sword is only formidable to the tyrants who oppress you!"

What happened to the princes who reigned in Italy? Bonaparte left for a moment an empty shadow of sovereignty to those who humbly solicited the favour of his protection, who supplicated for peace at the hands of the republic.

Victor Amœdeus retained his royal hereditary title; but, in exchange for such concession, he surrendered Savoy, and the counties of Nice, of Tende, and of Benil. His fortresses were occupied, and his estates subjected to military requisitions; the roads through his dominions were thrown open to the French armies!

The Duke of Modena fled to Venice; he purchased his return at the cost of enormous pecuniary sacrifices, and was soon compelled to with-

draw for the second time, and make way for the Cispadane republic.

Thanks to the mediation of Spain, Rome, Parma, and Naples obtained a respite: nevertheless, Bologna and Ferrara were wrested from the Holy See, whose harbours, as well as those of the kingdom of Naples, were to be closed against the enemies of France: the three governments were compelled to pay heavy sums of money; the museums of Rome and Parma were stripped for the purpose of adorning and enriching the gallery of the Louvre.

The Grand-duke of Tuscany, who was the first to acknowledge the republic, beheld the invasion of his territory; Leghorn was forced to receive a French garrison.

Did those countries derive greater happiness from the change? They were ground down by a foreign soldiery. . . . . Oppressive requisitions, subsidies, never-ending loans, the plunder of the church, the confiscation of the property of absentees,—all these they had to endure: discontent soon broke out; the Italians rose in a body; and the restorer of their liberty returned to chastise the refractory. On the vague report of this event, it was hoped that an Austrian army would soon come to their relief; Lombardy was in motion; Pavia gave the first signal. It was abandoned to the fury of the French soldiers; the whole municipal body was condemned to death; Vignasco

was burnt to the ground; the population of the fiefs of the empire likewise rose to a man; Arquata and several adjacent villages were reduced to ashes. The Romagna had followed the same impulse a few days before; a hundred French dragoons were massacred; the people ran to arms, and resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity; but the invading army soon crushed this tumultuous resistance. Everything was put to fire and sword.

What happened to Austria? Mantua, her only remaining town, surrendered to the French. Wurmser was taken prisoner; Beaulieu resigned the command. This veteran general lost courage and hope together; he recommended peace on any terms. Fresh reinforcements arrived from Germany; fresh defeats befell the Austrian armies. The gallant Alvinzi, the last resource of the empire, was instantly driven across the Adige. The Archduke Charles came up in all haste with the view of attempting at least to defend the gorges of the Tyrol.

The pope had also made an appeal to arms. Rome was again threatened, and the Spanish minister again succeeded, with great difficulty, in bringing about a treaty which saved the capital of the Christian world. The Holy See preserved her patrimony; but Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna were dismembered from it.

A year had not yet elapsed; the Tyrol, Istria,

Carinthia, and the Frioul were in the power of the French. Bonaparte marched upon Vienna; his head-quarters were at Ildemburg. Austria at last sued for peace. After eight days of anxious efforts, she procured the pitiful and celebrated preliminaries of Leoben, followed by the treaty of Campo-Formio: to the loss of her hereditary states of the Low Countries was added the loss of Italy.

There existed an ancient monument of European society, the first point of departure of the middle age towards civilization; this was Venice. A prey to disgraceful agitations, fomented by revolutionary anarchists, she fell, scandalously parcelled out between the two contracting parties, the victor and the vanquished, who divided the wrecks between them.

I should wander too far from my subject, were I to pursue the thread of events; I therefore content myself with pointing them out;—the invasion of Switzerland, that old ally of France, as well as the alterations which the Helvetic constitution was made to undergo; the subjugation of Rome, and the abolition of the papal sovereignty; the new war in Piedmont, and the final and deplorable downfall of the King of Sardinia; the fatal attempt of the King of Naples, the flight of his family, the Parthenopian republic, the royalist reaction, the disasters, the executions which embrued the capital and the provinces

with blood; the invasion of the Austro-Russian troops, the rigour and oppression of the new power, which attempted to visit upon the people their past errors; the return of the French sway, with a repetition of the same calamities; the re-appearance of the supreme dictator, in whose presence the tumult of arms was again hushed, and the overflowing stream of blood returned into its channel. . . . The peace was signed at Luneville.

Had the coalition of Austria, England, and Russia adopted the wise policy of Prussia and Spain, when the sovereigns of these two kingdoms treated with the French republic; had the latter been left to herself and to her intestine quarrels, the mighty name of Bonaparte would perhaps have remained unrecorded in the pages of history.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> It has been asserted, that if Prussia and Spain had continued the war, the republic would not have secured so easy a triumph. Let me ask, in turn, whether at a far more critical period, (1793 and 1794,) when as yet unprepared to resist the first coalition, France was not equally victorious, though Prussia and Spain took an active part in the war, in conjunction with the northern powers? What was then proved to be impracticable had not become easier of attainment: the armies of the republic, well disciplined, accustomed to conquer, and commanded by skilful generals, might defy the whole power of Europe.

Consequently, since the recourse to arms had failed; since the war only added strength to the republic, instead of weakening it; prudence recommended a trial of what might be the effect of peace, and of allowing France to fall back upon herself. On which side was the error? The events are my answer.



Let us now consider the result of a nine years' struggle, which had at first the sanction of justice and sound reason, but which, owing to the course of policy pursued, was ill understood and received a wrong direction. Prussia, the first to make war as well as to conclude a timely peace, lost her possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, under promise of an indemnity to be wrested from other princes of the empire.

Holland, deprived of her stadtholder and of her states-general, surrendered to France the fortresses and portion of her territory which the latter coveted as a barrier on the Maese.

The German princes whose territories were on the left bank of the Rhine, had to submit to the same mutilation as Prussia, indemnity being likewise to be procured for them at the expense of others; that is to say, the weakest were to be despoiled for the benefit of the strongest.

The concession of these sacrifices, nevertheless, spared them the infliction of heavier ones. . . .

The governments which had again compelled France to take up arms, had to bear the whole weight of the war. They had kindled the fire; they were consumed in the flames.

The King of Sardinia, after suffering all the degradation of a treaty which bound him hand and foot, and placed him at the mercy of the republic, finding that he was not allowed in his own dominions to exercise the extent of autho-

riety commonly vested in a mere provincial prefect, and that his subjects were become demoralized, determined to abandon his capital, and voluntarily withdrew to the island of Sardinia.

The Duke of Modena, the last remaining descendant of the house of Este, lulled for a time with the hope of recovering his estates, finally lost his money and his crown.

The Grand-duke of Tuscany, who had never been the enemy of France, was compelled to seek an asylum in Germany.

Rome, twice saved by the mediation of Spain, having again provoked the intervention of France, beheld a phantom of a republic installed in the Vatican; and when the vicegerent of Jesus Christ was allowed to re-ascend the throne, his three legations and the town of Ancona had changed masters.

Naples, which was the sanguinary theatre of re-actions, and made peace and war by turns, was at last compelled to yield to France the island of Elba, the presidencies of Tuscany, the principality of Piombino, the towns of Gallipoli, Brundisium, and Otranto, to which we must add enormous contributions, and the closing of her harbours against all the enemies of the republic.

Lucca, compelled to exchange her old liberty for the new one, was deprived of her independence.

Genoa, the country of Columbus and of Andrew

Doria, after having been alternately lured by England, Austria, and France, saw her aristocracy humbled, and had to submit at one and the same time to the institutions and the yoke of the French republic.

Switzerland, the faithful and sincere friend of her mighty neighbour, was nevertheless invaded, sacked, curtailed in her territory, and delivered up to a reckless democracy.

The queen of the Adriatic, she who in the days of her prosperity claimed to be the rival of ancient Rome,—the impregnable Venice, no longer ranked among nations.

Lastly, the Emperor of Germany, who so long carried on the war, and with greater obstinacy than any other power, aided by all the princes of Italy, abundantly supported by the subsidies of England, and in whose favour the northern barbarians, after an absence of fifteen centuries, again brought the terror of their presence to Italy,—that emperor, so worthy of a better fate, lost at this frightful game, 1st, his rich provinces of Belgium; 2ndly, the county of Salkeinstein; 3rdly, the Fricktal and his other possessions between Zurzach and Bâle on the left bank of the Rhine; 4thly, the Brisgau; 5thly, Austrian Lombardy, the territories of Bergamo, the Brescia, and Cremona; the town, citadel, and country of Mantua, as well as the Italian fiefs of the empire.

But, amongst so many continental powers, was not one found to preserve her territory inviolate, and whose limits were respected by the desolating storm?

Spain alone enjoyed this privilege: she lost not a hair of her venerable head, not a gem of her crown; her pure and virginal gold was not tarnished by the slightest, the most transient vapour.

Had Spain no treasures calculated to tempt the cupidity of the common foe?

She had greater wealth at command than any other nation; all her reserve capital was untouched; the treasures of the church, those of private individuals; her navy, her harbours, her galleons from both Americas; the manufacturing riches of her frontier provinces. . . . Where could more tempting objects be found? Notwithstanding so attractive a bait, the French republic respected Spain, her laws, her principles, her manners, her habits; no missionary of anarchy came to disturb our provinces: the republic was satisfied with our alliance and our friendship; she had sought the one and the other; they proved alike sincere and lasting.

What! with a Bourbon? with the near relative of the fallen family? Yes; and that Bourbon was not only respected, but liked, courted, endowed with a new crown for one of the members of his august family: another Bourbon, an Infant

of Spain, was called to reign over the country of the Medicis ; and the republican power, which had overturned so many thrones, was found to restore one in favour of a nephew of Charles IV.

What procured for Spain so flattering a distinction? The dignity of her conduct, her firmness in the war she carried on, her seasonably concluding a peace. For my part, I merely consulted public opinion and the national interest. This was my only merit.

Why was this treaty of peace broken off? An ambitious stranger discovered—not in Spain, but in the treachery of a few Spaniards, enemies of their country—pretexts for interfering in our domestic affairs, and facilities for the promotion of his views.

Was it then impossible to oppose and repel such foreign interventions?

When we were perhaps yet in time to do so, and as soon as Napoleon appeared to have meditated the invasion of Spain, I attempted to ward off the danger. The traitors, whom I have almost designated by name, robbed me of the glory of accomplishing this object. They paralysed all my efforts, and themselves urged Napoleon's invasion. The latter hastened with all eagerness to seize upon his prey. Though the chance of successfully resisting this colossus was already far remote, relying nevertheless on the patriotism, the honour, and the courage of Spaniards, and

determined to make head against the storm, I sought to rescue my sovereigns and my country ; I prepared and collected in haste every means of resistance and attack. . . . Treason had undermined the throne, and my own lot was a prison.

The treaty of Bâle was not the occasion of this disaster.

## CHAPTER XXX.

Motives of the rupture with England and of the alliance with France, fourteen months after the Treaty of Bâle.

THE treaty of Bâle left our independence undisturbed, and the French government manifested much good faith pending the negotiation : an instance will suffice to prove the assertion. Spain remained perfectly free to preserve her friendly intercourse with the other powers of the northern coalition, not excepting England. The republic had no wish to weigh us down, or drag us into the wars she had to carry on.

Guided by a well-understood policy, France neither required nor proposed anything that could prove injurious to our commerce, or expose our colonies to the ambitious cupidity of England. The French government was, besides, pre-occupied at the time with a paramount idea,—that of a general peace. The neutrality of Prussia and Spain encouraged the hope that it might achieve such a peace by our mediation with the cabinet of St. James.

But the latter rejected it. The war, undertaken at first under the auspices of morality, in

the name of justice and social order, was for England nothing more than a matter of calculation and a means of gratifying her animosity.

Our alliance with her was generous and disinterested. Prepared at all times to second with frankness the efforts of the coalesced powers, our co-operation was not burdensome to England; we never solicited subsidies or succours at her hand; but our moderation did not disarm her rancour.

Disdainful, indifferent, and acting moreover with bad faith towards us, as she had always done when the opportunity offered, how could we expect her to appreciate the friendly dispositions which, even after the peace concluded with the republic, Spain had always eagerly evinced towards England as far as the laws of neutrality left us at liberty to act.

How can I describe the new struggle I had to carry on with the British cabinet? It insisted on our again plunging into the embarrassments of a fatal war, in which other states had embarked. Promises, threats, flattery, insults, supplications, intrigues, all kinds of attempts and allurements,—gold, in short, in as great abundance as I might demand,—nothing was left untried; the most persevering efforts were made to deprive us of a peace inoffensive to all the belligerent powers.

I have spoken of the bad faith of England in her character of an *ally*. I am far from accusing the whole nation; the English people and their



cabinet are in perfect contrast with each other. Solely and exclusively attending to the advantage of the country, the administration openly manifested the object it aimed at obtaining. Once mistress of the seas, England would sway the continent; she would command the monopoly of industry and commerce. . . . A system favourable, no doubt, to British interests, but unjust in the highest degree towards every other nation. Should she succeed in her views, there would be an end to fraternal intercourse between nations: friends, enemies, all were alike condemned to bend to the exclusive principle set up by England. She claimed supremacy over all; she claimed the first consideration; again she stepped in under another character: she was everywhere to be found. Other nations were to rest contented with the crumbs that might fall, if she allowed any to fall, from her table.

Unquestionably the complaints of Spain were not vain subtleties, or pretexts invented in order to break off with England. How many insults did we not endure without remonstrance? How many acts of ingratitude and treachery had we not to complain of, even at a time when we were her allies! The expedition to Toulon, the deplorable result of which is so well known, and which, had it been properly directed and supported in accordance with the plan originally adopted, would have altered the aspect of affairs, at least in the

south of France ; that expedition alone, I repeat it, furnished a sufficient ground for breaking off with England. Spain, assuredly, would never have taken part in it for the object of setting fire to a harbour and ransacking the arsenals of the French navy. We suffered as much as France by this proceeding ; our honour was compromised ; Castilian loyalty had to blush at an act of infamy in which she appeared to be an accomplice.

It was unfortunately impossible for us, at that moment, to break the chains of that alliance ; the time had not arrived for publicly revealing our motives, or explaining our sentiments in the face of Europe. The English were well aware that we were embarked in the struggle, and their subsequent conduct sufficiently demonstrated that they had no apprehension of our taking offence. They followed up their insults.

Though we were in alliance with them, they mysteriously concealed from us all their operations ; we had no share in the advantages obtained, but were always sharers in the losses. Though we were their allies, they treated with whomsoever, and whenever they thought proper, without our ever being taken into consideration. It was not from them that we received the first intelligence of the treaty of 24th November 1794, with the states of the North American Union ; a treaty in which nothing was stipulated in our favour : on the contrary, our interests were not only neglected,

but sacrificed to those of England, or abandoned to the chances of a doubtful futurity. A special convention, which I had myself drawn up with Lord St. Helens, stipulated that the ships and cargoes retaken from the enemy should be mutually restored. We rigidly adhered to this convention on every opportunity that offered: and yet the English cabinet refused, on its part, to conform to it; preferring the wretched detention of a ship loaded with gold to the consideration of what was due to its own honour.<sup>1</sup>

We were allies, and our traders experienced every species of insult, under pretence that Frenchmen had an interest in the cargoes, though the certificates given in Spain were in due form and properly authenticated. We were allies, and they confiscated the naval effects actually purchased by the Spanish government, and on their way to our harbours in Dutch vessels under our own flag! Our coasts were so infested with smugglers,

<sup>1</sup> The Santiago, a galleon, on its way from Lima. The cargo of this ship was worth ninety-six millions of reales or twenty-four millions of francs. The Santiago was captured in the first instance by the French privateer, the Dumourier. The English recaptured it after it had been twenty-four hours in the power of the republican privateer. It belonged to the English agreeably to the maritime law; but the private convention between Lord St. Helens and myself had anticipated the case, and expressly provided that all vessels which might be recaptured, at whatever period the occurrence might take place, should be restored. Such grasping avidity is truly inconceivable; nevertheless, the fact is historical.

their adventures were calculated with such positive precision, that the greater part of our manufactures were broken up! We were allies; and yet abusing our confidence, they never ceased exploring the shores of our American possessions, organising a system of smuggling, and enticing the natives of the country, in order to secure to themselves the possession of our commerce in both hemispheres! Lastly, we were their allies, and in a moment of embarrassment occasioned by the necessity of providing for the third campaign, England abruptly refused to assist us in that emergency!

If such was her conduct whilst we were her allies, what had we to expect when, standing no longer in any other character than that of neutrals, our harbours were to be indiscriminately opened to French and English vessels?

Nevertheless, the Spanish nation bore insults upon insults, in order not to raise a fresh obstacle to the general peace, the hope of which was still fondly indulged.

However, every despatch from our ambassador in London announced the hostile intentions of the British cabinet, and urged upon us the necessity of adopting measures of defence. This intelligence was confirmed by the provocations and violence to which our flag was everywhere subjected. The English minister, whilst he laid stress upon his friendly dispositions, replied to our

complaints that, "in so serious a struggle, in so colossal a war, it was impossible that the comprehensive measures to be adopted against the common enemy should not, to a certain degree, affect those nations which were in contact with that enemy." This language was a mere mockery.

It was followed by promises for the future, not one of which was attended to. . . . Such a state was infinitely worse than an open rupture; and if we did not apply a remedy to it, if we still allowed ourselves to be enticed by vain hopes of peace, it could never prevent the war from breaking out, and would fasten upon us the disgrace of having hesitated to fight when honour pointed to that course.

I had fortunately prepared myself beforehand to bear this fresh trial which it was the fate of Spain to undergo. I had foreseen the dangers that threatened our possessions beyond seas if our alliance with England should be brought to a close. I issued, in time, the requisite orders: the maritime towns of both continents and of our islands were placed in a state of defence; our arsenals were suitably provided; the number of our cruisers was increased; our fleets were reinforced. The co-operation of the local authorities, of the commanders of the land and sea forces, was not left in doubt. If the war should take place, we were in readiness at all points.

I did more; I had taken to heart the treaty

which, unknown to us, the English cabinet had negotiated with the United States of America : this treaty afforded great latitude to evil designs ; it was possible to injure Spain in an indirect manner, and without risk, in her distant possessions.

I endeavoured to conclude another treaty with the same states, and had the satisfaction to succeed in my object ; I obtained unexpected advantages, and met with sympathy, loyalty, and generous sentiments in that nation of republicans.

This was not a mere treaty or alliance ; it was, moreover, a formal act of navigation. Independently of carefully providing for the common interests of both nations, we realised the first application of modern ideas respecting the equality of maritime rights, and the measures which humanity enjoins in order to lessen the evils of war ; ideas hitherto recorded in books, proclaimed by the civilization of the age, but the practical application of which has at all times been opposed by England.<sup>2</sup> This creditable and successful transaction has been suffered to pass unnoticed, like so many important facts of my political life. The treaty was signed at the Escorial, the 27th of October 1795, by citizen Thomas Pinckney and myself, without any other intervening party. The secret was so well kept for a whole year, that the

<sup>2</sup> The text of this treaty will be found in the explanatory documents, No. 2.

English only had knowledge of it on the 4th of September 1796, when it was made public; the war having then been determined upon.

Yes; the war was determined upon: our patience could endure no longer. We had exhausted every means in our power to protect our independence in our intercourse with England. We were now bound to protect our honour.

Nevertheless, this determination, and the measures consequent upon it, were not my own work, or an act exclusively emanating from my own political views. I was desirous that the king should cause a matter of so much importance to be maturely and leisurely considered by his council, and that his majesty should afterwards pronounce his sovereign decision, after having heard and weighed the opinions of his state counsellors.

Anxiously alive to the result of these weighty deliberations, France repeatedly offered us her alliance, and alluded, on the occasion, to the family compact. The question was new to us, and required to be seriously considered, notwithstanding the advantages which it offered in the event of a war becoming unavoidable with a power which exercised over the seas an undisputed sway.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Continuation of the preceding Chapter. — Discussion in the Council of State.

By dint of uncontradicted assertions, it was at last credited throughout Europe, that my power in Spain was that of a viceroy, or of a mayor of the palace, who had the uncontrolled disposal of everything at will, and directed the views and acts of the government.

I should feel no reluctance to accept an honour thus intended for me by my enemies: for if every act really emanated from me, and me only; if I succeeded in happily steering, unaided, the vessel of the state, in spite of the many shoals calculated to impede its course, and the violent storms which convulsed all Europe; if, I say, the vessel only perished when directed by my enemies, when, after forcing me away from the helm, they took upon themselves the management of it; it is no slight merit to him to whom it has been ascribed, that he should have so long preserved the vessel uninjured. But it would be as unfair in me to set up an exclusive claim to this merit, if merit it shall appear, as it would be unfair in others to make me alone responsible for the



errors which may have been committed. Few Spanish ministers have summoned councils to their aid with greater abnegation of self-love, with more honest intentions than I evinced. None ever showed greater zeal and readiness to enhance the services of the ministers who shared the anxieties and cares of the government. My views being at all times directed to the welfare and prosperity of the state, I have constantly sought for information in all quarters, without distinction of persons, and whatever might be their presumed or avowed opinions in my regard. Is blame to be cast upon the alliance with France, or the war against England? This double resolution obtained the unanimous assent of the council of state, and that of all the men of honour, knowledge, and experience who were otherwise consulted. If all were in error, having readily adopted their advice, I assume to myself the whole weight of responsibility. I even claim it as mine alone; well satisfied as I was at the time, and as I am still at the present day, that Spain was indebted to this determination for her existence in both hemispheres.

The motives upon which the opinion of the council was founded will now be laid before the reader. A brief analysis of the votes will serve as a reply to the calumnious accusations emanating from party spirit.

The council had frequent meetings and at various intervals; in other words, it acted with calm

deliberation, and had full leisure for reflection : it was proper to avoid, as much as possible, awakening the attention of the representatives of foreign countries. To the usual number of voters were added several general officers of the land and sea forces, two ministers of the council of Castile, two from the council of the Indies, and some diplomatists selected amongst those who were the most skilled in European politics. I had ordered, on the other hand, circumstantial reports, and every requisite information, to be prepared for the council's consideration.

After presenting a candid statement of the political situation of our cabinet, I proposed that a close inquiry should be instituted into the diplomatic proceedings of my department before and since the peace of Bâle, up to the time of their meeting. The despatches of our ministers in Paris, in London, and at the principal courts of Europe, were attentively read. These documents included the important correspondence of Don Domingo d'Yriarte during the short period of his life subsequently to his signing the peace of Bâle.<sup>1</sup> All

<sup>1</sup> This worthy minister, so advantageously known, and so highly esteemed in Europe for his excellent qualities and his consummate knowledge, was no less distinguished for the resources of his mind and his skill in political combinations, than for his moderation and his engaging manners, which won him every heart. He was in the prime of life, and might still have rendered essential services to his country, when death overtook him at Gerona, on his return from Bâle, the 22nd November

the reports and intelligence communicated to us affirmed that the republic acted with good faith towards Spain and Prussia ; that she was not only sincere, but eager, in her desire for a general peace ; that the discussions between France and Austria, respecting the restitution of conquered countries would bring on an obstinate war, the chances of which were likely to prove adverse to the latter ; that some successes of a doubtful character, obtained at the close of the campaign, encouraged Austria to prosecute the war, notwithstanding her weakness in Italy, where the republican spirit was making rapid strides, the consequences of which none could foresee ; that the indifference evinced by the people of Germany scarcely justified Austria in relying upon Saxony, Bavaria and Swabia ; that the Empress of Russia would content herself with threats and promises, without any intention of carrying the one or the other into effect, — her well-known policy was to suffer the other powers to waste their strength in the contest, and gradually to erect herself into the arbitress of the affairs of Europe ; that England, to whom alone the coali-

1795. He died at the mansion and in the arms of his friend, Don Thomas Lorenzana, the bishop of that diocese. Yriarte confided to this worthy prelate, on his death-bed, his last despatch addressed direct to the king, in which he advised his majesty, as the last prayer of a loyal subject and of a friend of his country, to maintain himself at peace with the French republic. The king had just appointed him his ambassador at Paris.

tion had been profitable, was unceasingly bent upon increasing her navy ; that her ambition exceeded all bounds ; that, already mistress of the seas, she fanned the flame of war between France and Europe : that amongst the intrigues upon the success of which she placed strong reliance, without even disavowing their treacherous character, was to be numbered the plan of disturbing the peace between France and Spain, whether by promising troops and subsidies to the latter, by stirring up a spirit of discord and mistrust between both nations, or threatening to attack Spain ; for it was her intention to render Spain the theatre of the war, as Holland could no longer be a stage for carrying it on. Thus it was that the cabinet of St. James's hoped to establish its influence over the Peninsula ; that this cabinet, solely intent upon its own interests, was but slightly affected at the frightful evils which would overwhelm the Continent if France should again be called upon to put forth the commanding resources she had already wielded in preceding campaigns. Lastly, that such a war being, with respect to Spain, without a motive and without an object, would naturally terminate to the advantage of England, Austria, or France, probably to the benefit of the latter ; when we might expect as a necessary consequence, that the balance of Europe, already endangered but not yet destroyed, would be wholly swept away.

From the first opening of the negotiations at Bâle, until the last moment of his existence, Don Domingo Yriarte never ceased to report that it was morally impossible to maintain ourselves at peace with France and England at the same time. "If we conclude a peace with the republic," said he, "and desire scrupulously to adhere to it, the cabinet of St. James's will not be slow in declaring war against us. It aims at our navy as much as at the navy of France; its policy, whether in time of war or during peace, will ever be the same; it will ever be our enemy. *In the present situation of Europe, we are not left to choose between good and evil, but out of two evils that which is the least pregnant with dangers, which least threatens to disturb the monarchy and to entail upon it irreparable losses.*"<sup>2</sup> The continuance or renewal of the war will involve immense sacrifices, which may possibly be unattended with any useful result; but in a war with England, the natural strength of the country, and the patriotic zeal of the Spaniards, will prove adequate to keep the English in check in Europe as well as in America. At all events, Spain may rely upon France in case of a maritime war. Citizen Barthelemy opened his mind on the subject with-

<sup>2</sup> This argument has had no weight in the sequel, though it was then perfectly solid and correct. The whole council admitted its force. We were under the necessity of choosing between two unavoidable evils; for it was beyond our power to escape the one and the other at the same time.

out disguise ; he spoke of the propriety, the necessity, of an alliance between both nations, in which Holland would at once take part, and would at a later moment be followed by the republic of Genoa, by Denmark, and other states. The King of Prussia is bent upon a general peace : he is especially apprehensive lest the balance of Europe should be disturbed by a protracted war ; he approves of such an alliance as would compel England to adopt a less turbulent, a less hostile system ; he would be ready to concur towards promoting it in the north, with a view to prevent the English from extending their sway in that quarter. Let us allow these ideas to ripen, and pause for some time longer. The horizon is too obscure to allow of our anticipating the result of the conferences at Bâle, where so many negotiators are met. We cannot, in my opinion, expect that England, or the Emperor of Germany, will evince any disposition towards peace at the present moment. With respect to us," he added, " my sentiments are unchanged ; it is our interest to remain at peace with France so long as she may find her account in appreciating the honour and advantage of living in good harmony with Spain. The republic, as now constituted, prides itself in entertaining these views."

Our ambassador in London complained, in all his communications, of the contempt with which

Mr. Pitt affected to speak of the rights of neutrality and of the generous intentions of Spain, upon which he appeared to set no value, assuming as a pretext the dangers and emergency brought about by the struggle against France. England was unwilling to bend to the common law of nations; "*neck or nothing*," such is the perpetual burden of the minister's song; "the nature of this war does not allow us to draw any distinction between enemies and neutrals."—"If this be the case," replied the ambassador, "Prussia, Spain, and the other powers that have hitherto endeavoured, whilst treating with France, to prove their regard for England, must henceforth be on their guard."—"My language is to be taken hyperbolically," rejoined Mr. Pitt; "but I lay it down as a principle, that the distance between friends and neutrals is immense: it is small, on the contrary, between enemies and neutrals; the slightest accident, a mere chance, the least mistrust, a false appearance, is enough to efface the distinction between them."

The same ambassador announced, in another despatch, that the following questions had been discussed in a cabinet council: 1st, to take possession of a Spanish harbour; 2ndly, to land an army; 3rdly, to renew the offer of an alliance with England, and compel Spain, by fair means or by force of arms, to renew the war against France. In his subsequent reports, the same am-

bassador alluded to projects of seizing upon several points of our American possessions, especially in the archipelago of the Antilles. These plan were publicly spoken of. He had lost all hope of our maintaining any longer a friendly intercourse; and he pointed to the urgent necessity of forming a maritime alliance with France and other states at war or dissatisfied with England. He wrote anew that reports were spread in London of an approaching rupture with Spain; that these rumours seemed to be circulated with the intention of their coming to his knowledge. "They are threats," he added, "which are intended to frighten us, and thereby to secure the object they have in view; nevertheless they are not devoid of truth. The war is impending; and it will be entered upon in a treacherous manner so soon as they shall have lost all hope of rendering Spain the instrument and the permanent theatre of their quarrel with France."

Our minister in Paris reported that, without entertaining any doubt of our good faith, the Directory was nevertheless apprehensive lest an opposition party, which already manifested its leaning towards England, should succeed in imposing upon the loyalty of Charles IV; or lest its influence, strengthened by the fear of a rupture with Great Britain, should create hesitation in our cabinet. "Our naval forces," added the mi-



nister, " were not in a condition to make head against the English navy: how could we adequately provide for the safety of our Indian possessions? Since the intentions of England are no longer doubtful, and we cannot expect, on the other hand, to preserve much longer the state of neutrality so scrupulously observed towards her, is it not incumbent upon us to dispel any hope she might still indulge in of compromising us with the French, and to endeavour at the same time to baffle her ambitious projects? The Executive Directory was most anxious to enter with us into a treaty similar to the old family compact; whilst it wished it to be clearly understood, that no intention was meditated of drawing Spain into the continental wars, or of inducing her to fall out with any who might not be her avowed enemies. With regard to a maritime war, the Directory tendered the assistance of France and Holland; and hoped to procure the co-operation in it, at a later period, of other states already inclined to shake off the yoke of British tyranny." The reports of our ministers were frequent, and always in the same strain: the French government was urgent in its proposals; and its ambassador in Madrid, in his friendly and courteous communications, expressed himself to the same effect.

After the perusal of those official documents, I laid before the council the intelligence occa-

sionally transmitted to me of the constant provocations we received from the English on the high seas. I presented the numerous reports forwarded at my request by the chief superintendents of our harbours, and by persons of note in other parts of the country.

All opinions were agreed on the following points:

1st. The strong prejudice excited against France, three years before, by the political and religious crimes which had spread dismay throughout Europe, had been removed, owing to the reaction produced in France itself against the anarchical party, to the adoption of a more regular system of government, or to the brilliant triumphs which had given solidity to the republic: nevertheless, this change of opinion had not weakened the loyalty of the Spanish nation towards her legitimate sovereign; but the rising generation evinced a lively predilection for France under its new aspect,—a feeling which more especially prevailed amongst young men of the middling and others of the privileged classes, without excepting the clergy itself.

2ndly. The peace of Bâle had given general satisfaction even to those most averse to the republican system and to the French revolution, because it had dispelled all apprehensions of an invasion, then deemed of possible occurrence after what had taken place in Italy,—an invasion

the more to be dreaded, as intrigue and seduction would be promoted by means of a powerful army; and, in a contest carried on within our territory, we had to guard ourselves against the insurrection of the mass of the people, who were easily led astray by the cry of liberty and the allurements of a better fate.

If the peace created general satisfaction on the one hand, the attempt of England on the other to deprive us of that peace when we were beginning to taste its fruits, would be treated with feelings of intense indignation; for the taxes had been diminished, and were become as light as before the war. The commanders of provinces, the superintendents of harbours, and other persons consulted in mercantile towns, communicated to the government that the commercial community manifested an excellent spirit, and offered to bear the expenses which an augmentation of our naval forces would call for; that many private individuals were prepared to equip letters of marque in order to avenge the insults offered by Great Britain to the Spanish flag.

The communications from the bishops teemed with expressions of thanks and with blessings on account of the peace with France. "This peace," said the bishops, "has saved the throne and the altar; it has crushed the hopes of those who dreamed of establishing a republic in Spain!" All the prelates spoke in unequivocal language.

Whilst they detested the principles of the revolution, they congratulated the king on a peace which had averted the scourge from Spain. Some went so far as to exhort his majesty to repel every insinuation of England. I retain a more particular recollection of the report of the Archbishop of Granada, a venerable old man, as much versed in political matters as in those appertaining to his functions.<sup>3</sup> As if he had guessed or rather anticipated the motives of the court in asking his opinion, he commented upon the risk of extensive disorders occurring in America, should Spain, yielding to the suggestions of England, engage in a new war against France.

“The preservation of those vast colonies,” said the prelate, “depends upon the tranquillity of the mother country. Should public order be dis-

<sup>3</sup> Don Juan Manuel de Moscoso y Peralta, a native of Arequipa in Peru. He rendered, when Bishop of Cusco, the most signal services on the occasion of the revolt of the noted Tupac Amato. Shamefully calumniated by his enemies, the prelate had to submit to the affront of being brought back to Spain, with a sentinel placed to keep watch over him on board ship, as a flagrant state criminal: this happened under the administration of Count Florida Blanca. After undergoing various other humiliations whilst in Madrid, he not only succeeded in proving that he was innocent, but that, by his talents, zeal, and firmness, he had brought about the downfall of the rebel and saved Peru. This was demonstrated in the clearest manner. Charles IV. would not leave such virtues and such signal services unrewarded. M. Moscoso received the grand cross of the order of Charles III, and was appointed Archbishop of Granada.

turbed in Spain, should a foreign power, especially, exercise any sway over us, America, under pretext of escaping that foreign control, will listen to the counsels of men who already dream of independence. Should Spain, in consequence of involving herself in a new war, experience such misfortunes as have befallen Italy, what assistance can we rely on to aid us in preserving our distant possessions? Shall we rely upon England? A deep-laid rancour, selfish considerations of interest, would urge her to seize upon the trade and wealth of the New World. Should Spain, in alliance with England, suffer reverses in a new struggle against France; should she be compelled to direct all her attention, and exert all her resources, to the defence of the Peninsula; shall she confide to England the care of protecting and watching over America? Would not this be tantamount to introducing the wolf into the sheepfold? . . . . You know what they have attempted to do during the three years of the past war. It is easy to foresee what they will do, should a new war, carried on with still greater obstinacy, and likely to be attended with more serious consequences, afford them facilities to ruin the system of reciprocal interests which binds America to the mother country. I speak of my own certain knowledge and from personal experience; for no one in Spain can be better acquainted with, or form a more correct judgment

of, the affairs of America. These countries evince no disposition to sympathise with England; they show, on the contrary, a strong leaning towards the French. If you disregard the latter, and manifest a partiality for the English; if they are allowed the privilege of supplying our harbours, and receive every facility to minister to the taste and captivate the good-will of the natives; you afford them an influence and a lever which have hitherto been wanting to them. My conscience, my loyalty, my character of bishop, of natural counsellor of the crown, may perhaps warrant me in overstepping the limits which I should otherwise have prescribed to myself; and my duty commands me to enlighten the government on this subject, because few persons in Spain are acquainted with the real state of America. The question is generally ill-understood. The views of England in provoking the war are not directed against the strength of France as a European power; what she aims at and covets is the wealth of our colonies, which the treaty of Bâle has rescued from her ambitious rapacity."

Such was the substance of the opinion of this octogenarian prelate; an opinion the more remarkable, as it evinces a deep knowledge of the interests of the country, and of the spirit of the age. His report embraced a positive knowledge of the state of our colonies, suggestions for securing the undisturbed possession of them,

warnings as to the course of policy it behoved us to pursue in the existing condition of Europe; accordingly it was often read and consulted during the repeated sittings of the council.

I shall not dwell much upon the answer of the supreme tribunal of the Inquisition. It had watched with intense anxiety the march and effects of French ideas in religious and political matters. The holy office lamented the extraordinary progress of those ideas, especially in the maritime provinces: nevertheless, it acknowledged that the success of the Propaganda coincided with the critical epochs at which reverses were experienced by our armies; and that the contagion stopped short in its course so soon as the war was brought to a close. The tribunal inferred from this circumstance, that France, no doubt, ceased at that moment to wield the doctrinary policy; and that the restoration of peace, instead of favouring the relaxation of religious zeal, appeared rather to have consolidated sound principles along with the Catholic faith. . . . For the rest, it prayed not to be impeded in its endeavours to pluck the weeds, not to be fettered in its course; and concluded by denouncing several persons of merit as holding dangerous doctrines.\*

\* The holy tribunal received for answer, that it must confine itself to gentle and conciliating measures, and avoid increasing the number of proselytes by the exercise of an ill-judged seve-

When the reading of every document was concluded, the council had to deliberate upon an anonymous pamphlet, which the party devoted to England found means to convey to the king's hands: its title was as follows, *War with the whole World; peace with England*. It consisted of a long series of violent declamations against France, of exhortations to undertake a new crusade against the republic, of flagrant exaggerations on the advantage of an English alliance, in the absence of which it asserted that Spain herself would soon merge into a republic. Though this pamphlet did not allude to me by name, or openly attack me, nevertheless it evidently was a first experiment of my enemies, instigated by the cabinet of St. James's. The object aimed at was to ruin me in the king's good opinion.<sup>5</sup> My request that the pamphlet should be read

rity. It was admonished that the public announcement of its decisions and censures only stimulated the desire to read forbidden books; that it should act with moderation in this regard, reserving to itself the right of keeping a watchful eye over everything, and reporting to government the result of its inquiries.

<sup>5</sup> Well-founded conjectures ascribed this intrigue to the Duke D'Infantado, the champion who first manifested an intention to enter the lists against me. The Anglomania of this Spanish nobleman is known to every one. During the most critical moments of the war of Independence, he would fain have urged the Spanish nation to surrender to the English the direction of her government and of her armies. At the period of



from beginning to end was assented to ; when the council came to an opinion that it was hardly worth the trouble bestowed upon its perusal, which had proved a mere waste of time.

which I am now speaking, I opposed every inquiry into the origin of the pamphlet, and, be the author who he might, evinced my contempt for him.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

Questions submitted to the Council of State. — Resolutions adopted.

AFTER a long and minute investigation of all the reports, advices, and intelligence communicated to the government, the following questions were laid down :

First. Do the situation of Spain, and the conduct of France towards us since the 22nd of July last year,—date of the treaty of Bâle, afford a legitimate pretence for renouncing the pacific system we have adopted towards the republic ?

The unanimous reply was in the negative.

Secondly. Should the apprehension of a maritime war, with which England threatens Spain, compel us anew to take up arms against the republic ?

The unanimous reply was also in the negative. This question, which was examined and discussed under every political and military point of view, as well as on grounds of economy, was most earnestly considered by the council, and was at last brought forward under a new aspect : “ Supposing that a war either with France or England should

become inevitable, which of them is it preferable for us to encounter?"

All the members of the council decided against the latter power. "A war with France, undertaken for no other motive than to avoid a war with England, would be unjust; and it does not become the dignity of the Spanish cabinet thus to bend to the will of a foreign power. A war with Great Britain will doubtless be injurious to our commerce; but a war with France will bear heavily upon all classes of the community, not excepting the commercial class. Such a war will call for gigantic efforts, for enormous sacrifices, having no other object in view than a compliance with the wishes of England: it may be the means of exciting civil dissensions; and, notwithstanding the spirit of loyalty which characterises the generality of Spaniards, a handful of wicked or misguided men will be sufficient to create serious evils. When once we shall have engaged in the struggle, when the din of arms shall have spread in all directions, republican ideas, hitherto kept in check, will revive; and if we meet with reverses, the basis of the monarchy may be shaken, and even the prerogatives of the crown again called in question."

Several counsellors spoke at great length on this important article of discussion. "Have we not witnessed," they argued, "what has happened in Belgium, in Savoy, in Holland, in Italy, and even

amongst us at the close of the second campaign—the surrender of Figueiras, the treacherous giving up of St. Sebastian? The latter misdeed was assuredly the result of the republican illusions spread through the province of Biscay.” Other members of the council insisted upon the contrast we had always discovered between the promises and performances of England, a contrast too often attended with fatal consequences to us not to warrant future circumspection on our part. They instanced the expeditions of Holland, of Toulon, Quiberon, L’île Dieu, each of them as blustering as they proved disastrous to the French royalists. They laid stress upon the great danger of admitting an English army into the Peninsula. “If once allowed to land on our shores, would it not insist upon being put in possession of one of our harbours, under pretence of securing its retreat? and if the English should be compelled to withdraw, would they depart without pillaging our arsenals and destroying our navy? What may not the stay of a foreign army in Spain compel us to endure from a soldiery whose language, habits, and manners have no affinity with ours! Sacrifices of every kind, useless if the English army should prove inadequate to ensure a victory to our cause; burthensome, oppressive, out of all proportion with our means, if that army should fall short of the numbers required to meet the emergency! What will be the fate of our manufacturing in-

dustry? English armies are wont to engage in commerce; they bring in their train more bales of merchandise than ammunitions of war; a new mode of spreading in all directions the surplus of their manufactures, and of carrying on a contraband trade under protection of their armies! . . . . But the greatest of all calamities is that of being under a foreign yoke; and we shall have lost our independence so soon as the English shall have succeeded in obtaining a footing in the Peninsula: Spain will then be placed between two fires. What will then become of our already exhausted manufactures, if, in order to complete their ruin, and to take advantage of it, the British generals should purposely draw the war into our manufacturing provinces? Heavy will be the misfortune of Spain if condemned to become the theatre of an obstinate war between France and England? Who can measure the extent of such a contest?

“The cabinet of St. James’s has not forgot our co-operation in the North American war. Once introduced into the Peninsula, in possession of our harbours, exercising full sway over us, England will have a finer opportunity for gratifying her old rancour against Spain than if she were at open war with her. It is the interest and the wish of the English government to compromise and ruin us by compelling the adoption of the course to which it heedlessly urges us, in order to stir up our colonies, and to obtain undisputed

possession of them. What a disgrace would it not be for us to renew the war against France upon no other ground than that England has frightened us into it."

Other arguments were added to the preceding ones. Counsellors, ministers, generals, all who attended the deliberation, decided with common accord that, in the rigorous alternative of coming to a rupture with France or with England, honour, justice, and the national weal, commanded us to break off with the latter power.

Third question. Supposing a war with England to be unavoidable, are we to contract an alliance with France?

Opinions were agreed on this question: all admitted that Spain, left to her own resources, was unable to contend with success against the English, considering the immense extent of the possessions she had to protect from attack. It behoved her, therefore, to call in the aid of her allies. All were of opinion that the naval forces of France, combined with those of Spain and Holland, if insufficient to crush the power of England, might, at least, so engage her attention in Europe as to preclude her making any attempt against our colonies. It was likewise hoped that other northern states, which were not engaged in the coalition against France, would sooner or later shake off the tyrannical yoke of England, and assist us in the like attempt.

Fourth question. What ought to be the con-

ditions of the alliance with France? Shall it be a purely defensive and offensive treaty against England, or will it be proper to renew the old family compact?

The members of the council were nearly unanimous in considering the family compact as the most effectual means of forming a solid alliance. They alleged that "this compact had been confirmed at our request in 1790; to depart from, or attempt to modify it, now that it was called for by the republic, would be to convey a suspicion of our not being actuated by the friendly intentions we professed towards the new government: though motives were not wanting for a circumspect conduct on our part, nevertheless it was consistent with sound policy to avoid exhibiting a spirit of mistrust calculated to damp the good feeling openly manifested in our regard. Left with a choice of evils, it behoved us to dispose of the most urgent, which was the state of uncertainty with respect to the measures to be adopted in order to keep England in check and put an end to her intrigues: to seek a middle course, and fetter the alliance by restrictions, would expose us to its rejection, and consequently to the necessity of resorting to evasions towards England, and of patiently enduring her insults; a course which, when she should discover our weakness, and the misunderstanding growing up between France and Spain, would not prevent her availing herself of the first op-

portunity to attack us at advantage: we should then be compelled to have recourse to France, and to solicit what we had previously rejected with more pride than sound wisdom. The singular condition of Europe at the present moment greatly tended to modify the ordinary rules of policy; nearly every question then under agitation was to be solved by the paramount law of self-preservation, as it must always happen on occasions of imminent danger, when human prudence recommends the adoption of that course which is attended with the least inconvenience, whilst it calls for no sacrifice of honour. It was far safer to renew with France the old family compact, a pledge of union tried by the test of thirty years. The change effected in the forms of the French government brought no change in the reciprocal interests of the two countries: Spanish honour was open to no reproach, since the government was intent on preserving the vast dominions of Spain, and had that very object in view when treating with the republic: no law, no rule of policy or of convenience, precluded a monarchy from entering into alliance with governments under other forms: the French republic was acknowledged by several powers entitled to respect, and indirectly by those, not excepting England, which were at war with her, since all had, at least, manifested the desire to negotiate with the republic; and the continuance of hostilities had no longer for object to



restore the old monarchy, or to overthrow the new system, but rather the restitution of conquered territories. Lastly, admitting, as a principle, the imperious necessity of concluding a general peace in order to deprive France of the opportunity of aggrandizing herself and overthrowing the balance of Europe, a treaty of alliance was, in the opinion of every impartial man, a means of obtaining that peace so earnestly desired by all; for it must remove from the belligerent powers the hope of conquering France, strengthened as she would then be by the support of Spain."

Two or three members of the council—my memory does not assist me in recollecting a greater number—gave utterance to a different opinion: "Should France refuse every arrangement short of the family compact, should England on the other hand persist in her unjust dealings towards us, let us stand on our defence; assume an attitude independent of both, and oppose to them an armed neutrality: this will be the means of satisfying the demands of England, if she is really jealous of our predilection for her rival; and of satisfying France likewise, if she should entertain apprehensions from our present state of peace with England. The cabinets of St. James's and of Paris will perceive that we act an impartial part, and that our pacific intentions claim the respect of both."

Those who argued in this manner gave evi-

dence that they were in earnest; they weighed the character of the British cabinet by the standard of their own sentiments. It never entered their minds that France could be brought to mistrust us. But this opinion had been suggested to them; ideas such as these were insidiously propagated by partisans of England: had they been adopted, a rupture between France and Spain would have become immediate and unavoidable. On the other hand, the pure and simple adoption of the family compact, as recommended by the rest of the council, was not free from difficulties which might have compromised us with the coalesced powers at that time on friendly terms with Spain. The war they were waging against the republic was undertaken in virtue of a league, the object of which — though it eventually failed of success — was to invade the French territory, and attack the national independence. Such being the case, the family compact, if substantially renewed, obliged us to assist France in repelling her aggressors. I was now called upon to emit my individual opinion: I demonstrated that “the principle unquestionably led to the consequence pointed out; but we were bound, at all risks, to protect ourselves from its application. With regard to the armed neutrality towards France and England, I was too well acquainted with the cabinet of St. James’s to hesitate a moment in combating so great a delusion: I proved by numberless instances how inadequate is the precarious

resource of a neutrality, when a nation is placed between two gigantic powers, with whom it falls into unavoidable contact, is constantly exposed to obstruct their course, and comes in for a share of the blows they level at each other. Such had been the fatal position of the republic of Genoa, which, failing to command the respect of either party, was by turns an object of derision to the French, the English, and the Austrians." I reminded the council of what had just occurred in Tuscany: "Notwithstanding the protests of the sovereign, the English had seized upon the port of Leghorn, thus openly violating the well-known neutrality of the country; Bonaparte, no less insulting in his conduct, had forthwith caused Leghorn to be occupied by his troops, and scarcely deigned to notify to the peaceful archduke this act of aggression." I represented "the inveterate character of the present war between England and France,—a war at variance with ordinary contests, and regardless of private rights." After having refuted, upon principle, the paradox of an armed neutrality, "In our present position," I added, "whichever way we turn, we can only expect war. Superior to other nations as a maritime power, England acknowledges neither an armed nor a peaceful neutrality: she well knows that the impartial, the conciliating character of our government admits of no doubt or mistrust; but England has appropriated to herself this axiom, *he who is not with us is against us*; a

divided friendship is, in her estimation, valueless; she rejects any friendship that is shared with a nation at war with her. Deaf to reason and to justice, will she respect our forces, the inferiority of which on her own privileged element is so well known to her? Whatever attitude we may assume, as she has little or nothing to apprehend from our naval armaments, she will wage a hidden war against us, as she does at the present day, so long as it may suit her convenience, so long as she may indulge the hope of forcing upon us a different political system; but no sooner shall that hope have vanished than we must expect an open declaration of war. I dread far more the first species of warfare; because, if we consent to submit to it, we compromise our honour, have the same dangers to apprehend, and shall never succeed in extricating ourselves from the difficulties in which her craft and audacity will not fail to involve us. If we attempt to retort upon England her unjust dealings towards us, we cease to be neutrals, and the war will have begun. In order to maintain an armed neutrality, we should be enabled to wield forces superior, or at least equal, to those which might be brought to bear against us. Should such superior forces be wanting to us, the pretended neutrality becomes a chimerical illusion: it will raise a smile of pity or contempt.

“With respect to France, I suppose for a moment that England, influenced by sounder con-

siderations, should consent to accept our neutrality,—a circumstance very unlikely to occur; rest assured that, sooner or later, war would be the result. The French republic, a new government, the legality of which is not acknowledged in some parts of Europe, finding itself exposed to the attacks of foreign powers, and of a host of internal enemies who threaten its existence, will not take in good part that Spain should place herself upon a war footing, or rather, that she should arm against France.

“ The republic must ever be under an apprehension lest Spain, her late enemy, and in readiness to wage war at a moment’s notice, should be tempted to renew it on the slightest check that might befall the French armies. In spite of the just confidence inspired by the loyalty of our monarch, will it be in the power of the republic to forget that he is a king and a Bourbon? . . . . I entertain the firm conviction, which you all share with me, that the French government would reply by a declaration of war to the first intelligence of military preparations along our frontiers. How singular is our condition! to be threatened with a twofold war, by land and by sea at the same time, both impending over us, against two nations equally formidable; worse than all, to be compelled to fall out with one of them, without much reliance that we shall be assisted by the other; exposed to be plundered and sacrificed by both, if, as I have

already observed it to have occurred under like circumstances, they should be weary of contending against each other, and become reconciled at our expense.<sup>1</sup> Let history be our guide; the future is indicated by the past. We have not to blame ourselves for the painful situation of Europe at this moment, the rebound of which reaches as far as Spain. How many nations are more ill-fated than we are! Let us not lightly, and through a mistaken pride, adopt a system which would lead us to certain ruin. In politics, an extreme resolution is assuredly not open to censure, unless it be dictated by fear, perversity, or baseness. Should the irresistible force of events, which it is neither in our power to arrest nor to modify, compel us to adopt a course not in accordance with our wishes, prudence and duty alike bid us be resigned. This is the point of view under which we are to consider our alliance with France in the painful alternative which England imposes upon us.

“In what relates to the nature of the treaty, I must always maintain, that whilst we approxi-

<sup>1</sup> Scarce a twelvemonth had elapsed since Europe was a witness to arrangements which morality condemns, though policy sanctions them. Venice, in her endeavour to preserve her neutrality between France and Austria, forfeited her very existence; the treaty of Campo Formio was concluded at her expense. Not a voice was raised in her behalf. That state, which had subsisted with glory through a long series of ages, ignominiously disappeared. Such was the punishment which befell her wavering and dastardly conduct.


mate more or less to the family compact, we are in honour bound never to wage war in the train of France against other powers in alliance with Spain. I feel confident you will coincide with me in this opinion, and I am bound to declare, that my mind is unalterably made up on the subject. Let us sign the treaty for the purpose of lowering the pride of England; let us identify our interests and views with those of France on a footing of perfect equality; let it no longer be said that she draws us along with her into her distant wars, but that we jointly wage war against England: to this I agree. France and Spain have a common cause of complaint against her."

The whole council readily, I may say enthusiastically, adopted my opinion: each of my honourable colleagues loaded me with assurances of sincere adhesion to my sentiments, and of the liveliest interest. "Well then, gentlemen," I said, as we parted, "let us trust to Providence; let us hope that Heaven will throw its shield over the fortunes of Spain; may it grant me the means and the glory of fulfilling the engagements I am contracting towards our common country!"

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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W. B. Smith

Charles. IV  
King of Spain

Charles. IV  
Roi d'Espagne

# MEMOIRS

OF

**DON MANUEL DE GODOY,**

**PRINCE OF THE PEACE,**

**DUKE DEL ALCUDIA, COUNT D'EVERAMONTE, &c.,**

**FORMERLY PRIME MINISTER OF THE KING OF SPAIN, GENERALISSIMO  
OF HIS ARMIES, HIGH ADMIRAL, &c.**

**WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.**

**EDITED, UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIS HIGHNESS,**

**BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. B. D'ESMÉNARD.**

**WITH**

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**MEMOIRS**  
**OF**  
**DON MANUEL DE GODOY,**  
**&c. &c.**



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# MEMOIRS

## OF THE

### PRINCE OF THE PEACE.

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#### CHAPTER XXXIII.

Negotiations.—Alliance with the Republic.

WHILST these grave discussions engaged the council of state, circumstances were every day becoming more critical.

The conduct of the English was undisguisedly hostile. Despatches from America announced that they were assuming a menacing attitude at various important points of both continents; they were landing every where, minutely exploring the coast, and inundating the country with their merchandize, fraudulently introduced, and almost always by armed men. Their low prices seduced the colonists; and, what was not at first per-

ceived, the bales of printed cottons contained incendiary pamphlets, forged gazettes, and false statements, representing Spain as ready to give up to France a part of her possessions in the New World. Besides these attempts at moral subversion, they seized upon advantageous positions under false pretences, and it was evident that their ambition was directed to further encroachments.

Towards the north, their stations established in Missouri, and the energy with which they were fortifying them, created serious apprehension.

On the side of the Rio de la Plata, of Peru, and Chili, every intelligence brought also cause of alarm. At the Antilles the English adopted a different course: they endeavoured to sow dissension between France and us. They declared that peace with the Republic no longer subsisted. The governor of the Spanish part of St. Domingo, uncertain as to the wishes of his court, and alarmed by threats, was thinking of repelling the Republicans with aid of the English which was offered him. Being absolute masters in those seas, they assumed to themselves the most insulting right of search. There would be no end to it, were an enumeration made of all the violent and vexatious acts they practised against our sailors. Many of our merchants were ruined by sequestrations imposed on their goods and prolonged with a marked bad faith.

In Europe, in the Mediterranean, under our very eyes, the same conduct, the same insolence ; continual acts of hostility, without condescending to observe even the appearance of friendliness. A swarm of Anglo-Corsican pirates infested the coast of Catalonia,—no more safety for our trade. Corsica, in the hands of England, was to us a resort of robbers—another Algiers. Instead of imposing a curb upon this system of plunder, the ships belonging to the Royal Navy committed the like insult ; they did not even respect the vessels of the Spanish Government. They attacked our property upon the most frivolous pretences. I will cite an instance. They seized, without shame and contrary to all right, the Minerva frigate. Every thing that was entering, every thing that was leaving our harbours, they carried off, saying that it was French property.

The greater the insolence and injustice exercised by the English in their conduct towards us, the more earnestly did the Republic insist upon a treaty of alliance, and endeavour to obtain favourable terms. The negotiation proceeded languidly : at length the French minister received orders to declare that the substantial renewal of the treaty had not for its object to draw us into any continental war, nor to require from us any contingent whatsoever, still less to compromise us with other powers that were not our declared enemies. For this purpose, wishing to give entire security on the

subject to his Catholic Majesty, the Directory engaged to state the same formally in a secret article, the verbal expression of which should be left to the pleasure of the king. By this procedure the cabinet of Madrid could no longer doubt the intentions of the Directory. In this renewal of the family compact, it was intended merely to present the union of the two powers upon the same footing that had caused it to be respected in Europe in 1761. The belligerent powers would perceive that this alliance had the same scope and the same bearing as the former treaty : it must have been a further motive to induce them to make peace, and renounce all new coalitions which England was constantly endeavouring to bring about.

It was in fact known that she was making great efforts in the north of Europe, and on the shores of Italy.

It was well known to us that she was endeavouring to irritate the passions of the Muscovite cabinet to induce it to take part in the crusade against the Republic. This Colossus, pressing with all its weight upon the German States bordering on France, and which desired to remain neuter, must have compelled them to take part. However, besides the delicacy to be observed towards the Republic, the south had every interest to keep Russia at a distance, to ward off her domineering influence, and prevent the barbarians of the north

from acquiring a taste for the pleasures of climes more favoured of Heaven. Spain, even, could not look upon herself as so far free from the consequences of a continental war as not to apprehend an invasion on the side of Portugal, a weak kingdom, and always swayed by the impulses of England. The cabinet of St. James's, amongst the plans it was ever devising against France, had formed one of sending a British army to Lisbon, for the purpose of compelling Spain, in spite of her inclination, to join in the coalition : a fatal determination, and tending to render our beautiful country the theatre of a devastating war ; since in that case France would certainly have insisted on a free passage for her armies, either as auxiliary or principal, in order to make head against the storm, and protect her own frontier. The Directory did not regard such a landing in Portugal as an impending occurrence, but it was informed that the English cabinet had made the proposal to the Czarina, at the same time offering her a harbour—a trading port—in the Mediterranean. The name of the Belearic Isles had even been uttered. This was too seductive a bait not to awaken the natural ambition of the Empress Catherine ; and the project might have been effected sooner or later, if Spain should have appeared in the eyes of Europe abandoned to her solitary neutrality. An excessive moderation prevented our having friends ; and our disinterestedness seemed like a confession of our

weakness; and thus, from day to day Spain would have found herself assailed by unexpected and formidable enemies. The ostensible renewal of the ancient family compact would put an end to all similar projects, when it should be seen that the two united nations were ready to repel their enemies in common; and the cabinet of Lisbon, brought to a stand by the warlike attitude of Spain, would no longer listen to the rash insinuations of that of St. James's.<sup>1</sup> It was above all important

<sup>1</sup> These fears of an Anglo-Russian expedition to Portugal were not a fiction invented by the Directory. It is clearly averred that in September 1796, a triple alliance was contracted between Russia, England, and Austria,—a celebrated negotiation, of which the second coalition was the consequence. Strengthened by this treaty, the English did not yet cease to form plans for expeditions upon different points of the Continent, in order to divide the force and the attention of the Republic. One of these plans consisted in transporting to Portugal an Anglo-Russian army, and thus to make the Peninsula a base of attack against France. The Spanish Cabinet had secret information of this from the Portuguese Government itself; and I am bound to acknowledge, that it was heartily opposed to this foreign invasion; but, at the same time, it announced that if the Anglo-Russian forces should present themselves in great numbers, it was not in a condition to repel them. I kept the secret, under an apprehension that the French Government might seize this pretence for sending troops against Portugal. However, the Directory must have received the same intelligence through its agents at Copenhagen; and, therefore, it insisted so strenuously upon the renewal of the ancient family compact, or an offensive and defensive alliance. In my opinion, had even the Anglo-Russian expedition taken place, it would have been better for us to make head alone, rather than borrow assistance from without, at all times a dangerous expedient. For many

to prevent delay on the subject of this negotiation, which had been lingering so many months. England alone gained by it; in the first place, she gave hopes to her partizans in Spain; secondly, she postponed the results that must have followed the co-operation of the fleets of France and Holland. This latter power was employing incredible energy in regard

ages Portugal has been to us a fatal stumbling-block. If, under any circumstances, it would have been advisable to revive our old claims to that kingdom, and to take possession of it at all cost, and without any delicacy, it was at that very moment, when the fierce struggle between France and England exposed to the least practised eyes the weakness of Portugal, and the equivocal system she was following with regard to England. But it was never possible to make Charles IV. entertain this impression. Too late, and to his misfortune, he discovered the truth; and not without useless regret at having been so paternal and so scrupulous. Happily, for this time the danger passed by of itself. It did not escape the penetration of the Directory; and the Empress Catherine did not dare detach a part of her troops, for fear of being disturbed by the Ottoman Porte, with which power France had succeeded in re-establishing her former union. Three years afterwards Paul I. was tempted to adopt the projects of the English minister. The gross and extravagant manifesto of this monarch, the whimsical originality of which was spread abroad by England, proved to what extent English influence had impressed him against us. The disasters of his army in Switzerland and Holland, prevented his attempting any further adventures in our direction. Naples alone was condemned to undergo the presence of the Russians and Turks, not to mention her other calamities. After these events, the autocrat was seen suddenly to change his views, to abandon the coalition, reject England, and shew himself favourable to France. He wished to place himself at the head of a maritime confederacy against English tyranny. . . . and died by assassination.



to her navy ; and the Directory was no less energetic in restoring the navy of France. If Spain should unite heartily in these noble efforts, the combined squadrons of the three nations might perhaps re-establish the liberty of the seas, effectively protect the colonies, and contribute more than by any other means to a general peace, of which all the world was desirous.

These numerous instances of cajolery and promise did not, however, make me proceed faster in this important negotiation. I would not expose the monarchy to doubtful hazards, nor to ulterior discussions with the Republic of France. The Directory was pressing for the conclusion of the treaty, and especially to be seconded in the struggle with England. I availed myself of this disposition, of which I was perfectly aware, to insist, on my side, on those precautions which it was necessary to provide against all after-thoughts, and not to be drawn ultimately into the wars of the Continent. Under this view, and with the approbation of the King and the unanimous satisfaction of the council, I transmitted to citizen Perignon a note bearing the ultimatum of our court. It was conceived nearly in these terms :—

1st. The express, firm, and decided will of his Catholic Majesty, is to contract an alliance between the two governments, against the common enemy who tyrannizes over the seas, and envenoms the politics of Europe. All the resentments which

gave rise to the war from 1793 to 1795 are forgotten. The King only beholds in France the ancient friend and ally of Spain : he is therefore ready to assent to all approaches that may favour the reciprocal interests of both nations, without any other limitations than those which honour and a just reciprocity prescribe it as his duty to adopt in relation to powers hitherto his allies, and which may not show themselves hostile to Spain.

2d. On this subject, H.C.M. saw with satisfaction, that the Directory rendered full justice to the loyal sentiments by which he was actuated, and which have regulated his political conduct. The King was thoroughly convinced of the loyalty of the Government of the Republic, and of its intention not to alter, either directly or indirectly, the basis upon which his Majesty had proposed to negotiate with relation to the common interests of France and Spain, without in any manner interfering with the rigorous neutrality of the latter power towards those states which were at peace with her.

3d. Although the Directory, faithful to the intentions which it had nobly manifested, consented to insert them in a secret and supplementary article, it is not the less evident that, notwithstanding this guarantee, the delicacy of his Catholic Majesty would be compromised with regard to the other powers which are on friendly terms with Spain : in fact, the renewal of the ancient family compact

would place H.C.M. in a kind of attitude eventually hostile towards those very powers to which this limiting article should remain a secret, the said powers not being then in a condition to know that the declared articles were modified. In truth, the secret article would be every way proper and available, in the sense that the Government of the Republic was not to require the co-operation of H.C.M. against the powers mentioned. But this clandestine clause would not destroy the idea that they might, according to appearances, form to themselves respecting the real sentiments of H.C.M., whose immutable rule it ever was, and ever will be, never to separate morality from politics, nor even to appear to have done so.

4th. The treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, now under consideration, being to be restricted to the maritime war with Great Britain, and the other powers against whom Spain has no complaint being excepted, these latter would be inspired with perfect confidence in the rectitude and moderation of the Spanish Cabinet ; and this would preserve to H.C.M. the character of a mediator, which from the commencement the French Government were desirous that he should maintain—a character which the King has already successfully employed, and which, influencing the south of Europe, as the like character on the part of the King of Prussia was influencing the north, would give to the Republic a double advantage,

in the concurrence of two sovereigns of the first rank disposed to labour powerfully to bring about a general pacification.

5th. If H.C.M. should withdraw, or, which comes to the same thing, should appear to withdraw by the said treaty from his neutrality towards the belligerent powers of the Continent, and if Spain should appear to make common cause with France against all her enemies, the English ministry would be furnished with a specious motive for determining those powers to declare war against us; and then, far from opposing any obstacle to the plan of an expedition to the coast of Portugal, it would be adding a new stimulus, which would excite Russia to undertake the expedition,—since, being in alliance with Austria and England, she might believe herself in a state of eventual hostility with Spain.

6th. As regards this danger, so long as Spain observed this strict neutrality towards non-offending powers, H.C.M. viewed as alike both improbable and absurd the design of attacking her territory on the side of Portugal; and if such an act of military extravagance should take place, Spain would be amply prepared to repel and baffle it in an exemplary manner; the government of the King and the entire nation would avenge it with the greater rigour, as the country was at the time at the summit of its wishes, being at peace and in complete harmony with the Republic:

7th. This happy disposition of his subjects permitted H. C. M. to affirm, that the public opinion was generally favourable to the maintenance of peace with France ; but that this disposition might change if, besides the war with Great Britain, generally considered just and necessary under the circumstances, the subjects of H.C.M. should have reason to fear that the friendship of the Republic might draw them into a continental war, and into other sacrifices beyond the charges of naval armaments ; that such a mistaken opinion might arise on the bare reading of the ostensible articles of the treaty of alliance, as proposed by the Directory. How could this apprehension in men's minds be tranquillized whilst the limiting and supplementary article remained unknown ? The best guarantee for the strict and sincere union which H.C.M. desired should prevail between the two nations consisted in the happy agreement of the public will with the system of government ; without this agreement, the King could not answer for the maintenance of the desired alliance, the less so as the secret intrigues of England would not fail to suggest sinister ideas ; and the subjects of the King would consent with reluctance to sacrifices in aid of a continental war against powers that had given us no motive to break our existing relations with them.

8th. The well-understood commercial interest of both France and Spain required that the latter

should preserve a perfect neutrality with regard to the other nations of the Continent; the losses and injuries inevitable in a maritime war with England, would be balanced by the benefits of trade with the other nations of Europe, and France under the neutral flag of Spain would obtain an indirect means of carrying on her own trade; whereas if, by the tenour of the treaty proposed by the Directory, Spain were exposed to be ever treated as an enemy, both nations, French and Spanish, would alike suffer, without any species of compensation.

9th. Lastly. In order to remove all apprehension on the side of Portugal, H.C.M. would redouble his representations and efforts with the Government of Lisbon, to induce it to shake off the yoke of England, or at least to cause it to adopt a sincere and frank system of neutrality towards the Republic; in the condition of uncertainty in which the fear of the vengeance of England kept Portugal, this is all that it was perhaps possible to obtain, at that period, from the Portuguese Government.

To these observations I added, that H.C.M. would willingly consent that the treaty of alliance should contain substantially those articles of the ancient family compact which were considered compatible with existing circumstances, but would at the same time persist in demanding certain stated restrictions or modifications. The King

desired that the restrictive and explanatory article should be declared and published like the rest of the treaty. This condition once accepted, the good faith of H. C. M. evinced, and his subjects fully assured on this point, the King would with pleasure sign this solemn act, being persuaded that it would prove the basis of a lasting and sincere friendship between the two nations, whose mutual interests would thus be guaranteed.

This note was sent to Paris. Whether from conviction, the desire of mortifying the English cabinet, or the firmness with which I declared to the ambassador that no other basis would on any pretext be accepted, the cabinet of the Luxembourg subscribed to the condition that *the restrictive article should be published with the rest of the treaty*, merely asking as an act of condescension on our part, that the article should be so drawn up that the exception might appear to be limited to a neutrality towards those powers that were then actually non-offensive towards Spain, in order that it might not be inferred by the enemies of France that Spain would remain neuter in any ulterior war, which would render the alliance altogether illusory. This point settled, and in order that the cabinet of Madrid might not fear to become compromised by the secrecy of the article relative to any eventual wars, the Directory gave an extension of power to their ambassador and

minister plenipotentiary, by virtue of which a reserved declaration was made on both sides, stating that the treaty of alliance should be obligatory only for the maritime war against Great Britain. The two governments were to unite their efforts, and lend each other mutual support. In every other case, and against every other power, a new agreement was to be entered into, special, free, and voluntary, as regarded each government.

Thus the Directory, with honourable frankness, met our scruples, and fully satisfied them. I can affirm to the honour of truth, that if the Directory ever appeared loyal, sincere, and accommodating, it did so incontestably with regard to Spain. I gave an account to H.C.M. of the state of the negotiation; all was examined and approved in the council; I received orders to sign the treaty. The act was concluded at St. Ildefonso, the 18th August 1796, nearly thirteen months after the treaty of Basle. The articles were drawn up in the forms constantly observed in offensive and defensive alliances, with the reciprocal guarantee of the states of both the contracting parties.\*

The restrictive article was thus expressed :  
“ England being the only power from which Spain has received direct offence, this alliance shall have effect against her in the present war,

\* This treaty is literally copied amongst the explanatory documents, No.8.



and Spain shall remain neutral relatively to the other powers which are at war with the Republic.”<sup>3</sup>

All being settled and concluded, war was declared against England on the 18th of August 1796, and the treaty of alliance with France a month and some days afterwards. The negotiations had lasted eight months without any thing being definitively settled with the Republic. It was the conduct of England that obliged the Government to adopt this resolution.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> They who, on first reading this, the 18th article, may find it in contradiction with the preceding articles, will readily clear up the difficulty after the statement I have just given of this important negotiation.

<sup>4</sup> The manifesto of the Spanish Court is amongst the explanatory documents, No. 4.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

## Motives and Justification of the Alliance with the French Republic.

THE treaty of St. Ildefonso is much more the work of the council of the crown than mine. It was approved and sanctioned by every statesman in the country ; it was for a long time regarded as the palladium of peace between Spain and France ; it saved the country. After my secession from the ministry, and my retirement from court, this treaty was observed and maintained, to the great vexation of England, by all my successors. The ties of friendship with France were drawn still closer than I could myself have wished. This treaty, I repeat, saved us much evil and did us much good. . . . It was, nevertheless, fourteen years afterwards, the common text of my enemies for assailing my character.

I shall not appeal to the vote of the council of state, which demanded an alliance still more explicit and of longer duration, nor to the recollections of those who so often gave thanks to the Government for having procured them the advantages of it, nor to the authority of those who, after myself, adopted the same system. I consent that

the treaty of alliance should be my own work ; I. accept all the responsibility.

The Abbé Muriel has said that *this alliance was shameful*. According to him, two years before (in March 1794), when it was proposed by Count D'Aranda, it was a master-stroke of policy, when we must have begged France to grant it us, when we must have negotiated with men, whose crimes excited horror, and whose very touch left an indelible stain.

Afterwards we treated with France when she had a government more regular, more moderate, and better established, and then “ it is a tardy, shameful transaction.” Will M. Muriel say on what he founds his injurious qualification ? Things were equal on both sides, the obligations reciprocal, and if the balance inclined on one side, was it not on that of Spain ? Read the exception declared in the 18th article, by which we refused all assistance to the Republic in its wars with the Continent. Spain had but a single enemy ; this was England ; and France assisted us in combating her. France had several, and we were not obliged to aid her except against England, which was our enemy. To whom then was the bargain advantageous ? Who made the first approaches, the first proposals ? Which of the two powers begged the other to accede ? France. Besides, she modified, she limited her pretensions. Where, then, is the shame to Spain ?

Let us pass on to General Foy, or rather to those who have spoken for him after his death. “The Prince of the Peace was not at all friendly to the French; and far from being favourable to the revolution, he seemed rather to incline towards England. He would have wished to remain at peace with all the world, but, forced to choose between two rival powers, he preferred to decide for that which gave more immediate security for his tranquillity, his pleasures, his power, and the dishonour of his masters.”<sup>1</sup>

It is difficult to believe that a Frenchman—above all, a general, in whom the national spirit shone forth with so much splendour—should have written these latter words. To say that a prince has dishonoured himself by an alliance with France—for a Frenchman, it is to esteem but little his country!

Whosoever may be the writer to whom I am replying, it will be enough for me to tell him: if it was to secure my tranquillity, my pleasures, the favour of the court, that I preferred amity with France, why did I not prefer that amity during three years?—why had I chosen war, when I had only to agree in the opinion of Count D’Aranda, so strongly pronounced for peace, and thus place my policy under the protection and guardianship of that old and famed diplomatist? The contest with England offered, according to your account, less danger

<sup>1</sup> Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule, tom. iii.

to Spain, but did it require less to be done?—did it impose less responsibility on him who had to answer for, and who, in fact, did answer for the preservation of our vast possessions in the two Worlds? During peace as during war, was it permitted to those who were charged with the government to sleep away their time in pleasures or wanton indolence? In the midst of the shocks which made Europe totter, so long as I was at the head of affairs, did Spain experience the smallest concussion?—did she lose the smallest portion of her immense inheritance?—such were my leisure moments, my enjoyments, my pastimes. Yes, the hours of the day were insufficient; often was I obliged to employ the best part of the night. I appeal to the testimony of the men of knowledge and experience whom I consulted for information, and who participated with me in the cares and anxieties of mind inseparable from so thorny a situation. There remain but few of my noble fellow-labourers, the associates of my work, who saw what was done in those days and what has been done since. But there do yet exist a few; let them not fear to raise their voices. I appeal to what they shall say: they will not falsify their character. Is not the time then come to speak out without disguise, and to render to every one the justice that is his due?

I shall now proceed to grapple with the Archbishop de Pradt. One might say that he has been paid to embroil the question, and to drown the

truth in a deluge of captious phrases devoid of sense. His inconceivable ignorance upon all that regards Spain, has it been studiously affected; or is the historical knowledge of M. de Pradt really so shallow? This is the way in which he speaks of the treaty of alliance.

It is not without trouble that I have translated these involved phrases, every word of which is either a mistake or an absurdity. France and Europe have been inundated with M. de Pradt's pamphlets. Some people have taken for perspicuity the imperturbable assurance with which he has dashed over state affairs: others have censured severely the ignorance which he evinces on every occasion, the doctrines of personal interest he professes, and, in short, the paradoxes that swarm throughout his writings.

*From the text of M. de Pradt.*

From the reconciliation between the two countries to an alliance between them is but a short step. Spain gave up a part of St. Domingo, as useless to France in the state of her colonies, as it was burdensome. The ancient family compact was re-established under the aspects that appeared to concern the policy alone of the two nations; but Spain did not perceive the inferiority of her share in the transaction; for she had to uphold the revolution even more than France. The latter was fighting to confirm the revolution; consequently Spain, by renewing the treaty styled the 'family compact,' undertook to uphold at once France and her revolution, and to fight for the one at the

these involved phrases, every word of which is either a mistake or an absurdity. France and Europe have been inundated with M. de Pradt's pamphlets. Some people have taken for perspicuity the imperturbable assurance with which he has dashed over state affairs: others have censured severely the ignorance which he evinces on every occasion, the doctrines of personal interest he professes, and, in short, the paradoxes that swarm throughout his writings.

I shall shew that he has no right to complain of the latter.

same time that she was fighting for the other; whereas France had to uphold no positive interest of Spain, since Spain had no enemy on the continent, and England, the only one she had at sea, could not be assailed by France.

He says that the family compact was renewed between the French republic and Spain. M. de Pradt has read neither the old nor the latter treaty. If he has read them, he has de-

ceived himself, or he wishes to deceive his readers: and this is a bishop, who is writing history!

The following are the differences subsisting between the two transactions:

Art. 1st, of the family compact:—The Most Christian King and the Catholic King undertake to regard henceforward as the enemy of both, every power that shall declare itself the enemy of either of the two crowns.

Art. 4. It is laid down as a principle, that whosoever attacks one of the two crowns shall be held to have attacked the other; therefore it is stipulated that they shall reciprocally aid each other with the totality of their forces, the mode being undefined; the contingents fixed by Articles 5 and 6 were but a first succour, or, so to speak, a draft upon the totality of the forces eventually pledged.

Art. 8. The only wars to a co-operation in which Spain is not bound, are those in which his Christian Majesty may be obliged to take a part in consequence of his engagements contracted by

the treaty of Westphalia ; or any others with the powers of Germany ; and, nevertheless, it was added, that if the results of the war became such that the soil of France should be invaded, the Catholic King should march to the assistance of his ally with the maximum of the forces stipulated in the preceding articles.

Art. 17: Stating that whether at peace or at war, the two kingdoms should be considered as constituting only one and the same power.

Art. 18. The respective subjects of the three powers, France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, shall be on the same footing with the natives of each of the three kingdoms as regards all civil matters.

Finally, by Art. 25, it is said that the subjects of the three powers above-mentioned shall be treated in the harbours of each of them like the natives of the country, with an absolute inhibition to grant a like privilege to other nations.

These, then, are the stipulations made in the family compact, at the time when the distinguished Count D'Aranda enjoyed the highest influence in all the affairs of state.

All these articles were erased from the treaty which I signed ; a simple and entirely new treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, according to the ordinary rules, but restricted by a wise and rigid policy to the war with England alone.

This slight view of the exorbitant articles of the family compact suffices to shew that they were all



omitted in the treaty of St. Ildefonso, the 18th Article of which I will here repeat. "England being the only power from which Spain has received direct offence, this alliance shall have effect only against her in the present war, and Spain shall remain neutral with regard to the other powers that are at war with the Republic."

What means then this obscure and ill-constructed phrase of M. de Pradt: "Spain had to uphold the revolution, even more than France. The latter was fighting to confirm the revolution. Consequently, Spain, by renewing the treaty of the family compact, undertook to uphold at once France and her revolution, and to fight for the one at the same time that she was fighting for the other."

I have now shewn, by the very text of the two treaties, that there was no renewing of the family compact; that the treaty of St. Ildefonso was a simple convention of alliance offensive and defensive against England, for the common and reciprocal interest of France and Spain. To combat the maritime tyranny of England with the aid of France; was that to combat for the French revolution? No: that revolution was a fact achieved. Spain had frankly warred against it; much more than England had done; and without any views of ambition or selfish interest, as long as there was any hope of arresting it by force of arms. She retired from no danger, from no sacrifice, and made peace only when it

was demonstrable that war was a prime encouragement, stimulating the ardour of the Republicans, and giving more force to their government. As a sovereign power, free to choose her political system, Spain accepted peace. This peace was not a truce, an artifice, nor a servile condescension. In withdrawing from the coalition, as Prussia and so many other states of Europe had done, she preserved her independence. She desired, at the same time, to remain at peace with the other powers hostile to the Republic, without excepting even England, of whom she had so much to complain; a noble and dignified neutrality, within the limits of which Spain confined herself with admirable sincerity. Who compelled her to quit this inoffensive position? Who urged her to the foot of the precipice, and drove her to the necessity of joining her arms to those of France? England. Against what power hostile to France was Spain pledged by this treaty? Against England, who compromised her, who sought to oppress her, who insulted her by sea, and threatened to attack her colonies. For more than a year Spain bore these multiplied injuries.

“It was but a step from the treaty of Basle to that of St. Ildefonso,” falsely states M. de Pradt, with his wonted levity. It was a thousand leagues from the one transaction to the other. All gentle measures were exhausted; remonstrances equally so; every offer was made of guarantees to avoid

the rupture : nothing succeeded. England would never consent to respect our neutrality. There was no other course to be taken than that of uniting with France and Holland. Undertaken by ourselves alone, the war would have been too unequal. We were obliged to have recourse to France. The interest at stake was similar for both ; at the same time it was more pressing on our side, great as to Spain, immense as to our colonies. We turned towards France, as we should have done towards any other power that had the same interests, and the same grievances to be redressed.

If, by the words *uphold the revolution*, M. de Pradt means that we upheld the principles and doctrines of the French Republic, the accusation is unjust and false. Spain did not approve those principles and doctrines ; she never dreamt of defending them ; she was not the enemy of the enemies of the Republic : she took no part in her wars of ambition or of principles. If to treat with Republican France, recognized as such by a crowd of other governments,<sup>2</sup> consolidated by four years of victory and by gigantic triumphs, was to treat and make alliance with the revolution, then must all connexions be renounced, all political interests with nations which recognize other forms of govern-

<sup>2</sup> Tuscany, Naples, Parma, Rome, Genoa, Sardinia, Switzerland, Venice, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, the Ottoman Porte, Russia, and many other States of the empire.

ment, or which entertain other religious creeds. In the view taken by M. de Pradt, it would not be allowable, at the present day any more than in the middle ages, to treat with infidels, for instance with the Ottoman Porte; M. de Pradt would say it was to uphold the Coran and reject the Gospel. In these involved insinuations of the Archbishop of Mechlin, do we not perceive a bit of the ear, or rather of the cassock? Is not this the policy of the vestry? The almoner of the god Mars had to do with consciences less timorous. The scruples of the theologian should have become less delicate in the warlike train of Napoleon. And why did he not take the pains to judge my system by the facts? He would have seen, that of all the powers bordering upon France, Spain was the one which contended with the greatest skill and success against that revolution, fatal to so many other countries, and so innocuous to ours.

The grand coalition of the north of Europe had not been able to extinguish the volcano of which France was the focus—a volcano profound and terrible, and which, for thirty years, has not ceased to ferment and produce consternation in the world by its frequent irruptions.

I was, however, fortunate enough, so long as my enemies did not succeed in violently thrusting me from the post confided to my charge,—I was, I say, fortunate enough to preserve my country from the conflagration. What I had not been able to bring

about by force of arms, my wise policy effected. Bayonets and cannon could do little against the seductions and secret proceedings of the Propaganda. The shock of arms attracted and served this Propaganda. I treated frankly and amicably with the men who were armed with the revolutionary thunder, and my country was spared. At the same time, I betrayed none of our foreign friends; my policy injured no power, and was serviceable to many. Spain, at that epoch, was the power that France treated with the greatest delicacy. We were not her allies for the purpose of defending or aiding the revolutionists; our mediation twice saved Rome and Parma. In all the wars that devastated the Continent, was ever a single Spaniard seen under the colours of the Republic? We were united with France against England only, who desired, at all events, to precipitate us into a disastrous struggle, in which so many states miserably perished.

France, our ally, redoubled her attentions towards us; no one saw planted in Spain that deceitful tree, whose intoxicating fruits were but a dangerous poison. Spanish loyalty had not to contend against the seductions of the missionaries, the apostles, and the magicians of a sect the enemy of thrones. The formidable Propaganda received orders to stop at the Pyrenees, and not to pass them. It is not after the event that I come forward to make boast of my fore-

sight ; no, the aim and scope of my policy were known at the time : few were mistaken in it ; M. de Pradt was of the number of these : I shall only cite for his instruction a passage from M. Thiers, a more faithful, and above all, a better-informed historian.\*

“ The sentiments of the court of Spain,” says this author, “ were not, could not, be favourable to the Republicans ; but its policy, directed by the Prince of the Peace, appeared kindly towards them. It regarded their friendship as the most certain mode of being protected against their principles ; it believed, and with reason, that the French Government would not endeavour to revolutionize Spain, so long as it found in her a potent auxiliary in the maritime war.”

M. Thiers had judged correctly.

It remains to be seen if it was France only that obtained advantages from the alliance with Spain against England. Was this alliance a sacrifice on our part, or a treaty of reciprocal interest ? Was the interest of Spain favoured as much, or more, than that of France ? Let us put the question more precisely : was our alliance with the Republic useful to Spain ? I shall prove that it was useful, and that we gained much more by it than France.

\* Hist. de la Révolution Française, tom. ix. chap. xii.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

**Friendly and honourable Conduct of the French Republic, which observes religiously the Treaties of Basle and St. Ildefonso.**

I BELIEVE I have sufficiently explained the motives which determined us at first to make peace, and then a treaty of alliance with the French Republic; it is proved that this alliance, useful to both nations, was especially so to Spain.

It was pretended that this treaty reduced us to a state of servitude; that the direction and employment of our forces being at the mercy of France, the latter disposed of them arbitrarily, according to her interest or her caprice.

In truth, if in relation to the interchange of good offices on both sides, one of the two nations had a right to complain, it was France. Any other government, less desirous of conciliating us, would not have failed to accuse us of indifference or selfishness. The French Republic, in general so exclusive and imperious, chose to make an exception in our favour.

In the very first days of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, the Directory met with an obstacle in our cabinet in every claim, however humble; I will

say more, to certain claims which were not rigidly just, but which the mutual interests of France and Spain, or considerations of policy, rendered very plausible. Here is one proof among many : I shall cite a fact very notorious at the time, at present probably forgotten.

The declaration of war and the treaty of St. Ildefonso, of which England had no knowledge, were published. On this intelligence, the British forces immediately quitted the Mediterranean. Sir John Jervis retired towards Gibraltar, rather to watch than to attack the squadrons of Toulon and Cadiz, which were about to form a junction at the latter point, and which were three times as strong as his own. Jervis was under the impossibility of sending succours to Portugal before the arrival of the reinforcements which he was expecting. The first enterprise of which the French Government entertained the idea (and it strongly inclined to it) was to attempt a coup de main against the English established at Oporto and on the coast of Lisbon. In fact, the Cadiz and Toulon squadrons having joined, nothing was easier than to force the entrance to the Tagus, advance upon the capital, and compel the surrender of all the merchant ships, with the immense magazines that covered the whole coast of the kingdom. Certainly Admiral Jervis had no means to oppose it; a similar operation could have been effected at the mouth of the Douro :



it would have been a mortal blow to the British interests: it would have been sufficient to overthrow, to lay prostrate, that pitiless cabinet. I refused to lend myself to the project. I committed, perhaps, a great fault. I sacrificed policy to morality. Scrupulously attached to the text of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, I did not think that, either directly or indirectly, under the pretence of attacking the common enemy, it was allowable to join Spanish troops to French, upon the territory of a people who were not enemies of Spain. Unquestionably my scruples admitted of being combated; it was a doubtful question. The Directory had good reasons to advance; I stood upon a single one. I said that the invasion of a neutral state, as was Portugal in regard to us, a country governed by a king who was united to the court of Madrid by intimate family relations, would afflict Charles IV., and would disgust him with the alliance just contracted with the Republic. The French Government insisted no further, and by this strict application of the principle established in the treaty, the 18th Article acquired ever after an incontestable authority. Collisions were no longer to be feared with our friends, not even with those who were so but slightly, and in appearance.

Still the conduct of Portugal, always under the influence of England, was not that of a friend to Spain. There existed only an apparent peace

between us, and nothing more. I experience no sort of vanity at this triumph obtained through me on this occasion. I believed I was fulfilling a duty in sacrificing material interests to Spanish honour. This fact sufficiently shews that our alliance with the Republic had nothing servile in it : let my enemies produce others, if they can, to prove the contrary. I defy them. Even in those enterprizes, for which, by the tenor of the treaty, we were obliged to furnish assistance to the Republic, the Directory was moderate in its demands, and Spain still more reserved in her disposition to accede to them. I speak not merely of the period at which I was at the head of the cabinet : the French Government observed the same moderation with my successors after my retreat from the ministry and the court. Spain furnished no assistance to France in her expeditions against Ireland, nor did she concur in any respect in that against Egypt. . . . See, however, which of the two powers gained the most profit. The attention of England was called to defend her own shores ; and whilst she was exhausting her resources in combating the French in Africa, we were enabled to watch over the safety of our colonies, and to receive our galleons : we traversed in freedom all the seas that bathe the dominions of Spain.

On what occasion, either by land or by sea, have we served as instruments in the hands of the Republic ? Twice did the Directory (in 1797 and

1798) advance the right to see our troops and their own marching together against Portugal, or at least to be allowed free passage to invade it with their own forces. The Spanish cabinet refused both the one and the other with firmness and dexterity: our mediation was accepted; an advantageous peace concluded at Paris secured the repose of Portugal; but her government, always ruled by England, and lured by her promises, would not ratify the treaty. What must have been the irritation of the Directory! The Portuguese minister was at first thrown into prison.<sup>1</sup> The French Government, persuaded that Spain must have participated in the resentment, resolved to carry the war at once to Lisbon; and for this purpose, would await neither our concurrence nor our approbation. Several divisions of troops destined for this campaign were collected in the Western Pyrenees. General Augereau was recalled from Germany to take the command of them. The fact is well known. But the Spanish cabinet again refused to allow a passage to the French army. It undertook the charge of arranging matters, without coming to the last extremity. The Directory was again willing to give way on this occasion. It is, nevertheless, to be remarked, that Portugal, the eternal stumbling-block to Spain, always ungrateful and ill-advised, never renounced her system of hostility, more or less disguised, against France

<sup>1</sup> The Temple.

and against ourselves ; and France consented to imitate our indulgence towards her. Thus much for Portugal.

Neither must it be allowed to remain unknown, how great was the respect paid by the Directory to the recommendation of Charles IV. in favour of the houses of Parma and Naples. The Pope was twice saved through the intervention of Spain whilst I was in the ministry : the first time in 1796, the period of the treaty of Bologna ; the second, the year following, when the Holy Father, having again thrown himself into the fatal war of Italy, was compelled to subscribe the treaty of Tolentino.<sup>2</sup>

Shall it be said that the Directory had some interest in maintaining the temporal power and the spiritual influence of the Vicar of J. C. ? It is known, on the contrary, that the French Government would rather have seen the downfall of this Colossus, which gave it umbrage in consequence of its influence over the consciences of Catholic nations. It is also known with what prejudice, and with what fanaticism of a new species, the theophilanthropist, La Révellière, then a member of the

<sup>2</sup> The third and last misfortune experienced by Pius VI., the 15th February 1796, was the result of the insurrection of the Romans, springing out of contradictory accidents, and which allowed no time for negotiation either on the one side or the other. If the government of the Holy Father had profited by the wise councils of our minister Azara, the pontifical throne might have been saved for the third time.

Directory, had determined to destroy the ancient Roman ritual.

All these obstacles disappeared. What was the part of Spain in this fortunate result? Here is Bonaparte's letter to our ambassador at Rome, Don Joseph Nicolas de Azara :—

“ The mediation and the good offices of H. C. M. the King of Spain have produced the effect you desired. You will find enclosed the articles of the treaty of peace concluded, two hours since, between the Republic and the Pope. I regret that circumstances did not allow you to assist at the definitive conclusion of the treaty. It is eight months since you saved Rome by the amnesty of Bologna. Had our advice been followed, it would not have been exposed to the dangers of an insensate war ; but since experience has shewn its value, I doubt not his Holiness will perceive how important it is, for the public tranquillity and the preservation of peace, that you should return speedily to Rome ; for myself, I desire it ardently. I am well convinced that your presence will contribute greatly to confirm the pacific sentiments of which the Holy Father ought not in future to divest himself. Receive the expression of my esteem, &c.

(Signed) “ BONAPARTE.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This letter appeared in all the journals of France and Italy. It is to be found in the Madrid Gazette of April 18, 1797, page 318. This is a fit occasion to refute a calumny which my vile

The published papers of the day likewise disclose the conduct of the Spanish cabinet with

vile enemies spread abroad at this period, and which the authors of the "*Nouvelle Biographie des Contemporains*" have not failed to collect with much other filth.

When that excellent and candid Pontiff, Pius VI., was seduced so far as to join the Italian league, he wrote to Charles IV. to exhort him to rescind, on his part, the treaty of Basle. His Holiness's nuncio at Madrid exercised every means with the cabinet then confided to my direction. The King's answer, as well as mine, was filled with sentiments of filial piety, love, and respect for the common Father of the faithful. Still H. M. solicited Pius IV. not to interfere in wars which might compromise his character and his existence. The King, at the same time, explained to him the motives in virtue of which he persisted in adhering to the peace with France. The Biographies state that my letter was only a contemptuous tissue of insults against the Pope. They added, that I circulated this letter publicly, when it created so great an indignation, that I was obliged to stop its course, by withdrawing all the copies already in circulation. Ought not men to compare facts, who undertake to write history,—should they not decide only when they have submitted them to a sound criticism? Besides, it was natural to entertain a doubt of the authenticity of this pretended letter, since at that very time I was daily giving proofs of my devotedness to the Head of the Church, and of my respectful affection towards his person. One thing only is true—which is, that there was circulated in Madrid a falsified copy of my ministerial letter. The slanderers who pushed matters to extremes, and endeavoured to render me odious, devised this imposition. As soon as I obtained a knowledge of it, my indignation was equal to my surprise. I instantly put a stop to this surreptitious circulation; and when the publication of my genuine letter could no longer compromise the Pope, I ordered it to be published in all Spain. This inconceivable levity of these fabricators of biographies, so eager to collect the imputations of my enemies, has it not caused them some regret? With such profanations, the press can be little more than an instrument of mischief.

regard to the Holy Father. During the last and deplorable trial he had to undergo (15th February 1798), I was disposed to quit the ministry ; but I wished to remain in office some time longer, in order to devise means for soothing the situation of his Holiness, and of sending that support of which Spain was never grudging towards him up to the period of his death. I must here add, that France was mistrustful of every government except that of Spain. We were always permitted to preserve our direct and intimate relations with the august prisoner. Three prelates,—M. M. Lorenzana, inquisitor-general, archbishop of Toledo ; Don Raphael Musquiz, since archbishop of St. James ; and Despuig, archbishop of Valencia, afterwards a cardinal—were sent to the Sovereign Pontiff, to bear him consolation and support.\* The Directory was not alarmed at these communications, but saw without jealousy our solicitude and deference towards the Pope, and never thought of taking umbrage at them. Such were the character and freedom of our alliance with the Republic.

Those who then had to negotiate with France,

mischief. What an abuse of the most splendid invention of the human mind !

\* See the biographical note of the Table referring to these three archbishops. The Prince of the Peace killed two birds with one stone, as the proverb says. He sent support and consolation to the Pope ; but he sent them by three men, whose intrigues and malevolence were thus dexterously paralyzed. The details of this affair are given in the note—E.

those who read in history the rigour with which kings and governments were treated by the French Republic, will not know to what cause they are to attribute this condescension towards us. They will perhaps believe that it was purchased by sacrifices; my calumniators have not failed to affirm it; but they have never been able to advance a single proof. I have already declared it elsewhere; I defy them to shew the least ground for these base insinuations. There neither exist, in Spain nor elsewhere, any data from which it can be inferred that the generous and friendly conduct of France was not thoroughly disinterested. There have indeed been spread vague reports on this subject. Here is one that General Foy did not fear to entertain: "The French squadrons," said he, "when they came to Spain, exhausted, consumed the king's stores." It is painful to see this illustrious general accept with such levity, the part that calumny assigns to France with reference to a friendly and allied nation! It is very true that our squadrons more than once took the supplies they required from the stores at Brest and Toulon, at that time well provided; and the French squadrons did the same in our ports. But an account was kept on both sides, and in the end every thing was paid for with the most rigid exactness.

I should wish to explain in this place the honourable proceedings of France, and her accommo-



dating spirit in all pecuniary matters, towards the Spanish Government. But not having at hand the documents necessary to support assertions which would appear exaggerated, I shall only adduce one fact, well known to many persons still living.

About the end of 1801 (I think I am not mistaken as to the date), two of the Philippine Company's vessels, freighted with ingots and goods to the value of nearly six millions of piastres (more than thirty millions of francs) touched at the Isle of France, and requested an escort. Two frigates, *La Vertu* and *La Régénérée*, were ready to set sail for France. The governor of the island consented that they should convoy the two Spanish vessels on the voyage ; but he demanded by way of loan a sum of two millions of francs, of which the colony was in want. The proposal having been accepted, the two frigates convoyed our galleons till they reached Spain. Solely devoted to the protection of the charge confided to them, they never attempted to make prizes, although the opportunity offered more than once on the voyage. The passage was long and tedious ; the object of the mission of the French ships sustained delays : this object was important and pressing. The advance or loan of the two millions only concerned private interests, those of the Philippine Company. It was not a direct concern of the Government. In 1808, our ambassador at Paris was extolling, in

a diplomatic conference, the honourable proceeding of the French Government, and was remarking the advantages that the protection and support of France gave to the commerce of both countries ; he seized the opportunity of referring, though not in terms of complaint, to the loan or engagement of the two millions advanced for the Indian frigates. " It was rather a dear escort," added he. " But the case, as you see," said Cambaceres, " does not belong to our time." " That money shall be paid back," exclaimed the First Consul. In fact, a few days afterwards, the sum was ordered to be repaid from the public treasury. The minister of foreign affairs communicated the decree, adding that the French Government invited ours to produce all claims for interest that H. C. M. or his subjects might think due, whatsoever was the date or remoteness of the transaction.

" Between two great nations which mutually esteem each other and make it their honour to share the advantages and dangers of a common war, nothing should take place to wound the dignity of their alliance, and convert it into a species of traffic to the prejudice of both." Such was the language of the French minister.

The Consular Government had already given other proofs of respect for the double treaty of peace and alliance. A decree of the 8th December 1800, recommended the fulfilment of the 10th article of the treaty of Basle. All the restitutions

and indemnities due to the subjects of H. C. M., for the goods and effects confiscated during the war, were to be liquidated and definitively settled. The late Directory had never refused to acknowledge these debts, but the difficulties in which it was placed, and the continual changes in the administration, had not allowed it to bring the matter to a conclusion. Many settlements had been agreed on : however, there still remained much to discuss. Amongst the payments effected, some were not in full. The necessities of the creditors had induced them to consent to reductions which were not authorized by the treaty. The fall of the Directory left things in this state of uncertainty. It is well known that in cases of the like nature, a new government is willing enough to throw a doubt upon old engagements, or at least to postpone their consideration. This was not the conduct of the Consulate. All the regular claims of the Spanish creditors were liquidated ; and what is more, the accounts audited and even paid under the Directory, by arbitrary or incomplete payments, were allowed to be rectified, and were discharged in full.

It is painful to me to have to call attention in this place to the ignorance or injustice of the *Central Governing Junta* of Spain, in the declaration of war against France, published at Aranjuez the 14th November 1808.

Amongst the injuries that Spain pretends to

have received from France under her different Governments, they go so far as to say " that the indemnities due to the Crown or to the subjects of H. C. M. were constantly denied, and all claims on this head absolutely rejected."

There were sufficient motives to declare war against Napoleon, without its being necessary to allege one that was unjust and contrary to truth.

The consular decree of which I have just spoken was inserted in the Madrid Gazette. All the courts of the kingdom received notice of it, and copies, with the requisite instructions. The Junta of Reprisals<sup>5</sup> was charged with this official communication, and acquitted itself with all the required solemnity; every municipality had the decree published within its district. How could the central Junta be ignorant of, or misrepresent, the fact?

Here is the text of the leading articles of this document: 1st. The offer made by his Excellency the Ambassador of the King of Spain, in the name of H. C. M., to proceed by way of negotiation to the execution of the 10th article of the treaty of Basle is accepted.

2d. There shall be appointed a special commis-

<sup>5</sup> Supplement to the Madrid Gazette of 18th Nov. 1808.

<sup>6</sup> *Junta de Represalias*, a tribunal, whose name indicates its objects—captures, confiscations, sequestrations of property belonging to foreigners.

sion of three persons named by the first consul, on the proposal of the ministers of foreign affairs and finance.

3d. This commission is charged to receive and examine the claims of Spanish creditors, to verify their legality according to what is laid down in the 10th article of the aforesaid treaty; and in concurrence with the commissioners appointed by H. C. M., the commission shall determine the character or real value, definitively authenticated, as well as the terms and modes of payment.

4th. Confirmed the authentications already settled at the time of the appointment of the present commission.

5th. The Spanish creditors, who after the authentication of their claims shall have been forced to accept the reimbursement in full or in part, from a false application of laws at variance with the treaty of Basle, which guaranteed the entire reimbursement, will address their claims to the commission. It will decide according to right.

9th. The accounts of authentications, certified by the minister of foreign affairs, shall be communicated to the minister of the public treasury, who shall order the reimbursement according to the disposition and tenor of each article.

11th. The public treasury shall make the payments according to the decree of the consuls, and upon the report made by the minister. The authentication being decreed and fixed, the pay-

ment shall take place without difficulty, without delay, without awaiting the end of the general authentication.

After such a convention, religiously and publicly fulfilled, what excuse can be alleged by those persons who have charged with neglect and weakness as well my administration as that of my successors? How could they say, in the face of the world, that "the indemnities and restitutions due to the crown, or to the subjects of H. C. M., had been constantly denied and all claims rejected?"

And thus they have allowed themselves to stigmatize the equitable and just conduct of the Republican Government, whose honourable proceedings towards Spain have ever been consistent!

Enough of proof: if I am not labouring under a vain illusion, I have shewn to demonstration that this peace of Basle, alike opportune and honourable, saved the country and the throne from those disastrous chances which cost so many tears and so much blood to the other powers of Europe, who were bent upon combating the Republic. The alliance which consolidated the peace was at once a necessity imposed upon Spain by England, and a wise measure of policy, the merit of which belongs to the worthy counsellors of the crown still more than to myself. I obtained, without at first daring to hope it, the advantage of not passing the line by which our interest was bound to that of France. Spain was indebted to that happy

inspiration for the honour of being considered and respected more than any other nation of the European continent. If it was not given us to conquer England, we were at least enabled to withstand her ambition, and to preserve intact our vast dominions beyond sea. This grand result was obtained without compromising our dignity, and still less our national independence. The sacrifices that the maritime war imposed upon us were not sacrifices made to France: we made them for our safety, for our liberty, which France threatened not, and which England wished to deprive us of. In the colossal struggle of these two powers, it was not possible for us to remain neutral; the lesser evil, which it was unavoidable for us to encounter, was to brave the declared enmity of Great Britain, by leaning upon France; and Spain drew more advantage than France from this support. Spain, in short, in spite of this union with the Republic, was not her vassal; the Republic did not exercise sway over her. . . . We are not yet come to the period of the Empire, with regard to which my defence is prepared, and will prove to be equally complete.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

Continuation of the same subject.—Advantages that Spain obtained by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso.

“THE alliance of Spain with France was advantageous only to the latter,” says M. de Pradt. “France had not to uphold any positive interest of Spain, as the latter had no enemy on the Continent, and the only one she had at sea, England, could not be reached by France.”

This assertion is completely erroneous.

First. If France had not any interest of Spain to maintain on the Continent, Spain, on her side, was not bound to maintain those of France.

And if France could not herself, and with her unaided force, affect England, Spain being in the same condition, and the two powers united being able to act effectively against the common enemy, the alliance was equally advantageous to both.

But is it true that France had not the means of injuring England? Is M. de Pradt so ill-informed upon the events of this period? Was he ignorant, that at the periods the most disastrous to the French navy from the commencement of the war to 1795, according to details exposed every where to the sight and knowledge of all the



world, the privateers of the Republic had captured or destroyed more than three thousand English vessels?

Was he ignorant that these enormous losses raised great outcries in England; that the discontent there was extreme; that in a riot caused by this discontent, the King, George III., was publicly insulted, and his carriage assailed with stones? Was he ignorant, that in the month of March 1796 Mr. Wickham was sent to Basle with a mission real or feigned, to treat for peace?—that Lord Malmesbury, charged with a like mission, came to Paris in October of the same year? Is it possible he had not heard of the celebrated conferences which took place between that ambassador and the minister Charles de la Croix! Did he never hear of the brilliant expeditions of Victor Hugues, of Richery,<sup>1</sup> of Gantheaume de Sercy?

Is he ignorant of the impulse given to the dock-yards of the French navy under the ministry of Admiral Truguet, the zeal with which the Directory devoted itself to this department of the public

<sup>1</sup> The city of Cadiz saw the rich prize made by this rear-admiral enter her harbour, consisting of thirty merchant vessels and a ship of war as convoy from the Levant in the month of October 1795. At the same time Victor Hugues had retaken Guadaloupe and St. Lucia from the English, as well as the Dutch Islands of St. Eustatia and St. Martin's. In one of their attempts upon Jamaica, the French closely pressed Kingston, and were very near taking it. At St. Vincent and Grenada they obtained great advantages.

service, the vast enterprises which were set on foot at that period, the co-operation of Holland in all these armaments, and the pecuniary resources she furnished on the occasion ?

Is he ignorant that at the period of our alliance, the maritime coalition of France, Spain, and Holland was in a condition to oppose one hundred ships of the line to the common enemy ?

Has M. de Pradt forgotten that France alone, out of her own resources, made expeditions against Ireland, without reckoning that against Newfoundland, in which the aid of Spain was not, in truth, without advantage to her.\*

In short, is he ignorant that England, disconcerted, had to fear for her own colonies ? And the expedition to Egypt, was it not a prodigious effort of the French navy ?

How, then, could this historian conceive the idea, or accept the office of calumniator of the policy of Charles IV. as well as of my administration ? How could a Frenchman say, that France is powerless

\* This expedition, composed of seven ships of the line and three frigates, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Richery, sailed from Cadiz August 1796, accompanied by a much stronger Spanish squadron, commanded by General Solano, which had the double object of escorting it to the coast of Terra Firma, and then of reinforcing our cruizers and the garrisons in our ports. Richery destroyed the English establishments in Bull Bay and Castles Bay. He sacked the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon : more than one hundred English ships were sunk or burnt : the prizes were numerous and valuable.

against England?—the co-operation of Spain and Holland doubled the resources of the Republic? Undoubtedly this co-operation did not suffice to daunt England; she gained signal victories in the naval engagements she fought against us. But it is not the less true, that the triple alliance attained its objects, by giving her serious occupation, and preventing her from engaging in other enterprises, especially against Spain, enterprises which the ministry had foreseen, and which well-founded fears for their own country forced them to postpone: England was obliged to incur enormous expenses: her mercantile navy experienced multiplied losses; her forces were necessarily divided, a portion of them being employed in Europe; and instead of attacking, she was kept on the defensive at various points. If the whole of the immense possessions of Spain in the two Americas were effectually protected, and in a manner redounding to our honour, during the long years of my administration, this advantage is the fruit of our treaty of alliance. I will say more; in the cruel alternative to which England reduced us, of contending against her or against France, if we had preferred a war with the Republic, the loss of our possessions in America was unavoidable.

Of this I had a full conviction, and this conviction was the basis of my policy; succeeding events have but too surely justified it.

Never has England pardoned either France or

Spain for the share they took in the revolt of her colonies.

. Whether she was our friend or our ally, the old animosity rankled in her breast. Her interest and her ambition counselled her to avenge it. To provoke *emancipation*, to appropriate to herself our wealth in those distant countries, to establish a commercial footing in them, to foment divisions, to render herself necessary there as a friend, as a protector of the parties conquering or conquered, to seize upon the sources of the precious metals,—such was the plan of England; sometimes pushed into activity, sometimes deferred from accidental circumstances—never abandoned—constantly in the order of the day;—the occasion only was wanting: it presented itself. France and Europe were violently agitated; the longer the storm lasted, the greater the chances for England to succeed in her object. If France and Spain had engaged in a war of destruction against each other, the vigilance of Spain beyond the seas was necessarily weakened, and the time was come for causing the loss of her colonies. This was proved to me to demonstration by the conduct of the English minister towards us, in the three years' quarrel we had with the Republic. I do not speak here from hearsay or vain assumptions; the council of state, as already mentioned, saw the thing as clearly as myself when the question arose of an alliance with France. My ministerial papers abound with do-

cuments, advices, official reports, sent from all the viceroys ; secret and perfidious intrigues disturbed those distant dominions ; alarming intelligence, projects, plans of insurrection, of separation, were artfully spread ; the fear was excited of a possible and proximate catastrophe in Spain ; assistance as well as support, in case of a commotion, brought about by circumstances ; better means of improvement ; more institutions, liberal, more appropriate to the moral state of the country ; every thing was offered. Insidious programmes, insidiously distributed and propagated, recommended these subversive ideas. The danger was daily becoming more serious. The fidelity of the colonies still held out : but it was absolutely essential that Spain should be at rest on the side of France, without which all was lost. Engaged in a war with so formidable a neighbour, how would it have been possible to defend at once Spain and America ? . . . .

The honour of the crown was satisfied ; the contest terminated ; peace was concluded without any show of weakness, and in a solid and durable manner ; and England could no longer rejoice in our troubles, or stir them up. Hence so much ill-humour ; hence that persistence in wishing to re-plunge us into the mire, into the miseries of a new contest ; hence all those promises of subsidies, of auxiliary armies, which they had taken care not to put at our disposal when we were fighting alone,

and reduced to our own strength. At present we were offered mountains and wonders to seduce us, as other states more credulous than we were, were seduced, and paid dearly their fatal complaisance.

The counsels and specious promises of England made no more impression than her insults and her threats. The wisdom of the cabinet disconcerted her perfidy, and disdained to answer her bravadoes. By the treaty of alliance the crown of Castile was strengthened, and our two Americas preserved from all danger. These are the facts which apply to the first epoch of my administration; history will consecrate them. I shall here glance by anticipation at the succeeding epoch.

The revolution of Aranjuez, for which England was well prepared, dethroned Charles IV. and delivered over his son to the mercy of the French.

That war of extermination which the cabinet of St. James's was impatiently expecting, and provoking by a thousand means,—that unnatural war broke out in 1808. Spain was involved in a general conflagration. England immediately appeared as a saving angel. She offered aid to an orphan people: this people threw themselves into her arms. What were the consequences?

The cabinet of St. James's, constant in its plans, sought at once to ruin both nations. Assistance was furnished with a Machiavellian parsimony,—just enough to prolong the contest; they calculated its

duration and inevitable effects : they counted, as it were, the pulse of the invalid ; but to balance the first charges, smuggling boldly entered the Peninsula, along with the foreign auxiliaries. Our manufactures were annihilated : and what was not at first strangled by this sudden pressure, soon perished from accidents, either natural or dexterously superinduced during the contest.

The navy of Spain disappeared : part was carried off ; the rest rotted in the abandoned dock-yards and arsenals, which were delivered over to pillage. Our valiant sailors, distinguished alike for skill and bravery, the legacy of former wars, were torn from their special destination, dispersed, lost amidst the military (the English had so advised), and when there remained no more than the name of the ancient Spanish navy, then was the glorious crown of the two worlds miserably mutilated ; by dint of intrigues, seductions, and secret or open artifices, they succeeded in detaching America from the mother country. These are facts which also belong to history.

I will now ask M. de Pradt and General Foy, or him who speaks in his name,—I will ask all my detractors, was the treaty of St. Ildefonso that transaction of which France, like the lion in the fable, alone obtained all the advantages ? Assuredly not. France had nothing to maintain or to lose, except some islands of little importance, and unhealthy or uninhabited coasts. Spain pos-

sessed an entire world beyond the seas. Thanks to our alliance, and to the powerful diversion by means of which this alliance occupied a part of the power of England in defending her own possessions, and even her native soil, all that delightful half of the globe was kept in peace and preserved intact under the laws of the mother country. Shall it be said that this was a miracle, an effect of chance? However, this miracle lasted twelve years, as long a time as the war with Great Britain.\* And I had foreseen this miracle; the result has only justified the calculations and the wisdom of the cabinet with the direction of which I was entrusted.

But commerce suffered greatly, my adversaries will not fail to assert. Doubtless, our relations with America were frequently interrupted; but whose was the fault? We had not provoked England: we had employed every means to bring her back to a system of moderation. Whether from ambition or inveterate hatred against France,—and against France all our measures were unavailing,—not being enabled to seduce or ruin us, she persisted in doing us mischief. The damages she caused us were even slight in comparison with

<sup>3</sup> I say twelve years, not reckoning the short duration of the truce of Amiens. This truce cost us four frigates, an immense treasure, the lives of three hundred brave men attacked in profound peace, and to the great astonishment of all civilized nations, by our friends the English. We lost much less during the whole twelve years of the war.



the sufferings of other nations, dragged on by England much further than they should have gone. Spain experienced some sort of compensation in the national spirit, and in the paternal solicitude of the government, which created unexpected resources. Notwithstanding all the mischances of the maritime war, the wealth heaped up for ages came forth from its recesses, in which mistrust or ignorance had kept it concealed. The sales of property in mortmain favoured the circulation of money; agriculture received useful encouragement; the soil became more fruitful: speculations of industry were multiplied with success. Smuggling sensibly decreased; knowledge, carefully fostered, was making great advances; and the mass of the nation, set in motion by industry, was acquiring a taste for labour. The good faith and loyalty of the government, the patriotic devotedness of commerce, revived our credit; the activity of our dockyards encouraged production. All these advantages were in a great measure repairing the evils of the war; and these evils were not above our power to bear. Every man, at least, held his property secure, his religion free from danger, his fireside free from insult under the watchful protection and through the wise policy of our excellent king, Charles IV.

I am not now dealing in fiction; this great development of the resources, moral, manufacturing, and agricultural, of the country was favoured and

maintained during and in spite of the naval war in which Spain was engaged.

Of this I shall speak more at large elsewhere, when tracing a true picture of this reign, which has been so shamelessly calumniated. I speak in the presence of persons who were then living, and who are still alive ; I call upon them to come forward and convict me of falsehood if I depart from the truth.

A last explanation remains to be given. Were there in Spain, in this state of things, many persons who would have preferred war with France ? Not one. The continual disasters of Italy and Germany made men bless the administration which had saved the country from them. Undoubtedly, Spain, strong and vigorous, was ready to repel whosoever should dare to provoke her by any direct aggression. But no Spaniard would, out of mere wantonness, have exposed his country to a war, which in case of reverse, would have shaken religion, property, morals, the crown of her monarch, and the foundations of her altars. In the interior of the provinces, in the heart of the country, and even in the cities, scarcely was it known that a maritime war existed. Its effects were not sensibly felt ; and where they were, no complaint was made of the Government, which had not provoked the war. It was known to have originated in another quarter. The territorial peace counterbalanced many evils, and kept at a distance the calamities

with which the Continent was afflicted. The same resignation, the same general good-will, the same deference to the Government reigned in America. Though the natives of that continent did not fear attack on the part of France, they desired peace with her, and preferred having to defend themselves against England. This remarkable union of men's minds in the Peninsula, in Asia, in the islands, and, above all, on the continent of America—is a splendid eulogium on the policy of Charles IV. ! The thorough accordance of the people, the extraordinary conformity of their sentiments throughout the whole extent of the empire, gave an immense advantage to Spain. M. de Pradt never doubted it . . . . . shall it still be said that the treaty of St. Ildefonso was advantageous only to France ?

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

Don Joseph Monino, Count de Florida Blanca, President of the Central Governing Junta in 1808.—Manifesto published by the Junta.—Answer to its injurious contents.

AFTER having overturned the throne of Charles IV. and delivered Spain over to the mercy of Napoleon, they who had done the mischief hastened to cast the blame upon me. “He has sold his country,” said they, with unparalleled effrontery. But the veil with which they had covered their intrigues was not yet raised.<sup>1</sup> The indignation excited against me reached almost to madness; my name was outraged, and proscription tacitly extended to all my friends. Many faithful servants of the monarchy were murdered by the excited populace, and several incurred great dangers; others, seized with a cowardly terror, affected to declare against me, endeavouring even to prove that they had always been my enemies. Thus, on one side fear, and on the other calumny, took away from me every species of support. No one

<sup>1</sup> The Letter of Ferdinand VII. to Napoleon was known to the public only in the month of May, after the events of the 19th March 1808; and it was Napoleon who made it known by his answer. This letter discloses all the intrigues of Escôiquiz, l’Infantado, Beauharnais, &c.—E.

dared to raise his voice to defend me ; in truth, it would have been quite useless in presence of the infuriated multitude, who were fully persuaded that I alone was guilty of the treason which delivered up Spain to the French. There were, however, certain persons, or at least there might have been some found, who were enjoying the popular favour, free from every suspicion of connivance, who might have endeavoured to calm this feeling and to throw light on the facts ; not to stir up the flame, or at least to abstain from speaking or writing against their own conviction.

Of all those men who failed in courage and honour, I will only cite one ; his age, his honourable position, his ancient renown, gave him a degree of authority.

I have already refuted the false assertion contained in the manifesto of the *Central Governing Junta*, an official document, but much more remarkable for the justice of the cause it advocated than for the manner in which it was conceived and drawn up. It is in this that I am styled, *the infamous author* of the treaty of 1796 ; and the *alliance with the Republic is characterised as having produced infinite evils*. The double sentence is pronounced in a solemn tone, without, however, stating what were these evils, or even deigning to hint at them.<sup>2</sup>

The Count de Florida Blanca (Don Joseph Mo-

<sup>2</sup> When I come to speak of the events of 1808, I shall give the manifesto with notes.

nino), president of the Junta, made himself the responsible author of the denunciation; that ancient minister, of whom I never was the enemy, and who had never been mine, had often given me proofs of kindness. He had congratulated me more than once upon the success of my administration.<sup>3</sup> The most expressive of his letters refer

<sup>3</sup> An infinite number of strange reports concerning me were circulated; amongst others that which attributed to me the disgrace of the Count de Florida Blanca, in February 1792. So far from having the least share in it, it gave me the most painful concern. Besides my respect and esteem for him, I owed him obligations; he never failed to testify his regard for me, particularly in the presence of Charles IV. I may even add that he had commended me to his Majesty, in doing me the honour of attributing to me considerable capacity for diplomacy.\* The real causes of his disgrace are known. The nobility and clergy were for a long time opposed to him; but the fatal blow was struck by his declared enemy, the Count d'Aranda, who invested himself with his spoils, by succeeding him in the ministry. I have already spoken of him in the 11th chapter of these Memoirs. It is notorious that d'Aranda, not satisfied with having overthrown him, and assumed his place, procured his exile and imprisonment in the castle of Pampeluna. It is notorious, also, that on my entrance into the ministry, one of my first acts was to recall Florida Blanca from his exile, and to restore to him his honours and his wealth. He enjoyed them both and in tranquillity, during the whole of the time that I held the reins of power, or some influence, at court. If I had my papers at my disposal I would bring

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\* It was said at that time, that Florida Blanca, jealous of the distinctions of which young Godoy was the object, had ingeniously tried to persuade the king that it would be well to make him travel, by giving him some diplomatic mission. The thing is possible, but it is not worth while to clear it up.—E.

to the years 1795 and 1796, on the subject of the peace of Basle and the treaty of St. Ildefonso. What was my astonishment when I beheld this aged man paying so disgraceful a tribute to human frailty; belying at once his past life, his character, and his own testimony, and imputing to me misfortunes of which he was himself the primary cause!

In fact, if we go back to the source, the Count de Florida Blanca, without having contemplated it, though he ought to have done so, was the real author of all the mischief to which Spain was a prey.

Is it, then, from cowardice, from weakness of character, or from a wretched condescension to the frantic opinions of the period, that he so cruelly insulted me? He should have expressed himself with more caution than any other man. He was speaking of his successor, of a friend who had fallen whilst struggling against the hurricane, against the dangers that he, Florida Blanca, had bequeathed to Spain, to Europe, to the whole world, by his imprudence or his incapacity. Still, if he had

bring forward in this place several of his letters, full of affection and cordiality. I had received from him, as a private testimony of friendship, six handsome chandeliers and a crucifix of lapis lazuli, which the Count had brought from Rome, where he had been the King's Minister. "I had left you them as a legacy in my will," he wrote to me, "but I prefer that you should be in possession of them now." Some of my old friends who are still living can well recollect having seen these valuable articles on the altar of my oratory.

supported his invectives by some kind of reasoning ; if he had attempted to justify the epithet *infamous*, which he dared to apply to me for having made the treaty of St. Ildefonso ; if he had cited facts to prove that the treaty caused infinite evils, I should have confined myself to answering his assertions by other reasonings ; but he has spoken officially, with a tone of authority ; I must attack him directly in my turn ; I will have my character entirely cleared from this imputation.

Don Joseph Monino, Count de Florida Blanca, prime minister in 1777, found Spain rich, powerful, and in a state of peace the most satisfactory. The road was open and unobstructed for arriving at results favourable to our domestic as well as to our foreign relations ; Spain was respected in Europe ; she possessed a great weight in the political balance. England and France both sought her friendship. Without an enemy on the Continent, her flag floated in security on every sea ; the dynasty of the Bourbons was at the very climax of greatness. She was enjoying in France, in Spain, in Italy, without dispute, the immense inheritance which the policy, the zeal, and the energy of Louis XIV. had procured for her.

What a desirable, what a splendid position for a statesman placed at the helm of the vessel ! A propitious wind filled her sails, the sky was calm, not the least appearance of a storm. The whole of Europe, too, enjoyed a similar perspective of



improvement and progression ; knowledge was advancing rapidly ; industry went forward with prodigious strides ; commerce had no longer any limits ; all nations were growing rich ; it was become easy to do good ; the taste for the good and the useful was extensively spread ; the sovereigns of Europe, more or less advanced, were following the movements of the age—none sought to retard them ; laws improved, education more widely diffused, were dispelling ancient prejudices, and salutary reforms were being gradually made. The bases of power were well established ; no disputes arose on the subject. Neither the ambition of the *many*, nor that of the *one*, coveted any where the supreme power. The questions, always delicate, of *popular sovereignty* and Utopian systems, existed only in books, and attracted the attention only of a small number of readers ; all the ancient authorities were respected ; labour, industry, and commerce, engaged the public attention ; the revolutionary spirit had not yet arisen.

All at once the general calm was disturbed by the quarrel of a country of North America with the parent state. A minister of the king of France, the Count de Vergennes, a grave and profound diplomatist, seduced by the vain glory of thwarting and humbling England, wished to support the insurrection of the colonies ; he secretly provided them with arms, money, and advice ; he ended by treating with them upon the footing of equality.

The French monarchy became the ally of nascent liberty beyond the seas.

England, offended, hastened to encounter her enemy; the war was kindled; and France, to secure her triumph in the war she had provoked, solicited the support of Spain, which was then become necessary.

What was the conduct observed in this state of things by the minister of the Catholic King, a king possessing immense colonies in both hemispheres of America, in which the insurrection had just broken out, in which a republic was growing up at the very threshold of the Mexican empire?

The Spanish minister espoused the dangerous system of France; he dissipated the treasures of the state; he raised loans. Our ships covered all the seas. An active diplomacy was at work for a whole year in undermining the friendships that England enjoyed in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia; and when things appeared to him ripe for his purpose, he threw into one of the scales of the balance the whole weight of the Spanish monarchy. He concurred in this improvident war, which tended to consecrate the insurrection of nations against their legitimate sovereigns. Hence arose that eternal hatred. The fatal precedent called for vengeance, or rather retaliation. . . . The day that the two cabinets of France and Spain leagued together, in defiance of the regard that civilized states reciprocally owe each other, and of

the general laws of preservation that secure social order, Pandora's box was opened, and out flew all the calamities that have since afflicted both the Old and the New World.\*

Was there a stronger power, an irresistible necessity, that obliged the Spanish minister to submit to a condescension that was to cost us so dear? No; Spain was at that time more powerful than France herself. So far from imposing law on her, she was reduced to supplicate. Was it the private wish of Charles III.? Undoubtedly not. That monarch was averse to a coalition with France for any object of such a nature. It was

<sup>4</sup> Let it not be said, in excuse for the Count de Florida Blanca, that the Court of Madrid acknowledged the independence of North America only after the termination of the war. What avails such feeble dissimulation? Spain did not concur the less absolutely in the war while it lasted. During the very year that our cabinet appeared engaged in negotiations, in offers of its mediation between France and Great Britain, our naval forces were augmented, and ready to join the French squadron, if the bases of the mediation were not accepted. Now, what did England demand? a perfect neutrality in the quarrel. What did Florida Blanca propose? a truce of twenty-five years, to embrace even the insurgent colonies. Was not this openly favouring the cause of the latter? France, at least, exhibited frankness from the commencement. She declared for the Americans. But the Spanish minister, all the time protesting his impartiality, and proposing an inadmissible truce, assumed the air of wishing to favour England, whilst he was endeavouring to paralyze the authority of the mother country over her revolted colonies for twenty-five years, that is to say, to give to the Americans the necessary time for consolidating their independence.

not without difficulty that the minister succeeded in triumphing over his resistance. Was it the wish of the public? Still less. Every one deplored the war. Was it for the interest of the country? The disasters before Gibraltar, those experienced by our navy, the ruin of our credit, attest the contrary. And did the evil end there? It was only the prelude to what we were about to suffer. The seed, sown and watered in North America, produced its fruit. The genius of revolution cleared the ocean, and began to agitate France; thence it spread over all Europe; it made the circuit of the globe, leaving everywhere traces of its passage. . . . These are political transactions, and alliances fatal in a very different sense from those of 1795 and 1796; these are indeed treaties of which it may with reason be said that *they occasioned an infinity of evils*. Every nation, every country suffered its share. Such were the results of the system adopted by these two most ill-advised ministers.

Into what an abyss was Spain precipitated? Like the young and imprudent chemist who finds himself all at once surrounded by the fires that he can no longer control, the rash Florida Blanca was seized with dread; doubt beset his mind; his diplomacy could suggest to him no means of arresting the conflagration; he could neither negotiate nor prepare for resistance; the nation was left to the chance of events; the danger was increasing

from day to day, and the ministerial council was struck with a moral paralysis.

Another famed diplomatist was invoked. The Count d'Aranda, although the personal and declared enemy of Florida Blanca, observed the same system of hesitation ; and only struggled in the same ruts in which the other had stuck fast. But the march of the French Revolution was assuming a menacing aspect ; the torrent was rushing upon us, and the new minister did not even think of opposing a dyke. . . . . Spain uttered a cry of alarm.

Young at the time, a soldier yet untried, possessing nothing but my patriotism and my zeal, but elated by the high confidence that deigned to regard me, I dared to take up the burthen which the two illustrious old men had let fall to the ground ; I thought myself called to save my king and my country. . . . All Europe was running to arms ; Spain figured nobly in the field of honour. Often victorious, sometimes vanquished, always worthy of herself, she regained her ancient military glory, and preserved her independence. When the moment arrived, peace was made with honour. The scourge of the Revolution was stayed before the boundaries of the Spanish territory. . . . This personified Revolution produced a son more audacious, more formidable than his mother ; I still had the good fortune to restrain him ; to avoid for a long time the blow he was endeavouring to aim at

us; when at length the terrific giant was about to spring upon us, I desired still to make head against him, persuaded that the country would not abandon me in the holy struggle. Treason and rebellion paralyzed my arm; basely abandoned, insulted, loaded with chains, I fell under the wreck of the throne, which I had defended to the last extremity. . . .

At the report of the fall of the dynasty, and of the foreign invasion, the former magic of his name caused to be evoked, as it were from the tomb, the Count de Florida Blanca, whose physical and moral powers age had exhausted. His enfeebled memory did not remind him that he was himself the primary cause of the evils for which the nation was in vain seeking a remedy. He signed mechanically the manifesto of the Junta. . . . Impartial history will declare upon whom should fall the mark of *infamy*, or the reproach of having caused the calamity of our country. - Florida Blanca scarcely preserved the use of his reason when he ventured upon so unmerited a charge; but he possessed all his faculties at the period when he admitted and consecrated the fatal principle, the consequences of which were wielded by England to our prejudice.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

War with England.—Successes and Reverses to the end of the Year 1800.

It has been already shown, that this war was forced upon us. We had to decide against France or against England; there was no middle course. Honour was consulted more than interest. The defence of our harbours and of our shores throughout the whole extent of the Spanish dominions in the two hemispheres, the proper distribution and the augmentation of our naval force—nothing was neglected: let us examine the results.

Of all the powers which were at variance with England at that period, Spain, from the immense extent of her frontiers, and the distance of her possessions in Asia and America, offered the widest scope to the attacks of England, and, wonderful to say, in that violent war, which continued more than ten years, we only lost one island, of the second or third rank, the island of Trinidad! and that loss was not incurred through any fault of the government! . . . . Four ships of the line, one frigate, and other vessels of different sizes, defended the colony. The squadron was stationed in the harbour of Chaguarrama, under the orders

of Don Sebastian Ruiz de Apodaca, a general officer of some renown in the Spanish service. The governor of the island, Don Joseph Maria Chacon, brigadier of the naval forces, also enjoyed a merited reputation for bravery and skill ; much beloved by the inhabitants of the colony, to which he was a benefactor, and which had never been entrusted to abler hands. Three battalions of veteran infantry, good artillery-men, the colonial militia, provisions and ammunition,—every means of resistance were provided. The English succeeded in intimidating and gaining over a part of the colonists, amongst whom were to be found many foreign adventurers, more attached to their property than to their adopted country : defection and avarice paralyzed the defence.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In politics, the application of a principle sometimes contradicts theory. This island, nearly deserted and abandoned, was an object of great solicitude to the minister Galvez. In a little time it became flourishing ; the unrestricted admission of strangers, the freedom allowed in her harbours,—these were the bases of this sudden prosperity. Spaniards and foreigners were invited to settle and clear a soil favoured by Nature. Those who brought only the ability for labour, received lands, implements, and advances in money, which they were to reimburse in three, five, and eight years, according to the nature and importance of their works. Few Spaniards availed themselves of these advantages ; but foreigners assembled in crowds ; some applied themselves to agriculture, and others to commerce ; all the discontented of the neighbouring islands came over with their capital and with negroes. In 1796, two years before the loss of the colony, there were above 300 sugar manufactories, which yielded an immense revenue. This prosperity was, in a great measure,



With the exception of this triumph (if, however, the acquisition of Trinidad, gained in such a manner, deserves to be considered a triumph) all the attempts of the English against our possessions, whether in Spain or America, were failures, and often with little honour to our adversary. The conspiracy attempted at the Caraccas was a complete abortion. The expedition which for a moment succeeded on the coast of Guatemala was

measure, the work of the unfortunate governor, whose benevolence, mildness, and talents merited a different return, especially from the foreign colonists. In truth these men had brought every thing into the colony except patriotism. The English having threatened them with confiscation if they succeeded in obtaining forcible possession of the island, an open entrance was given to the enemy. During this base defection, and in the midst of the tumult, Chacon became bewildered. He who had made himself beloved, was unable to make himself respected. It required only a single skirmish with the English light companies.

The naval commander, Apodaca, still more disconcerted than the governor Chacon, hastily set fire to his squadron, for fear of its falling into the hands of the English. A decree of the king, upon the report of the minister Cavallero, and countersigned by him, pronounced the dismissal of the two chiefs. Chacon was further condemned to perpetual banishment from his Majesty's dominions.

Thus, as I have before said, it was proved that the best theories are not always without inconvenience in practice. The island of Trinidad prospered from the application of principles, of which the government wished to make trial in the colony. The mother country was expecting to enjoy the fruits of her generous condescension; but at the first danger, the island consulting merely its own interests, whether well or ill understood, voluntarily submitted to another government.

immediately repulsed; the English lost many men there; the armament directed against the Philippines was arrested by the preparations of defence which awaited it, and ended by perishing in the stormy seas in which it had been a long time tossed. It was said at the time that the attempt cost many millions. At a later period the English attacked Porto Ricco: our resistance redounded to the honour of our arms: the enemy was vigorously repulsed, and compelled to re-embark after an ineffectual contest of fifteen days.<sup>2</sup>

A short time afterwards came the attack on Teneriffe; Nelson directed the expedition; he suffered in his reputation and lost an arm.<sup>3</sup> A few

<sup>2</sup> Sixty-eight transports, supported by one three-decker, four ships carrying from fifty to seventy guns, two bomb vessels, with innumerable sloops and gun-boats, had landed 10,000 English on the shore at Cangrejos. The fighting by sea and land lasted fifteen days. The English perceived the inutility of their partial efforts. On our side, a general attack was determined on; they prevented it by hastily taking refuge on board their ships, to which they were hotly pursued, with the loss of 2,000 men killed or prisoners. They abandoned their cannon, ammunition, tents, provisions, horses—all that they had disembarked. About 100 Frenchmen, who were on the island, reaped their share in the glory, to which they greatly contributed. The intrepid Brigadier General, Don Ramon de Castro, commanded in the colony. All the officers and soldiers distinguished themselves in the heroic contest; the negroes, too, deserve to be most honourably mentioned.

<sup>3</sup> The English expedition was composed of three ships of ninety-four guns, one of seventy, three frigates, one bomb vessel, and several light sloops and barks. After a first attack, the troops put on shore were compelled to re-embark. Nelson, enraged,

days before, in the first attack in July, he assisted in the bombardment of Cadiz, and exerted the most unheard-of energy to get possession of our squadron, or to burn it. Our intrepid sailors and the loyal inhabitants forced the enemy to desist from his rash enterprize.<sup>4</sup>

enraged, determined to renew the attack, and march himself at the head of the marines. Under the protection of a dark night, on the 24th July, he attempted a double coup-de-main against the mole and against the city. About eleven o'clock at night, 2,000 men reached within half-cannon shot of Paso Alto. The English gave the shout of attack ; it was answered on our side with a shower of grape. Sixty cannon fired at once. On setting foot on the mole, Nelson was hit by a cannon ball. Andrews, the second in command, was mortally wounded. Captain Bowen, with other officers and upwards of 500 men, remained on the field. The streets were barricaded, and our fire well kept up. Several sloops having missed the entrance to the harbour were driven on shore: the Fox cutter, perforated with balls between wind and water, entirely disappeared. The sea was excessively rough ; the re-embarkation impossible. Don Francis Gutierrez, the governor of the Islands, might have taken prisoner every man there ; but Nelson, whom his men were enabled to save, demanded (a thing incredible!) to be allowed to collect his troops, upon undertaking to renounce thenceforward, not only his own enterprize, but every other in the Archipelago of the Canaries. Gutierrez did not know what forces remained to the English admiral, or might still join him ; he consented ; the English re-embarked. Weak, but generous, Gutierrez lost no time in sending Nelson medicines and dressings for his wound ; and the latter engaged to forward to the Court of Madrid the official correspondence of the Spanish Government. I should add, that the French sailors, a great number of whom were then at Teneriffe, greatly contributed to our victory.

<sup>4</sup> On the two memorable nights of the third and fifth of July, there was an ample harvest of glory for those who directed

Soon after, in 1800, the English came to brave us on our own soil. In August they determined

ed and executed our means of resistance. On the third, in the midst of the darkness, our boats raised the bombardment. The ketch had not been able to throw above five or six projectiles, of which three only fell within the town. The attacks of our gun-boats were obstinate and bloody. Nelson was every where a witness to the courage of our soldiers; and he took especial care of the wounded who fell into his power on the mutual assaults. The second night, that of the 5th, was no less glorious; but it did not cost so much blood; the English spared us, in sparing themselves. Five bomb ketches and one howitzer began the attack. The enemy was enabled to approach nearer in consequence of the rising tide; but he was unable to maintain his fire for more than three hours: he could not even direct it with precision. Five or six bombs fell on the mole; two in the bay, none in the city; all of them burst in the air. The English found themselves in great difficulty to get back by rowing and towing off; they suffered dreadfully before they could re-embark, our fire, both on land and sea, having been incessant and well served. On the tenth, the English were desirous of recommencing, but our new means of defence, now got ready, prevented them. Don Joseph Mazaredo, Commander-in-chief of the squadron, Lieutenant-General Don Frederick Gravina, Major-General Don Antonio Ascaño, Don Domingo de Nava, and Don Juan de Villa Vicenzio, Commadore, Don Antonio Miralles, captain of a frigate, and Don Miguel Yrigoyen, besides many other officers, acquired on that day new claims to the gratitude of their country. Cadiz gave evidence of incomparable patriotism and devotion, the inhabitants at once came forward with a gift of 500,000 francs, and the city further added the necessary funds to establish new means of defence. Within seven days of the blockade there appeared, as if by enchantment, eight tartans, provided with furnaces for red-hot balls, and twenty four-pounders; ten large barks, mounting guns of the same calibre, a great number of gun-boats, &c. The Consulate (Court of Commerce) gave a million of reals, to be distributed amongst the  
soldiers

to attack Ferrol : their aim here, too, was no other than to carry off our squadron, and destroy this noble branch of our marine. At that period, our army was reduced to half the efficiency to which I had raised it; and our finances grievously depressed through the multiplied blunders of the ministers who came after me. In endeavouring to raise and force our credit, they had ruined it. The English were well aware of the state of weakness of our army. They landed 15,000 men on the coast at Doñinos. Ten ships of the line, four of them three-deckers, seven frigates, as many small vessels, transports, and a numerous light flotilla, covered the coast of Galicia.

Is it necessary to ascend to times gone by, in order to seek instances of national glory, when the present age furnishes such splendid ones? Two days and two battles sufficed to confound this invasion, which ended in smoke.

On the night of the 26-27th the English regained their ships with an immense loss, and their military glory tarnished.\* They proceeded

soldiers and sailors; and the Bishop, Don Antonio Martinez de la Plaza, assigned from the revenues of his mitre 7,500 francs in pensions to the wounded and maimed, and the widows and children of the brave men slain in the service of their country. This example was followed by many of the merchants; and the inhabitants of Cadiz honoured me so far as to nominate me perpetual *regidor* (municipal officer) of the city; my assumption of the office was celebrated for three days with public rejoicings.

\* The defence of Ferrol was in great measure owing to the flying

to avenge their defeat on the unfortunate city of Cadiz, then a prey to the yellow fever: they had the cruelty to attack it in these dreadful circumstances, and the impudence to demand that the squadron should be given up. The very sick were anxious to join in the defence,—heroic devotion! To the English the shame alone redounded of having committed useless hostilities against a generous and dying people.<sup>6</sup>

As for the naval successes from 1796 to 1800, the English could only boast of the victory gained by Admiral Jervis at Cape St. Vincent (February 1797). That battle gave them four ships of the line, dismasted and almost destroyed.<sup>7</sup> A few

flying camps which I had established on the coast previously to my quitting the ministry, and which happily had been continued. This is no vain-glory on my part. Whosoever doubts the truth of the fact, may read the *Gazette Extraordinary* of Madrid of the 31st August 1800, and of the 12th of September of the same year. He will there find the details of this brilliant success specially attributed to the camps formed in 1797; and this was not stated as a compliment to me. Urquijo was then minister, and it is well known that he was no friend of mine.

The brave defenders of Ferrol were Don Francisco Melgarejo, commander of the naval department; Don Juan Joachim Moreno, who commanded the squadron stationed in the harbour; Don Francisco Xavier Negrété, captain-general of the province; and field-marechal Count Donadio, who commanded the detached camps for the protection of the coasts.

<sup>6</sup> It was said in France, on this occasion: It is throwing bombs against an hospital.

<sup>7</sup> Our noble squadron amounted to twenty-seven ships of the line, seven of them three-deckers, ten frigates, three corvettes,

months after the Republic of Holland, more unfortunate than we were, lost an entire squadron, nine ships of the line and several frigates.

The capture of some galleons coming from America was not an object of much importance.<sup>1</sup> The English did not obtain by it enough to indemnify themselves for the losses they had incurred by their expeditions against us up to 1800. Add to all this the costly armaments they were obliged to maintain to contend against the triple alliance of France, Spain, and Holland ; the ex-

vettes, &c. It might have prevented the junction of Admiral Parker with Jervis ; and even after their junction, our squadron, under the orders of the commander-in-chief, Don Joseph de Cordova, was still superior to that of the English. They ought to have beaten them. The length of our line, which was ill-conceived, allowed the enemy to cut off or separate six ships which were condemned to sustain the weight of the attack. We lost the *St. Joseph*, the *Salvador*, the *St. Isidore*, and the *St. Nicholas*, notwithstanding an obstinate resistance. Jervis declined a new encounter, and the fleet returned into the harbour of Cadiz. This unfortunate result could not be imputed to the government. There was a fatality, a negligence, an excessive presumption, on the part of the commander, Cordova, an officer who, till that day, had borne an excellent reputation.

The admiral, Don Antonio Valdes, pronounced against him a sentence of dismissal from the service, and declared him incapable of holding any command in future. He was interdicted from residing in the capital, as well as from presenting himself in the principal places of the three departments of the royal navy.

(<sup>8</sup>) Our Gazette and the other public papers detail the numerous prizes made by our privateers, both in Europe and America.

penses occasioned by the necessity of defending their own shores ; in short, the loss of all the trade of our colonies ; and it will be seen that England suffered much more than we did from this collision, which she had herself provoked.



## CHAPTER XXXIX.

Internal Administration, from my Entrance into the Ministry in 1792, to my Retirement in March 1798.

*Finances.*

IN representing in their proper light the acts of administration of the last six years of which I have been speaking, it is not my cause alone that I am defending ; I am speaking also for the honourable men who participated with me in the cares and dangers of an epoch truly memorable and critical. It would be unjust to attribute to me exclusively the blame, if any has been incurred ; and on my side, I have no right to claim as my own the good that was done by my colleagues. There existed between us but one thought, one desire, that of preserving our country from the calamities which pressed upon the rest of Europe, or at least to diminish the eventual share in those calamities which Spain had to dread. Our efforts were not without their use ; other people worthy of a better fate were reduced to envy ours. Such was the result of the respective co-operation of all the members of the council.

To villify, therefore, this period of the government of the Spanish monarchy, is to put on their trial all

the men who concurred in it; those worthy servants of the state are not unknown to the world; the names of Valdes, Acuña, Bejamar, Llaguno, Campo de Alanje, Gardoqui, Varela, La Cañada, Vallejo, <sup>1</sup> deserve to be recorded with distinction. Spain has nothing wherewith to reproach their memory; the good they did not do, it was impossible to perform; and it is much that they turned aside the evil with which we were threatened. To maintain, to preserve, was at that time more than to acquire, or make advances in circumstances of calm and tranquillity. Spain left to herself came forth from the crisis without having exhausted all her resources, without the public weal being compromised or affected. The pressure of the war was hardly felt: the unavoidable taxes reached those only who were able to bear them; they were so happily conceived, that there even resulted from them ameliorations difficult to obtain in any other circumstances. The government diffused benefit from the sacrifices imperiously demanded for the common defence. They who have accused us of malversation and wasteful expenditure, have no just idea of the species of government to which such reproaches should be applied; they have seen what

<sup>1</sup> Le Bailli Don Antonio de Valdes, Minister of Marine; Acuña, Minister of Justice; Llaguno, idem; Porlier, Count de Bejamar, President of the Council of the Indies; Don Felipe Vallejo, Governor of the Council of Castile; Gardoqui, Minister of Finance; Varela, of the Marine; Azedo Rico, Count de la Cañada, Governor of the Council of Castile.

has since taken place. . . . They may now form a comparison between the administration of 1792 to 1798, and those of the subsequent years. They have seen, more especially from 1814 to 1830, and to the present period, a government superlatively loyal ; a restorative government, the one which the men of the Escorial, of Aranjuez and of Bayonne, had evoked by their vows ; which had been got up by so many artifices and bequeathed as their rightful inheritance ; a government which has devoured, gnawed to the very bones, that heroic and gallant monarchy, of which the skeleton only remains. . . . Who can enumerate the sufferings, the agonies of Spain, during the last twenty years ? O my country ! more alive to thy misfortunes than to those by which I am myself overwhelmed, what tears hast thou cost me in my exile ! I have served thee with exclusive devotedness ; I have loved thee with ardour ; my only ambition has been to see thee honoured and renowned amongst the nations of the earth ! On quitting thee, at least I left thee glorious, still *Queen of the two Worlds* ; and amongst thy numerous children, dispersed and tossed by the storm, I am the only one towards whom every sentiment of justice and generosity seems extinguished in the hearts of Spaniards ! Time, that great reformer of the judgments of passion, must have taught thee, O my noble country ! who were thy true enemies. . . . They are the very men who have calum-

niated, persecuted me, who have cast upon me all the errors, the faults, the crimes of which they themselves were guilty, and the unmerited penalty of which I alone am doomed to bear.

But to return to my subject. Here is the exact statement of the *legitimate means*, the loyal resources which Spain put forth during the six years of my ministry, to make head against the terrible exigencies of this long crisis, to preserve her independence, her integrity, and to lower her anchor in a safe harbour, in spite of the hurricane that alarmed the world.

#### *Indirect Contributions.*

A moderate and temporary supply, raised upon certain incomes, privileged or in trust. The stamp tax was applied in all judicial acts, civil or ecclesiastical, as well as in all kinds of civil contracts, or claims of interest for money, increasing in proportion to the amount. The poorer classes were exempt from its operation.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Personal Contributions.*

No personal contributions levied upon the class of the people; and even the old ones were lessened. The working class were held, as it were, sacred.

<sup>2</sup> *Papel de Pobres*, stamped paper of the poor; whoever chose to employ this paper only was at liberty to do so. The treasury was not exacting on this point.

All salaries of employés above eight thousand reals (2,000 francs) were subject to a drawback of four per cent. during the three years of the duration of the war with France. Pluralities in office were reformed. In all the departments, beginning with the palace, the most rigorous economy prevailed.

#### LOANS.

There were many ; but all were national ; I shall give a statement of them :—

##### *1st Loan.*

Sixteen millions of piastres (eighty millions of francs), by virtue of the royal order of the 16th January 1794.

This loan, like the succeeding ones, underwent a long and mature discussion in the council of state. After this first deliberation, the matter was referred to the royal council of Castile, and was again the subject of a further and no less mature examination. None of these state debts were contracted by the supreme *authority*, or by *ministerial influence* ; never, above all, in opposition to the wish of one or other of the councils. When the first loan which is here referred to was raised, after a year's war with France, the royal vales, or bonds of the loan, obtained a premium upon their amount ; which proves, 1st. the confidence in the government ; 2dly. the abundance of capital unemployed ; 3dly. the punctuality of the

treasury in paying the stipulated interest, and in effecting the progressive extinction of the debt. The interest was four per cent., without deduction or charge of any kind.

In this emission or creation of sixteen millions of piastres were comprehended the acknowledged debts of the preceding reign. New funds were specially appropriated to the gradual extinction of this debt ; 1st. the contribution of ten per cent. on the annual produce of the capital and property of the Commons of the kingdom ;<sup>3</sup> 2dly. the right of discount, on the exclusive payment of the piastres, formerly granted to the bank of St. Carlos, and which was deferred for this purpose. These two sources produced an annual amount of more than a million piastres (five millions of francs). There was established at the public treasury a special chest for receiving these funds, entirely distinct and separate from the other revenues of the state, and kept in the said chest under three keys, one in the hands of the minister of finance, the other entrusted to the governor of the council of Castile, the third to the treasurer general ; the receipt, the charge, and the application of these funds to

<sup>3</sup> *Fondos y arbitrios*, funds and means. On the 17th May 1792, the Count d'Aranda being then minister, the surplus of these very funds had been destined for the progressive extinction of the debt in arrear ; but this measure was attended with inconvenience : it pressed unequally on the commons, and moreover it was easy to render it illusory, by so arranging as that there should be no surplus.

the annual extinction of the vales, and the special care of the extinction itself, belonged to the royal council of Castile.

*2d Loan.*

Creation of vales or royal bonds for the sum of eighteen millions of piastres (ninety millions of francs).

In virtue of his Majesty's order of the 8th September of the same year, and bearing interest at four per cent. on the entire nominal value, without deduction or charge of any kind. The royal order decreed that the sinking fund should be increased by a million of piastres ; 1st. arising from a supplement of seven millions of reals (or 1,750,000 francs) to the annual subsidy of the clergy, conformably to the brief of his holiness obtained to this effect; 2dly. of an extraordinary and temporary contribution from all leasehold land, real property, royal, jurisdictional, and other rights ; which contribution was raised to six per cent. on the value of the lease, but with an exception in favour of every proprietor who himself farmed, or superintended the cultivation on his own account. There was likewise levied, still for the same purpose of the sinking fund, five per cent. on the net produce of royal and jurisdictional rights, and the four per cent. on leases of houses and manufactories, with the exception of those inhabited by the proprietors themselves, or employed on their account. This latter contribution was by no means novel, for it had been sub-

stituted for that of the *civil fruits*; 1st. to render that contribution more effective; 2dly. to avoid the difficulties of that of the *civil fruits*, which could never be regularly established; in fact, this latter contribution, ill understood, and already odious under the ministry of Moniño and Llerena, had only met with partial success in some provinces, and produced, on the final computation, no benefit to the treasury. The sound and politic views of the government may clearly be discerned in the royal decree of the 8th September.\*

\* Royal Decree.—“This creation of eighteen millions of piastres has appeared to me the most prompt mode, and the least onerous to the state, considering the known result of the former creation of the month of February of this year.

It is assigned from funds which secure the extinction of the principal and the payment of the interest; the operation will proceed altogether independently of the ordinary revenues of the crown, which being, as they are, proportioned to the current charges and expenditure, ought to remain altogether distinct from the extraordinary expenses occasioned by the war. In conformity with these motives,” said his Majesty, “wishing to secure the payment of the new obligations and debts, as they become contracted, and considering that this mode is the most advisable for maintaining public credit and removing all uncertainty, various sources have been proposed to me as proper for augmenting the sinking fund, instituted by my decree of the 16th January of the present year. I have submitted these proposals to the council of state, which, observing that the heavy burthens were already imposed on the poorer classes, who are serving both in purse and person, conceived that the funds destined to the payment of the extraordinary debts, ought to be furnished principally by our subjects who are proprietors, and who live on their revenues. Now as these constitute the class upon whom fall the contribution of the *civil fruits* (royal decree of



*3d Loan.*

Charles III. wishing to give full security to the debt of the state contracted in his reign, and to meet, at the same time, the expenses of the war with Great Britain, raised a loan, to be either redeemable or as a life annuity, at the choice of the capitalists. This loan was only partially effected, the termination of the war having rendered the money unnecessary which the treasury had for a moment required. However, many of

of the 29th June 1785), hitherto imperfectly organised in most of the provinces, and as the small produce of this contribution has barely sufficed to cover the ordinary expenses and obligations of the state; the council has decided that it would be proper to suppress it, and replace it by an extraordinary and temporary contribution exclusively applicable to the sinking fund, at the same time not extending to those provinces already liable to the old contribution . . . . Persuaded of the justice of these reasons, so conformable to my paternal intentions, and my constant desire of favouring the less fortunate classes of my subjects, by my decree of this day, addressed to Don Diego Gardoqui, my secretary of state for the financial department, I suppress the said contribution of *civil fruits*, as you will see from the copy of my decree above mentioned, and I establish an extraordinary and temporary one, having for its sole object the progressive extinction of the *royal vales*; the royal council shall be charged with the collection and the application, as already stated, of the receipt and of the ten per cent. derived from the *funds and property* of the commons of the kingdom, in order that these amounts may never be confounded with any other revenue of the state, and that under no pretence they may be diverted from the purpose to which they are destined. The council will scrupulously watch that they are assigned to the sinking fund, and will employ all the zeal requisite in so important an operation," &c.

these obligations issued at the commencement of the operation, and others, arising from the arrears of the reign of Ferdinand VI. were in public circulation when Charles IV. ascended the throne. His first care was to have the total amount recognized and classified. In a short time there was paid off and cancelled the sum of twenty-six millions of reals (six millions and a-half of francs).

The debts thus liquidated or classified of Philip V. and Ferdinand VI. amounted to 91,336,800 reals (about twenty-three millions of francs). The necessity of acquitting these debts, and the enormous charges of the war with the French Republic became pressing. The Government conceived the thought of reproducing and completing the old loan of Charles III. It was wished, by this means, to convert the old debt into a current one, to make of the two but one consolidated mass, free the treasury from debts then payable, and interest the old creditors in the success of the operation by the value given to their renovated titles. This matter having been maturely considered by the council of state, it was determined to offer to the creditors an advantageous employment for their old obligations, which they were to have the power of converting into bonds or shares in the new debt. The old debts were received at the treasury at their nominal value, to the amount of a third or a fourth of the capital which it was wished to employ. This investment of capital was to be payable by

the state, and was to produce an interest of three per cent. The two-thirds being furnished in ready money, royal vales, or bank notes, and the other third in old debts, also with an interest of seven per cent. on the two heads, or of eight on the one alone; Spaniard or foreigner, every one was admitted to take part in the loan; and with regard to the latter, an express clause guaranteed, under the royal word, the payment even in case of war with the power of which he was the subject.

The revenues on the tobacco of Europe and America were assigned as a special security, keeping apart from the amount the sum necessary for the payment of the annual interest. In order to give to the obligations of the crown all the necessary force, the king stigmatized solemnly, as an error always to be reprobated, *the opinion tending to regard the treasury as incompetent, when it has contracted engagements*. His Majesty, besides, devoted and assigned, in general, all the revenues of the state to the payment of the said loan, and submitted to the ordinary courts all disputes on the subject between the lenders and the treasury. To add to these modes of security in the new claims or recognizances for the sums furnished, there was made no further mention of the first origin of these vales, which, from that time, became one and the same with other debts. The treasury was to admit them without distinction, and to give the recognizances without any charge.

*4th Loan.*

New creation of royal vales of thirty millions of piastres, (150,000,000 of francs) by virtue of the Royal order of his Majesty and of the Council. 4th March 1795.\*

At the same time, and very opportunely the government received from the court of Rome the

\* Royal order.—“Although to meet the serious wants and exigencies of the war there have been imposed temporary burthens on employed capital, and specific contributions on the more affluent classes of my subjects, sparing as much as possible the poorer class; considering that these products, although considerable, are yet insufficient to cover the expenses of this campaign, according to the conditions and plans which have been furnished to the council, it has appeared less burthensome to create a quantity of *royal vales* proportioned to the efforts required by the justice and the necessity of the common defence. This mode is in truth more simple, and will alone remove the difficulties of our present position. For if, as is pretended, the manufacturing and agricultural wealth of Spain is inferior to that of the other European powers, it is still sufficiently considerable to pay the interest of a debt, which, were it raised to double its present amount, would not still reach a tenth of the known debt of those powers. Notwithstanding this, prudence and other considerations of the public good have always led me to use with moderation the resources offered by loans, and to provide before-hand a security for the payment of the interest, as well as the progressive extinction of the capital, in order that there may exist no doubt as to the preference to be given to the said royal bonds over every other tax, and that they may possess a special credit in their character of *current money*.

“Such has been the rule I have observed in this new loan. The reimbursement of it is guaranteed by assignments already known, without reckoning the others, which will be successively decreed,

apostolic concessions which, after long discussions in the council of Castile, had been demanded of his Holiness. It was essential to maintain the public credit by all possible means ; these concessions were capable of contributing greatly to this object ; they were, 1st, thirty-six millions of reals (nine millions of francs), which the clergy of Spain, of the Indies, and of the adjacent isles, were to pay as an *extraordinary subsidy* once only in the year, and thirty millions besides (seven millions and a-half of francs), which the same clergy were to continue paying as an ordinary contribution ; 2dly, the application to the royal treasury of the revenue of the *dignities, prebends*, and other ecclesiastical benefices in the king's gift (curacies excepted), which should be then vacant, or might become so during the whole of the time necessary to meet the expences already incurred, and for the extinction of the royal vales.

It was thus that, without compromising our independence by the admission of foreign subsidies, without affecting our own credit by loans from

decreed, so that the object may be fulfilled with exact punctuality ; in virtue of which I have authorised the creation of *thirty millions of piastres*, that is to say, twenty-one millions of vales, of one hundred and fifty piastres ; and nine millions of vales of six hundred piastres. Both the one and the other shall be issued the 15th March of the present year, from No. 223,501 to 378,500 inclusively, constituting a sequence to the preceding creations, with interest at four per cent., and without charges for negotiation," &c.

abroad, the government of Charles IV. succeeded in covering the enormous expenses, the losses occasioned by the reverses of the former campaign. The armies received numerous reinforcements ; the matériel of these armies was immediately restored, and the royal navy augmented : all concurred in preparing for the third campaign which saved the kingdom, and enabled us to obtain an honourable and solid peace. If some unreasonable persons blamed these dispositions, eminently national, I might even say, religious, since, in coming forward to the support of the state, the clergy were at the same time supporting the cause of the altar : the great mass of Spaniards at large blessed the supreme Pontiff, who consecrated the measures adopted, and the wise monarch whose ministers, by removing a multitude of obstacles, had boldly opened this road to safety.

I must, however, request of my readers to remark, that it is from this epoch of my administration that must be dated the hatred, the system of calumny, of my enemies. . . .

The choice of a person, worthy, capable, faithful, and at the same time, agreeable to the clergy, proved at once the consideration of the government for the church, and the disinterestedness of the authorities. Don Pedro Joachim de Murcia was nominated ; he was an old servant of the crown, and a member of the council of Castile. Every one was acquainted with his elevated character ; none

had ever assailed his exalted reputation. A government less pure than that of Charles IV. would not have chosen so scrupulous a depository.

### 5th Loan.

(31st July 1795): 240,000,000 of reals, (sixty millions of francs) repayable in twelve years.— See the conditions in the royal order, published by the council.\*

\* Royal order.—“To meet the expenses of the war, and wishing to spare my subjects new contributions, and the inconvenience of a superabundance of *royal vales*, which, by their character of a common currency, necessarily affect the prices of provisions and merchandize, after having adopted the most simple and economical means to provide for the interest as well as the extinction of the former loans; by the unanimous advice of my council of state, in the sitting of the 31st July last, I have resolved to open a loan of 240,000,000 of reals, divided into 240,000 shares (*actions*) of 10,000 reals each. . . . There shall be received for this purpose, without distinction, *current money* and bonds or *royal vales* of the former loans at their integral value, comprehending therein the interest, and to reckon from the day of the delivery; there shall be paid five per cent. till the reimbursement of the capital, which shall take place in the term of twelve years, dating from 1797, at the rate of twenty millions of reals a-year. There is further granted to the lenders, for this once only, a premium of three per cent. upon the capital, amounting to the sum of 7,200,000 reals, which shall be distributed by way of lottery amongst the 240,000 shares, under the regulations and in form following:

“First Article: This loan is declared national debt. All the revenues of the state are affected to the repayment; and, as a special pledge, the produce and revenue of the customs at Cadiz.

“Second and third Articles: Form of the orders to be delivered to the lenders.

“Fourth

It is not necessary to be well versed in these financial matters to perceive, that if on the one hand the government had interests to manage with a host of creditors, whose generosity had provided it with the means of continuing the war, nevertheless its principal object was to secure the credit of the *royal bonds*, to prevent fluctuation, to maintain the level of value in the state, to diminish the price of

“ Fourth Article: Permission granted to the lenders to receive the interest accrued, and the capital at the proper time, either at the public treasury, or from the provincial treasurers.

“ Fifth Article: Indication of the series of the numbers.

“ Sixth Article: Indorsements prohibited: it is allowable to sell, make over, transfer, but by a public and notarial Act: formalities to be observed.

“ Seventh Article: Payment of the fractions of interest incurred up to the new year, from which the successive interest is to date.

“ Eighth Article: Foreigners shall be allowed to concur up to the end of November next.

“ Ninth Article: Designation of the lottery shares, after the realization of half the loan: formality and solemnity of the drawing.

“ Tenth Article: Fixing of the second drawing for the second year, after the realization of a determinate portion of the loan; exclusion of the lenders who shall come too late, unless the Government consents to admit them to come forward.

“ Eleventh Article: This loan, in short, like the preceding ones, having no other design than that of contributing to the national defence, I solemnly declare, in my own name and that of my successors, that in case of war with the powers whose subjects shall be holders of shares or orders of this loan, the interest and principal belonging to them shall be paid punctually, as if in a state of peace, renouncing all rights of detention or reprisal, without the possibility of there arising, on this point, any species of doubt or contestation,” &c.



specie, and above all to strengthen morality, which is easily lost amidst the proceedings and speculations of the exchange. These were the views of the government, which was giving an example of good faith. The bank orders, and the vales or royal orders, were received at all the treasuries of the state, at their nominal value: the interest was paid with punctuality. Commerce acted in the same spirit, and even anticipated the views of government. Every measure was grounded on the general interest, and all these operations had more or less for their object to prepare the way for those reforms or ameliorations, which it would have been impossible to attempt directly, without provoking the resistance of the privileged orders.

A few days after the issue of the fifth loan, a new fund was added by royal order of the 24th August, to those of the sinking fund of the *royal vales*. I will repeat some passages of this order, which display the frankness and simplicity of official language at that period. The government writers did not endeavour to evince a vain eloquence; but they had good sense, and above all, a high respect for truth.<sup>7</sup> Under the same date,

<sup>7</sup> Royal order.—“Convinced of the imperative necessity of consolidating the public credit, and extinguishing, as soon as possible, without, however, affecting industry, the *royal vales*, created on the occasion of the last war, I have caused to be examined, by the members of the royal council, in whom I place entire confidence, the various means suited to covering the expences and augmenting the funds for this extinction, established  
by

and always with the same motives, another royal order assigned a drawback of fifteen per cent. upon

by my decree of the 12th January 1794. My council of state was at the same time intent upon this subject with all possible zeal, and, according to their unanimous advice, I have approved of several of those means already successively presented to the cognizance of the public. I have now resolved, that for the distinct unchangeable object of being applied to the extinction of the said vales, there be imposed a tax of fifteen per cent. on all the fixed property and real or royal rights acquired henceforth by mortmain in the kingdoms of Castile, Leon, and other parts of my dominions, by what title soever held, whether gratuitous or conditional, by testament, last will, or donation during life. This deduction will be but a slight compensation for the loss of the rights of the treasury, in the sales or exchanges which suffer no deduction, and the losses to the state caused by the stoppage of circulation of the property which falls under the power of the said mortmain, \* such as the rights of alienation and of long leases,

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\* Would it not have been better, it may be said, to prohibit formally all acquisition by mortmain, and thus cut off the evil at the root? I have a plain answer to this question. What prevents at the present time (1834) the government of Spain, armed with a national representation, with its two Chambers of Peers and of Deputies of the kingdom, from adopting a multitude of reforms pointed out, and which the two reactions of 1814 and 1823 rendered abortive? Forty years of progress, from 1795 to 1834, have notwithstanding passed on. This is my first observation. Let us pass on to the second:—The right of property ought to be respected, in order to stimulate further the natural ambition to acquire. Every opposition to this right necessarily chills the love of labour, whose end is to produce, to possess, and which consequently augments the mass of the public wealth. The law ought never openly to thwart the affections and views of the possessor. Put, if you will, some sort of restraint or indirect obstacle to his disposing of his property in a way disadvantageous to the society of which he is a member, but let him, nevertheless, be allowed to fulfil the intentions by which he is influenced; without which he will no longer make the same efforts, or he will make none to augment production and the general wealth. The only stimulants to labour are

all sorts of property, rents, and jurisdictions belonging to the crown, converted into entails.

leases, rights, judicial sales, definitive or reserved in favour of mortmain, exchanges, charges, or pensions on defined secular property, the founding of benefices lay or ecclesiastical in perpetuity or redeemable, all to be subject to this contribution or drawback ; there shall be at present no exception, saving that in favour of capital placed or vested by ecclesiastical corporations, or by holders in mortmain against the state, or converted into royal vales. I declare, in order to avoid all ambiguity on the subject, that this denomination of mortmain applies to seminaries, houses of instruction, hospitals, and all pious foundations which are not under my immediate protection, or whose property should be administered by a community or by ecclesiastics, &c. &c. The rest of the Order contains the rules and formalities to be observed, in order that this contribution might be real and effective towards the definitive increase of the sinking fund."

Royal decree.—" Profoundly affected by the constant generosity

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pecuniary interest or glory ; an exalted love of country, disengaged from every secondary interest, is the most noble sentiment of the human breast. But this heroic sentiment is unusual. From a sort of fatality, he that takes it for his guide lives surrounded by enemies. The fraternity of the envious and the wicked will always be numerous and powerful. Let governments strive to implant and foster this love of country, but let them not too far constrain the natural affections, the weaknesses of humanity. Extract from these all possible advantage. Favour the knowledge that corrects manners, and which can turn even evil to the profit of the state ; above all do not cross too violently the natural affections of which man has so much difficulty to divest himself. Such were my opinions at the time of my first entrance into the world. My head blanched with age, enlightened by experience painfully acquired, still entertains the same ideas. It will be seen, in the course of these memoirs, that my principles have been always the same. My doctrine is to be seen in my acts : I venture to affirm it, without fear of being accused of exaggeration, that never has any Spanish minister had it more at heart than myself, to excite and honour the sacred love of country.

(Majorats or substitutions):—When the royal council should have granted its authority thus to circumscribe property, and to confine its

rosity and ardour, with which my subjects have manifested their attachment to my person on the great occasions that have just taken place, I cannot rest satisfied with having put an end to the calamities of war by an honourable and advantageous peace, a worthy result of so many loyal sacrifices; I desire further to recompense my people, and enable them to experience from this moment the effects of my royal beneficence: I grant them immediately a relief which my paternal love was long endeavouring to bring about, whilst awaiting those ulterior concessions which I promise, as soon as the engagements contracted during the war shall have been fulfilled. The contribution designated under the name of ordinary and extraordinary service, and the fifteen per thousand had always appeared to me injurious to the progress of agriculture and to the general welfare of the kingdom, because these two imposts affected an interesting and numerous class which is least favoured, and which contributes most to production, and to the common defence, both in money and person; has not this class, nevertheless, poured forth its blood and its means with a devotedness beyond all praise or compensation? According to these just motives, and until I can obtain for all my subjects in general the relief I am contemplating in their favour, I commence with testifying my benevolence towards those who are so usefully employed in reproducing the fruits of the earth, in creating that abundance which augments the public wealth, and who, besides, are the poorest and the most burdened with taxes. This class has need of support and protection to recover itself, to improve its condition and enjoy at ease the fruit of its labour.

“ In consequence I have resolved wholly to suppress the contributions of ordinary and extraordinary service, and of the fifteen per thousand.

“ I order that from next year and thenceforward, they cease to be exacted in the provinces of the kingdom where they were established,” &c. &c.

movement, the supplements added to these entails, by testament or last will, were subject to this drawback, with the single exception of the capital which the testator or donor preferred to place in the public treasury, or to employ on royal vales. . . . This order, as well as the preceding ones, was only published on the report of persons worthy of entire confidence, and on the unanimous vote of the council of state ; the individuals aimed at by these financial measures, were variously affected by them : but they were applauded by the nation, and beneficial to it. Complaints and murmurs were raised against me alone, as head of the cabinet ; gratitude, the expression of which is always more subdued and measured, divided her tribute amongst all my colleagues.

Thus sailed the vessel of public finance with a prosperous wind, so that the excellent Charles IV. had the satisfaction of seeing one part of his wishes accomplished. The people were exempt from more than one contribution.

This favour or protection, thus spontaneously granted to agriculture, under circumstances when so prompt a reduction of the public burthens was little expected, created a marked conviction of the value of peace, and strengthened the public confidence which had not yet in any degree been withdrawn from the Government.

Gratitude amounted almost to enthusiasm, when it was seen that this unexpected reduction was brought about with perfect good faith.

The part of the provincial rentes which the king was suppressing were for a long time applied to old debts of the state (*Juros*<sup>8</sup>). The government assumed the responsibility of these old debts, whose origin was removed to a far earlier period than that of the accession of the Bourbons to the throne of Spain.

Moderation, sincerity, good faith towards all, constituted the system pursued, as much from a principle of justice as from the well understood interest of the state.

Next came the suppression of the temporary deduction from the salaries of public servants . . .

Many of the communes were exempted from payment of their arrears of contribution, especially in those parts which had suffered most from the ravages of war ; some of these communes received, moreover, aids which they had not applied for . . . There was shown a marked predilection in favour of the widows, the orphans, and the wounded of the soldiery. Pensions, or proportionate sums of money, were distributed to them. Every loyal act met with its recompense ; every loss, its indemnity: thus was acquitted the debt of the country. The monarch, eager to do good, gave no rest to

<sup>8</sup> *Juros*, old claims against the state, which date as far back as the reigns of the catholic sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella, successively pared down and diminished, but the total of which was still important in amount, although reduced to the twenty-fifth part of their primitive value, . . . . one in twenty-five.

his ministers till these sacred duties were accomplished. No claim was rejected; attention was, above all, paid to those of the humbler class, who have not the means of procuring redress.

The government of the king was recovering its vigour; all was progressing with ease and regularity; the wounds of the state were beginning to close, when the hateful policy of England began to raise up new storms.

It became necessary to discover new resources—to renew our sacrifices—to sustain the public credit under the shock which the maritime war was about to produce. The good-will of the commercial interest seconded the efforts of authority to support the currency of the paper money, and to prevent fluctuations, which excite and stir up every kind of mistrust. The recent peace with the French Republic had already allowed the reduction of half the issues of the fifth loan of 240,000,000 of reals, opened in the last year of the war.

This loan, favourable to circulation, and even to the royal vales, which were received for their full nominal value and as ready money, was again called into action.<sup>9</sup> The success it had had,

<sup>9</sup> Royal Order of the 7th July 1796.—“ You know that by my royal order of the 13th August 1795, published in virtue of my decree of the second of the same month, a loan was opened of 240,000,000 of reals to meet the expenses of the war, taking, at the same time, suitable measures to secure at once the payment of the interest and the extinction of the principal . . . . . The cessation of the war having allowed breathing

the good effects it had produced on the paper currency, in meeting the wants of commerce, which

breathing time, and my Government having no longer occasion for the whole of the amount, I had judged fit to suspend the further payments, one-half of which had already been effected, as well as the drawing of the premiums agreed on according to the principle of the operation . . . . . But the present circumstances of Europe requiring that the greatest part of our land and sea forces should be kept in a state of readiness, there arise new expenses which it is impossible to discharge with the ordinary revenues of the Crown.\* It has been shewn that the most ready and the most advantageous mode of meeting them, would be the realization of the half, as yet unissued, of the loan of 240,000,000 of reals, the repayment of which was secured beforehand by measures already taken ; that the completion of this loan would dispense with the necessity of having recourse to other taxes ; that the royal vales would be the more valuable, by having a part of the new funds devoted to the extinction of the said vales, and that by this disposition I should still be enabled to continued the reduction of heavy taxes of which my well-beloved subjects were beginning to feel the benefit.† After having submitted this matter to the examination of my council of state, and, conformably to their advice, I have ordained by another decree of the same day, that from  
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\* This passage of his Majesty's order is sufficient to give the lie to those who accuse me of having availed myself of the leisure of peace to slumber on the bosom of pleasure, and of having neglected the navy and army. It is the king himself who takes care to justify me, as well as the council of Castile, by this declaration, addressed to the nation at large upon a fact, besides, of public notoriety. Thus it is with all the attacks that have been directed against me.

† Although the royal order does not enter into details, allusion is here made to the measures adopted by the commercial body towards the government for the purpose of supporting the credit of the royal vales, and to the noble and patriotic address which was presented to his Majesty, on proposing to him to complete the loan of the 240,000,000.



required its completion, determined the king and his council to prefer it to every other means of covering the expenses of the war with England.

*6th Loan,*

Of 100,000,000 of reals (twenty-five millions of francs) on the same conditions and in the same form as the preceding, opened the 15th July 1795.<sup>10</sup>

To this loan, guaranteed by the whole of the state revenues, was assigned a specific mortgage,

this time and till the end of December in the current year, either at the public treasury or at the provincial chests, there be received the funds that shall be lent, to be re-issued in shares (actions) of 10,000 reals each, until the completion of the 120,000,000 of reals remaining of the aforesaid loan, the repayment of which, as well as the payment of interest thereon, shall be made in the forms prescribed by my royal order above mentioned, together with the drawing of the premiums agreed on, as soon as the loan shall be completed ; or at the beginning of the next year, as has been done for the part of the loan already realized . . . . . Regard being had to the convenience and advantage resulting in all respects from the extinction of the royal vales, I will that, to augment the funds destined to this important object, all the principal in specie proceeding from this loan, be religiously applied to it," &c.

<sup>10</sup> Royal Order.—“ The extraordinary expenses required for the defence, the honour, and the safety of the kingdom in the present conjuncture, demand new sacrifices ; new resources must be raised. I have long reflected on the means necessary to obtain adequate funds without creating new taxes ; considering that the less wealthy class of the country has not been able to enjoy the advantages of the loan of 240,000,000 opened by my decree of the 8th August 1795, because the shares were raised to the fixed sum of 10,000 reals each ; and wishing to reconcile

that of stamped paper, an assured produce, free from every assignment upon it. It was offered to natives and to foreigners, with express renunciation of all right of sequestration, drawback, or reprisal, in case of war . . . . to which should be added another advantage announced in the royal order:—"As this loan is issued in favour of the less wealthy class, with a view to spare the holders the expense of powers of attorney, contracts of sale, justification of title, &c., the transfer of shares may be effected by simple indorsement."

Another advantageous condition was, that the part of the loan furnished in money should likewise be replaced in specie at the period of the definitive repayment.

The eagerness to full up this loan became such that the government found itself obliged, as it were, to raise it to sixty millions of reals more (fifteen millions of francs), which gave rise to another royal order of his Majesty.<sup>11</sup>

reconcile the duty of meeting the expenses of the state with the interest of my subjects, who ought all to profit by the produce of the amounts which circumstances oblige us to borrow, I have resolved to authorise a new issue of 100,000,000 of reals in 25,000 shares of 4,000 each. For this loan there shall be received, without distinction, money and royal vales with annual interest at five per cent. from the day of the deposit of the amounts till their reimbursement, which shall take place in the term of twelve years, reckoning from the present month of July to the 30th June 1809. There is further granted to the lenders a premium of three per cent. distributed by lottery amongst the 25,000 shares," &c.

<sup>11</sup> Royal Order.—"The loan of 100,000,000 opened by  
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These operations, useful, salutary, welcomed by public opinion, saved the people from a multitude of burthensome taxes, which, without this

my royal decree and order of council of the 12th and 15th July last, having been filled up with so much promptitude, that many persons, determined not to take the shares till the last moment, in order the longer to enjoy the advantages they offer in comparison with other investments of capital in the state, complain that they have not found any disposable shares;\* and desirous on the other hand, to meet the actual wants of the treasury, which do not allow of delay for the realization of other well-considered means, to ensure the extinction of the debt, and maintain the public prosperity, I have resolved to increase the amount of the said loan, created by my royal decree and order of council, to sixty millions above the 100 already issued; which sixty millions shall be divided into 15,000 shares of 4,000 reals each, under the same rules and conditions adopted for the 25,000 shares preceding. The extinction of these last 15,000 shall commence in July 1810, the year immediately following that

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\* The capitalists found no other inconvenience in this, than the too early appointment of the time of repayment. Every one wished to be the last to be repaid, in order to profit the more by an advantageous investment: so that many came too late to take up the shares—the loan was already completed.

Nothing could convey a greater eulogium on the government which inspired so much confidence. Shall it be said that it was prodigal in stipulating such high interest? (for the interest on the last loan, including the premiums and other advantages, amounted, in fact, to more than eight per cent.) But let the matter be well weighed; let the results of these operations, the vigour given to the paper money; the lowering the price of specie; the mischiefs avoided by the absence of fluctuations, receive their due consideration; and it will appear, that in spite of this interest, in appearance so excessive, the public treasury and the general wealth lost nothing by it. What signified the eight per cent. at that period, when the capital and the interest did not remain, as in these latter times, in the palace, or in the hands of a few bankers, courtiers, stock-brokers, and other wolves, the true leeches of the state? At the time of which I speak, nothing was nominal, artificial—all was real and undisguised.

happy resource, it would have been necessary to impose, or retain in full force. The rich bore the weight; they willingly accepted the burthen, their own interest being identified with that of the country. . . . All these financial changes, impressed with the same character, had for their object to spare the poor and laborious class, to restore capital to circulation, and support the credit of the state. . . .

I will confine myself to reciting some of these means:—

1st. The assessment, or taxation, redeemable by the public treasury of unemployed capital, left in deposit, or destined to fall into mortmain and into the hands of the clergy.<sup>12</sup>

that in which is to be effected the extinction of the others, and shall be completed in 1816, according to the order established; that is to say, 2,000 shares shall be annulled in each year, and in the last year the 3,000 remaining. The payment of the interest of these shall take place at the same time as that of the 25,000 preceding," &c.

<sup>12</sup> Here is the important part of the royal order issued the 3d September 1793. "The great expenses of the present war, the most costly the Spanish monarchy has ever had to maintain, oblige me to take extraordinary measures; it is moreover indispensable to provide with punctuality, as has been hitherto done, for all the other wants of the state.

"In these grave circumstances, it was incumbent to consider the best means to be adopted, without too much burdening my well-beloved subjects. It has been felt, that one of the most equitable, and which, without injuring any one, will be advantageous to the public weal, consists in taking advantage of the capital existing in deposit, or destined to be invested in favour of entails (majorats), substitutions, ecclesiastical patronage,

2d. The revocation of all privilege or exemption from the payment of tythe. It is to be observed, that the general class of agriculturists were subject to this heavy tax, and on the other hand, that certain persons, and opulent corporations and classes, had found means of procuring a dispensation from it, by old concessions from the Holy See. In consequence, many churches were destitute of the funds necessary for the service of the altar, and the public treasury lost its part (*Tercias Reales*), the king's third, which it ought to have derived from that source. The Government soli-

age, pious foundations, &c.—a capital at this moment, and for more or less time past, withdrawn from circulation. . . . The example for this was furnished by my august predecessor, in the last war with England. . . . By disposing of this capital, it is possible to meet the expenses of the just war in which I find myself engaged: it is to spare the holders of entails, and those having title to those pious foundations, the inconvenience of being themselves deprived of the interest of their capital, and the public the loss from the non-circulation, buried as it were, and lost, or exposed to every species of casualty.

“After having attentively weighed these considerations, and received the reports, which were communicated at an extraordinary sitting convoked for this purpose the 12th September last, the council have proposed to me, and I adopt the following resolution: Immediate use shall be made of this capital, in order that, on the one hand, the will of the founders may be religiously fulfilled, and, on the other, that an end may be put to the losses above-mentioned. In consequence, the said capital shall be taken at a redeemable rate, on an interest of three per cent., the highest the laws authorize in contracts of this nature; and I assign, as guarantee for the payment, the produce of the sale of tobacco, as was done in 1780 by the king my father,” &c.

cited and obtained a brief from his Holiness, annulling these privileges. Amidst so many wise measures adopted at this period, this met with the most opposition. The high classes, hitherto exempt, felt it deeply; but the administration pursued its system with becoming firmness. The people, and in general all that were taxable, expressed great satisfaction.

3d. The produce of buildings, and immoveable property belonging to corporations, and the placing of this produce on the revenue of tobacco, with interest at three per cent. . . . The ministry, the council of state, and that of Castile, employed themselves simultaneously, and by turns, and with equal ardour, on these matters of public economy. They were desirous of bringing back into circulation a mass of capital held in mortmain, and by religious corporations: a stagnant wealth, and which was wasting away in the hands of their pious holders. This was one of the greatest ulcers in the state; to remedy it was a primary object, as far as respect to the rights of property and the means of the government allowed, in order to give life and animation to this capital, and at the same time to indemnify the claimants on the funds. The industrious class were to profit by it. This vast project was in course of gradual accomplishment. They began with the sale of the property of the corporation. From the end of 1795, the value of the immoveable property had doubled: agricul-

tural produce had increased in the same proportion. See the royal order of the 21st February 1798.<sup>18</sup>

Let us now pause.

This is what has been done in regard to the finances and the administration, during the time I was at the head of the government, from November 1792 to the end of March 1798, when I was allowed to quit the ministry.

I could not have been more brief: there will be found in this *exposé* both lengthiness and repetition; but it was necessary to bring forward the official documents in support of this species of statement. It forms an essential part of the history of our country. My narrative, if less explicit, and

<sup>18</sup> Royal Order.—“The communes of the kingdom possess, besides other edifices in town and country, certain dwelling-houses, the repairs of which absorb almost all the rent, which, moreover, is never proportioned to the capital, and when such houses fall to ruin there arises an insupportable charge upon the commune. The disputes and law-suits induced by the settling of the rent, the claims of the tenants, and other accidents, still further diminish the small produce of this property. For this reason, and because the general interest requires that this said property should not be thus agglomerated, and above all, that it should enter into circulation, I have resolved by my decree, communicated to the council the 7th of this month, that the properties above-mentioned should be sold by public auction, &c. (formalities to be observed in the sale). The produce shall be charged against the revenue derived from tobacco, at the rate of three per cent. interest, according to the regulations prescribed for the taxation of capital resulting from the public deposits; the Communes will not have to pay the dues of Alcavala in this kind of sale. Interest at three per cent. shall be guaranteed to them,” &c.

resting on my own simple assertion, would have been incomplete ; I had to refute popular exaggerations, of which my greatly-calumniated administration was the object . . . . The purposes, the sums expended, the means employed, the forms observed—all is now known. It is seen with what sincerity, what intelligence, individuals and the first bodies in the state endeavoured, under circumstances the most difficult in which the Spanish monarchy was ever placed, to provide against events, and maintain the honour and independence of the country. Enlightened men, and men practised in business, will appreciate our efforts : they will readily perceive that, exposed as we were to unforeseen conflicts, it was scarcely possible to come off with better success. If there were errors and mistakes, it will at least be allowed that the ministry acted with purity of motive, good faith, and patriotism.

What has since occurred ? The power fell into the hands of those who were so loud in their accusations against our administrative and political government : they have but too well justified me by their own conduct. Is not the moral and financial position of Spain, from 1814 to 1832, a matter of public notoriety, too clear to be misunderstood ?

If any one should pretend to consider as exorbitant the expenses occasioned by the war which saved the honour and integrity of the country, I should desire him to observe, that at my entrance



into the ministry there was nothing prepared to sustain that inevitable contest—a contest rendered so complicated, from the convulsive movements of France, our immediate neighbour, which was then agitated by a revolutionary storm.

I will add, that every want was provided without the loss of a single moment: the military organization was imperfect; immemorial disorder reigned in every branch of the service. Could I remedy this in an instant? I had to bear the mischances, the severe trials of three campaigns, of which the second was marked by reverses. . . . Great and unexpected losses are only repaired by the employment of resources commensurate to the emergency. We had before us a powerful and formidable enemy; this was not the time for reform and economy. It remains to be said that this war was carried on by Spain at her own charge: we were not provided with any foreign aid or subsidy. The loans were all national; and these loans, which without doubt served to keep up the credit of the state, did not in reality produce very large sums to the public treasury.

If this be well considered, and if we add, that immediately afterwards we had to encounter a new war with the English, without any provocation from us,—is it not a matter of astonishment that we should have gone on from 1792 to 1798, without loading the people with taxes, without the general service of the state being a single moment interrupted, without any delay being experienced

in the payment of the interest of the public debt ? We may further add, that in the midst of this crisis, industry and agriculture continued its rapid improvement. All comparisons are odious ; (they are repugnant to my feelings;) but let one be allowed to me, at which none will have a right to take offence.

Forestalling us by a few months, the King of Prussia signed a peace with France; during the first year of the war, he received subsidies from England and Holland at one and the same time. The number of soldiers of all arms which he had engaged to furnish only amounted to 62,400 men. He received £300,000 sterling for the first expenses; £50,000 a month, independently of rations of bread and forage ; and £100,000 over and above, for the charges of their return to their own country, at the end of the campaign. Notwithstanding these advantages, when the moment for treating occurred in 1794, his Prussian Majesty hastened to make peace. This monarch, in his manifestoes, published at the time, declares that one of the principal motives of his determination, was the state of his finances, which endangered the public welfare of his kingdom.

Now Spain was, and always remained, single, depending on herself, supported only by her own resources; the armies that she put on foot were at least twice as numerous as those of the King of Prussia. . . . We went on to the third

campaign ; the war, too, was carried on, at one and the same time, by sea and land ; . . . and yet, Spain was neither discouraged, nor even seriously affected with regard to her finances. . . .

Enough for the glory of the administration over which I had the honour to preside.

## CHAPTER XL.

Don Francisco Saavedra and Don Gaspar Melchior Jovellanos  
are called to the Ministry.

*Last measure adopted to secure public Credit before  
my Retirement.*

THE national outcry was for war: it was carried on with energy. After a contest of three years, Spain desired peace; the treaty of Basle was signed. In both circumstances, I had fulfilled the wishes of the country.

Harmony having been re-established with France for the preceding two years, I had no further ambition than for repose. I sought permission of the king to give up the direction of the ministry.

Far from yielding to my entreaty, Charles IV. would absolutely retain me near his person. There can be no difficulty in conceiving that I already had enemies. In order to secure me from their machinations, the king was pleased to load me with honours, and to such a degree, that the monarch seemed each time to regret that he could raise me no higher. Such favours did not produce the good effect he had wished to obtain from them; envy was superadded to malevolence. The English cabinet, whose exorbitant preten-

sions I had opposed, secretly encouraged the party opposed to me; and, within the country, the men of the old routine, whether administrative or financial, and those who beheld the popular interests consulted at the expense of the classes hitherto privileged, found a pretence for opposition in the unavoidable expenses of the war.

Firmly resolved to withdraw from office, I pointed out to his Majesty the fittest persons, in my estimation, to manage the government. It was important to find out safe and able hands. Don Francisco Saavedra and Don Gaspar Melchior were highly recommended by public opinion, the one as an enlightened minister, the other as versed in matters of legislation and political economy. I proposed them both to his Majesty, who immediately determined upon their nomination.

It will assuredly not be said that I chose creatures of my own, with a view to their applauding all that I had done, or consenting to become merely servile followers in my footsteps? These were not phantoms, men of straw: but I was sincerely anxious to lay down the burden of power and responsibility. I thought I had sufficiently discharged my debt of patriotism. Above all, I was fully convinced that my administration required no complaisant encomium on the part of my successors. I even continued to assist at the coun-

cil, with Saavedra and Jovellanos, for some months before I finally left the ministry.

All the acts of the government, from my entrance into the cabinet, at the end of 1792, till the end of 1797, having been placed under their inspection, without any reserve, any disguise, any exception, the system they adopted was precisely that which I had traced out and followed up myself. Nothing was thought of but to continue, and to realize by degrees the improvements pointed out, as they became opportune and practicable.

To seek out the means of reviving the springs of public wealth; to remove gently the obstacles created by ancient errors or abuses, successively introduced; to maintain the public credit, which our enemies wished to overthrow: these were the objects of my constant solicitude; these were the aim and desire of the new administration, reinforced by the presence of these two statesmen. The first step taken on their entrance into the cabinet, and whilst I still held the nominal presidency, was to confirm all that had been antecedently done to secure the payment of the public debt, interest as well as principal; that is to say, the guarantee of the debt and its gradual extinction.

All the preceding acts and decrees were again brought forward in a solemn law, which attested the perseverance of the government and its immoveable determination to maintain the obligatinos

contracted towards the creditors of the state, notwithstanding the expenses occasioned by the war with England ; the funds assigned, and the royal revenues pledged to this purpose being never to be confounded with the other resources of the state, destined to supply the means necessary for the current service.—(See the royal order issued to this effect the 9th March 1798.)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Royal Order. —“ One of the principal objects that have fixed my attention since I came to the crown, has been to consolidate the debt of the state, whether by formally declaring that it was responsible for the engagements contracted by my august father, or by extending that guarantee to the debts of the preceding reigns, as far as our actual wants allow, and according to their particular nature ; or by fulfilling, with scrupulous exactitude, the new obligations resulting from the necessity of providing for the defence and maintaining the dignity of the monarchy.

“ I have therefore frankly manifested my adherence to the inviolable principle already laid down in the royal decree of 17th December 1782, viz. that the state being permanent, its obligations ought to be so likewise, when they have been contracted in its name by the legal authority which represents it ; that on this subject, no arbitrary exception is admissible ; and that the opinion ought to be rejected as erroneous, hurtful, and injurious to dignity and supreme authority, that kings are temporary, and that their engagements are binding only during their reign.

“ Wishing still further to improve this branch of administrative economy, to give new pledges to the creditors of the state, and to repress by wise and paternal measures the practice of speculation, or premiums of reduction in currency, of which the vales have become the object, notwithstanding the punctuality with which the accruing interest is paid, and the extinction of the capital is realized by the funds assigned for the

This classic document marks the line of separation that I must point out to the attention of the

the purpose:\* I have resolved to establish, and I do establish a sinking fund, entirely distinct from my royal treasury, under the following regulations, which shall henceforth be observed as fundamental and definitive laws on the subject.†

“ Art. 1. The principal object of the sinking fund is to provide for the payment of the interest, and the progressive re-payment of the capital of the royal vales, of the loans created by my decrees of the 2d August 1795, 12th July and 22d November 1797, of those effected in foreign countries, and of every other whose acquittance concerned the public treasury up to this period, without prejudice to the other parts of the national debt, which may yet have to be placed to the charge of the said sinking fund.

Art. 2. There shall be deposited in this chest all the funds applicable to the extinction of the royal vales, in virtue of my decrees of 12th January and 29th August 1794, 25th February and 21st August 1795, 23d January 1796, and the ordinance of the 12th July of the same year, that is to say, the annual  
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\* This single document is sufficient to prove that the government, faithful to its promises, had punctually fulfilled them; that in spite of the pressure of the war, the interest of the public debt was paid, and a part of the capital extinguished, as had been determined at the beginning. This is a public and well known fact; it is to the nation at large that the king addresses himself, and his Majesty well knew that it was impossible to contradict him.

† The reader has seen, in the preceding chapter, the decree of the 12th January 1794, established a sinking-fund under the inspection of the council of Castile, in a chest, the three keys of which were confided, one to the minister of finance, another to the governor of the council, and the last to the treasurer general, a chest entirely distinct from every other revenue of the state. It is evident, therefore, that this was not a new measure, but a simple confirmation of the first, to which were added some special directions to facilitate the operations of the government, and increase the confidence of the state creditor.



reader:—it is that of departure of an administration which is no longer mine. This is not the

ten per cent. upon all the funds and income (*fondos y arbitrios*) of the kingdom, whether there be a surplus or not; the entire produce of the duty on the exportation of piastres; that of the extraordinary contribution of the civil fruits; the extraordinary supplement of seven millions of reals (1,750,000 francs), added to the subsidies from the clergy; the produce of all the vacant benefices of the church; that of the fifteen per cent. on the value of property acquired in mortmain; the annual assignment of four millions of reals which I have withdrawn from the revenue of the salt mines and the produce of the *quadragesimal grant* in America.

“ Art. 3. There shall also be deposited in the said chest the sums appertaining to the interest of the royal vales in circulation, which sums are to be levied in money upon the general produce of the other various branches of the public revenue, until there shall have been made upon each a special assignment of a fourth, to be furnished in due proportions, according to the nature and the net amount of the returns.

“ Art. 4. These assignments shall not cease to have effect until after the entire extinction of the vales, and of every other sum borrowed by the state, or substituted for the said vales. Thus the sinking fund will be gradually augmented by the progressive difference between the sum deposited, according to the third article, and the sums paid for interest.

“ Art. 5. From the produce of the customs at Cadiz, specially applicable to the repayment of the loan of 240 millions of reals (sixty millions of francs) on the conditions settled by my decree of the 2d August 1795, there shall be deposited every month, and in equal portions, in the chest, the sums to be annually paid for the interest and capital from the 1st January 1799 to the same day of 1807, when the amount of the bonds (*cedulas*) issued by the public treasury is to be reimbursed.

“ Art. 6. The revenue on stamped paper will likewise furnish to the chest the sums to be paid on the 1st July for the interest, and part of the principal of the loan of one hundred millions of reals (twenty-five millions of francs) created by my decree of the

the

place for praising or blaming it; I merely state that, where my responsibility ceases, commences the

the 12th July 1797, and raised to sixty millions more (fifteen millions of francs) by my other decree of 22d November.

Art. 7. There shall be given special assignments for the other loans, the payment of which is made over to the said chest, within the kingdom and without ; it being understood that the principle is to be always admitted as an elementary and unalterable basis, that no obligation or engagement is to be contracted without a previous and adequate assignment, and that if, by any accident whatsoever, that assignment should prove insufficient, farther provision shall be immediately made by the aggregation of sums taken from the other revenues, or general means of the state.

Art. 8. I give and confer ample powers and complete authority to those having the management of the chest, that, in order to hasten as much as possible the extinction of the vales and loans above-mentioned, they may subrogate or substitute in their place new loans of a less onerous character, by pledging or engaging, for security of the repayment of the capital and interest, the sinking fund itself, the assignments upon determinate revenues, and in general all the revenues of the public treasury, on condition that the form and terms of these loans shall be fixed and specified by ulterior decrees.

Art. 9. As soon as the funds, from whatsoever source arising, shall have entered the chest, and until they are taken out to satisfy the prescribed purposes, these funds may be employed provisionally, in such manner as may be judged most suitable and proper, above all for diminishing or restraining speculations upon the vales.

Art. 10. The employment of the said funds shall be regulated in such a manner that our subjects may enjoy the benefit of the successive reduction in the interest of money, which reduction must contribute to the progress of industry and commerce.

Art. 11. The chest is from this time established at the National Bank of St. Carlos, by means of which the funds may be brought from the provinces to Madrid. These funds shall be realized in the capital, without discount or other condition than  
the

responsibility of those who, in 1808, and especially from 1814 up to the present time, succeeded to

the fixed delay of forty-five days, between the local receipt in the provinces and their being placed at the disposal of the director of the chest at Madrid.

“ Art. 12. Orders shall in consequence be dispatched by my royal council, through the collector-general of the produce and revenues of ecclesiastical vacancies, and through the director-general of the receipts of the state, to the respective intendants, receivers, and administrators, in order that, in proportion to the receipts, and as soon as the periods of the assignments upon the revenues of the state shall have fallen in, the funds may be delivered at the Bank of Madrid, or to its agents and factors in the provinces, for which the latter shall give acknowledgments, awaiting the formal acquittances, given by the directors of the chest, as is customary at my royal treasury.

“ Art. 13. There shall likewise be given, by the commissary-general of the crusade, drafts upon the chapters and corporations that have to pay the extraordinary subsidy of seven millions annually, in two equal payments, the one at the end of June, the other at the end of December.

“ Art. 14. The president-judge of the receipts (*arribadas*) from America to Cadiz, shall transmit to the chest of discount at the Bank the sums coming from beyond sea, the *quadragesimal* contribution, and any other sum destined to the extinction, in proportion as the ships arrive in port.

“ Art. 15. The administration, the anterior management, the special functions of the chest, shall be entirely independent and distinct from the Bank ; a special director is exclusively entrusted with it under my orders, which shall be transmitted to him through the express channel of the finance minister.

“ Art. 16. For the greater accommodation of the public and the dispatch of business, there shall be established at the Bank, offices of direction of the chest, where the payment shall be made ; I shall appoint the officers, and their salary shall be paid by me.

“ Art. 17. The offices established at the general treasury for the renewal of the vales, which is to continue engaged upon them,

the ministry of my own period. This solemn act renewed and confirmed all the financial system them, shall form the principal *contaduria* (control of accounts) of the sinking fund, and in this quality shall exercise a vigilant inspection over all its operations.

“ Art. 18. Although all the payments relative to the obligations mentioned in Art. 1st are to be effected in the offices of this *contaduria*, nevertheless, the royal vales, and orders or obligations of the loan of one hundred millions of reals, raised to sixty millions more, shall be renewed with the signatures of the treasurer-general on duty, and of the chief of the pay office (*contador*) of the said treasury, as heretofore.

“ Art. 19. On the first day of each month there shall be transmitted to me, by the minister of finances, the state of the chest, authenticated at the *contaduria*, comprising therein, without exception, that of all pending affairs ; and in the month of January the chest shall furnish a general statement of the preceding year.

“ Art. 20. There shall likewise be remitted to the council, annually, a detailed statement of all the funds brought into the chest, or produced by these special assignments, or by its economical operations, expressing the quantity, the number, and the amount of the royal vales comprised in each act of extinction. \*

“ Art.

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\* My earnest entreaties occasioned the adoption of this article ; Saavedra and Jovellanos opposed it. 1st. They regarded it as an useless formality, considering the other guarantees which insured the correctness of the management, the right direction, and the just employment of the funds. 2dly. This measure, said they, may confuse and paralyze the operation of the chest. I agreed with them, that the royal council of Castile was not naturally called to exercise these acts of administration ; but I strongly maintained, that in all civil affairs which intimately involved great state interests, it was not only advisable, but to a certain degree necessary, to give to the council a right of inspection. “ So long as Spain has not, as heretofore, a national representation, this council, venerable from its antiquity, standing high in public estimation, is the sole authority fitted to curb the abuses of the supreme power.” It was objected to me that such important attributes were not conferred by the laws in a categorical manner. I answered, “ That custom, long usage, granted them in reality,

of my administration, and fully secured the creditors of the state. The manœuvres of speculators had no longer any ground to work upon, and were necessarily brought to a stand. But it is difficult to extirpate this scourge ever attendant upon a public debt, even in the most prosperous times. It had made some progress amongst us, because no serious attempt had been made to repress it.

The war with France put in question our very existence—the peril was manifest—and every one saw his own involved the general interest.

“ Art. 21. The accounts prepared by the *Contaduria* with explanatory statements, shall be presented annually to be examined and passed by the tribunal of the *Contaduria Mayor* (Court of Accounts), in order to make known the existing amount. There shall be taken, on the 31st December, an inventory of all the assets in hand and on account, which shall be examined and corrected by three ministers or members of different tribunals, whom I shall appoint.

“ Art. 23. The annual state of the chest shall be printed and published, together with a recapitulation of facts and all necessary explanations, for the information and satisfaction of the public.

“ This being understood, you will communicate the orders and instructions respectively necessary to ensure its complete execution. Signed by the royal hand of his Majesty, 26th February 1798. To Don Francisco de Saavedra.

“ Published in council,” &c. &c. &c. &c.

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reality, and that no tribunal, no newly-created institution, no person, how great soever the authority with which he was invested, would obtain such general confidence as that enjoyed by the council of Castile : a confidence especially necessary in an affair of public credit : “ In short,” said I, “ what evil can arise from an additional, an incorruptible witness, as to the manner in which the public interests are administered ? ” The article was then adopted.

It was not so with the war with England; the danger to our national independence was no longer so impending; the chances of this contest did not threaten the mass; it was an ordinary collision, like those of which history, ancient or modern, offers us a thousand examples. The general interest was not visibly, palpably, bound up with individual interest; and if honour or patriotism did not purify or direct the tendencies of the latter, it acted in a sense opposed to that of the state. Weakness, ignorance, cupidity, divers causes influenced men's minds. Many individuals forgot or misunderstood their first duty towards their country,—that of not thwarting the measures of government. There existed, besides, a party favourable to England,—a party, certainly not numerous, but sufficiently so to be obnoxious in various ways; by exciting mistrust for instance, as to the solidity of public credit and of the paper currency. Merchants of enlightened mind energetically repelled such perfidious insinuations. The government resolved to fulfil its engagements at all costs, and speculation was restrained. Still the rise and fall took place, according to the more or less favourable occurrences of the war. The unexpected disaster of our splendid naval armament, at Cape St. Vincent, in the month of February 1797,<sup>2</sup> materially affected the price of the

<sup>2</sup> Our noble squadron, amounting to twenty-seven sail of the line, of which seven were three-deckers, ten frigates, and other

royal vales; but this security rose again in an equal proportion, when intelligence was brought, in succession, of the defeat of the English before Porto Rico and of the glorious defence of the Canaries, where Nelson lost his arm. The rage for speculation, when the concurrence of loyalty and patriotism could alone support the ministry, excited general animadversion; commercial men of character were indignant at it. The council of state and the other special councils of finance, seeking for means to arrest this disorder, adopted the idea of taking up, at a discount, the royal vales, with the assistance of the chest destined to produce their extinction.

At the first glance, and considering the intended object, the idea appeared a happy one. Notwithstanding these favourable appearances, and the nearly unanimous opinion of the council, I could not help saying that I thought it inconsiderate, and even chimerical. "We had a

smaller ships, might have prevented the junction of Admiral Parker with Sir John Jervis; and even the two English admirals having joined, the Spanish admiral ought to have beaten them, for his forces were superior. This deplorable event cost us four ships of war. Was it the fault of the government? It was the neglect, the excessive confidence of our admiral.\* The council of war assembled at Cadiz, under the presidency of Don Antonio Valdez, has settled public opinion on the subject. The admiral was condemned to the loss of his rank, deprived for ever of military command, and forbidden to present himself at court and to inhabit the chief town of a maritime department.

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\* Don . . . . . Cordova.

war to maintain with an active and able adversary, —the British Government, to whom all means of aggression were alike. . . . One of two events must happen ; either the discount of the vales must be restricted to the holders, who will thus prove the absolute necessity they are under of having ready money ; and in this case, without speaking of the jealousies, the rivalries, which any marked preference will stir up, or of the perplexities thus entailed upon the direction, few persons really pressed by the state of their affairs, will consent to expose publicly their embarrassment ; people will prefer to make sacrifices in the management of private affairs, and without noise . . . or, the discount must be offered generally, without distinction of persons or circumstances . . . then the offer could not possibly be realised ; intrigues, reverses, a false alarm, would rouse cupidity ; all the world would press forward to demand their money . . . . Besides," said I, further, " whatsoever be the sum, whether great or small, employed in discounting, it is a wrong done to public credit ; it will soon be calculated that all that is taken from the fund of the chest, no more to be returned, will be wanting to meet the interest on its becoming due, to the promised extinction, and to the loans contracted under condition of definite repayment, according to the special institution of the chest . . . whereas, so long as the latter shall faith-



fully fulfil its obligations, as it has hitherto done, with the funds devoted to this purpose, public confidence is secure. Before adopting a measure which the bad faith of a few, or of several, might render altogether disastrous, and which would drag us into an abyss, let us rather seek to find employment for our royal vales. We have the good fortune to possess a king who only desires and regards the happiness of his people; and the government has a thousand resources to meet the public debt. Does there not exist an immensity of funds, both communal and belonging to the domains? Has not the crown immoveable property, its possession of which is unnecessary? Is there not a multitude of estates and properties in town and country which, without infringing on any right, and even to the great advantage of the actual owners, and of the nation at large, might be employed for redeeming the debt and augmenting the revenues of the state? The resources of the country are infinite; those of America are still untouched. Could we not treat or negotiate with Spanish houses which will be able to set in motion all such capital as remains paralyzed in our indolent hands? The measure lately proposed in the council, of calling in the Jewish capitalists, whose gratitude will willingly repay the protection of the government by generous sacrifices,—this measure, and others of the like nature, will raise our credit to the level, perhaps to a

higher level than that of England and of other nations.\* Let us unfold these resources, and then what need we care for our enemies, whoever they may be? Agitators are formidable when the government is weak—when it would drown itself in the smallest streamlet—when it dares not raise itself above the most wretched routine.”

I added many other observations, but without effect. The calling in of the royal vales was decided by the majority of the council. “Spanish loyalty,” they exclaimed, “which has never failed, and the satisfactory result produced by the means adopted, are the best pledges for the future.” Thus reasoned my colleagues. (See the royal order issued the 15th March 1798, a few days previously to my quitting the ministry.)<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Such were the means proposed by the worthy minister of the king, Don Pedro Varela, a good catholic undoubtedly, a very religious man, but superior to vulgar prejudices. “The expulsion of the Jews,” said he, “may have suited the policy of the epoch when that measure was adopted; it was not the less injurious to Spain, which it deprived of a part of her riches. Would it be dangerous now to recall those exiles, whose industry might be so useful to us? What would religion have to fear from the toleration granted to a sect which no longer makes proselytes, and which does not even desire them? Are we better catholics than the pope, and many other christian princes who admit Jews into their dominions? Almost all these rich capitalists still preserve a hereditary affection for this land; they have never ceased to cultivate its language: they would pay a large price for permission to return to their ancient country. And at what period has Spain ever stood in greater need of raising her industry to the level of that of other civilized nations.

<sup>5</sup> Royal order.—“The extraordinary wants of the state, and

This measure relative to the discount, to which I absolutely refused my assent (and I was not the

my system of meeting them, by overburdening my subjects as little as possible, determined me to create royal vales. The abundance of this paper money and the cupidity of speculators, have turned to the injury of the public, a measure so simple and so reasonable for fulfilling the obligations of the treasury, without augmenting the existing taxes. To prevent this evil, I had adopted the plan of extinguishing by degrees the said vales, by ordering, in my decree of the 12th January 1794, that there should be established a sinking fund, to which was applied, with other assignments, the ten per cent. of the funds and properties (*fondos y arbitrios*) of the communes of the kingdom: this measure seemed to be the most equitable, the most proper for procuring an equitable distribution, instead of the contingent determined by the existing surplus, as was prescribed by the royal order of the 29th May 1792. . . . Although this surplus has been religiously applied to the object of its destination, it has not produced the effect I had hoped, of increasing the credit of the vales; to attain this object, I have resolved by my decree of the 26th February last, to create a sinking fund and discount fund at the same time, which, by the re-union of all the funds available to it, should not only proceed to the extinction of the said vales, but also to the discount or conversion of this property into money. Thus speculation having no longer any pretext, will cease to exercise a fatal influence upon the credit of the paper of the state.

“ The double operation of extinction and discount requiring more considerable resources, I have ordered that besides other assignments, and besides the annual ten per cent. of the communal funds, there be immediately paid into the said chest, the half of all the actual surplus in the kingdom. The council will deliver, through the intendants, the existing sums to the agents of the bank in every capital, in order that the latter may be equally bound to convey them to their destination; and that the exacting of these sums may not appear in any manner burthensome to my subjects, who have already seen them applied to the extinction of the debt, and without any interest; by an effect of my royal solicitude,

only one), was the determining cause, or immediate occasion of all the financial difficulties which very soon broke out. Though always influenced by the best intentions, those who took in hand the reins of government allowed themselves to adopt hazardous and complicated operations, till then unknown in our country, and consequently ill-understood. To launch into the midst of the ocean, and attempt to navigate without experienced sailors, would be rashness even on the part of the best pilot. Heavy disappointments, multiplied embarrassments, deplorable accidents, signalized the three years during which I was removed from public affairs and from the court. The financial and moral condition of the monarchy was seriously endangered : I experienced the re-action, when I afterwards found myself compelled, for the second time, to take part in the administration, without having ambitioned so dan-

solicitude, so far from wishing to create the least prejudice in the disposal of the said sums, I will that they be accounted for at the rate of three per cent. interest, payable by the sinking fund. The intendants shall deliver the respective contracts of *imposition*, and shall take care to notify the same to the royal council, that note of it may be taken in the general *Contaduría*. . . . And if some communes, after an account of it shall have been rendered to me through the said council, should experience a real necessity of recovering back a part of these sums, exceeding one-half of the surplus, the sum that they have already furnished to the sinking fund shall be immediately restored to them, in proportion to the admitted urgency of the case. . . .

"Let this be understood," &c. &c. &c.

gerous an honour. This will presently be adverted to. In the mean time let me be allowed to point out the results of my administration, of which I have just given an account:—1st. From the epoch of my entrance into the cabinet in 1792 to the 28th March 1798, the finances of the kingdom advanced in a regular, it may even be said, in a prosperous progression, notwithstanding the unforeseen political storms; the taxes were not increased; all the means resorted to were honourable, simple, within reach of ordinary minds; no hazardous experiments were ventured upon . . . . 2dly. When I quitted the ministry, the measures I had taken to insure public credit were found so just, and so secure in their effects, that my immediate successors did not hesitate to offer to discount the vales in open office, hoping, by that means, to remove all pretence for stock-jobbing. 3dly. Power was never exercised despotically; none can reproach me with any arbitrary act; all operations, financial ones in particular, were treated of, examined, and fully discussed in the council of state; no measure was put in force without its assent. He who had the honour of presiding over the cabinet was the sincere friend of his king and country, not the man of a *camarilla*—a court favourite—still less a mayor of the palace, governing all according to his caprice.

I have produced a multitude of public and authentic documents. Envy and hatred can never deny or destroy them. Without doubt, it would be

easy for me to add other proofs as strong, perhaps even more decisive, if I, or any one of my friends, were permitted to consult the Government archives, or my own papers. There are to be found the official correspondence, the notes, the original reports, in general all the papers relating to the affairs with which I was entrusted. But by the sequestration which has, for twenty-seven years, been maintained over my whole property, all my means of defence and justification have likewise been taken from me . . . . No judgment, no legal sentence, no protective form, has ever authorized this Turkish spoliation. I possessed various registers, in which were recorded, day by day, month by month, all the acts in which I had taken part. There, I say, will be found, consigned to writing, the good already effected, the evil happily avoided, the projects of good to be done by degrees in favour of that country which is always present to my thoughts, and whose happiness and glory were the objects of my constant solicitude. . . . But the Eastern despotism which has so long borne me down, will not, I hope, be naturalized in a Christian and civilized nation: the men of the present Government will repudiate the fatal inheritance of a period of violence, calumny, and ingratitude. . . . If, in short, Spain of the present day should refuse me the justice which is my due, my memory and my misfortunes will obtain a fair and equitable satisfaction at the hands of impartial history.

## CHAPTER XLI.

System and Direction of the Government under my  
Ministry.

I AGAIN invoke the testimony of those men who lived under the reign of Charles IV., and who have also witnessed that of his successor. They can form a comparison between both. The present generation should mistrust the interested accounts of the faction which has so long exercised sway. There are still living high-minded men of advanced age, whose recollections carry them back to 1790, . . . . those who, trampling under foot all laws, human and divine, outraged and despoiled their legitimate sovereign—who adjudged to themselves the prize of the labour and the blood of a heroic people, without ever concurring, by their own efforts, in the defence of the country against foreigners,—those men I formally accuse of having brought about the invasion, by their guilty intrigues,—those men, I say, are now well known. It is understood by what means they got into power. It is time to reinstate the truth in all its power, in order that every one should be treated according to his works—that facts alone should speak for us or against us. Let us both, at the bar of public opi-

nion, submit to the declarations of ocular witnesses.

*Internal Policy.*

Under the complex and arduous state of things brought about by the French Revolution, what was the policy of the Government, the direction of which was intrusted to my hands? All the thrones of Europe were menaced; still no precautionary measures were adopted in Spain; the existing laws, the protective forms of justice, were amply sufficient; the public peace was maintained without effort. Our old institutions, our paternal codes, the inherent loyalty of the nation, gave confidence to the Government. No recourse was had to special tribunals, or to commissions, with a view to repress unforeseen crimes. Every one of its faithful subjects watched over the preservation of the crown. Let my enemies say, if, at this stormy epoch, trials by the inquisition, arbitrary imprisonment, severe punishments, were known amongst us. . . . Afterwards, however, when the power had passed into other hands, our country was the scene of all sorts of calamities; thousands of Spaniards, accused of revolt or treason, and condemned to exile, excited mistrust, and the compassion of foreigners; the national character was compromised, dishonoured throughout all Europe; . . . but so long as I had the honour of presiding over the Government, call to your recollection, my dear countrymen, that spies and informers were neither welcomed



nor even tolerated. No family had to fear for the existence of a father, a son, a relative, or a friend. My administration has left no traces of blood ; I have deprived the country of none of its children ; the public prisons confined none but malefactors legally sentenced ; state trials were extremely rare ; they were rather menacing than formal. If any man adopted opinions that were dangerous or revolutionary, it was thought right to give him a salutary admonition, to intimate that his conduct was watched. If a man of talent inspired some apprehension, I lost no time in drawing him over to the service of the state : when suitably employed, he ceased to be dangerous ; he became useful. They whom a rigid inflexibility, or even a marked distrust, might have rendered discontented, and objects of apprehension, became attached to the Government, which laid open to them all the roads to honour and fortune. Who can accuse me of having feared the light of knowledge, or of seeking to extinguish it ? No : it was my wish that it should shine forth with brilliancy, taking care, at the same time, that it should not create a conflagration. I was a sincere votary at its shrine. In my opinion, enlightened men must be the allies, the support of power. Instead of pursuing them as enemies, how many have I not saved from persecution ! Merit, forgotten or persecuted, has always found me disposed to lend it my support ; and, in truth, I did not require to be solicited ; I myself

sought occasions—I created them—of coming to its assistance. No ancient friendship, no private relationship, attached me to Cabarus and Jovellanos. The first was for a long time exposed to the intrigues which the envious had raised against him in the preceding reign. I defended him. No one will accuse the latter of having been one of my flatterers, or servile followers. His enemies had inspired Charles IV. with strong prejudices against him. . . . I restored him, not without difficulty, to the favour of the monarch, whose heart was open to the kindest feelings. I employed every possible means<sup>1</sup> for the purpose, and I had the good for-

<sup>1</sup> The chief means I employed was to concert with our worthy common friend, Don Antonio Valdes, the Minister of Marine, and to assign to Jovellanos the duty of founding and organizing the Royal Institute of the Asturias. This establishment, one of those which date from my administration, was formed at Gijon, the native place of Jovellanos, and was devoted to the teaching of mathematics, mineralogy, and navigation. The carrying into effect the order for the establishment was entrusted to Jovellanos himself. All that he did in the business having been approved, he received thanks in the king's name, on the 7th January 1794. The school was installed under the presidency of Jovellanos; the programme was his; public rejoicings took place on the occasion. The following is the inscription in the front of the building of the Institute:—

“ Charles IV., the protector of science, the father and the object of the love of his subjects, founds and erects at Gijon an Institute for Navigation and Mineralogy, in order to favour the study of the exact and the natural sciences, to create good sailors, and to extract from the bosom of the Asturian mountains, the coal which is to be exported in national vessels.”

This school was largely endowed, notwithstanding the embarrassments of the war with France, then at its height.

Don

tune to succeed beyond my expectations. I procured his nomination to the ministry.

I might bring forward many other instances, less known, of individuals similarly circumstanced. There is one, however, of which I must not forbear the mention. As every one knows the circumstances, I do not apprehend to be contradicted in relating them.

Much has been said of the unhappy fate of Don Pablo Olavidé, prosecuted and condemned by the Holy Office in November 1778, without any attempt on the part of the King, Charles III., of his minister, Florida Blanca, or of the powerful friends of that illustrious man to save him. Olivadé was rather the victim of a party, than of his own misconduct.<sup>2</sup> Power did not dare to shew itself; those

Don Melchior G. Jovellanos was well known for the liberality of his opinions, which had drawn upon him many powerful enemies. When his name appeared in the official Gazette, many affected to be alarmed, and murmured loudly; as for myself, I was proud of sharing in such a sin. His enemies became mine.

\* Unquestionably guilty of imprudence, Olavidé displayed too openly the principles of the School of the Encyclopedists, then in great vogue beyond the Pyrenees. His ideas were those of his friends, the Counts d'Aranda, de Campomanes, O'Reilly, Don Antonio Ricardos, the Marquis de Roda, the Count de Riela, the Duke d'Almodovar, and other learned or literary men of the period. The inquisition wished to make an example, and selected Olavidé. These are the principal charges against him: He was hostile to the monks; he corresponded with Voltaire; he possessed prohibited books and lent them to others; he had obscene pictures; he boasted of irreligion; did not observe the commandments of the church; did not respect its ministers, led the life of a pagan, and professed heretical opinions; amongst others the Copernican error. Olavidé, in his defence,  
and

who ought to have aided him, had not the courage. Olavidé was publicly paraded through the capital. At the reading of his sentence he fainted.<sup>3</sup> Some time afterwards, accident gave him the opportunity of escaping from this severe treatment; he was enabled to take refuge in France. The Count de Florida Blanca demanded his being given up by the Cabinet of Versailles, in conformity with existing treaties. Such was the power of fear over the personal convictions of this minister, notwithstanding the high favour he enjoyed with Charles III. Happily for Olivadé, the French Government refused to deliver him up, or rather it gave him the means of quitting the country and seeking safety in Switzerland. He afterwards returned into France, where he incurred great dangers during the convulsions of 1793 and 1794. No longer daring to flatter himself with the hopes of ever again seeing a

and at the very moment of execution, protested loudly that he had never denied, or doubted in his mind, any dogma of the Catholic faith.

<sup>3</sup> He was condemned to the loss of all his employments; declared incapable of holding any; banished for ever from Madrid, from the royal residences, from Seville, from the colonies of the Sierra Morena, which he had founded, and from Lima, his native place. He was interdicted from riding in a carriage, from having horses, and from wearing clothes embroidered with gold and silver; besides being condemned eight years of penance in one of the most rigid convents; and publicly to abjure his errors; he was to abstain from reading any but pious books; was to confess every month, &c.

Be it noticed, by the way, that he had already passed upwards of two years in prison, and in solitary confinement.

Spanish sky, he had fixed his retreat on the banks of the Loire.

I interceded in his favour the moment the opportunity seemed favourable, and induced the benevolent Charles IV. to give way to milder sentiments. The unfortunate old man was allowed to appear at court with freedom: he received a suitable pension, and at his own choice, withdrew to end his days in peaceful retirement at Baeza, not far from the scene of his glorious labours, and close to the colonies which he had organized, and of which he had been, as it were, the creator.<sup>4</sup>

The history of Olivadé is not singular of its

<sup>4</sup> Don Andre Muriel, in one of his additional articles to the translation of William Coxe's work, has lost sight of the truth. . . . . He attributes to the good offices of Don Mariano Luis de Urquijo, in his capacity of Minister *ad interim*, the return of Olavidé to Spain. Urquijo was charged with the management of affairs as Minister of State in 1798 (in the absence and on account of the illness of Saavedra). All had been previously agreed on and determined, with regard to the recall of Olavidé. His nephew, Lieutenant-General Don Luis de Urbina, had come to an understanding with me upon the subject. Urquijo and Saavedra himself had no power to save their common friend, Jovellanos, when in my absence; and after my definitive retirement from the Ministry; the latter was removed and supplanted by Don Joseph Antonio Cavellero, in the same month of August. Olavidé was very fortunate to have obtained his recall before this last ministerial change, and it is to me that he was in reality indebted for it. Every one knows what a gloom was spread over the palace when Cavallero was armed with power. Don Andre Muriel, in attributing to Urquijo the favourable reception given to Olavidé, refers to Mr. Bourgoing, in his Picture of Spain. But Mr. Bourgoing (as may easily be seen by

kind. The tribunal of the Inquisition, rivalling the supreme power, made even the most religious men tremble. Is it not known what efforts I exerted, from the first moment of my coming into the ministry, to compel the Holy Office to adopt the spirit of the gospel, with the simple power of applying a Christian-like and moderate correction, which they ought never to have exceeded? Is it forgotten on what occasion, and through what motive, I procured the dismissal of the inquisitor-general, the Abade de la Sierra? I could not, however, wholly succeed in infusing into the mind of the pious Charles IV. my ideas, and my system of preventing every kind of re-action. . . . Is it not known what was the paramount aim of the Holy Office, that to which it uniformly aspired, but could never obtain, in spite of all the pretences afforded by the French Revolution for the accomplishment of its designs and its threats? My zeal and my vigilance were not restricted to a privileged few; all Spaniards in general were the objects of my solicitude. I will mention one more instance, that of a mere professor at Salamanca, Don Ramon de Salas, of whose cause I had procured the removal from the court of the Inquisition to the Council of Castile. Such an act of vigour no Spanish minister had ever dared to exercise since the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic! And by a subsequent order

by reference to his work) does not even pronounce the name of Urquijo when he relates the adventures of Olavidé.

of the king, the Holy Office were further interdicted from proceeding to any act of arrest without previously consulting his Majesty, and obtaining his assent. Such is the use I made of the favour and confidence I possessed. Who, then, great God ! has a right to reproach me with having abused my power ? Who can say that my administration was oppressive ? So long as I preserved some influence, no persecution was allowed : the French Revolution met with no response amongst us ; the king governed by himself, without listening to any party : the common law was always respected by his ministers, the tribunals, and the councils ; no faction obtained any undue weight at court ; no one was oppressed. A policy, based upon honour and upon the wisdom of our institutions, and not upon a senseless rigour, was the sole guide of the Government at this period, which has been so unjustly blackened and disregarded. If what I aver is not the exact truth, let me be refuted by facts. I am prepared to reply to all but injurious aspersions.

I will only make another observation. The governments which at that time adopted a system of rigour, as, for example, those of Naples and Piedmont, did but increase the flame. What a terrible crisis for nations and for kings ! And without going abroad to seek for examples, what is the cause, in our own Spain, of the numerous misunderstandings and calamities which formed the

sequel to our restoration of 1814? Had it not been for the proscriptions and the unheard-of punishments which disgrace that period of our national history; had it not been for the fatal system of retaliation, which placed upon trial one half of the inhabitants of the Peninsula, would there have arisen those endless conspiracies, those deplorable strifes, which have disfigured the reign of Ferdinand VII.?

Whoever forms his judgment with impartiality, with justice and uprightness, will compare the reign of the son with that of the father; the ministers whom Charles IV. honoured with his confidence, with those whose counsels swayed Ferdinand; in one word, the government of my time with that which has succeeded me. I have nothing to fear from such a comparison; my enemies, without intending it, have taken upon themselves my justification. Their own acts constitute my best apology.



## CHAPTER XLII.

*(Continuation of the preceding chapter.)*

What it was possible to do at this period.—What was done.

MANY of those who pardoned me my elevation as minister, and others who were more or less sincere, reproached me for not having availed myself of the confidence of Charles IV. to give good institutions to Spain. The national spirit, said they, is imbued with recollections of the country's ancient glory, with elements that might regenerate Spain, and put her on a level with the state of France and of Europe. Thus roused from the apathy in which she had languished for two hundred years of uninterrupted despotism, the country, happy in herself, and respected by other nations, might have seen her former days revive; the reign of Charles IV. might have offered us a new era, by raising Spain to the high position to which she appeared entitled by her natural advantages, her religious principles, her patriotism, and her monarchical loyalty, so often put to the test.

Could she hesitate to amend her ancient institutions, in order that she might not remain behind the two great powers who disputed the empire of the world? Did they not owe their acquired pre-

eminence to the enlightened and improving policy of their respective governments ?

On this grave matter I owe explanations to my fellow citizens, and to the age in which I have lived.

I certainly did not come into power with the narrow views of a courtier, pre-occupied by his calculations of fortune and of vanity. I cherished hopes of glory, of that glory which was then the dream and the rock of statesmen. Few persons, it is true, knew my principles on the delicate questions then under discussion ; but there still exist Spaniards who possessed my secret.

In my mind, hereditary monarchy, subordinate to law, is the first and best of all governments, if supported by national counsels. In youth this was my belief ; it is now my rooted conviction. But I wished the monarchical form to prevail in this government, because, if not, the republican would. Democracy ought to mingle, like an heroic medicine in a generous cordial : aristocracy must be there too ; yet, I repeat, the monarchical dose should predominate, tempered by the mixture of the other two ingredients.

The ancient Cortes of Castile had no other rights save those of explanation and petition, on which the sovereign decided of his own free will. Taxes alone were freely voted by the three estates (Brazos).

I have ever looked on this organization as that most fit for Spain. Having the authorities of time

and experience in its favour, it might easily suffice us, slightly modified, or, if necessary, arranged to suit modern taste. Were it either more democratic or more aristocratic, I should perceive some dangers for liberty; whereas, being thus kept within check, the action of sovereign power is strong, free, and regular. The judicial power had need be independent; civil and political rights should be carefully distinguished; the one equal for all, the others submitted to conditions, yet gradually accessible, in accordance with given pledges, and with civil liberty scrupulously defined; add to this a conservative power. United institutions have too much neglected stability: an indispensable condition, without which every thing is precarious; a principle which it suffices not solemnly to proclaim; its application and practicability must be well secured, if it would repel the continual attempts of human ambition.

I would have given this salutary power to the Supreme Council of Castile, an old and venerable body, sanctified by time, and constituting our last remaining monument of ancient Spanish liberty.

In fact, what could have been substituted in its place? I thought to maintain and establish it on the most solid foundations, on heights inaccessible to all collision. Councillors not to be removed would have been elected in a manner inflexibly determined, after a long trial, accompanied by unequivocal reputation, intelligence, and virtue.

Age, services, all should have been fixed and peremptorily regulated.

Once admitted into this Areopagus, and placed in the first rank of high state functionaries, their task would have been to watch over the conduct of our institutions, without aspiring to other honours, other rewards, or any other species of glory. To them would have devolved the task to register and promulgate the law ; to watch over its administration, and to check the deviations of other powers, whatever might be their nature. This was assuredly a high function, but it was essential to those who would preserve their rights, and make them respected.

Such was my Utopian predilection ; it was not an exclusive devotion to my king, nor a sentiment of purely disinterested patriotism, but a dream of personal glory.

Alas ! nothing was ready for such an enterprize ; and even had there existed some favourable tendency towards it in men's minds, was this the moment for putting a hand to the work ? In sight of the tempest which agitated our neighbours, the French nation, could we expose the vessel of our state to the fury of unchained waves ? Who would have dared advise it ? In days so calm, who would have attempted innovations so sudden, unsupported by popular opinion ? Who could do still worse, and, all at once, demand the sacrifices which such a reform would have exacted ?

When it is contemplated to change existing

laws, to introduce new customs and create fresh opinions, it suffices not to throw upon paper a flattering theory, and fair promises for the future; firmness and rigour would alike be powerless to give them effect.

In France, who would have recommended her vaunted liberty, could the blood and tears which it cost have been foretold ?

To convert minds by gentle means is the only way to remodel a nation. We should favour information, inspire virtue by good example, and, above all, bring forward new interests in the place of old ones.

To effect this revolution in Spain, we should have had not only errors and prejudices to combat, we must have destroyed an immensity of abuses, over which it would have been impossible to triumph by persuasion, because then as now, after so many revolutions, so much experience, these abuses served to feed an innumerable multitude of persons : corroding abuses, doubtless, yet authorized by long impunity, become the patrimony of families, of powerful associations, of the high and the middle classes, and even of the class which has nothing, but exists from day to day.

How extirpate at once abuses whose roots were so deep and so extensive ?

Let an attempt be made to apply the wisest and most useful institutions to a corrupted order of things, and you will find that the legislator perishes in the attempt. The most precious rights, pro-

claimed aloud, I repeat it, the most seducing promises for the future, will not give daily bread, perhaps may never give it to those accustomed to subsist on old abuses.

“ Long live absolute Monarchy ! down with the Nation ! ” These shameful cries were heard in Spain, not long since, and I was not astonished at them. Proceeding from the wretches who uttered them, they were sincere, and expressed an idea which we may convey in these words :—

“ Long live the power by which I live, and my existence is secure ! perish the power with which I should lose my means of living ! ”

I believe that no proprietors, no Spaniards, with ever so little fortune or independence, pronounced such blasphemies ; but these were but few in numbers ; the mass had nothing, not even the means of earning a scanty subsistence.

Let them have bread, and the knowledge which bestows it ; the land must be prepared ere the seed be sown. This I said to myself, as I beheld so much wretchedness from the elevation on which destiny had placed me. Those who look up from below, see not the obstacles which he who holds the reins has to avoid or to surmount. I wished to do much. I did all I could ; but there was so much to do. The evils of Spain’s worst ages seemed let loose upon ours ; besides the difficulties which the scourge of war and the critical situation of Europe entailed upon us. To lift the waggon from the slough, to make it speed over so rocky and track-

less a way, was no slight undertaking. Let me, at least, be given credit for my efforts. I will here enter into a few particulars.

*Public Instruction.*

I should observe that, on my attaining the ministry, I found all opening effectually stopped, walled up, against the new lights which were accused of causing all the misfortunes of France. The Count de Florida Blanca, after having, with his friends, favoured public instruction, became its enemy, when he imagined it dangerous and culpable. Reforms, long since begun with remarkable success, ceased at once. It was wished to adopt a retrograde movement.

The press was rigorously examined. The government wrapped itself in silence, and would have imposed the same on the whole kingdom. Journals exclusively devoted to literature and the arts ceased to appear in the year 1791, as well in Madrid as in the interior. Our only gazette spoke less of what was occurring in France than of affairs in China. This was not all; the terror of government grew every day more intense. Directors of patriotic societies received secret orders: "Slacken the progress of your labours," said they; "no discussions upon political economy." The universities were to confine themselves to the most indispensable branches of instruction. The heads of provinces were ordered to dissolve all newly-founded academies, and watch over the old

ones which existed in virtue of long established laws.

Spain, submissive to this course of intellectual abstinence for two years, was now but a convent of the order of St. Bruno. Philanthropic zeal and love of country alike alarmed the court.

This system of severity and mistrust appeared to me at once impolitic and cruel; yet it required more time than I at first believed needful to dispel the dread with which Florida Blanca had impressed the mind of Charles IV.

The glowing loyalty evinced throughout the Peninsula, on the declaration of war with France, furnished me with arms against the prejudices of the king.

By degrees, without seeming to change the system adopted, I succeeded in removing the interdict. The light of mind was about to be extinguished; I rekindled it. The associations, true schools of patriotism, where all kinds of talents were of kindred growth, received a new life. I awakened a spirit of emulation. Instead of fearing the press, I gave it all possible latitude. The door was opened to sound learning, even in those corporations which, till now, had obstinately repelled it, and which more than once had resisted government itself, when it strove to break through their prejudices.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Don André Muriel, whom none will accuse of having depreciated the reign of Charles III., but rather of having frequently praised it at the expense of that of Charles IV., after adverting to the resistance of the first university in the kingdom



The plan of studies laid down by the council of Castile, and so long rejected by peripatetics, was at last generally received by the universities and royal colleges. Are these apocryphal assertions? Is it not true, that public studies were improved? The notices, exercises, and memorials of that epoch are now covered with dust in the recesses of our libraries. They will be found when wanted. The ministerial records, of which I had charge, would afford a thousand proofs of the general movement, and of the proper direction given to public instruction. I will cite but one example, but of so remarkable a character that it may supply the place of many others. Don Narcisso Heredia, now Marquis of Heredia, Count d'Ofalia, was one of the best professors of the University of Grenada. I still remember an argumentative prospectus of philosophic sciences, the pupils in which discussed and developed them with much credit at three public meetings. It was a summary of every known science. It may be added, that the work of M. Heredia would, even now, do honour

dom to the reform enjoined by the Council of Castile, and reciting the scripture text on which the university founded its repugnance, added these words: "Roda, and the erudite men by whom he was surrounded, saw with regret, amidst the general impulse which elsewhere moved all bodies of instructors, the strange phenomenon beyond the sphere of learned bodies devoted to instruction, exhibited by the fatal insensibility of our universities. The reign of Charles III., so beneficial under so many administrative aspects, also passed away without correcting the vices which time had introduced."—Spain, under the Kings of the House of Bourbon, vol. vi. additional chapter iv.

to the most celebrated academy of Europe. This production is the more commendable, because, whilst respecting the purity of religious doctrines, the author has not shrunk from freely broaching the highest metaphysical questions of modern schools. He was then scarcely twenty-three years of age.

Is this a singular phenomenon, an isolated case? No; all teaching communities rivalled each other in zeal. Ecclesiastical seminaries, in which, till then, the eternal Gudin had reigned paramount, where instruction was limited to a poor scholastic theology, and some lessons in lithurgy, these seminaries, I say, welcomed nearly all the new methods, —nay, more, this moral revolution penetrated the very cloisters. The names of Descartes, Newton, Locke, Condillac, Leibnitz, and other contemporary sages, rung from the Professor's chair, so long devoted to the antiquated argumentations of the middle age.

How was this progress brought about? Without the least violence. There might have been opposed the power of inertness, which had constantly checked every species of innovation. I also knew that violence could have but a fleeting effect, and produce no advantage. It was by magisterial robes, prebends, and mitres, that I worked this miracle. Persuasion and rewards were my weapons. These are the best resources of a government. Indolent minds, all votaries of the former routine, declared against me. In reforming abuses, I had cut off

their supplies ; but I was then young, and felt the enthusiasm of that happy age in which we give ourselves up to the love of good and glorious achievements. I braved this crowd of jealous and peevish men of obtuse understanding, who soon rallied round other more dangerous malcontents, powerfully backed, who succeeded at last in overthrowing me.

Yes, I favoured literature, sciences, and arts ; this can never be forgotten. It will suffice to cast a glance over the municipal archives of the kingdom ; there will be found a multitude of circulars, ordinances, and edicts, which followed each other, without interruption, and had for object to direct and promote primary instruction—a truly royal solicitude, which I felt it my duty to encourage. Never before nor since were schools seen to multiply as they did at that time. In the capital, in all the cities, great and small, were formed academies and associations, to superintend and forward general education. What efforts had not Government, the council, the patriotic societies to exert on the occasion ! All Spain felt the change. I will instance some of the institutions which were either created or restored through my instrumentality.

#### *The Veterinary School.*

Amongst divers branches of instruction which were neglected under the preceding reigns, I must mention the veterinary art, reduced among us to a simple traditionary practice, without principle, with-

out method. The military, above all the cavalry, fell into so deplorable a state under the administrations of Florida Blanca and Llerena, that agriculture, the management of herds and flocks, commerce, industry, wainage, all suffered by this shameful neglect. When the king vouchsafed me his confidence, I called his attention to this important subject. He graciously received all which to him appeared useful, approving the formation of a normal school, for the veterinary art in all its branches. Florida Blanca was still minister (1792), and himself applauded the idea. Well-instructed men were chosen, of acknowledged capacity. They travelled, studying the progress of science, collecting observations, books, and instruments. Others were commissioned to make a tour of Spain, in order to discover the good and evil existing in the country. They returned well stored in studies and experiments. Already authorized by a royal edict, the school was instituted October 18th 1793, at the moment of my succeeding the Count de Florida Blanca; a suitable site had been provisionally assigned to it, near the gate of the Recollets. The director of it was Don Sigismondo Malatz;<sup>2</sup> and his assistant, Don Hyppolito Estevez; the inspectors, Don Domingo Codina, counsellor of Castile, and Lieutenant-general Prince de Montfort, at the same time inspector-general of dragoons. The number

<sup>2</sup> This excellent professor had frequented the best schools of France, especially those of Chabert and Gilbert.

of pupils fixed by the king's edict was ninety-six, one-half being for the service of the army, the other half for the public service. There were at first only thirty : the complement was filled up as soon as the edifice was completed. With a view to facilitate observation and the progress of instruction, the inhabitants of Madrid were invited to confide to the care of the professors any domestic animals attacked by disease ; and this, without any further expense than that their owners were either to furnish or pay for their food. It is needless to remind any one of the success of this establishment. The special protection extended to it, the clever men it produced, the general utility of its results—all these facts are notorious. Among its other duties, it devolved upon this school to spread learning through the interior of the provinces ; to send help thither in times of need ; to combat epidemic or endemic disorders of cattle, wherever they broke out. Finally, the school was enjoined to publish its observations, the course it adopted, to render science familiar, and place it within the reach of all.

The best works printed up to 1798 are the following :—

Elements of the Veterinary Art, by Don Sigismondo Malatz, the director.

Veterinary Guide, by Don Francisco and Don Alonzo de Rus Garcia.

Treatise on the Epidemic and Contagious Diseases of all kinds of Cattle, by Don Juan Antonio Montès.

Instructions to Herdsmen and Proprietors of Stock, by the celebrated Daubenton; translated, with Notes relative to Spain, by Don Francisco Gonzales, professor of the School.

*Medicine; Surgery, and Physic, its auxiliaries.*

The difficulty Government had to contend with in giving good professors to the land and sea forces, shews the neglected state in which science had been left amongst us, and the urgent necessity for its reform. Not thinking it consistent with my duty to assign this task to other hands, I took it upon myself. My first care was to revise old ordinances, to improve and augment instruction in the three colleges of surgery at Madrid, Barcelona, and Cadiz, whilst awaiting the completion of the buildings prepared to receive new students, such as were soon afterwards erected at Burgos and Saint Jago. In the capital, even that of San Carlos had not a lecture-room for practical instruction. To fill this hiatus, I established an extensive infirmary, attached to the college, well supplied with medicines, dressings of all kinds, and necessary instruments. At the same time, in order to encourage the pupils, and rekindle emulation, twelve places were endowed, in favour of the youths who showed the most zeal and capacity. These various measures having been adopted as early as the year 1793, the same solicitude extended to pharmacy, as well as to other auxiliary sciences, nearly unknown throughout Spain. After having thus provided for the

most urgent object, I founded, in 1795, the Royal College of Madrid; and, in the same year, the foundations were laid for the study of medicine and practical chemistry, the happy results of which, common to the whole kingdom, have been justly appreciated.<sup>3</sup>

Without drawing on the public purse, which, at this period, was sufficiently exhausted, I sought secure and well combined means, for meeting the expense of the great establishment, the existence of which I had so much at heart. Nothing was wanting to it. A library, the depôt of all kinds of knowledge, whether acquired at home or abroad, was established, and open to the public, like every other in the capital.

In the train of practical studies followed the study of experimental physic, chemistry, and botany, as applied to medicine. The co-founders, directors, and professors, were,

<sup>3</sup> Besides the insufficiency of university instruction, the laws in force up to this time permitted the title of physician to be granted to any who had exercised the practice under the auspices of an approved physician, or a mere village doctor; the certificate of such a man sufficed—it was thus he had himself obtained his diploma. It will be easily seen, that the service of suffering humanity was abandoned to unskilful hands. The new regulation required punctual attendance to a course of chemistry in Madrid, for two years, in order to empower a pupil, already received into any other university, to take his final degree; instruction in practical chemistry extended itself successively to all the colleges in the kingdom, where the pupils could more commodiously follow this course, during the prescribed period of two years.

Don Joseph Yberti,<sup>4</sup>  
Don Joseph Sever Lopez,  
Don Francisco Martinez Sobral,  
Don Higinio Antonio Fernandez,  
Don Leonard de Galli,  
Don Santiago Herner.

Their talents and admirable self-devotion give them many claims on the gratitude of their country. All that was then doing for science was turned to profit. During the whole reign of Charles IV. the progress was never relaxed.<sup>5</sup> The

<sup>4</sup> The celebrated Yberti was, in his time, one of the most distinguished men in Europe. His writings merited general approbation. He was a member of the Academy and Institute of Sciences at Bologna, fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine in London, of the Society of Naturalists in Paris, &c. &c. He had to defend himself in Spain against a host of envious enemies. His talents triumphed over these contemptible rivalries. The world appreciated his great learning. He was physician to the king, member of the Royal Academy of Madrid, and professor of practico-clinic medicine in the new establishment.

<sup>5</sup> On the occasion of the amendment and reform in instruction, I had occasion to discover how difficult it is to extirpate abuses or prejudices derived from previous education. The right of possession or of enjoyment appeared sacred to those who lived by it. Myself, and those who wished to aid me in this great undertaking, must inevitably have yielded, so strong and general was the resistance, had I possessed none but the weapons of power. The happy results obtained by degrees, in a short space of time, were the effects of wisdom diffused with skill and perseverance. By means of a discreet dilatoriness, we gently pushed on the wheel, without forcing its speed. Those who would obtain reforms without incurring the danger of reaction, should clear the soil, and begin by weeding it. This is the only way to impart fresh vigour into a people; such resuscitation is always a kind of miracle.



Royal Decree of May 6th 1804, records all the ordinances on medico-surgical studies. It is a magnificent programme of the sundry divisions of the science which required cultivation ; and all were so cultivated with brilliant success. I had taken care to procure good books, to advise and favour translations of the best foreign works, and the publication of other works of the learned men of our own country, who assisted me with much zeal in this truly national enterprize. The greater part of them had explored Europe, at the expense of the state, to bring back to us, as they did, the knowledge and improvements of Paris and of London. I shall specify a few of the translations published between 1793 and 1798 :—

A complete translation of Cullen's Practical Medicine and Medical Practice.

Bell's Treatise on Ulcers, and that of d'Enaux's Malignant Pustula; translated by the indefatigable Don Barthelemy Piñera.

Introduction to Cullen's Medicine ; written by M. Lafont, and translated by Don Juan Rafoo.

These works, undertaken at the beginning of Charles IV.'s reign, were completed during my ministry.

Legal Medicine and Surgery (Medical Jurisprudence), by James Plenck ; translated, with annotations, by Higinio Lorente, in 1796.

Different works, translated from the English and French, by Don Santiago Garcia ; amongst

others, that of Ward on Ophthalmia and Psoropthalmia, &c. &c. 1797.

Plenk's Surgical Pharmacopeia, translated, with Notes, by Don Antonio Lavedan, 1797,

Physiological, Pathological, and Therapeutic Observations, by M. Fabre ; translated by Don Juan Antonio Gonzales.

The Elements of Pharmacy, by Mr. Beaume ; translated by Don Domingo Garcia Fernandez, 1793.

The Influence of Climate on Animal and Vegetable Bodies, by Wilson ; translated from the English, by Don Salvador Ximenes Coronado, 1793.

The Elements of Natural History and Chemistry, by Fourcroy, 1793.

The Works of Spallantani, by Don Joseph Bonillo, 1794.

The Elements of Chemistry, by Chaptal ; translator, Don Higinio Antonio Lorente, 1794.

The Elements of Physio-chemical General Analysis of Waters, by the learned Bergman ; translator, Don Ignatius Soto d'Araujo, cadet in the Company of Spanish Body Guards. This work was dedicated to me.

Lessons in Chemistry, Theoretical and Practical, of the Academy at Dijon, adapted to the New Vocabulary of 1795.

Physical Dictionary, by Brisson ; with the modern discoveries, by that worthy ecclesiastic, Don Christóbal Ladera, and one of his friends, 1796.

**Elementary Treatise on Chemistry, by Lavoisier ; translated by Don Juan Munnariz, captain of Artillery, 1797.**

**System, or Complete Course of Surgery, by Bell ; translated, with Notes, by Don Santiago Garcia, 1798.**

*Spanish Works.*

**Apologetic Essay on Inoculation of the Small-pox, by Dr. O. Scandon, first consulting physician of the King's Armies, of the Royal Academy of Madrid, of the Society of Seville, and of the Academy of Practical Medicine at Barcelona ; 1794.**

**Journal of the New Discoveries in Physical Science, as applicable to the healing art, begun in the reign of Charles IV., suppressed in 1791, as were all other journals, and re-established when I became minister.**

**Treatise on Chronic and Acute Diseases of the Stomach, by Don Antonio Corbela.**

**New inquiries on Fractures of the Knee-pan, and on the evils resulting from them, by Don Antonio Galli, surgeon to the King.**

Foreigners ascribed great merit to this work ; it was translated into many languages. Doctor Galli did me the honour of dedicating it to me.

**Treatise on Pathology, Theoretic and Practical, for the pupils of the College of Surgery, by Don Domingo Vidal.**

**Quinology ; by Don Hyppolito Ruiz, chief botanist ; 1796.**

**Legal Surgery; Medical Jurisprudence, general and particular, divided into four parts, Civil, Political, Military, Canonical, and Criminal ; by Don Juan Fernandez del Valle ; 1796.**

It was admitted by foreigners that this was the best work of the kind then existing in Europe.

**Analysis of the Chemical Laboratory at Segovia, by Don Louis Proust ; a magnificent work, published in separate pamphlets.**

**Artificial Method of rearing New-born Infants ; a complete treatise on the diseases of childhood ; by Don Joseph Yberti ; one of the works which spread his reputation throughout Europe. Yberti, in the same year, 1796, published his excellent Treatise on Medical Studies.**

**A complete course of Human Anatomy, dedicated to Charles IV., and written by his Majesty's order ; its authors, Don Francisco Bonelli, and Don Ignatio Lacava. 1797. This is a classic work which was wanting in Spain.**

**Elements of Pharmacy, according to the principles and operations of Modern Chemistry ; by Don Francisco Carbonell, of the Royal Societies of Madrid and Barcelona ; 1797.**

**Elementary course of Meteorology, written by the command of his Majesty. Its author, Don Joseph Garigo, professor at the Royal Observatory. This work was intended to apply to medicine, agriculture, &c. &c. 1794, and the following years.**

Treatise, by Don Juan Naval, on the Diseases of the Eye and Ear; 1796 and 1798.

Boerhave's Medical Directory, or Abridgment; by Don Juan Baptista de Soldevila.

This list would be too long were I to quote all the useful works produced by the impetus given to science and to the healing art during the six years of my administration; the labours of every day, the correspondence, both foreign and domestic, of this kingdom; the memorials and immense collection of remarks, experiments, discoveries, enriched science, and rendered it common in Spain. Fortunately this salutary revolution, the fruit of zeal protected by government, had time to consolidate itself, gaining power for resisting the attacks of which it was the object, when my slanderers or my foes succeeded in supplanting me.\*

\* It is well known within what narrow limits medical science, above all physiology, was confined. The best foreign works were prohibited, denounced, kept back in the sea-ports and custom-houses of the kingdom. Books of magic appeared less criminal, at a certain epoch of religious fanaticism, than those of physiology were considered in Spain in our own day. I must not here omit mentioning a report made to Government on this subject, though a lingering regard bids me conceal the author's name. He closed his statement with these discouraging words:—"Let us, above all, attend to the health of the soul, which is of far greater importance than that of the body. Dust and ashes we were, and such we shall be again. Since it must be so, what signifies it whether a little sooner or a little later? Our days are numbered. No physician, not even Hippocrates himself, knew how to add a moment to those destined to us from all eternity.

The

*High and exact Sciences.*

Without reckoning the numerous establishments consecrated to the special studies which government, the economic societies, and many enlightened persons encouraged in every province, I will only speak of the temple erected for the purpose in the capital of the kingdom.

I am proud of having been the founder of that illustrious body, the Cosmographic Engineers of the State.

The object of this institution was the study of theoretic and practical astronomy, in all its ramifications, and with all the latitude of mathematics, applied to navigation, geography, agriculture, medicine, statistics, and the various uses of social life.

The ordinances for the creation of this military and scientific body were issued August 19th 1796.

A director, six professors, four substitutes for the latter, twelve candidates or pupils.

These were the appointments of lectureships established :

Arithmetic—Analysis and Geometry.

Method of Infinitesimals, sublime Mechanism.

Trigonometry, plain and spherical.

The health of souls, the welfare of the state require that a check should be given to impiety propagated under the cloak of medicine. In modern days, physician and materialist are synonymous terms. Let us tear away the mask from impiety, and banish this pestilence far from us."

**General Optics.**

**Synthetic Astronomy.**

**Practical Astronomy.**

**The formation of Geographical and Geometrical Charts.**

**Meteorology ; its application.**

**Hydrostatics and Hydraulics.**

**Physical Astronomy.**

**Drawing of Plans.**

To these varied instructions we must add, that the heavens were incessantly examined, night and day, by a professor, a substitute, and by two candidates; they were to be, in important cases, joined by all the members of the observatory. The clyrical directors of the veterinary school and the intendant of the botanical garden were enjoined to communicate with cosmographers, mutually exchanging their observations, and regularly publishing passing events in astronomy, medicine, and agriculture. Nothing was neglected on these points. In a short time, the Observatory of Madrid could vie with every other in Europe. Don Salvador Ximenes Coronado, his worthy colleagues, and excellent disciples, furnished both Spain and other countries with justly valued works. One of the first objects confided to this illustrious body was a complete statistical view of the kingdom, a project often conceived but never realized. The Revolution of Aranjuez, and its fatal consequences, checked this useful undertaking, which

was about to furnish us with a physical, mathematical, and civil geography of Spain.

In recalling to mind these noble creations, I do not pretend to attribute their merit to myself, exclusively, at the expense of the ministers who had preceded me in this career. What they had suggested or commenced, I religiously respected ; both men and things were left undisturbed. It was a bequest, of which the country ought not to have lost the inheritance. No talent already known was deprived of its rights. I drew more than one from oblivion, and saved others from persecution. The deference I exacted for the veterans of science satisfied the young that their own future fate was secure ; and what could I have done without these meritorious men ? They were my feet and my hands ; the only courtiers I loved to see about me. To them the geographical cabinet was indebted for its existence,—not a nominal, but a real existence,—and its high reputation. They enriched the Hydrographic Museum with marine charts, plans, and all sorts of instruments, with scarce books, and valuable manuscripts, collected with great trouble and expense.

Natural and exact sciences were cultivated simultaneously, and with equal ardour. The fine collection of the Cabinet of Natural History was increased and perfected. The Botanical Garden was daily opened to new guests. No vessel arrived in our ports that was not freighted with a



multitude of these interesting visitors, furnished with passports from the learned men whom royal munificence supported in those vast regions of the New World where Spain still held sway. It was at the Botanical Gardens that these travellers were received, attended to, and entertained, by other men of learning: Don Casimio Gomez Ortega, the pride of two reigns, Don Hyppolito Ruiz, Don Joseph Pavon, Don Isidoro Galvez, Don Joseph Severe Lopez, Don Joachim Rodriguez, Don Antonio Fernandez, Don Santiago Herner, Don Salvador Soliva, and many other naturalists, versed in the various branches of this delightful science.

All these distinguished men had their appropriate duties at the Garden of Plants. The erudite Izquierdo, the eloquent Clavijo had charge of the cabinet. What choice works were not to be found there!

Those of Ortega, the foundations of Botany; Linnæus' Botanical Philosophy; his elementary course, written by royal command. The works of Ruiz and of Pavon; the *Prodromus Floræ Peruviansis et Chiliensis* (floral productions of Peru and Chili), and the great work which followed it, and was the admiration of all Europe. At the same time the immortal Cabanilles published his *Description of Plants indigenous to Spain*, and Clavijo finished his beautiful Translation of Buffon and Lacépède.

It was not to these efforts that the productions of science were limited ; science in general was ardently cultivated. But I shall not here write the literary history of that epoch in which Spain ought to exult. It is enough to recall its remembrance. These specimens may suffice.

#### SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

##### *Agriculture, Commerce, &c.*

It was on these heads that my solicitude was most earnestly called into exertion. Nothing that existed in the actual state of things could satisfy me ; all needed to be rectified and enlightened. The resuscitation of Spain depended upon the attainment of this object. I caused to be reprinted the works of our old economists, and those of foreign statesmen. I urged the completion of such as were commenced. The most part of them were published at the charge and under the auspices of government. I will enumerate some of them.

Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith. Translated by Don Joseph Alonzo, with illustrations, notes, and an appendix relative to Spain.

The Political and Economical Discourses of David Hume.

Supplement to the Appendix of popular Education, with two Discourses by Christóbal de la Mata, recently discovered.

The immense work of Don Eugenio Larruga

entitled, **Political and Economical Memoirs on the Natural Productions, Commerce, Manufactures, and Mines of Spain**, continued under my ministry, and amply patronized.

**Observations on the Natural History, Geography, Agriculture, Population, and Produce of the Kingdom of Valentia**, by Don Antonio Joseph Cabanilles. This learned man was one of those who travelled through Spain, at the expense of government, to collect materials for the natural history, statistics, and geography of the Peninsula.

**History of the Political Economy of Arragon**, by Don Ignatio de Aso.

**Reflections, Political and Economical**, by Don Miguel Generès, on the Population, Agriculture, and Manufactures of the kingdom of Arragon.

**Political and Economical Thoughts in Favour of Agriculture and other Branches of Industry in Spain**, by Don Miguel Perez Quintero.

**Essay on the Corn Laws**. Translated, by order of the king, from the original French, and applied to Spain by Don Thomas Anzano.

**Practical Lessons on Agriculture**; a work commenced in 1792, continued, augmented by Appendices, and happily terminated.

**Rosier's Dictionary of Agriculture**; translated and published under the auspices of Government, by Don Juan Alvarez Guerra, now Minister of the Interior (1835); a work which all the munici-

palities of the kingdom were invited to bespeak, with orders to hold it at the disposal of every inhabitant who might wish to consult it.

General History of the Commercial Interests of all Nations; translated by Don Domingo Marcoleta.

The Natural and Chemical Elements of Agriculture; by the Count de Gillemberg; translated from the English by Don Casimero Gomez Ortega.

On the Manufacture of Salts and Potash; by Don Juan Manuel Munarriz; printed by the king's order, and distributed in all economical societies and consulates of the kingdom. (Commercial Tribunals.)

Elements of the Art of Dyeing; by Berthollet; translated by order of the king, and enlarged by Don Domingo Garcia Fernandez. A great number of specimens of this work, and of others equally important, were sent to the economic societies.

Works and Memoirs of the Patriotic Societies, which vied with each other in publishing them in all the provinces.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> These are the names of the societies existing towards the close of 1798:—Almunecar, Astorga, Avila, Alaejos, Aguilar de la Fontera, Alcala de los Gazules, Baneza, Baeza, Benevente, Bujalance, Chinchou, Cuidad-Rodrigo, Cuenca, Constantina, Cabra, Cantabrica, Granada, Gran Canaria, Gomera, Herrera de Rio Pisuerga, Iaca, Jaen, Leon, Lucena, Lugo, Madrid, Murcia, Mallorquina, Medina Sidonia, Medina de Rio Seco, Medina del Campo, Malaga, Motril, Oveida, Osuña, Puerto Real, Requena, Rioja

These publications were so useful, and at the same time so numerous, that, in order to diffuse and bring them within the reach of all classes, it became necessary to make extracts, and publish them periodically, every fortnight, leaving persons at liberty either to agree for the purchase of the whole collection, or to buy the separate parts.

The Weekly Journal of Agriculture and Arts, especially devoted to the instruction of the working classes, owed its creation to me.\* Many men

Rioja Castellana, Sevilla, Sigüenza, Soria, Segovia, San Lucar, Santiago, Toledo, Tudela, Tarrega, Tenerife, Talavera, Trujillo, Tordesillas, Tarazona de la Mancha, Tarragona, Vascougada, Valencia, Vera, Valladolid, Velez Malaga, Xeres de la Frontera, Zaragoza, Zamora.

\* The following is a passage from the prospectus of this literary undertaking :—

“ It needs no great study to discover the utility of these extracts ; the good principles circulated through the kingdom by the Patriotic Societies throw sufficient light on the subject. The work will neither be so voluminous nor so expensive as are collections in general, which are sometimes of slow progress. Every one will be able to afford paying for the part he wants, and need buy no other than that required in his calling or profession. The husbandman, the merchant, the artisan, will find in these pamphlets abundant information and practical rules. Domestic prosperity constitutes the wealth of a state. This journal furnishes complete instruction in all branches of political economy. The farmer will there find useful advice and positive information. He will therein learn the use of implements, good methods, mechanical operations, such as the various kinds of improvement demand, the distinguishing qualities of soils and plants, the way to rear and keep cattle without injury to agriculture, by correcting false systems, errors introduced by ignorance, and old prejudices. Thus every

of learning contributed to it the tributes of their peculiar talents. The good effects of this publication were generally appreciated. The curates of all the parishes subscribed for it; the bishops set the example. It still exists, in Paris, among the living ruins of the country, which have been scattered over the four quarters of the globe. The director of this estimable journal was Don Juan Melon, a statesman and a literary character, whose well-earned fame had long passed beyond the frontiers of Spain.\*

every one may contribute his share towards the progress of commerce, arts, trade, and general industry. By degrees will disappear that idleness which is the mother of every vice. Even women will devote themselves to such toils as befit their sex. The unfortunate, actually reduced to beggary, disgraceful blots upon our social state, will become useful citizens; our journal will render the science of economy familiar, by adapting it to all capacities.

\* In the works of Melendez will be found an epistle, which he then addressed to me on the subject of the creation of this journal. He applauded my efforts in favour of the improvement of arts and agriculture. I cannot resist the temptation of quoting some of his verses. The name of Melendez will interest the reader.

It was on the occasion of the Weekly Journal being established that he addressed me the epistle which forms part of his works, and of which the following are extracts:

“What do I see? The illustrious Charles, from his exalted throne, and you too, my Lord, casting a look of interest on the humble plough? You deign to feel solicitude for the honest husbandman! You wish that a purer light may shine on his lowly hearth, from whence you would banish sloth, which would otherwise devour the fruits raised by the sweat of his brow;—sloth which leads so many wretches from misfortune to crime.”

“At

There were a great number of other periodical works published in the capital, and in the pro-

“ At your powerful voice error is dispelled, and light dawns upon us ; maternal Spain raises her venerable forehead, proud of being encircled by ears of golden corn ; again shall she triumph amongst nations.

“ Ah ! my Lord, enjoy this glorious perspective ! behold a countless people, whose cares and toils now produce rich harvests. Their tutelary deity secures the welfare of all. Behold them ! How they celebrate the blessings which they owe to your care. They raise their suppliant hands towards Heaven, invoking benedictions on their Monarch and on you.”

After a touching picture of a husbandman's fatigues, and of the state of servitude in which he still sighed, Melendez continues in these terms :—

“ Break his chains, my Lord ; he will then rush joyously to his labour, and bless the hand of his deliverer. Enlighten him, encourage his efforts ; seeds hitherto unknown ; more perfect implements of husbandry will double his produce ; plenty will fill his stores, and science herself will promote and recompense the toils which nourish the noble sons of our country.

“ No more henceforth shall be disdained ; no longer the victim of gross ignorance, man's primitive profession, which kings and consuls have not blushed to exercise ; that holy calling of which the Creator of the universe, with his own divine lips, dictated to man the earliest lessons, will no longer be disdained, no longer be the victim of gross ignorance.”

Here followed a picture of the prosperity to which agriculture might raise itself. The poet's imagination soars to the sublime idea of the religious morality which must be the consequence of instruction shed among that interesting class, the cultivators of the soil.

“ The labourer, already good by natural instinct, becomes better from conviction. Vice has less power over him. His religion is enlightened. Hitherto bent towards earth, like the yoked ox, henceforth he shall look to Heaven, whose splendours have not as yet affected him ; he will admire the active power of his Creator, which shines at once in the perpetual miracle of repro-

vinces, all of which concurred in the like objects: that is to say, in spreading intelligence, combatting abuses, re-kindling and encouraging

reproduction by seed, and in the brilliant colours of flowers, the gentle breath of zephyr, the fury of the north wind, the delicious freshness of autumn, the roaring of the storm, the fertilizing power of snow. In contemplating the immensity of divine goodness, man is penetrated with gratitude; religious sentiments pour into his heart an ineffable joy."

I believe I in no way belied Melendez' predictions. Never in the preceding century, nor at any anterior epoch, was agriculture so encouraged as during the reign of Charles IV. I shared with my excellent King the blessings of the people. The treacherous artifice of my enemies alone could have corrupted the regard of which I so often received assurances. But I am thoroughly persuaded that Spain is now undeceived, and no longer unjust towards me. Melendez thus continues:

"What prayers, what well-earned praises does not the future promise to you! Let your glance o'erskip an interval of time, and behold the Spaniards rich, virtuous, and free; no longer slaves to ignorance and misery. Behold a vigorous generation, born of fruitful times! My Lord, behold your work! This new race owes to you its existence. Your name is on every lip. The old who hear it uttered shed tears of joy. Revel already in this blest hereafter. You, to whom the present has cost such watchful cares, open your heart to the delight of having done so much good."

Finally, having transposed into beautiful poetry the conversations we had often enjoyed together, on the means of securing our country's emancipation, of favouring its culture by a better distribution of the soil, above all by good laws, without which not all the instruction lavished on that class, our labouring poor, can ameliorate their condition, the great poet thus concludes:

"My Lord, raise the husbandman's just complaint, his humble prayer to the ear of the good King. Destroy the throne of error. The friend, the father, the prop of agriculture, may a fair sheaf of golden corn in blade crown the crest of your arms."



newly-revived education. The following were those most in repute:—the Literary Memorial; the Annals of Literature, Arts, and Sciences; the Spirit of the best European Journals; the Salamanca Weekly Journal of Erudition (a work designed after the plan of the English Spectator); the Literary Courier of Murcia; the Grenada Weekly Gazette of Learning and Economy; the Literary Pastimes of Alcala de Henarez, &c. &c.

The royal censors of the press were ordered gradually to slacken the reins, and to allow great latitude to literature; always providing, that religion and the principles of monarchy were respected. The same indulgence was extended to foreign books and journals, so that they did not openly preach atheism or anarchy, and were calculated to promote the progress of science or of art. These excited amongst us a salutary emulation, and placed us on a level with the most civilized of other countries; I will even say more. When the books and papers which were justly prohibited contained some useful articles, these were judiciously extracted, and appeared in the works whose circulation was sanctioned by the government. This good faith, this toleration from those in power, was notorious at that epoch: certainly, many Spaniards must still remember it, and may compare it with the rude tyranny exercised in latter days.

## POPULAR INSTRUCTION.

*Arts and Trades.*

Not confining myself to rendering instruction easily accessible to all ranks, I warmly encouraged it. Schools were specially devoted to it. Science was applied to industry. The bequests of anterior reigns had been religiously preserved; but they were increased by my care. I will speak but of the principal improvements.—I must first transcribe an extract from the Gazette of February 28th 1794, the most stormy period of our contest with France:—

“ Our lord the King, in spite of the embarrassments of the existing war, wishes to neglect nothing which can contribute to the glory and happiness of his faithful subjects. His majesty is aware that natural sciences can make no progress unless the arts lend them a co-relative support, by becoming auxiliaries to them. Aware, too, that it were in vain to expect this progress in science, while the country, tributary to foreign powers, was by that connexion obliged to borrow from strangers all the instruments and requisite machinery for various scientific operations, he has accordingly determined to establish, near the Royal Observatory, a manufactory for astronomical and surgical instruments, and a professorship for the public instruction of the principles of both sciences,—

which ought to be known by those who devote themselves to this ingenious profession.

“ The king, anxious to give his subjects this new proof of his gracious consideration, had sent Don Carlos Rodriguez and Don Amaro Fernandez to England, at the charge of the state, there to perfect the talents of which they have already given unequivocal proofs. These two able mechanicians were to qualify themselves to initiate the youth of this country into all the processes now used by the manufactories of London. Conformably with the King’s intentions, and in order that they may produce the good results which his Majesty relied on, his excellency the Duke de l’Alcudia, persuaded that the lessons of the best masters would be fruitless if their pupils were not prepared for them before-hand, by a competent study of the principles of geometry, astronomy, physics, and mechanics, without which, they would never be more than artists, if not thoroughly useless, at best of mere mediocrity, without genius, without invention, incapable of understanding or appreciating the instruments which themselves had not made ; has, therefore, resolved that the professorship devoted to the inculcation of these principles, shall be opened immediately, in order that the young pupils destined to construct surgical and mathematical instruments, may acquire a due share of preparatory information ; and, in order to facilitate their

means of so doing, there is published at the royal press, by the order of his Majesty, the first volume of the Lessons of Don Joseph Radon, the professor to be appointed, in consideration of the zeal and talent of which he has already given so many proofs. In conformity with this notice, the youths who wish to apply themselves to the art of instrument making, shall have to wait upon Don Salvador Ximenès Coronado, at the palace of the Buen Retiro; they will there learn the day, hour, and place fixed upon for opening the course of lectures, with no other conditions than those of knowing how to write and read, and of having at least completed their thirteenth year. There will also be given, at separate hours, elementary lessons in astronomy, adapted to the use of other persons, especially such as wish to be well grounded in geography;<sup>10</sup> but those desirous of following the astronomical course, must have previously studied trigonometry, mechanics, &c."

This establishment was not a mere project; it

<sup>10</sup> At this period were reprinted, or published for the first time, many ancient and modern works; among others, the Universal Geographical Dictionary, considerably augmented; the new and very elaborate work entitled, a New Method of Teaching General Geography, by Principles; comprehending the Sublime or Astronomic Branch. The Spanish Atlas, by Don Bernardo Espinalt; Geographical Principles, applied to the use of the Chart, by my particular friend Don Thomas Lopez; Modern Historical Geography; and a multitude of Manuals, or abridgments, for the use of colleges, schools, &c. &c.

was fully carried into effect in the following year, when the Royal Observatory and the Society of Cosmographic Engineers were completely organized.

At the same period was instituted at Madrid, (calle de St. Marco) a royal school for turning, and for the manufacture of instruments, under the direction of that excellent mechanician, Don George Imre. Several of its pupils were supported by the Royal bounty. It was a free school, open to the public. Every one witnessed its progress. Its works in tortoise-shell, ivory and choice woods, in steel, bronze, cast-iron, and all sorts of metal, or of composition, were eagerly purchased. Students from this school spread themselves through the provinces.

Subsequent to this institution, another was founded, equally protected by government (calle larga de St. Bernardo, from 1794 to 1795), for all sorts of machinery, clock-work, brass wire, &c., under the direction of Don Miguel Sastre.

In 1797, was also established (calle de Jesus Maria) a school for the manufacture of cylinders, like those of England, under the direction of Don Roberto Dale, and the special protection of the government.

Who has not seen and admired the royal and sumptuous manufactory for coloured papers by Don Pedro Giraud de Vilette (near the convent of the Canonesses of Santiago)? Many young Spa-

niards profited by the lessons of that skilful manufacturer.

The favourable reception given to Don Henrique Simon, formerly engraver to the King of France, is well known. This artist had attained the power of engraving on hard stone with as much facility as on metal. Government welcomed him, on the only condition that he should receive pupils : he had many, most of them supported by the state.

The school for clock-work, established like the rest in 1798, was alike esteemed by foreigners and natives. The King spontaneously founded it, at his own expense : (calle del Barquillo). He confided the superintendence of it to the two brothers (Don Felipe and Don Pedro Charost). These talented masters published, by his Majesty's command, an elementary treatise on plain clock-work ; two years before, and at the private cost of that king whose services to Spain it is attempted to consign to oblivion, Don Manual de Cirella, clock-maker of the palace, published his great work on Universal Clock-making. . Besides explaining general methods, the author disclosed his secret, of applying to pendulums and watches the indications of astronomy, a new instrument for piercing the cylinder, on a diapason of twenty notes ; time-pieces, &c., &c.

Let us not forget the fine establishment for manufacturing furniture, for veneering, marble

work, &c., placed under the protection of Government, and intended for the instruction of the people, by Don Louis Hennequin (real calle de Almudina). Thence were sent forth, even to foreign lands, a quantity of flowers, vases, white stones, corners, pier glasses, chimney ornaments, bas-reliefs, tables, chandeliers, urns, cameos, and other curious objects, which were universally sought and admired. The rich manufactory of goldsmiths' work, by the celebrated Martinez, was well known. I constantly befriended it, and so made it flourish, that it received numerous commands from various parts of Europe, and from the New World. With the good old rules of his art, to the elegance of the Arabs, and the ingenious capriciousness of the Americans, Martinez knew how to combine the grace and correctness of modern artists, and by this happy admixture, he may be said to have formed a new taste, which was peculiarly his own.<sup>11</sup>

His scholars scattered themselves through the provinces, where they promulgated the taste and manner of their master.

<sup>11</sup> The plate which was carried away from my dwelling was the work of Martinez; on it was ably represented the most beautiful productions of the animal and vegetable kingdoms with which Spain and America have furnished our tables. In the pillage of my house, this rich plate was at first spared, but it was finally taken to the palace of his Majesty, under the care and by the order of the commissioners who were charged with superintending the sequestration of my property.

Many other branches of industry were either created or revived by the care of Charles IV. and his government, in spite of all the embarrassments and expenses in which they were involved by the war, first with France, and afterwards with England.

Every year the Royal Museum of the Buen Retiro was enriched by a crowd of mechanical models. This was not a vain ostentation, nor an useless luxury: instruction in theories, and their application to practice, went along with it. Those who wished to possess any of these machines for their own private use, found instructions, facilities, and economical means for procuring them. The solicitude of Government extended itself to those who could not come and visit the museum at the capital. Descriptive catalogues were made of the most useful instruments, and those least known in the interior of the kingdom. Don Juan Lopez de Penalver, with other meritorious men, who had, like himself, explored the best establishments in Europe, travelling at the expense of the state, were commissioned to draw up these catalogues, which were distributed and delivered in parts, pending the general publication of the whole collection in its proper order.

In fact, wherever the interest of a branch of industry, either just sprung up or fallen into decay, stood in need of assistance, the adminis-



tration hastened to despatch models, in order to revive emulation and curiosity.

It is known, or at least it ought to be known, what were my efforts, to cause the kingdom of Valencia to adopt the methods of Vaucanson, relative to the different preparations of silks. A practical school, established at Venaresa, was directed by the celebrated Lapayese, whose luminous work, as well as the book of Doctor Ortella, powerfully contributed to the progress of our looms. This object was earnestly recommended to all the economical societies. Lapayese received commission to promulgate information, and amply supply facilities and means of execution to all those who applied to him. Copies of works were given at a moderate price, regulated by their actual cost, so that every one who chose might purchase them; but distributed gratuitously among the labouring poor. Thus intelligence was diffused on all sides, and competition became general. It was no fault of the Government that the cultivation of silk, that chief wealth of southern lands, should fail to revive and attain perfection. The cloths of Guadalaxara and of Brihuega, which daily improved, rivalled those of France for durability and texture. There were sold at Madrid, after the restoration of peace, more than ten thousand pieces in each month. Our wools could not meet the demands from abroad. The manufacturers of

Valencia and Catalonia rivalled the royal ones. Those of Segovia did not remain behind-hand.<sup>12</sup>

At Cadiz and elsewhere, the manufacture of sailcloths employed thousands of hands, and from that time none were used save the hems of our own country.<sup>13</sup>

The threads and linens of Galicia made great improvements; greater proficiency was acquired

<sup>12</sup> Far from diminishing, after the peace, the prosperity of these various establishments rather increased. In 1795 and 1796 Government was obliged to come to the assistance of the new manufacturers, and their new methods, which suffered great opposition from the old manufacturers, and from the rooted ignorance of local authorities. Don Joseph Perez Inigo, of San Domingo de la Cazada, had recourse to the protection of Government to keep up his cloth manufactory, so remarkable for the fine quality of its goods, and the moderation of their prices; an additional motive for the persecution directed against him. The King granted him the title of royal manufacturer, and the honour of placing his Majesty's arms over the doors of his dwelling and his warehouse.

<sup>13</sup> The manufacture of sails, cables, cordage, &c. became altogether a national one. Hemp was eagerly cultivated wherever the soil permitted, especially in Navarre and Arragon; but above all in the kingdom of Granada, where I myself set the example of its cultivation on a large scale. I devoted to it more than a thousand acres of newly-cleared land of my estate of Soto de Roma, and another great track on my property at Guadalcazar. I made considerable advances to the planters. The Government, on its part, was also very liberal towards the cultivators of this rich valley. In a short time a stream of gold and silver circulated in it, for the disposal of the produce were certain; prices were continuing to rise; the state offered a prize of encouragement, instead of exerting a right of monopoly; so that our arsenals had shortly no need of applying to other countries for this indispensable article.

in the art of weaving.<sup>14</sup> Cotton was raised in our own country, and supplied the national manufactures.<sup>15</sup> The breed of silkworms, which was almost failing in Spain, so much had it been neglected or corrupted by erroneous systems, was now highly protected. Mulberry plants of all kinds multiplied amongst us. Paper makers received an impulse proportioned to the prodigious activity of the press; that of Catalonia no longer shrunk from comparison with foreign states. In short, beams of light darted from the central focus. Distinguished scholars from Madrid were sent into the interior, where they introduced proper methods of proceeding.

The best part of these advantages is to be ascribed to the economic societies; but Govern-

<sup>14</sup> In order to accelerate its progress, Don Francisco Coural Jove published his *Physico-economic Memoir* on the improvement of weaving the thread of Galicia, and other provinces of the kingdom, by every possible means; that is to say, by the choice of a suitable soil, by varieties of grain, by rules of cultivation, &c.

<sup>15</sup> It is well known that in the kingdom of Granada, and in other parts of the Peninsula, on the banks of the Mediterranean, an advantageous impetus was given to the culture of cotton, of which formerly there had scarcely been seen above a plant or two in the gardens of amateurs. As a new production, recently created, it was admitted into the privileged class (*novales*), that is to say, not subject, for a certain time, to the tythe tax, nor to that of civil contributions. The industrious Catalonians established themselves at Motril, and at other points of the coast of Granada, with a view to cultivate this article; the results were satisfactory, and proved adequate to supply the manufactories of their provinces.

ment excited their patriotism, and gave them its entire confidence. They were meetings of enlightened citizens taken from all ranks, without any distinction. Animated by an excellent spirit, they aided the success of useful innovations, and extended their benefits to all places. Schools of commerce, of agriculture, of trades, and of sciences, which are auxiliary to all arts, were seen to increase in all directions. The societies each year distributed prizes of encouragement, and public praises. I must not here omit to pay a just tribute of encomium to those noble ladies who, whether in Madrid or in the provinces, associated themselves to these patriotic unions. What did they not effect for the education of the poor of their own sex ! With what zeal, what delicate and minute attention did these worthy matrons watch over the proper management of hospitals and workhouses ! What gentle persuasion did they exert to encourage virtue, and a proper employment of time ! They set the example ; participating in the labour of their pupils, evincing their own ambition to win the prizes of encouragement, and then offering them to the most deserving of those they called their school-mates. Oh, what a nation might ours become, if it were but properly governed !

## CHAPTER XLIII.

**School for the Deaf and Dumb.—Philanthropic and Christian Measures in favour of Foundlings.**

PRIMARY instruction was encouraged throughout the kingdom; nothing was neglected to place it within the reach of the indigent classes; but the poor deaf and dumb had hitherto been forgotten. The ideas which have been revived in latter times respecting the mode of restoring to society these beings so disgraced by Nature, belonged originally to our country, though other nations subsequently profited by them. The sympathetic charity of the Spaniards, naturally so quick and so generous, had remained behind-hand. Thinly scattered through the crowd of unfortunates who had claims on public compassion, the deaf and dumb, unperceived, one may say, had painfully journeyed through life, without having received the benefit of religion, deprived of the advantages of social order, melancholy living machines, in many respects inferior to the brutes themselves.

Government owes especial protection to those classes which are devoid of support; the civilized community, that true association for mutual insurance, would be failing in its duty if a single

individual could justly reproach it with lukewarmness. “*Res Sacra Miser!*” such is the cry of humanity, to which no one ought to be deaf, above all, none of those entrusted with the power of doing good.

To call the attention of King Charles IV. to objects of this nature was the best way of courting his good opinion. In one of our conversations I spoke to him, as was my wonted custom, on what the well-being of his subjects stood in need of, and on the means which might be used for putting a stop to existing sufferings, or, at least, for softening them. I spoke of the unfortunate deaf and dumb. His Majesty took me at my word on the very day (July or August 1794). Charles IV. was well pleased at having witnessed the progress of the young pupils in the public school of St. Ildefonso. One was created on the next day for those to whom Nature had denied the faculties of speech and of hearing. This royal institution was established in the college of Lavapiès, under the direction of father Navarrete, of Santa Barbara (a pious foundation). This ecclesiastic united with much intellect and sound doctrines, all the virtues adapted to his station. The new establishment was the object of my special solicitude—I may say of my liberality. The care and talents of its professors left me nothing to desire. The excellent work of the Abbé Don Lorenzo Hervás de Panduco, entitled, “*The Spanish School for*

the Deaf and Dumb," or the art of teaching them to write and read the Spanish language, is well known. Thanks to this work, which instilled true principles and gave means for the frequent application of theory to practice, the school prospered, not only at Madrid, but even in the interior of the kingdom. Among the students who came to the capital to obtain their diplomas in sundry departments of instruction, many also wished to possess the method of teaching the deaf and dumb. A second school was soon opened in Barcelona, and intrusted to the care of that worthy ecclesiastic Don Juan Alberto. The learned Hervás, of whom I have already made mention, and who can never be named without praise, insisted upon contributing towards the success of this institution.

There was another family of unfortunates still more to be pitied than the deaf and dumb, having no relatives whose kindness they could claim, born in sorrow, never greeted by the smiles of a mother; these hapless ones, I say, were not only objects of charity, in my eyes, but I looked upon it as the duty of Government to come to their aid.

Two original sins weighed them down. The waters of baptism might wash away the first, but the second must pursue them through life.

Having neither father nor mother, it behoved the state to stand them instead of both, and not to punish them for the weakness or the insensibility of those who had given them life. In the reign of

Charles III. some legal and charitable measures had been adopted in behalf of these foundlings. But the rigour of certain moralists, and the insufficiency of the means at first adopted, paralyzed the good intentions of Government. Thousands of these hapless wretches perished; if a few survived, it was but to drag on an ignominious existence, worse even than premature death. The two royal decrees of Charles IV. (January 20th 1794, and December 11th 1796) checked this evil. The life, health, and honour of these orphans was protected in an effectual manner; a wisely-proportioned education enabled them to provide for themselves and become useful to society. No longer reproached with the misery of their birth, the law declared them citizens, with the same civil rights which others enjoyed, without the least difference between them; and this law, so well conceived, so well cemented, has ever since remained in full vigour.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is a passage from the enactment of the royal decree, 20th January 1794: "Notwithstanding the embarrassments and expenses of the present war, I have taken, and will not cease to take the most effectual measures in behalf of the foundlings. I shall provide for their subsistence, and settle them in an honest, a suitable career. They are the adopted children of christian charity; members of the social body; hitherto too much neglected, especially in some provinces, where they are, even to this day, ignominiously denominated bastards, doubtful offspring, sons of adultery. Nothing is more unjust than to declare them illegitimate, because their parents, fearing their inability to rear them, usually abandon them in order to preserve their lives.

Con-



All prejudices disappeared before the firm will of Government. The first classes of society willingly lent themselves to this object. Many of these unfortunates found in the higher classes, and subsequently in the middle classes, adopted parents, generous protectors, who took upon themselves their subsistence.<sup>2</sup> Those who had not this good fortune received nevertheless a carefully

Consequently, I ordain, by these presents, which will be inserted in the Collection of the Laws of Spain and the Indies, that all foundlings of both sexes now existing, or that may hereafter be born, already received into the hospitals of Madrid, or other houses of charity, and those who are now or may hereafter be admitted into other hospitals or houses of charity throughout the kingdom, be respected and held as legitimate children, enjoying all the civil rights, generally, and without restriction, notwithstanding any other royal disposition to the contrary. I declare that in no respect shall the fact of being a foundling be considered disgraceful, or serve as an obstacle to the full enjoyment of common rights. Foundlings at present existing and to come, are, and shall remain, though their real fathers are not legally known, in the general class of citizens (*hombres buenos de Estadollano general*), with the same prerogatives, subjected to the same rules and obligations as are other honest citizens of the common class. And I decree that, on attaining the age required for other children, they shall be received into the schools for the poor, the consistories, houses of charity, mercy, &c. &c.; where they shall share the endowments, bequests, consignments, which these establishments have, or may acquire a right to dispose of, towards the apportionment of orphans, of either sex, according to the will of their founders," &c. &c.

<sup>2</sup> The Ladies' Society was well known, and no doubt is so still. It took under its immediate protection the house for deserted orphans or foundlings. This good work, recommended by religion and humanity, will be henceforth an hereditary duty for Spanish ladies.

arranged education from the munificence of royalty, until they were able to provide for themselves.

To the male children I wished to give a career in which, while furthering their own fortunes, they might be of service to their country. I sought chiefly to have them instructed in the arts and trades connected with the army and navy. Being thus exercised, and naturally disposed, they afforded me, without having to contend against either inclination or habit, a ready means of recruiting our navy with robust men, accustomed to discipline, free from all those family ties which might have restrained them, or instilled a distaste for the service.

To complete these measures by establishing them on a steadfast and enlightened basis, by prudent regulations and solid instruction, I had but to make an appeal to the men of merit with whom I had always endeavoured to surround myself.

Don Joseph Yberti produced, in Spanish, a work entitled, *An artificial Method of rearing New-born Infants*, and giving them a proper Physical Education. He also published his *Treatise on the Diseases of Children*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This work bore away the first prize in Paris, 1789. The great number of children who had perished in France, while thus abandoned by their parents, excited the interest of the good Louis XVI. and that of the Academy of Medicine. Much attention was bestowed upon the means of preserving the lives of these innocents. Yberti's work was adopted in all the hospitals, and served to perfect the system of early education.

Don Santiago Garcia, of the academies of Madrid and of the Basque provinces, wrote his generally esteemed instructions on the manner of saving the lives of foundlings.

Don Jayme Bonelles and others, whose names have escaped me, also published some very good books on the same subject.

These useful inclinations in behalf of the country's adopted children, the wise and philanthropic measures taken with a sort of lavish kindness for those unfortunate mothers who blushed at becoming so, whose honour I strove to save, and whom I wished to spare from a crime so unnatural, drew on me the censure of certain pious men—men whose lives were holy, and whose zeal was very orthodox, I will not doubt, but who involved me in great difficulties. "This predilection," said they, "this favour shown (they never supposed that I considered it a point of duty), this benevolence towards foundlings, and towards those who give them life, is a premium of encouragement to libertinism and the corruption of morals."

The intelligence which began to pervade all around us, and the constancy of Government, triumphed over these obstacles. I ought to add, that my efforts were powerfully seconded by my friend Don Pedro Joachim de Murcia, member of the council of Castile. The partiality of friendship does not cloud my judgment. All Spaniards have acknowledged the virtues of this worthy

ecclesiastic, a perfect model for ministers of the Gospel! Many bishops also lent me their support; and ultimately, thank God! all was settled and consolidated at the same epoch.

We did not limit our solicitude to the class of foundlings. All the unfortunate whose childhood or whose youth needed assistance, were comprehended in the general measure. All who were deserted, whether orphans, or left by their parents to the charity of the public, were received, and made to partake of the same education as that given the foundlings. Let me be permitted here to transcribe the verses addressed to me by the immortal Melendez, in his Tenth Epistle.\*

\* " . . . No, prince! thou hast not been deaf to the cries of the unfortunate who implored thee. The voices of the brilliant circle who surround thee have not prevented the sighs of the poor from reaching thine ear. They were sure of touching the heart of one always ready to extend a helping hand, or wipe away the tears of suffering humanity. It is thou who art banishing a disgusting, an odious beggary. Thou who restorest existence to the hapless beings whose livid brows already bear the stamp of death. Thou savest them from the vice and sloth which blighted their best years. Thou givest them a new active, honest life; their toils will be blessed by Heaven, and their labours will prove useful to their native land.

" . . . No more unjust contempt; no more heart-rending complaints! Industry, and all the good it produces, have displaced that fatal indolence, which is the mother of all vices. The bounteous sweat that bathes their brows, that just salary, the price of their ingenious labours, shall be to them an abundant source of happiness and health. Thou hast raised them to be men and citizens. Prince, enjoy their tears of gratitude; accept their innocent blessings, and permit me to add to them the

simple expression of the attachment which I have vowed thee; my honest praise, free from all impure admixture of selfish interest, from all taint of flattery."

Further on, Melendez represents those measures of benevolence as a noble compensation for the cares which beset the man in power. He says, that, amidst all these anxieties, he who does good may still enjoy a sweet and undisturbed repose.

" . . . Prince, look now on the innocent creatures whose plaintive cry so lately broke our hearts, as they roved in tatters, without asylum, without bread. What a disgrace to humanity! what a shame, likewise, for the country which could not but number them amongst her children. Lifted from that abyss of ignominy, revived by thy care, behold them, full of health and contentment, rushing to the mart for honest toil, opened to them in the temple of humanity. Their assiduous labours enrich and adorn the land, which, but for thee, would offer them a grave, yawning to receive their wretched remains.

" . . . How must they bless the happy day, when, affected by their deep distress, thou dispensedst amongst them all these comforts, in exchange for so many woes. Henceforth the country shall smilingly receive them into her bosom. It is thou who hast given her the children she has adopted. She will enroll in her annals the memory of thy zeal and generosity. May I soon witness the fulfilment of all which public report holds out; all that philosophy expects of thee!" \*

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\* See the article on Melendez, in the Biographical Index.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

The Liberal Arts and Literature.—Poets and Orators of the Reign of Charles IV.—Liberty of the Press.—Abundance of Professors and of good Books.

No Government can be strong which does not rest upon public opinion; but, if the popular mind be not actuated by generous inspirations, if it be not habitually moved towards a better order of things, that benumbed mind will sleep in obscurity. It must be roused, and made sensible of the blessings which are only to be acquired at the cost of some sacrifices.

Ambitious of restoring to my country its full splendour, I wished that, amidst the tumult of arms, the gentle voices of the Muses should not be stifled. My intention was well matured. I was not content with showy foliage and fair blossoms, I aspired to cull the fruits; to raise intellect, to encourage the flights of talent, to bring about a moral revolution; such were my views, when I thought of rekindling the love of arts and literature.

Others, perhaps, may have sought so to attune them, that they might divert and enervate the people, thus fashioning them to servitude. I wished, on the contrary, to restore to my fellow citizens

their natural vigour, and rest the strength of Government not upon passive obedience, but on the rational conviction of well-informed men, of Spanish citizens, capable of worthily serving their country, and promoting, by common accord, the general welfare. When I took the reins of government, a severe tempest had just blown over the buds then ready to blossom. I rekindled their warmth; I multiplied the young plants. The hostile winds were imprisoned, at least as far as I had the power to close the cave of Eolus. I fear no contradiction when I assert, that never before, nor after my administration, had the Nine Celestial Sisters been more ardently courted. Religion, morals, philosophy, politics, all fell within their attributes; all-powerful as they were to inspire a taste, a sense of what is beautiful and just, of making truth apparent to all, of embellishing science, of rendering virtue amiable and of easy practice. The chisel, the graver, the pencil, the easel, the lyre, at once conspired to produce a noble enthusiasm, and to revive a patriotic spirit. Talent, left to itself, freely displayed its powers. I encouraged emulation. Government made a parade of this encouragement; and in more than one respect, modern Spain beheld the revival of her ancient glory.

It depended not on me, if the arts, of which the preceding reign had begun the restoration, did not get beyond the second childhood into which they

had relapsed. The title of Protector of the Academy was not merely a nominal one, but a real office, which I accepted with the intention and the desire to fulfil its duties. The academicians found in me a colleague anxious to go beyond their wishes. Artists in general, academicians or others, are aware that I was not only a protector, but an officious friend. The youngest regarded me as a father. I opened before them an honourable and useful career, whether in Spain or elsewhere. All the means of study were at their disposal. I strove to stimulate a taste for the arts in the opulent classes, who could offer to talent the just reward of its labours. The middle rank could procure, at a slight expense, all the productions of genius, the moderate price of which brought them within the reach of the most moderate incomes.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the embarrassments of war, from the commencement of 1793, a library was granted to the academy; books, engravings, drawings, all were

<sup>1</sup> Charles IV. made his first visit to the Academy in July, 1794; he was accompanied by the queen, by the infantas Donna Maria Amelia and Donna Maria Louisa, by the infant Don Antonio, and by the Prince of Parma. The King presented to the Academy several drawings, his own, and the Queen's productions. "These attempts," he said, "are of little value, but, as tributes which we wish to deposit in this temple of the arts, they may induce such of my subjects as are blessed with fortune, and who desire to please me, to redouble their efforts towards filling these halls with more perfect productions, the works of their children, or of the artists to whose labours they shall have extended their protection."



at the service of the public, as much for the study of models, as for the satisfaction of curiosity. Painting and sculpture had long been neglected, and languished in so shameful a desertion, that the very taste for them was lost.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The decay of the arts in the Peninsula coincides with the degradation of literature during the last days of the Austrian dynasty. The wars of the succession did not permit Philip V. to restore the worship of the Muses, and Ferdinand VI., in the bosom of a long peace, could scarcely see the dawn of that day which was to light the reigns of Charles III. and Charles IV. I will relate but one fact to show into what degradation had fallen the art of painting in our country; an art amongst us so nobly exercised in former times by the Murillos, the Velasquez, Ribera, and other masters of the Spanish school. The influence of the court of Louis XIV. acted powerfully on our young dynasty. The capital and the provinces hastened to collect French models. The cultivation of silk-worms, the national manufactures, were wholly neglected,—such was the result of the minister, Jean Orry's, self-interested preference for the success of his country's industry. The stuffs of Lyons invaded our dwelling-houses. This mania banished the best works of our old painters to the very lofts, where they were packed up amongst useless lumber, as if none knew what to do with them. They were sold for next to nothing, at sales of valueless articles, indiscriminately thrown into the street at certain periods of the year. A permanent stall of this kind existed in the suburb de Rastro, inhabited by the lowest orders, and incredible to relate, though true, the quantity of pictures was such, and the purchasers so little anxious about them, that historical and allegorical paintings, estimated by the number of figures they represented, large or small, taking one with the other, brought about forty sous a head.

It was thus that Don Juan Pacheco, a Portuguese gentleman, formerly page to Ferdinand VI., collected his fine gallery, as he more than once assured me. Don Bernardo Iriarte employed the

We had to circulate the models of foreign schools, and those of our own, which were scarcely less rare ; thus affording at once employment and emulation to our young artists. I particularly applied myself to the subject of engraving and drawing. We soon wanted hands, so numerous were the orders. The Royal Chalcography, almost forgotten, was again set in motion, without regard to expense. The rival enterprizes, designedly created, rekindled its zeal. Engraving attained a degree of perfection to which it had never before arrived. Artists and amateurs ultimately found access to countless treasures, till now unknown, or concealed.

the same means to make the magnificent collection, the remains of which were purchased, at Paris, for his highness the Prince of Wurtemberg.

At last this Vandalism awakened some remorse. Ferdinand VI. created an Academy of Arts, to which he gave his name ; but the arts were not easily raised from such lasting depression ; the less so, when they had to contend against idleness and bad taste. In the reign of Charles III., the presence of Mengs, the Raphael of Germany, during twelve successive years, did honour to Spain, and enriched it with magnificent works, but without reviving the good old times of our former glory. It is true that some imitators endeavoured to follow his steps, yet he did not found a school, either with us or elsewhere. This may have arisen from carelessness on his part. Be it as it may, the artists of his day, many of whom lived to see the reign of Charles IV., received, at last, the reward of their exertions. The career of the fine arts, lately so ungrateful, or at best requited by barren praise, now offered not only fame but solid advantages ; if its progress was in some respects less satisfactory than I could have wished, no parsimony or hindrance was shewn to it on the part of Government.

Let us here throw a retrospect at the labours, which, after having been either abandoned, or neglectfully pursued for want of support, in the preceding reigns, were continued by my care; and at the works which I had caused to be effectually undertaken, in order to generalize the progress by reviving the sublime ideas of religion, politics, and national glory.

Collection of Portraits of the Illustrious Men of Spain, with Biographical Notices.

The like of the Kings of Spain.

The like of the Costumes of Titian, augmented by those of Spain.

Costumes of the Spaniards of every province.

Those of other modern nations, derived from the Universal Traveller.

Collection of Engravings from the Bible, that fruitful source of religious thoughts and historical traits; from whence artists chosen for this great work cannot fail to derive lofty inspirations.

Iconology, another abundant source of moral motives and ideas, in the allegorical style.

Collection of Engravings from the antique, belonging to the Academy.

One from the best pictures in the palace of his Majesty, a work designed to facilitate the study of great models, from all schools, to illustrate our own school, so little or so ill-known in Europe. This undertaking was shared between the national and the French ones; not that Spain was deficient

in them, but with a view to excite emulation, and to compare the progress of each country in engraving. This rivalry procured us, at that time, more than one triumph.

A host of detached works emanated from the Royal Chalcography. The views of d'Aranjuez; the mosaics of Rielvès and Jumilla; the twenty-four fresco engravings of Jordano in the Cason of the Buen Retiro; the horses of Velasquez; the Apostles and our Saviour, by Raphael d'Urbino.

These productions were not useful to the arts alone; the graver served the sciences also. The Hydrographic Depôt corrected its earlier labours, and augmented its valuable collection, by a quantity of maps, plans, views, drawings, compasses, and nautical scales, the works of our sailors, who, at this time, were scattered over every sea. I did not wish these treasures to lie hidden, or be at the disposal of a limited number of persons: all were accessible to the public, and brought within every one's reach by moderate prices. These great publications deserved a distinguished reception in both hemispheres. Our learned Europe did us justice under the twofold aspect of science and of execution.

Other labours of the same kind, of which I lived to see the accomplishment, were begun after my becoming minister; amongst these the Atlas, or Collection of Spherical Charts, and a new Course of Geography, ancient and modern, contributions

to which were supplied by the unfortunate Ancillon, whose premature end excited such lively regret.

Among these labours must also be numbered the project of a Picturesque and Historical Journey through Spain, which, by dint of patriotism and perseverance, I succeeded in bringing to a successful termination. I shall speak of it more minutely in the second part of these Memoirs. All the works I have just quoted belong exclusively to the six first years of my administration.

Oh ! why was I not able to bring forward and support every man of talent, and endow my country with the chefs-d'œuvre of the arts ; but the embarrassed state of the treasury, the continual disturbances of Europe, were opposed to the realization of my wishes. Nevertheless, nothing was neglected. The progressive movement was not checked. We made the most of the talents to be found amongst us. If the modern Spanish artists could not found a school capable of rivaling that of our ancient masters, at least they paved the way for it ; and, in some respects, principally in drawing and engraving, nothing was left to desire.

General esteem deservedly requited Don Francisco Goya, Don Fernando Selma, Don Juan Salvador Carmona, Don Joseph Lopez Enguidanos, Don Francisco Bayeu, Don Vicente Lopez, Don Antonio Carnicero, Don Manuel Carmona, Don Miguel Rodriguez, Don Mariano Pio Rivero, Don

Luis Pared, and the indefatigable Echevarria.<sup>3</sup> Many other names are also entitled to praise. Traits of original talent and of the purest taste recommend those of Acuña, Alegre, Ballesteros, Barcelon, Blanco, Boix, Bonet, Braudé, Bruneté, Camaron, Capilla, Carbonnell, Castillo, Cobo, Esquivel, Estève, Fabregat, Fonceia, Gabriel, Ganborino, Gasió, Grollier, Jimeno, Latasa, Mata, Marcó, Marti, Más, Miranda, Moreno, Tejada, Montaner, Navia, Pasqual, Pilequer, Prades, Prò, Doña Isabel Ramvrez, Ramos, Ribelles, Rico, Risco, the two Vasques, Ugena, and so many others, all leaving successively the Academy to spread the taste for painting, engraving, and drawing, even through the remotest provinces of Spain and America.

No capital, whether in the Peninsula or in our colonies, was wanting in professors or in means of instruction.

After so many years of absence, writing in a strange land, with no other resource save my own recollections, I am sensible that I forget many honourable names, well worthy to be recalled in this place. Those who have surmounted the fatal revolutions of the country, will perhaps supply the void left by the weakness of my memory. It is for them to bear witness in favour of that epoch.

<sup>3</sup> This excellent artist is less known in Spain than in Mexico, where he was the director of the Royal Academy of the fine arts, created under the name of San Carlos.

They may tell the present generation whether the fine arts have a right to complain of it.

As to architecture and sculpture, their restoration was complete. Government chose to direct and watch over their progress. All the plans and models remained unexecuted until they obtained the formal approbation of the academy. None could exert these arts unless they were architects legally recognized, whether at Madrid or Valentia. This rule, inflexibly observed, was neither a tyranny nor a monopoly; it was intended to preserve the arts; it was a premium granted to real talent and classic study. Bad taste and eccentricity had been every where introduced in a scandalous manner. There was a rage for the wonderful, the extraordinary, which had plunged into a ridiculous mania for monstrosities.

The rigid regulations of the academy would admit of no distinction, but checked all the grotesque, all the fantastic excrescences which were at utter variance with ancient monuments. Regularity of proportion, good taste, discreet embellishment became appreciated, and the new edifices consecrated to the service of the public, or to the solemnities of religion, appeared with credit beside the antique wonders of the age of the fine arts.

I may be allowed, as I proceed, to name the principal architects and sculptors who contributed to the happy restoration of their arts, commenced and completed under the reign of Charles IV.

Don Ventura Rodriguez, Don Francisco Sabatini, Villanueva, Arnal, Lopez, Freyre, Martinez de la Torre, Asensio, Quintilian, and the great sculptor Adam, whose conception and execution were most brilliant, and who delighted in spreading science among his numerous pupils.

Need I speak of music? Need I recall to mind how greatly it was improved in our theatres! The sublime elevation of tone it attained in our temples of worship! With what ardour was every where cultivated this language of the angels, which became so general, I will even say so common, in the kingdom! I knew the value of music; it formed part of my plans of civilization and useful reform.

By liberalities, employments, pensions, and benefices, I created artists; these means are all-sufficient. The following are the names of some musicians of deserved celebrity:

First, Don Francisco Xavier Garcia, better known under the name of Espagnolette, incumbent and head organist of the cathedral of Saragossa.

Don Francisco Guttierrez, chaplain to the King.

Don Felix Lopez, and Don Joseph Lidon, head organists of the Chapel Royal.

Marchal, musician to the King.

Don Raymond Perez, head organist of the cathedral of Osma.

Don Vicente Palacios, of that of Granada.



Don Ramon Garay, of that of Jaën.

Fathers Asain and Garcia; besides a crowd of other men of acknowledged talent. Abreu, Calvo, Rodriguez, Coma, Puig, Ferrandiere, La Senna, Montero, Moreti,<sup>4</sup> Musat, Vidal, &c. &c.; not forgetting the two ladies who distinguished themselves at this period—Doña Maria de los Martyrs Garcia Quintana, and Doña Maria del Carmen Hurtado. The last, born at Seville, was scarcely twelve years old when she brought herself into notice by her productions. All connoisseurs admired the subjects, the grace, the originality of the compositions which this extraordinary child gave to the public before she had attained her fifteenth year.

On thus beholding that, by a general impulse, instruction, a taste for the arts, and a passion for glory gained on us step by step, that academic institutions spontaneously increased, that talent disclosed itself on all sides, and hastened to concur with the views of a government which sought to revive a sense of the beautiful, to encourage all that was useful, and to enhance harmless pleasures, I shed tears of joy; I floated in a kind of delirium of delight. To those who spoke to me of the danger, of the abuse of so many enlightening studies, so much mental activity, I replied with Moses, "Would to God that all in Israel were prophets."

<sup>4</sup> See the Biographic Index.

Yet it sufficed me not to have rekindled the sacred fire; I wished to secure its inheritance to posterity, and that the brightness of the present might not prove a passing meteor. In order to prevent the re-action of obscurity, the press became the depository of our acquired experience. I urged, I besought authors to publish their writings; I called for them. Classic works of all kinds, foreign and national, which existed amongst us, were reproduced in new editions, if the copies were becoming scarce. As to those which we still wanted, I had them brought to Spain, and ordered translations of such as were worth the labour of it. I have already named many writers and artists who answered all my expectations in the sciences of physic, medicine, political economy, agriculture, industry, and divers branches of popular instruction. I will now summarily notice the works devoted to the fine arts.

We possessed many books on architecture, and on painting, most of which were excellent, but, unfortunately, they had fallen into oblivion. The solicitude of the Academy and of the Patriotic Societies extricated them from it. In my time were reprinted two treatises of great importance, and become so scarce as to be almost unknown. I mean, *Commentaries on Painting*, by our Guevara, with the notes of Abbé Pons; and the ten books on *Architecture*, by Leon Baptista Alberti, translated into the Spanish language.

We had not the four books on Civil Architecture by André Palladio. Charles III. had caused a translation of Vitruve to be published: Charles IV. would not act less liberally in respect to Palladio. Don Joseph Ortiz de Sanz, librarian to the King, was commissioned to make this translation, to which he added some useful commentaries. After these two publications came the Dictionary of the Liberal Arts, by Don Diego Rejon. The architects Don Francisco Martinez de la Torre and Don Joseph Asensio, published the celebrated treatise of Engraving on Stone, by Simonin. Don Pedro Garcia de la Huerta gave his Commentaries on Encaustic Painting, or Enamel in Distemper. Royal munificence defrayed the expense of this impression.\*

At the same time, Don Joseph Lopez Enguidanos was at work on his Manual of the Principles of Drawing, which he published in successive parts; and Don Antonio Echeverria de Godoy received from me the express commission to trans-

\* This work did us the more honour, as the restoration of painting by fire, or encaustic painting, the process of which had been long unknown, is due to the labours of our fellow-countrymen. Don Pedro Garcia de la Huerta was one of those who contributed most to this valuable discovery of Abbé Requeno. It was he who made known in detail this method by which the Greeks employed wax in painting. He cleared the dark landscapes of the old authors, mingling with them many useful observations. The restoration of this process gave to works of art the advantage of durability, and preserved them from deterioration.

late the Anatomical Elements of Osteology and of Miology, for the use of Painters and Sculptors, from the German of Lavater.

Music was not neglected. These were some of the scientific works published at this time :—

Origin and Rules of Music, with the History of its Progress, Decay, and Restoration ; a work written in Italian, by the Spanish priest Ximeno, (Ex-Jesuit) ; translated into Spanish by that esteemed master, Don Francisco Gutierrez, chaplain to his Majesty. The royal printing press covered the expense of it.

Elementary Institutions of Music, for the use of Children, by Don Bernardo Perez, head organist of the cathedral of Osma.

General Elements of Music, and their application to the Guitar, by Don Frederico Moreti.

Books of Compositions, and small Music, by Alberto de Vidal, Lopez ; &c. &c.

At the same time, Don Gabriel Gomez, publisher to the King, established, with the aid of Government, a kind of new industry in Spain ; that is to say, a press for engraving every species of music by copper-plate, as in England. The results were superior to any thing that was then brought forth in France or in Germany.

The Government favoured, throughout the kingdom, the construction of instruments, which, till then, we had been obliged to import from other

countries. All are acquainted with the manufactory and school founded at Madrid by a German, Louis Rolland, under the special protection of the King. At Carthegena, Don Cyril Cros obtained equal support from his Majesty in the making of piano-fortes after the English style; Don Joseph Agwer directed the undertaking, which soon triumphantly competed with the artists of London. This branch of industry soon spread in Madrid and in other cities of the Peninsula. The Government watched over and encouraged it.

Let me now speak of Poetry and Eloquence. The reign of Charles IV. had no cause to envy the golden age of our literature. Their revival, scarcely begun, and twice discontinued during preceding reigns, was happily accomplished under that of Charles IV. I have but to submit to the reader the following splendid list:—Don Juan Melendez Valdez, Don Manuel Joseph Quintana, Don Leandro Fernandez Moratin, Don Nicasio Alvarez Cienfuegas, Don Joseph Antonio Conde, Don Juan Pablo Forner, the Count de Noronha, Don Antonio Ranz de Romanillos, Don Antero Benito Nunez,<sup>6</sup> Don Juan Bautista Arriaza, Don Joseph and Don Bernabé Canga Arguellas.<sup>7</sup> Don Francisco Patricio de Berguizas,<sup>8</sup> Don Francisco

<sup>6</sup> Better known under the name of Amato Benedicto.

<sup>7</sup> Translator of Anacreon and Sappho.

<sup>8</sup> Translator of Pindar, and an excellent prose writer.

Gregorio Salas, Don Tomas Gonzales Carvajal,<sup>9</sup> Don Manuel Arjona, Don Juan Maury,<sup>10</sup> Don Lorenzo Villanueva, Don Joseph de Vargas Ponce, Don Joachim Garcia Domenech, Don Diego Clemencin, Don Joseph Clavijo Fajardo, Father Aquino of the order of Minimcs, Don Joseph Mor de Fuentes, Don Felix Maria Reinoso, the anonymous author of the "Ode to Benevolence;"—and many others whose names escape my memory, and who will readily forgive me this involuntary forgetfulness. I write this list at random, without pretending to classify talent; such is not my intention; the task would be beyond my power. I limit myself to asserting that, all things well considered, the good, the excellent, the mediocre being held up to view, on the one side the sixteenth and half of the seventeenth century, on the other the reign of Charles IV., this reign, far from shrinking at the comparison, might stand the test with advantage.

<sup>9</sup> When I read his translation of the Psalms I fancied myself perusing them in the original, and felt that the author derived no inconsiderable share of inspiration from the sacred writings.

<sup>10</sup> One of the best poets of modern Spain, and the one most competent to read his own verses, M. Maury, who is not classed above according to his rank, united a charming talent with all the amiable qualities of a man of the world. In his recent work on the Spanish Poets, he had occasion to speak of the Prince of Peace. It will excite no wonder that he should have done so with moderation and kindness. M. Maury had no duty of personal gratitude to fulfil towards him: his tribute, therefore, is perfectly disinterested.—E.

Posterity, a more impartial judge than our contemporaries, will say if at any anterior era the Spanish Parnassus beheld poets superior to our Melendez or our Don Manuel Quintana. Luis de Leon, Garcilasco de la Vega, Herrera (the latter occasionally), and Francisco Rioja, may rival these two illustrious moderns, and perhaps surpass them in the admirable art of rhyme ; but poetic inspiration, elevation, and strength of thought, belong to Melendez and Quintana, whose genius possesses more resources, and who had cultivated several kinds of composition at once, and always with great success. I can never read Melendez without experiencing the sensation of a divine balm, which soothes and strengthens my whole being, both moral and physical. What shall I say of Quintana? He is a celestial Hercules, who lifts you from the earth and carries you away with him, sometimes into the lonely caves of despair, sometimes over the mountain tops, whence he launches his thunderbolts against tyranny, sweeps away the errors of the world, and makes every chord of the soul vibrate to the touch of honour and patriotism ; he arouses warlike ardour, he kindles a thirst for victory, he sets the seal of infamy on the corruption and perfidy of courts. The world quotes with admiration the ode called the Calm Night (*Noche Serena*), by Luis de Leon, addressed to Philip Ruiz ; the Battle of Lepanto, by the divine Herrera. Well then ! read the ode of Melendez,

called Fanaticism, and his Hebraic dithyrambics, entitled, the Apparent Prosperity of the Wicked. As for Quintana, according to my view of the subject, no poet, ancient or modern, ever produced any thing more beautiful than his Ode on the Invention of Printing. It may have been said that his versification is rude, because it is nervous, and disregards idle ornaments; but it will be long ere Spain has another lyric poet whose impetuous march, bold expressions, and magnificent display of heroic rythm, can reproduce the manner and the genius of Quintana.

Be this as it may, if prejudice misleads not my judgment, the ancient era of Spanish poetry and eloquence has no such rival in our history as the time of Charles IV. If it be possible that a living language should ever be irrevocably settled, ours obtained such advantage in the reign of that monarch. Spanish prose, it is said, has lost somewhat of the Latin pomp which was imparted to it by our great classics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but, without having belied the signs of its maternal origin, all the Castilian language has to regret of that rather sonorous than expressive pomp, it regained in the concision, neatness, and logic since applied to its grammatical rules. I need but mention, ere I proceed, its chief regenerators:—

Jovellanos, Azara, Clavijo Fajardo, Campo-  
manes, Gandara, who flourished under two reigns;



Villanueva, Forner, the same Quintana who has already been named as a poet, Hervás Panduro, Montengon, and especially Capmani, for whom I can find neither an equal nor a competitor, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for erudition, pure taste, and the art of properly wielding his language. All that was beautiful, brilliant, noble, rhythmical, in the prose of those boasted ages, may be found reproduced, and discreetly improved, in the Philosophy of Eloquence.<sup>11</sup> Let no one assert that the good method of the ancients was lost in our day; it will suffice to notice Vargas, Ponce, author of the Historical Eulogium on King Alphonso the Wise, and Berguizas, the admirable translator of the German Stanihurst.<sup>12</sup>

Perhaps Berguizas erred by a profusion of ornaments, and by the overstrained loftiness of his style; but, it is nevertheless easy to perceive what the noble Spanish language might yet acquire, and to what degree it might combine suavity of diction with its natural loftiness.

<sup>11</sup> To feel and appreciate the merit of this work, one should read the edition corrected and augmented by the author, and addressed by him to Lord Holland. It was published in London, if I mistake not, in 1811.

<sup>12</sup> This work, less known than it deserves to be, is entitled : *The Immortal God suffering in Human Flesh (Dios Immortal padeciendo en Carne Humana)*. Berguizas herein took occasion to display the full power of the Spanish language. He was lavish of antithesis. This is the defect of the original ; but he used this figure of rhetoric with singular felicity. The skill and magical style of Berguizas excused such prodigality.

Speaking of eloquence, I would ask, to what era can be assigned the reform of pulpit eloquence if not to the reign of Charles IV.? Evangelical orators, either in the first ranks of the clergy, or even amongst obscure monks, ardently embraced this salutary reform. The celebrated Father Isla gave the impetus, which Government failed not to encourage. All the honours, all the benefices of the church were granted to those who purified and ennobled, amongst us, the sacred pulpit. The number of these new orators was so great, that I should have much trouble in recording every name in this place :—

In the first rank we may number Father Santander, the wise and learned Taviva, the good and learned Cabrera,<sup>13</sup> Amat, Quevedo, the celebrated Bishop of Orense, so austere and virtuous, the reverend Fathers Aquino and Salvador, the Dominican friar Garcia, the Augustine friar Lasala, Father Traggia, Sanchez Sobrino, abbot of Quieipo Vejarano, Cueto, abbot of Monte Santo of Granada, the Abbot de Baza, Navarro, Alvarez, the two Centeno of the same cathedral, the learned Banqueri, Posadas,<sup>14</sup> Prieto Moreno, Florez, Ruiz,

<sup>13</sup> Father Don Francisco Xavier Cabrera, bishop of Avila, one of the masters who, at my request, was selected to educate the Prince of Asturias. In my early youth I had known this worthy priest, and learnt to venerate him. It was he who happily inspired me with the love of science, with respect for religion, and with devoted attachment to my country.

<sup>14</sup> Don Antonio Posadas, Rubin de Celis, canon of St. Isidro, afterwards

Roman, &c. &c. The multitude of remarkable sermons which were now heard throughout Spain, suggested the idea of forming a choice collection from them, and publishing it under the auspices of Government; for a part of these treasures remained concealed in the portfolios of their modest authors. All were invited to address them to the minister, who would undertake the expense of printing them. This occurred in 1796: at that critical and tumultuous period, what other nation adjoining France would have dared to give itself up to the cultivation of science and literature?

I make no mention of the crowd of third, fourth, and fifth-rate writers, who concurred, to the extent of their abilities, towards the progress of public instruction, and who at least propagated good taste by their example.<sup>15</sup> Some of their productions possessed great merit, others were indifferent, others again valueless.

afterwards bishop of Carthagená, a prelate deserving the respect and esteem of all men; a man of piety and intellect, yet tolerant and modest.—E.

<sup>15</sup> It is not given to every one to attain the height at which soared Melendez, Quintana, Moratin, and some others, of privileged genius. Many, nevertheless, merit honourable mention, such as Don Joseph Ybanes de la Renteria, Don Luis Repiso Hurtado, Don Ignacio Merasqueapo de Llano, Don Miguel Garcia Asensio, &c. &c. Among the dramatic authors some, by laudable efforts, paved the way for a theatrical reform. Melodramas or sentimental comedies, which were more or less in vogue, contributed to purify the stage. The shocking absurdities, the coarse trifles, the obscenity which had disgraced it, vanished by degrees. Art and morality were alike gainers by

The tribute paid by all classes was composed, as it were, of gold, silver, copper, and pewter; each one contributed something, according to his means; and the common treasury was enriched by these various contingents. This laudable emulation revived intellect, and formed good taste. From abundance sprung selection, or criticism. Certain severe wits desired (for philosophy and literature have bigots of their own) that a check should be put to the

by the change. Perfection is not to be attained in a moment. The same century does not produce a Molière and a Moratin. I do not hesitate to name Rodriguez de Arellano, Zavala, Lucian Comella, the Marquis of Palacios; still less certain ladies, who at this period, so favourable to the Muses, paid them a valuable tribute. The *Death of Abel* was arranged for our theatre by Doña Madalena Fernandez, and represented with success. Doña Rosa Galvez published some lyrical and dramatic compositions which enriched our Parnassus: she was applauded and extolled by all her literary contemporaries. Other women of more timid minds confined themselves to prose; we owe them some translations and original productions which are not wanting in merit. The names of three among them recur to my memory: Doña Anna Muñoz, authoress of the Spanish version of the *Conversations of Emilia*, by Madame d'Epinay, a moral work which treats of education, had been reproduced in many languages, and was wanting in our country. The Marchioness de Moya, who translated and dedicated to me the *Treatise on the Education of the Nobility*, a French book, much esteemed on account of the good feeling pervading it and the wise precepts it contained; Doña Ynes Joyes de Blake, who translated the English novel called the *Prince of Abyssinia*, to which this lady added an *Apology of Women*, written with superior talent.

These three publications appeared between 1796 and 1798, a period fruitful in good books and good authors of every description.

rage for translating and versifying, which might injure our language. I myself foresaw this evil; but was it proper that, in order to prevent it, we should establish a literary inquisition? Good books remain; the bad sink into oblivion; whilst the book trade and paper-making give bread to a multitude of people.

Nevertheless, with a view to combat ignorance and bad taste, I besought the assistance of my friends, of all those who loved their country, sciences, and arts; I advised with them on the means of securing to the rising generation a good system of studies. First, the old Greek and Spanish classics were reproduced by new editions, the royal printing press supplying the deficiency of private ones, and never remaining idle. Spain still knows and appreciates the excellent edition of the complete works of Cicero, 1797.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> This costly publication, in fourteen volumes, of works by the great master of eloquence, was the first and the most complete that ever appeared in Spain. It contained the Life of Cicero, Ernesti's Remarks, an Appendix by Nicholas Hortensius, de Re Frumentaria Romanorum, the Treatise of the Academy by Pedro Valencia, that of Olivet, de Theologia Græcanica, and many commentaries in illustration of the text. The work was embellished by portraits of several illustrious Romans, and in the frontispiece was seen that of Charles IV., the noble protector of this undertaking. M. l'Abbé Melon was charged with the direction of it. The name of Melon is connected with all the great literary and scientific works of that period. My friendship for him, and the power I then exercised, aided him in the happy achievement of this task, and of others no less important,

Deserved praise has been bestowed on the second edition of the works of Xenophon translated by Secretary Diego Gracian. Tacitus and Velleius Paterculus, by the eloquent and learned Hispano-Portuguese Manuel Soyeiro; the Annals and Histories of Tacitus, by Don Carlos Coloma; the Life of Agricola, and the Customs of the Germans, by Alonzo Barrientos;<sup>17</sup> the Commentaries of Cæsar, by Don Manuel Valbuena, with the Latin text (royal press); the Offices of Cicero, the Dialogues on old Age and Friendship, the Paradoxes, the Dream of Scipio, also by Valbuena; the Thoughts of Quintillian, by Don Francisco Antonio Gonzales, author of the Latin and Castilian Grammar; the Fables of Phædrus, and the Sentences of Publius Serus, by the same Gonzales. I omit other new editions which appeared at the same time, and shall only quote the choice collection of the pious foundations, which

important, which were entrusted to him. The enemies of intellect did not fail to bring upon him (on account of certain scholastic opinions), a political trial, well seasoned with perfidious imputations. M. Melon was threatened with being sent to expiate his zeal for the propagation of arts and sciences in a monastic prison. I had the good fortune to rescue him, and many other of the literary and distinguished men of the period, from this and similar persecutions.

<sup>17</sup> The editions of this work deserved the favour of Government; the Latin text was added to it, together with the small treatise on Orators, newly translated, with variations, a Latin index, prologues, the life of the author, that of the translator, critical and philosophical notes, &c. There never emanated from our press so complete a work (1797).

were carefully remodelled and completed, and the Course of Hispano-Greco-Latin Humanities, given with great success by that able master Don Caietano Sixto Garcia. All our principal Spanish authors were reprinted, without a single exception. To this abundance of classic works Government wished to add good books, and proper methods of instruction. The literary men and philologists invited to pay the tribute of their knowledge, seconded the views of Government. The rational plan of study presented by Garcia, whom I have previously named, obtained the approbation and preference of the council of Castile. This plan, adopted throughout Spain and our colonies, produced the best possible results. Many of those who now shine in the literary world, owe their education to this excellent system. About the same time, Don Agustin Garcia de Arrieta and Don Joseph Munarriz published their translations; the first, of the rational Course of Polite Literature by Le Batteux, and the second, of Lessons in Rhetoric and the Belles-Lettres; both these translations contained illustrations adapted to the Spanish language. The reverend fathers of the pious foundations also exhibited their art, or rhetoric of Hornero; and the celebrated Capmani prepared those two original productions, the Theatre and the Philosophy of Eloquence.

The Royal College of St. Isidro, in all that related to the learned languages, could boast of ta-

lented professors. Flores Causeco taught Greek ; Don Thomas Arteta, Hebrew ; Don Miguel Garcia Asenio, Arabic. The study of the two latter languages was encouraged in the provinces ; competent masters, of the first and second class, were provided for all the universities.

No lectureship was granted if the candidate did not understand Greek. There was still requisite, the combined study of written and of spoken Arabic. I obtained the King's authority to send well-instructed men to acquire the last of these accomplishments in Arabia. One of them, Don Manuel Vacas, repaired to Morocco, and afterwards dedicated to me his Abridged Grammatical Concordance of the ancient and modern Arabic.

I did not neglect the living languages ; French, Italian, English, and German. Capmani laboured at his excellent French and Spanish Dictionary, which rendered so great a service to our language. We stood in need of a good English Dictionary ; this work was confided, by an order from the King, to the estimable friars Thomas Conelly and Thomas Higgins. They also published a Spanish and English Grammar. The academy was uninterruptedly engaged upon our Dictionary, and I also expected that of Doctor Don Pedro Alvarès, dignitary canon of Baza, who was preparing an accurate philosophical and analytic dictionary of the Castilian language ; I had seen some excellent



specimens of it, but destiny had decreed that this fine work should never be completed.<sup>18</sup>

Convinced that taste depends on sound judgment, I engaged all our philologists to submit the language to the severities of analysis and dialectics ; I had but to desire it. On the one hand the protection of the King, on the other the zeal of men of letters, of the learned, by whom I loved to be surrounded, rendered all these successes of easy attainment.

Don Joseph Miguel Alca was expressly entrusted by me with the duty of forming a Spanish collection of the grammatical works of Dumarsais, for the instruction of pupils, as well as of masters : an eminently philosophical work, which proved very useful to our colleges. Don Santos Diaz Gonzales and Don Manuel Valbuena translated also, by the King's order, the Logic of Cæsar Baldinoti.

The Marquis of Santiago, Don Joseph Magallon,

<sup>18</sup> This worthy churchman, uncle to the Count d'Heredia and Ofalia, had completed his Dictionary, at the close of 1807. Unfortunately, some volumes of his manuscript were lost in the scene of pillage of which my house was the theatre, during the invasion of the French army. The indefatigable doctor returned to his task, and succeeded in repairing this mischance. He had afterwards the ill-luck of again losing the whole of his manuscript in the tumults of Seville, 1823. It seems that it was thrown into the Guadalquivir. Alvarez was at that time a deputy to the Cortes. I have heard a report of the loss of another dictionary by Don Bartholoméo Gallardo, which disappeared at the same time, and under the same circumstances.

published the *Elements of the Art of Thinking*, by Borelli, Professor of Eloquence in the college of nobles at Berlin.

Don Cyprian Gonzales, a work entitled *The Logical Foundations of all Languages*, with their application to Spanish and Latin.

Two others, whose names I have forgotten, produced, one, the *Universal Ortopeya*, the other, the *Elements of all Languages*, comprehending that of Music, which has just been revived in Paris, and held up as something new. The work on *Dialectics of Eximeno* was also published, by order of the king, in 1796, being a perfect Treatise on Ideology, properly speaking, which contained all that the ancients and the moderns have taught under the different names of *Dialectics*, *Onthology*, *Cosmogony*, *Psycology*, *Natural Theology*, and *Ethics*, or *Moral Philosophy*.

Ultimately, by my unwearied efforts, and after a persevering struggle against ignorance and the prejudices of self-love or of personal interest, Bacon, Locke, Descartes, Malebranche, and Condillac entered Spain, and took their places on the forms of our schools. I was thoroughly persuaded that, thus nourished by good principles, the study of literature could not fail to produce orators, poets, and, what were far more valuable, men of sound learning, of lofty and generous minds, of refined talents, such as I desired should shine forth, and add to the honour of their monarch and the glory of their country.

Time was wanting to us ; the harvest was ripe, but the storm, raised by a handful of traitors, destroyed all my hopes; nevertheless, in spite of the political commotions of which Spain was the ensanguined theatre, all have witnessed how great was the number of distinguished men, whose recent education belonged to the epoch of this so much calumniated reign.

The following is a brief enumeration of books and writers who, from 1792 to 1798, claimed the attention of the public.

*Military Sciences.*

The Universal Art of War, by Montecuculi.

Maxims and Instructions on the Military Art, by the Marquis de Quincy.

Treatise on Mines, and Table of Provisions required for Fortresses, by Vauban.

On the service of Light Troops, or Petty Warfare (Guerillas), by Grandmaison.<sup>19</sup>

Military Dictionary. Several officers of merit contributed to this work.

Collection of the Wars of Frederick II., with twenty-six plans, translated from the German, and accompanied with notes.

Treatise on the Attack and Defence of Fortresses, by Le Blond.

The original work of Captain Don Joseph Ser-

<sup>19</sup> This work, printed and revised in 1794, was liberally diffused through the provinces along the frontier, during the war with the Republic.

rano Valdenebro, of the Royal Navy, entitled a Discourse on the Art of War. The author wrote it at my suggestion, and did me the honour of dedicating it to me.

Treatise on Light Artillery, which Don Clemente Peñalosa, was pleased to dedicate to me, in 1796; it related to the organization and service of that newly-created branch.<sup>20</sup> To these various productions must be added the reprinting of the classic works of the Marquis de La Mina, of Santa Cruz, of Lieutenant-colonel Don Juan Senen (an abridgment of the latter), and many other works calculated to raise the moral strength and excite the patriotism of our military.

Political, Scientific, and Military Essays, for the use of those Spanish youths who devote themselves to the career of arms; with a detailed notice of the best works on this subject.

Spanish Honour; or, History of the Heroism of the Spanish Nation: a lengthy work, affording evidence of high capacity, and well known in 1796.

<sup>20</sup> I succeeded in introducing it into the army in 1795; this branch had been neglected, forgotten, but it was not altogether of recent creation. The successes of the campaign, in 1792, on the banks of the Fluvia were in a great measure owing to our horse artillery, a brigade of which had been attached to eight squadrons of his Majesty's guards. All Madrid often admired the brilliant reviews and sham fights exhibited by this select body of men in 1797. The new brigade of horse artillery distinguished itself among the troops of all arms who joined in these exercises.

**Military Honour; by Don Clemente Peñalosa.**  
And lastly,

A Treatise on Heroic Military Valour, by our learned Palacios Rubios; with Notes by Father Moralez, of the Escorial. This old book was reprinted in a splendid style. I subscribed for several hundred copies, which I distributed to all who applied for them.

In respect to navigation and the navy in general, our character had been long established; in my time, our depôt was considerably augmented.

Don Joseph Mendoza de los Rios published his Treatise on Navigation—a collection of nautical tables, of methods for calculating the longitude at sea by lunar observations; and Don Francisco Lopez Royo also followed in the same path.

Don Dionysio Alcalá Galiano produced his work on the calculation of latitude, by two solar altitudes; a work which demonstrated the danger of the principles till then pursued, and the means of averting it by adopting surer methods.

Reflections, by Don Francisco Ciscar; being explanations of different methods for correcting lunar distances, and solving problems of nautical astronomy.

Elementary Memoir on the new Decimal Weights and Measures. Explanation of the Principles of Calculation, with Notes and Additions to the Maritime Examination, Theoretic and Practical; by Don George Juan.

Don Joseph Mazarredo's Rudiments of Naval Tactics, and of Signals at Sea.

Don Joseph Solano Orteza de Rosas on Naval Tactics.

All these works, and others which the hydrographic depôt either possessed already or acquired by degrees, were multiplied by printing and engraving, and brought within the reach of all, whether in Spain or in America, by their moderate price. Our marine rivalled in every respect that of France. The public papers were loud in their praises of the knowledge and skill of our officers.

This is not yet the proper time for speaking of Trafalgar; but it is well known who displayed the most talent and carried courage to the greatest degree of heroism in that glorious disaster.

As to books of fundamental studies, and of religious instruction, published at that period, it were impossible for me to enumerate them in this place. To reap this rich harvest, no great efforts were required. There were a superabundance of works devoted to the defence of the faith, either imported from abroad or springing from our own soil. In this respect I asked but one thing; it was, that they should sustain the cause of religion by no other arms than those which are wielded by its enemies. I wished that philosophy, poetry, and human eloquence should unite their means with those of divine eloquence, as in the early ages of the Church; that the active and social virtues

which the Gospel inspires should be preached and inculcated, as much as the purely ascetic virtues. This was the motive which especially induced me to protect the publication of certain works, such as the Defence of the Christian Religion, by Doctor Heydeck, one of our best professors of the oriental languages ;<sup>21</sup> the admirable work by the German, Sturm, in which I took most delight, entitled Reflections on the Works of God, in the order of Nature, for every day in the year ; a work translated into several languages, and by my care into Spanish, with instructive and curious notes ; the Preservative against Atheism, by Don Juan Paul Forner ; the collection of the Ancient Apologists of the Christian Religion, translated from the French, annotated and enlarged by Don Manuel Ximeno ; the Fundamental and Universal Catechism, by the curate of Orgaz, Don Antonio Juan Perez ; Advices, Moral, Sacred, Political, and Military, by Don Juan Ximenez Donoso. The Passion of Jesus Christ, by Father Stanihurst ; translated by Berguizas, of whom I have already spoken ; the Gospel Triumphant, which, but for me, would have placed, for the second time, the name of Olavidé on the proscription table of the Holy Office ; because, it was asserted, with equal folly and malevolence, that it strongly savoured of philosophy ! The History of the Church, by Don Felix Amat, and

<sup>21</sup> This work was dedicated to his Majesty.

other writings of the same character, none of which were devoid of merit.

*Jurisprudence.*

Don Juan de Tres-palacios produced the Law of Nations, by Domat ; his Treatise on the Laws, and his preliminary work on Civil Rights ; with notes relative to the laws of our country.

The Universal Theatre of the Legislation of Spain was continued.

Don Ignacio Jordan de Aso and Don Miguel de Manuel were compiling their Institution of the Civil Law of Castile.

Don Juan Alvarez Posadilla published the Principles of Criminal Practice ; Don Joseph Garriga, his Observation on the Spirit of Laws, reduced to four articles—Religion, Morality, Politics, and Jurisprudence.

Don Arias Gonzalo de Mendoz produced his excellent translation of Moses considered as a legislator and a moralist by Pastoret.

Don Joachim Antoine del Camino, the improved translation of the Institutions of the Canon Law, by Berandi (1796).

Vanespen's Canon Law was printed at Madrid. Cavalario received the like honour ; and the Val-lensis' True Scourge of our Ecclesiastic Tribunals was corrected and purified.

Have I named a sufficient number of worthy Spaniards who seconded the views of Govern-



ment, and contributed to the progress of public reason? No, not yet. Without reckoning the professors, whose powerful voices rung through our universities, colleges, and economical societies, there still remain a host of honourable men, whose labours and literary success ought not to be forgotten.

*Jurisprudence, Morals, Civil History, Political Economy, Administration, &c. &c.*

Don Bartholomeo Rodriguez Fonseca, Don Vicente Vizcaïno, Don Nicolas Ruiz Garcia, Don Juan Bautista Muñoz, Don Joachim de Tragia, Don Domingo Garcia Fernandez, Don Luis Marulino Pereyra, Don Raphael Antunez, the Marquis de Val de Flores, Don Francisco Martinez Marina, Don Joachim Maria Sotelo, Don Manuel Maria Cambronero, Don Joseph Fernandez Vallejo, Don Juan Joseph Camaño, Don Joseph de Anduaga, Don Joseph Cornide, Don Lorenzo Guardiola, Don Juan Sempere,<sup>22</sup> Don Joseph

<sup>22</sup> In making this enumeration, I ought to repeat that my intention is not, for the present at least, nor in the course of these Memoirs, to classify the literary merits of each individual. I place them according to the order in which they offer themselves to my recollection.

I ought also to add, that in this list I wholly abstract myself from the political opinions of these gentlemen, or the course they pursued in the revolutions of the country. Regardless of the manner in which they have disqualified themselves by passion or party spirit, I merely speak of them as men who, during my administration, were illustrious by their talents, the services they rendered their country, and their useful co-operation with the march of mind. They will here find the honourable mention which

Alonzo Ortiz, Don Vicente Gonzalez Arnao, Don Manuel Marueza, Don Miguel Perez Quintero, Don Juan Antonio Llorente, the Count de Cabarrus, the Marquis d'Iranda, Don Felix Ignatio de Canga Arguelles, Don Stanislas de Lugo, the Count de Campomanes, Don Miguel Abella, Don Joseph Xavier de Iturriaga, Don Manuel de Lardizaval, Don Bernardo de Yriarte, Don Felipe Gil de Toboada, Don Joseph Henriquez de Luna, Don Andres Romero Valdes, Don Miguel Joseph de Asana, Don Manuel Rosset, Don Mariano Madraman, Don Simon de Vigas, Don Juan Baptista Verto, &c. &c.

which is their due, whatever might be their conduct (more or less hostile) towards me. It is with this feeling that I recall the name of Don Juan Sempere Guarinos. In return for the gratuitous insults he has heaped upon me, I will only say, that few amongst the literary men of that period were more obsequious, more supple, more assiduous in their attendance on me, than he was. I gave him especial proofs of my consideration. He was one of those I saved from the persecution raised against them on account of their writings or their projects of reform. But for me, in 1797, M. Sempere would infallibly have lost his situation, his means of existence; nevertheless, this old man, with already one foot in the grave, tormented with a desire to return to Spain at any price, as I have already said elsewhere, wrote, at Paris, his *History of the Cortes*, in which, to flatter the passions of the court of Ferdinand VII., he blushed not to employ means unworthy of an honest Spaniard. He depreciated and contemned our old institutions. He calumniated me in the most unblushing language. These means answered his purpose. Don Juan Sempere de Guarinos returned to his country. He had disgraced the last moments of his life.

*Antiquities, Criticism, and Biography.*

Don Joseph Ortiz de Sanz, whom I have already named in terms of praise, author of the Chronological Abridgment of the History of Spain ; Don Louis del Castillo, author of the Chronological Abridgment of the History of Russia, a work written by the order of Government ; (Castillo had explored the Muscovite empire at the expense of the state). Father Risco and Father Fernandez Rojas, who continued the work entitled Religious History of Spain, by Father Florez ; the Abbé Masden, Don Juan Antonio Pellicer, and Don Antonio Valladares de Soto Mayor, both well known and esteemed in Spain and in foreign countries ;<sup>22</sup> Don Juan Rodriguez de Castro, author of the Library of Spanish Rabbins ; Father Liciano Saez, a Benedictine friar ; Don Ignacio Abadia ; Don Juan Lozano, canon of Carthagená ; Father de St. Nicolas, a Ieronymite friar ; Don Guillermo Lopez Bustamente ; all highly distinguished antiquarians, and

<sup>23</sup> It is difficult to conceive how the indefatigable Valladares could accomplish the task of putting in order all that came from his pen. As a philosopher, a poet, a writer of pamphlets, a critic, romance writer, a biographer, he wrote with much taste and judgment. To him we owe the discovery of a multitude of books and manuscripts, which the revolutions of time and the negligence of their owners had allowed to lapse into utter oblivion. He was the editor of the Weekly Journal of Learning ; the Novel or Romance of Leander is his work ; he wrote the Life of the Marquis de Siete Iglesias ; that of Don Bartholoméo Carranza ; the Private Life of Philip II., which has been incorrectly attributed to Antonio Paez, &c. &c.

authors of the Dictionary of Illustrious Men of Madrid, and of the Ecclesiastical and Secular Annals of Seville; Don Francisco de Villanueva, translator of Crevier's<sup>24</sup> History of the Roman Emperors; Don Joseph Maria de Bolaños, translator of the Political and Literary History of Greece, by Denina; Don Felix Latasa, author of the Bibliography of Arragonese Writers; Don Balthazar Zapata, translator of the Abridgment of Macquer's Ecclesiastical History; Don Pedro Estala, editor of the Universal Traveller.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> This history appeared in September 1795. I was also desirous to encourage the publication of Barthélémy's Travels of Young Anacharsis, but it met so much opposition that it would have required the interference of Government to surmount it; that is to say, more harm would have been done than the book could have done good. Under these circumstances, after long debates, a middle course was adopted; leave was granted to reprint the work in its original language; a French edition was accordingly printed at Madrid, (1797, at the press of Don Benito Cano) at a price sufficiently moderate to place it within every one's reach.

<sup>25</sup> The Universal Traveller was not a bookseller's speculation. We wanted a book which might combat all kinds of vulgar errors and prejudices, without alarming the susceptibility of weak minds. The candid criticisms of Father Feijo did not produce all the effect which might have been expected from them, because they went too directly to the point at which they aimed. Besides, the abuses to which the learned Benedictine friar sought to do justice were compressed within a narrow circle. The Universal Traveller presented facts merely as an historian, without comments or applications, but every one might make them his own; the result was, that the simple comparison of the various customs, laws, and manners, of every country, opened the reader's eyes, and convinced him more than reasonings could have done. To behold his own errors, his own weaknesses,  
among

*Belles-Lettres—Translations.*

Second edition, greatly improved, of the Castilian poems of Don Luis Velazquez, 1797.

Plan of Education for all kinds of Preparatory Studies, by Don Juan Antonio Cañaveral, appointed by the King as director of the school for languages, science, and polite literature, established at Cadiz.

Don Pedro Montengon, author of Eusebius, of Antenor, and of Eudoxia; translator of the poems of Ossian.

Don Juan Lopez Peñalver, who rendered into Spanish the Gonsalvo de Cordova of Florian.

among people looked upon as idiots or savages, was a warning which raised a blush, and operated as a self-admonition. To see the prosperity of certain countries, and trace that prosperity to its causes,—moral principles, religion, and good works,—was a temptation for the beholder to adopt the same principles. The foes to mental light felt the blow; they guessed the author's intention; the book was unrelentingly attacked; I vanquished this resistance. Few persons are aware at what cost I achieved this triumph! O my dear country! the invention of the compass gave thee the conquest of the New World. Previously to the discovery of America, a wall, built up to the sky, forbade thy approach. The Traveller threw down this wall of separation; Spain, so long behind-hand, was so greedy of knowledge and learning, that never was any book received with so much eagerness. Thousands of subscribers appeared from all quarters. Published in small fragments, the price scared not even those whose means were the most scanty. Estala knew how to render his book agreeable, and far more interesting than that of Laporte. He corrected and appropriated to himself whatever was most valuable in the works of other travellers. This learned ecclesiastic was my reader in ordinary, and I had daily occasion for his services.

Don Casimiro Pellicer, to whom we owe the *Galatea* of the same author.

Don Joseph Marcos Gutierrez, translator of Richardson's *Clarissa Harlowe*; Don Cesareo de la Navas Palacios, of the *Life and Voyages of Captain Cooke*; Don Ignacio Garcia Malo, of *Blanchard's School of Manners*. (Malo is the first amongst us who attempted to translate the *Iliad* into Spanish verse.)

Don Fernando Romero de Leis translated the novel of *Caliste and Polydore*, by Barthélémy; Don Joseph de Covarrubias, Attorney-general to the Chancellorships of Valladolid and Granada, *Telemachus*, for the use of the Prince of the Asturias; Don Julian Velasco, the best works of Berquin; Don Pedro Ziriza, Cousin's *Introduction to Physical Astronomy*; Don Luis Gomez Negro, a learned author, the Abbé Parada's *Elements of Philosophy*; Don Christian Herrgen, collector of the Museum of Natural History, the *Orictognesia of Windermann*; the indefatigable Don Bernardo Maria de la Calzada, the *Fables of La Fontaine* into Spanish verse.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> It were unjust not here to name some other translators who were not deficient in merit, and who were, at least, of use to a numerous class of readers. Amongst those whom I remember at this moment, I will mention Don Francisco Mariano Nifo, Don Alonzo de la Peña Garcia of Segovia, Arrogal, Moles, La Torre, Doña Maria del Rio Arnedo, who translated the *Letters of Madame Moutier*, &c. &c. There were also many sermons, culled from languages: a mixed merchandize.

*Arabian Literature.*

Anxious to bring to light a portion of the treasures we unconsciously possessed, I appointed the three following professors for that purpose :— Don Pablo Lozano, Conservator at the Royal Library, who translated the Arab Paraphrase of the Table of Celes into Spanish, with the addition of excellent notes ; the royal press published the work with a liberality worthy of the august monarch who protected this literary undertaking. Don Joseph Banqueri, conservator at the same library, who translated, at my request, the Great Treatise on Agriculture of the Sevillian Abu Zacaria Sahia, printed in 1812, at the expense of the King's library (along with the Arabic text), in a style of splendour worthy of royalty.\*

Don Joseph Antonio Condé, translator of the poems of Anacreon, Theocritus, Bion, and Moschus. This estimable and learned writer was the object of my particular affection. After having long wandered over strange lands, Condé

\* Don Joseph Banqueri was a secularised friar of deep learning, especially in some special branches of knowledge. He understood Greek, Arabic, and Hebrew. A monastic persecution compelled him to quit the cloister. I obtained for him the signal favour of his being permitted to enjoy ecclesiastical benefices in the kingdom, in spite of the formal law which deprived secularised religious of that advantage. In 1798, a little before I left the ministry, I besought the king to make him a dignitary canon of the cathedral at Tortosa. This worthy churchman has left a name which is honourably remembered in these latter times.

returned to his native country, where he was supported by the liberality of a few friends : he sank under the weight of his misfortunes, and died, regretting that he could not live to see the publication of his great historical work, of the same kind as that of Banqueri, though a more curious and a more brilliant one, the fruit of long years of toils and researches, known and appreciated by all Europe,—the History of the Dominion of the Arabs in Spain.”

<sup>28</sup> There will long weigh upon Spain a debt which seriously compromises her national character. When will she redress the memories of a host of illustrious and innocent Spaniards,—some assassinated, others proscribed or kept in dungeons ; all worthy of an expiatory monument, and on whose tombs a tardy epitaph, at least, should preserve names which reflect honour upon the country ! Until this expiation is solemnly proclaimed, there are barbarians and blasphemers, who will brand with treason and with infamy a Melendez, a Moratin, a Condé, and a crowd of other noble victims to the tempest which disturbed the lovely sky of Spain. The traitors of the Escorial and of Aranjuez, who by the mouth of an unfortunate prince, whom they basely seduced and deceived, called on Napoleon,—those who invited the Emperor of the French to come and secure the happiness of Spain,—those dangerous men were raised to power, and long exerted it to their country’s ruin, while those whose only fault was that of having won the esteem and commanded the admiration of other realms, were pursued, despoiled, condemned to silence. The unnatural faction, enemy to all virtues, proscribed also the Spaniards who had the honour and happiness of resisting foreign invasion. A tradition, as mean as unreflecting, to this day punishes them for having sought to ameliorate the fate of their country. A heavy debt towards the victims of whom I speak is as yet unacquitted. Ah ! since these illustrious dead have not even been guilty of complaining, grant, at least, a pious suffrage,—a drop of holy water to their graves !



*Physical and Mathematical Sciences.*

Let me name the men who flourished at this period :—

Don Manuel Andres del Rio, author of the *Elements of Orictognesia*, according to the principles of Werner, for the Royal Seminary of Mexico, where he held the first lectureship on mineralogy.

Don Francisco Salva, Member of the Academy of Arts and Sciences at Barcelona; many memoirs and scientific works; inventor of the electric telegraph.

Don Francisco Gonzales, an *Abridgment of Mathematics*, greatly esteemed.

Don Tadéo Lopez, a *Course of Exact Sciences*, a work demanded by his Majesty for the Royal Seminary of Nobles, for the engineers, artillery, and navy.

Don Juan Justo Garcia, so creditably known by his *Abridgment of Mathematics*.

Don Antonio Rosell, a *Treatise on Arithmetic and Algebra*.

Don Thomas Mauricio Lopez, *Modern Historical Geography*, a work executed at my express desire.

The celebrated Geographers of the King, Don Thomas and Don Juan Lopez."

<sup>29</sup> The last is the author of the *Chart of Bastitania and Constetania*, with an application to their modern state, according to the geographies of Strabo, Pomponius Mela, Pliny, and Ptolemy;

Don Joseph Garriga, whom I am again called upon to notice, author of a work entitled *Urano-graphy*, or, a Description of the Heavens.

Don Francisco Pedro Casado, Continuator of the Geographical Dictionary of Charts; author of the *Historicographic Description of the Limits or Confines of France*."

Don Francisco Dalmau, among other works, the magnificent Topographical map of Granada.

Don Joseph Castañeda; Translation of the *Abridgment of Vitruvius' Architecture*, by Perrault.

At the same epoch appeared the third edition of Bail's *Principles of Mathematics*, and a new edition of *Tosca*. The geographical cabinet of the ministry of state was admirably supplied; whereas, on my arrival, I had not found a single map.

*Varieties—Politics, Philosophy, Industry, Administration, Statistics, History, &c. &c.*

Independently of the stock of intelligence and useful knowledge supplied by the periodical journals established in the kingdom, I have yet

Ptolemy; of the general map of ancient Spain, with the third book of Strabo's geography, and particular maps of Andalusia and Lusitania.

<sup>30</sup> There appeared a new edition of this dictionary, revised, corrected, and enlarged. The supplements might be purchased separately by any one already possessed of the first editions.

to mention here the inexhaustible Valladares and Don Valentin Foronda, no less fruitful in his productions.

Juan Baptista Conti translated our old poets into Italian.

Don Joseph Ortiz Sanz published his ten books, the Lives of the Philosophers, from the Greek of Diogenes Laertes.

Don Domingo Agüero : Essays, Political, Economical, and Philosophical, translated from Rumford.

Don Juan Antonio Pellicer prepared his two fine editions of Don Quixote, the one in 12mo., the other in large 8vo., with a preliminary discourse ; a Life of Cervantes, with striking notes, the text carefully corrected, and accompanied with prints and vignettes after Parvéd, engraved by Tejoda.

Don Ramon Fernandez : a Collection of the Castilian Poets.

Father Perez de Celis : a poem entitled the Philosophy of Morals.

Don Joseph Marcos du Veres, Sermons of Don Jeronimo de Trento, translated from the Tuscan.

Don Juan Juste Garcia and Father Martel remodelled and abridged our great Preacher Lanuza, as Trigueros had done in regard to our ancient dramatic authors.

The illustrious Curate of St. Ginès published his work on the authority, use, and abuse of relics.

Don Antoine Lopez ; a Treatise on Legal Honour and Dishonour, written in favour of artisans and mechanical offices.

Father Rodriguez, of the charitable schools, a Philosophical Discernment of Minds called to cultivate the arts or sciences.

Don Salvador Ximenez Coronado, inventor of the art of speaking from great distances, by the means of an acromatic telescope, published at this time his translation of the Ancient Methods of Speaking from Afar, by the Abbé Requeno.

Lastly, our mathematician, Don Agustin Pedrage (for we must not overwhelm the reader, however great the abundance of our materials) was preparing an Examination of the labours of the Academies of Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, contrasted with each other.

The reign of Charles IV. is still sufficiently near our own time ; every Spaniard of the age of fifty has seen the men and things of which I am now speaking. It is before a thousand eye-witnesses that I retrace this apparently incredible fact, which none of my contemporaries can disprove ; namely, that amid the conflicts of two formidable wars, first with France and afterwards with England ; while our horizon was obscured by the darkest clouds ; when the earth trembled beneath us ; when the arts were disdained, science and literature calumniated, proscribed at Naples, Turin, and in almost every capital of the Continent ; while the din

of arms, the fall of empires deafened Europe, Spain was the asylum of the Muses. Arts, sciences, and literature revived and flourished amongst us; the poet's lyre charmed our leisure; our busy animated workshops multiplied and perfected the products of our soil; a flood of light inundated the double hemisphere of the Spanish empire; and the country, happy in the present, awaited the future in perfect security.

## CHAPTER XLV.

Anticipated Reply to those who may not be satisfied with the last Chapter.

It will be said that I have sought to deck myself with the peacock's plumage; that the garden in which I found flowers and fruit had been planted and cultivated by my predecessors. I am proud to acknowledge it. The original merit belongs to them; but is it nothing to have nourished, guarded, and, above all, to have preserved the seeds entrusted to the earth, the young buds ready to blossom, from the attacks of a rigorous winter? Is it not known that a dread of knowledge was strongly felt at the end of Charles III.'s reign? How much was it not persecuted when the French Revolution broke forth! Learned and literary men scarcely ventured to breathe.

I was raised to the ministry. We stood, no doubt, on the brink of a precipice; the torrent had overflowed its banks, and threatened to bear down all the governments of Europe. It should not be forgotten that there were then amongst us, and increasing in power, a class which, even in the

lap of a steady peace, cordially detested every kind of improvement.

I conceived the design of saving Spain from the common danger, and success crowned my efforts. One of the means which I ventured to exert was that of checking the evil at its very source. I invoked the aid of minds which had filled others with so much apprehension, and gave my confidence to men of talent. I invited them to unite with me in effecting the welfare of their country. Such was my system ; I know not whether it had many admirers in Europe ; I was perhaps singular in my opinion ; but I have never repented it, though my political system was never free from opposition. Few persons had the courage to applaud my first attempts in the untrodden career which I had not feared to enter. I must, nevertheless, acknowledge that my colleagues, though leaving me the initiative responsibility, seconded me with much zeal, contrary to the advice of those who wished more than ever to impose chains and tortures on the march of mind.<sup>1</sup> The latter would

<sup>1</sup> I do full justice to the ministers who, at this period, partook my labours. I found them in place ; they remained there. The most cordial union ceased not to reign between us. What better proof can I give of the sincere faith, the patriotic zeal, by which I was animated, when I took the reins of government ? Believe it who will, I became prime minister without having sought to be so. I displaced no one. I met no enemies. Don Joseph Anduaga, first commissioner of foreign affairs, was particularly the favourite of Count Florida Blanca. After the first days of my ministry, he came to me, saying, " I have been extremely

have carried the day had it not been for the high confidence and special favour with which the King was pleased to grace me. I turned both to advantage; I rekindled the sacred fire, a pure and bounteous light, not the incendiary conflagration to which France was a prey. Had it not been for me, I am now free to avow it, our fortresses and prisons would not have sufficed to confine all who were suspected; it was of course impossible to correct every abuse in an instant, but by degrees the friends of literature took breath; what is more, their triumph was not equivocal; they resumed

extremely favoured by the minister whom you succeed. This predilection has cost me much annoyance during the last eight months. I have asked leave to retire; it is three weeks since that Count d'Aranda promised it me; I beseech your excellency to be so good as to grant it." "And I beseech you not to think of it," I replied: "The estimation in which you were held by Count Florida Blanca is with me an additional reason for retaining you; I beg you will stay; nay, I even insist on it; and be assured that, while I am minister, you shall have no reasons for regret." I kept my word with him. Three ministerial commissioners, younger in office than himself, and whose talents were inferior to those of Anduaga, were leagued against him, to enforce a second resignation of his place. He came and complained to me; but I had heard of it before-hand. M. Urquijo departed for London, as secretary to the embassy; M. Temes went to take possession of a professorship at Valladolid; and M. Labrador was nominated judge or counsellor of the Royal Court (Audiencia) of Seville.

As for the excellent and honourable Anduaga, he had no cause to lament his former patron; I had him given the employment of counsellor of the Order of the Golden Fleece, and afterwards made him secretary to the counsellor of state; finally, ambassador, &c. &c.



their station in society; I applied myself to strengthen their hold upon it. I even resorted to forcible measures, great as was my repugnance to the use of such extreme means. Had I not been at hand, others would not have failed to blight their hopes, to denounce them as traitors, as dangerous citizens; they would have been reduced to expatriate themselves. What their enemies and mine were enabled to accomplish with ease, after an interval of twenty years, during which the public mind had made some progress, and when knowledge was more diffused, might I not have effected, with equal facility, at the moment when the French Convention and its Propaganda appeared to justify the most rigorous precautions? Oh! had I but adopted the latter system, how many enemies should I have escaped! Those who have so much execrated, would then have canonized me, even had I as many sins on my conscience as Constantine the Great.

Have I not then well deserved of my country, by following sounder principles, by taking part with literature, and protecting those who cultivated it, from the very commencement of my administration?

Of all the sorrows which have beset me during a silence of twenty-seven years, the keenest has been that no account was kept of what I had done for the improvement of the public mind. The blindness and bad faith of many were carried to

such lengths as to deny the evidence; others were content to depreciate the merit of indisputable facts; others again believed they did me sufficient service by passing me over unnoticed.

Don Juan Maury, when complaining of the rigour with which literature was treated in the year 1790, seems to intimate that the persecution did not cease till 1795, after the peace with France. "At that time," he says, "we were permitted to breathe; the knowledge of French was no longer a title of proscription."

No, M. Maury, in wishing to yield me a tardy praise, or rather to render me some justice, you do not set down the true dates. Those who have had the power of seeing, and of judging, like yourself, the state of things in 1795, could also see and judge the two preceding years. I was already minister in 1792. M. Maury ought not to forget the frank tone taken, from the beginning of 1793, by the official gazette of Madrid, and all the other periodical writings, revived or created by me, which were not only tolerated, but encouraged; all favouring the progress of intellect. He ought also to be aware of the productions, full of useful instruction, which appeared at that time, 1793; in April and May, the translation of the *History of Greece* by Denina; soon afterwards the famous *History of the Knight Pelagio* (Cavallero Don Pelayo); and in the same and the following year, 1794, Mandramany published his three books

or Treatises on the Nobility; in September 1793, the Abbé Matanegui dedicated to me his Critical Letters, and Don Vicente Foronda brought forward his Discourses and Dialogues on Politics and Philosophy; the Elements of History, by Mably, were then translated into our language; a supreme order having suspended the printing of it in 1790. I caused the interdict to be removed.

The translation of the Methodical Encyclopedia, equally suspended and prohibited at the same time, was freely continued. There was read at a general meeting, and adopted by the Economic Society of Madrid, in 1794, the imperfect Report on the Agrarian Law, of which Jovellanos was the compiler. Exiled to Gijon under the ministry of Florida Blanca, that magistrate received, in 1793, the mission to establish and organize the magnificent Institute of the Asturias. At this time, too, were translated into Spanish, and published, the classic work of Smith on the Wealth of Nations; Filangieri's Treatise of Legislation, by Don Jayme Rubio; and, for the use of the clergy, the wise and learned Abridgment of Vanespen, by Father Oberhauser.

If M. Maury knew nothing of these various publications, at least he must have read the epistle of his illustrious friend Melendez to Don Eugenio Llaguno, when the latter was appointed Minister of Justice, January 31st, 1793. Therein may be seen to what extent was then carried the freedom

of thought and of writing. This celebrated epistle is a proof of the tolerant spirit of the Government.

Melendez speaks of the old system of education. . . . "Sad relics of the Gothic age! ill-assorted mixture of ancient and modern laws; our jurisprudence is a confused mass of uncertainties and contradictions. This object claims thy solicitude. Remodel and renew this ancient edifice. Thou wilt build nothing solid, if thou leavest standing one lonely column, one arch, one solitary pedestal or single stone of the old and ill-constructed fabric."

He then speaks of the magistracy. . . . "Throw a glance at the temple of Themis! There, if ignorance has been installed by blind partiality, if lukewarm zeal, cowardly virtue, dares not raise a courageous voice, remove without remorse those worthless magistrates, and stand beside thy monarch, the firm protector of the Spanish toga."

Melendez goes further: he speaks of the clergy; ". . . the ministry of a religion ineffably divine implores thy reforming care. Oh, how much is left here to be done! But I refrain from drawing the sacred veil. Elpino! thou only mayest lift it with a daring hand; thou mayest enter with firm steps into the sanctuary. . . ."

" . . . The sad son of toil has no bread: tutelar divinity, thou mayest give it him! Listen to his groans; behold his virtuous desolate companion, their little ones, bathed in tears! What an

insupportable burthen is life for these unfortunates! They sink beneath the weight of misery ; while the proud rich, without one yearning towards the poor, swim in luxury, and abandon themselves to all its vices."

It was thus that men wrote in the first months of 1794 ; not secretly, but under the eyes of Government, and even addressing its ministers. Will it be said that Melendez only indulged in this language towards his friend Llaguno ? Certainly not ; he spoke to my face with the same energy. Earnestly pleading the cause of the people, he exclaimed : " What may we not hope from thee ? Elpino, how much we depend on thee for the blessings thou mayest procure the people, placed as thou art beside thy glorious and powerful friend, who knows and partakes thy zeal. Walk together, and with firm steps, over the uncertain soil of the court. His noble heart is exempt from mean and vulgar passions. May ye alike constitute the good of the world ! Linked to each other by a sacred friendship, give us the happy days which I trust to see dawn o'er our country."

A few days afterwards, Melendez addressed to me his Ode on Fanaticism, which was afterwards printed in his works, 1797. Amongst the beauties with which this production teems, the passage wherein he thus apostrophises the Divinity has been most frequently quoted :

" Eternal Creator of this sad universe ! why

wilt thou not prevent the profanation of thy sublime name? Hast thou then abandoned the care of thy work? Is the world no better than an ensanguined theatre for vengeance, carnage, and death? Will there be no end to these miseries? Must the triumph of the monster endure for ever? O my God! show thyself to the terror-stricken human race! let pure and holy truth shine before our eyes! may feeble mortals behold that gentle light, and breathe again! may man, whilst contemplating heaven, no longer discover in it the startling signs of thine anger. God of goodness! deign to descend, and hurl yon odious monster into the shades of hell!"<sup>2</sup>

If the object Melendez had in view could be doubted, here is another extract, or rather a drama, in ten lines, in which he represents an auto-da-fé, in a style to make one's hair stand on end:—"Ah, dread Ambition has assumed its hypocritical mask and displays all its fury—Do you behold the inhuman band advancing in a body? What savage cries! how their eyes grow wild! how they excite each other! how they trim the fire! The roaring flames rise in devouring whirlwinds, and the executioners invoke the God of Peace! <sup>3</sup> No, Lord! thou wilt not suffer it;

<sup>2</sup> The Abbé Don Juan Andres was wont to say, that the eighteenth century had produced nothing equal to this ode of Melendez.

<sup>3</sup> The counsellors of Ferdinand, God grant them peace!

crush the impious monster who incessantly wars against holy truth."

The year had hardly elapsed when Melendez returned to the charge. He dedicated to me an Ode of Congratulation on my having concluded an honourable peace in 1795.

What Spanish minister would not have trembled at being the object of these philosophical encouragements and exhortations?

Count d'Aranda was much alarmed when the authors of the Encyclopedia publicly asserted that he intended to suppress the Inquisition, or at least to moderate its power. For my part, in the ardour of youth, and strong in my good intentions, I embraced Melendez, and obtained from his Majesty his appointment as attorney-general of the Hall of the Alcaldes of the King's Court and Household.\*

For the rest, I was not, on the other hand, intolerant, like the European philosophers of that time, or those who assumed that title. My reputation and my character have been the objects of so many calumnious attacks, that I may be per-

proposed to him that he should deliver me up to the Inquisition, as a heretic; they wished to celebrate his happy accession to the throne by an auto-da-fé. Some literary and learned men were also to have contributed, by their martyrdom, to the solemnity of this festival!

\* A supreme tribunal, considered as the fifth chamber of the council of Castile. It is at once a court of permanent assize, and a correctional tribunal, charged with the police of the capital.—E

mitted, after twenty-seven years of silence, to recall to mind with some degree of satisfaction, the testimonials which were publicly vouchsafed to me.

Moratin addressed to me the following verses :—  
“ Power is never rendered firm by violence : neither can the scaffold afford it any solid support, nor even squadrons cased in steel. Where love exists not, constraint is unavailing. Thou art aware of it, Prince ! as is evidenced by thy conduct. Thou protectest modest virtue and timid innocence ; if merit languisheth in obscurity, thou seekest it out, and awardest it its merited crown. Letters have flourished by thy care ; thou rekindlest zeal ; thou pardonest error ; thou wilt find the recompence for what thou hast done in the pleasure thou must feel within thy breast.”

I have said enough to answer those who have affected to disown or deny the services I have rendered to literature and science.<sup>5</sup> I will not

<sup>5</sup> Don Juan Mauri, after having yielded me some praises on this head,—just as an act of charity is exercised towards a needy man,—added, that when I was restored to power, I retained a feeling of bitterness towards enlightened men, and revived the system of hatred against mental superiority. I will answer this imputation when speaking of the second epoch of my life, not by mere assertions, but by facts. Don Juan Mauri will find how great is the imprudence of writing, in the midst of his contemporaries, without having any positive data to rely upon ; for it assuredly was at this second period of my return to power that, in proportion to the additional obstacles I had to conquer, I more than ever applied myself to promote the progress



here enumerate the rewards lavished at this epoch. It was not a barren liberality; the examples, the lessons of our masters, made numerous disciples; the crop was ripe, but heaven willed not that it should be quietly gathered in by those who had sown the seed. Many still live who received from my hands the requital of their merit. I consign to them the task of recounting these acts, and shall conclude by quoting the language of an illustrious writer, who is no longer of this world, but whose works are destined to outlive my enemies, and even their latest descendants. Moratin, in the twelfth note to his detached poems, thus expresses himself in my regard :—

“ He favoured the literary men who flourished at that period; he incessantly exhorted them to commit their labours to writing. If our comedies are worth anything, it is to him, to the preference he gave our works, that we are indebted for our best inspirations.”

Moratin was neither his intimate friend, his counsellor, nor his valet; but he was his dependant; and, if there exists an accommodating philosophy, which teaches one to receive favours, and yet be insensible to gratitude,—a philosophy which,

progress of knowledge. The enemies of this progress succeeded in triumphing over all my efforts. I was sacrificed; but they could not destroy all I had accomplished. In spite of so many storms and convulsions, the sacred fire, lit by my hands, is still burning.

varying with the vicissitudes of fortune, repays with either injuries or adulation the bounties it has solicited and obtained ; Moratin had too much value for his character ever to have disgraced it by such base conduct. He then sought to render himself agreeable to his protector by honest means ; then, as now, he put up prayers for that patron's prosperity ; yes, he utters the same wishes at the present day. The violence of passions which have convulsed public order have despoiled Moratin of all that he owed to the benevolence of the Prince of Peace ; but that violence cannot deprive a man of letters of his honourable character, or of his sense of duty, so long as he has at heart to preserve both ; he is true to gratitude, a virtue which is an insupportable burthen to the wicked, who rid themselves of it at the first favourable opportunity. For good men it is an obligation from which they never seek to be released.

## CHAPTER XLVI.

**Laws, Measures, Encouragements, Suppression of Abuses, Undertakings of general Utility, Statistical Works, from 1793 to 1798.**

SPAIN stood in need of comprehensive reforms; but the example of our neighbours recommended a course of prudence. It was essential in the first instance to prepare men's minds; to await the effects of those lights which were just springing up; to move gently with public opinion, and not run counter to it. We had to contend with abuses of long standing. We repressed as many of them as it was possible to remove, without causing tumults or exercising measures of rigour. Some acts of my administration will shew the spirit of patriotic zeal with which the monarch and his councillors were animated.

It is well known that the agriculture of the country was injured by the unbounded, the unparalleled favour extended to the travelling flocks (ganado trashumante). The privileges of the royal sheep-folds, the power of the council of la Mesta,<sup>1</sup> daily infringed the rights of landed proprietors.

<sup>1</sup> A privileged tribunal, to which were referred all the disputes and embarrassments occasioned by the periodical migrations of travelling flocks.—E.

The immense tracks of land, either conceded or usurped; the perpetual and ruinous law-suits occasioned by the temporary sojourn of these devouring flocks; the partiality of judges; the interminable length of the discussions: all these causes conspired to break the spirit of the husbandman.

It was reserved for the government of Charles IV. to put an end to so many evils. For two hundred years, the province of Estramadura in vain besought permission to enjoy its property undisturbed. In the reign of Philip V. a decree was passed for doing justice to it. Charles III. nominated, in 1783, a junta of ministers from the council of Castile, to examine every precedent, and report them to his Majesty. Charles IV. insisted that this quarrel should be settled by a conciliation of all interests. The investigation lasted three years, without any resolution having been taken on a matter of so serious an import; the fate of the province, its population, its agriculture, its very existence, depended on some decision; for, the want of grain was often felt in Estramadura, in spite of the natural fertility of the soil. In 1792, I caused those old and voluminous documents to be inquired into. After so long a privation the province was reinstated in its rights; those of the sheep proprietors were laid down; the mutual boundaries of land carefully re-established, agreeably to the old decree issued by Philip II., at Badajoz, in favour of lawful pasturage. The

property of newly-cleared land was declared exempt from all contributions during the space of ten years. The standing corn, the trees were sold, or let on long leases, to those who, till then, had but the bare possession of the land.

Three years afterwards (it was impossible to bring the matter to an earlier close), a royal schedule of 1796 suppressed the privileged jurisdictions.<sup>2</sup> Justice resumed her ordinary course. Husbandmen, farmers, stock proprietors, all were subjected to the common law. A detailed investigation was annexed to the royal schedule, with a view to facilitate its execution.

The whole kingdom profited by these salutary measures. The ordinance of 1770, relative to the distribution of common lands (*concejiles*), was put in force; and the council of Castile was also authorized by government to distribute lands belonging to the royal patrimony, whether at redeemable quit rents, or in payment of old credits against the state.

The example being thus set, the landlords who possessed much waste land disposed of it on nearly the same terms, and many day-labourers became proprietors. Government did not stop here; the long engrossment of seignorial property in mortmain was restrained. Freed from these various

<sup>2</sup> *Alcaldes entregadores*, *alcaldes*, or judges, appointed to mark the limits, who regulated the conditions and extent of pasturage for the migratory flocks.—E.

shackles, agriculture soared to a height which the expulsion of the Jews and Moors had so long prevented. The rugged mountains of Malaga and Granada were covered with vineyards, fig and almond trees; the plough passed over rocks till then deemed inaccessible. Foreigners poured in, with their capital and their industry. Numerous store-houses became depôts to receive the fruit intended for exportation. Our brandies supplied the markets of the north of Europe. The hilly sides of Valentia and Catalonia were also restored to cultivation; and in all the ports of the Peninsula the produce of our soil was eagerly sought. The interior of the kingdom was abundantly provided. But for the fatal and inevitable war, provoked by the cabinet of St. James's, no nation of the Continent could have boasted of greater happiness.

One of the chief wants of the country, at this period, was the encouragement and increase of the breed of horses. A mistaken vanity had constantly rejected all mixture with foreign breeds, under pretext of preserving the delicacy of our own horses, which are not strong enough for war, and whose fragility rendered them scarcely fit for agriculture or land carriage. Could no middle course be adopted? Might one not preserve what was good, and acquire at the same time that in which we were deficient?

On entering the administration, I was struck with the paucity of horses for the army; I sought

all possible means to remedy it. The evil had continued increasing from the time of Philip V. At last I succeeded in procuring the liberal encouragement of this branch of industry and agriculture in all the provinces of the kingdom, excepting those whence we derived the horses of a fine and privileged breed. Foreign stallions were admitted; the horse-breeders of Castile, where the use of the male ass is permitted, might now bring their mares to the horse, if such was their inclination. The privileges and exemptions of the ordinance of 1783, in favour of the delicate breeds of Andalusia, Murcia, and Estramadura, were rendered common to all the provinces. I followed in this the ancient laws and traditions which tell us of the handsome and powerful horses of Galicia, the Asturias, Arragon, and other parts of Spain. I went still further; setting the first example, I imported a hundred fine Normandy mares, six Danish horses, some from Africa (chiefly from Tripoli), in order to create new breeds. The best mares of Aranjuez and of Cordova were mated with foreign horses, and the Normandy mares with the finest Spanish breed. The Duke d'Osuna, and other great proprietors, followed my example. The new breeds, without losing any thing of the Andalusian symmetry, acquired more vigour, a greater height, and even more grace, more beauty. It was thus that we saw, for the first time, the airy mettlesome horse replace the

monstrous mule, whose corpulency and long ears contrasted with the elegant richness of our equipages. The Duke d'Ossuna's stud bore away the palm.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless I still respected the privileges of the horse-breeders, whilst I carried into effect the ordinance of 1789, till then indifferently observed; on this point, I exerted an inflexible rigour. One-third at least of the mares were to be mated with horses of their own kind, and in this case, without any other concession; whilst those who devoted themselves exclusively to the breeding of horses, obtained throughout the kingdom the preference of public pasturage; and moreover, the permission to employ the horse kept at the expense of the commune, exemption from hav-

<sup>3</sup> This excellent and noble friend bequeathed to me by his will the six best horses in his stables. I will say nothing of those in my own stud. Sad recollection!—have I said *my* stud? In Turkey my property would have been more respected; all was taken from me, under the government of Ferdinand VII., without judgment, without any charge, without the least formality or decency! . . . . One idea brings back another. . . . Pious souls! they wished to consecrate to God the pillage of my goods. My riding school, at Aranjuez, was converted into a chapel, dedicated to St. Joseph, the 19th of May 1808, being the day of that most blessed patriarch, assuredly the most pacific of all the saints in the calendar. They sought to make him their accomplice on this fatal day, the prelude to those at Bayonne, and which deprived the Spanish nation of a king who was truly the father of his people. Great saint! if thou hadst any influence on the events of May 19th, it must have been thou who didst preserve me from the poignards aimed at my life.



ing soldiers billeted upon him, from taking care of their baggage and from military conscriptions, &c.<sup>4</sup> The same advantages were granted to the persons

<sup>4</sup> The mule, above all the she-mule, were objects of a lucrative commerce; many people were engaged in it; loud were the complaints against the preference shown for the breed of horses; the vigour, the perseverance, the aptitude of the mules, both male and female, for the toils of agriculture, and for heavy transport, especially in mountainous districts, were unceasingly extolled. Such complaints were not well founded. This traffic or species of industry could well support itself without standing in need of protection. The consumption was great under this head; whilst horses, in time of peace, could hardly find purchasers. The thirst of gain had devoted the best, nay, even all our mares, to the male ass, in order to obtain mules; by these means the race of horses was on the point of disappearing. Besides, it is well known, that the mare which has once been coupled with an ass, becomes useless to the horse. How then could the wants of the army be supplied in case of war? At the close of the century before last, in spite of their evident decline, Spain could still dispose of 80,000 horses for the wars; and, in our time, she had not a quarter of that number wherewith to mount her cavalry. Such was the deplorable result of that strange predilection for mules. Under the reign of Charles III., as soon as the family compact was concluded, it was supposed that there would be no more wars with France. The preservation of our breed of horses was wholly neglected, to which must be added, the preference of that king for middle-sized horses, called, in Spain, "*hacas de dos cuerpos*," double-bodied hackneys, which were neither horses nor ponies. The breeders, with a kind of interested flattery, strove daily to procure them of a still smaller size. There were not left any war horses for our squadrons. God knows in what a dilemma I found myself, when it was a question of our waging war against the French Republic. By dint of care and sacrifices this evil was, if not altogether, at least in great measure remedied. In a point of public economy, the errors of a government weigh long upon a country, and it is not always easy to repair them.

employed in superintending these establishments. With respect to horses and mares coming from abroad, they were admitted into the kingdom free from all duties : several decrees offered premiums for their importation.

Sundry kinds of industry enjoyed equal favour. An obstacle difficult to surmount was opposed to the progressive movement of the arts ; it sprung from the privileges of corporate bodies.<sup>5</sup> To enlighten public opinion on this subject, and, by degrees, to diminish the evil, such was the system of government. As soon as the slightest manifestation took place of a desire to emancipate any branch of industry, the wishes of the parties interested were instantly complied with. The art of preparing silk and other manufactures, was thrown open to competition. If a niggardly private interest persevered in opposing such competition, the King granted exemptions to promote industry, especially that produce which found an assured vent, and might supply our colonial markets.

The young unmarried men attached to silk, woollen, or linen manufactories, those who had friends or positive interests in these establish-

<sup>5</sup> There was a period, doubtless, at which these associations contributed not only to the progress of the arts, but still more to that of civil liberty.

At the time to which I refer, circumstances were no longer the same. These companies formed an actual monopoly, organized in opposition to every development of industry.

ments, all manufacturers, in short, were exempt from military conscription. Prices were no longer fixed; that bad system was abolished wherever it was found to prevail. Instruments and machinery, of whatever kind, brought from abroad, were admitted without payment of duty. Many undue contributions were suppressed, such as had been improperly prolonged under the names of tolls, ferry, and bridge-dues, and which had much shackled circulation; no more dues were levied in respect to fairs or public markets. The rights of Alcabala and of cientos (centage) were considerably diminished, and ordinary traffic was rescued from a host of fiscal exactions.

Government afforded its special protection to navigation and commerce. Shipbuilders, already favoured by the royal decree of April 3d 1790, obtained fresh advantages; and owners of privateers new premiums of encouragement, during the two wars with France and Great Britain. Our navy, so far from being reduced, was increased, and rendered the most important services, both to the state and to individuals, who turned their thoughts to a profitable and active coasting trade.

The register of seafaring men was greatly extended; it was no longer necessary to order their impressment. The restoration of their ancient privileges, above all of the exclusive right to fish and navigate in salt water, encouraged men to embrace the profession of sailors; their num-

bers amounted to 80,000. The brigades are not included in this calculation.\* All the laws enacted during the preceding reign relative to commerce and navigation beyond sea, were upheld, and some of them received developments tending to realise all the freedom which the minister, Galvez, had wished to bestow upon commerce. No retrograde steps were resorted to; on the contrary, we marched rapidly forward. The viceroys of America had a *carte blanche*, empowering them to do all possible good, and to keep up a good understanding with the mother country. The provisional measures they adopted were, without exception, converted into laws by the council of the Indies. The fidelity of the Transatlantic Spaniards never deceived us, throughout the course of our long war with Great Britain. They resisted both the means of seductions and the arms alternately wielded by our enemies. What better eulogy can be bestowed on the enlightened and benevolent administration of Charles IV.? More than once the cry of independence was raised by the English in the heart of those distant lands; they offered their aid, their protection, in times when all communications with the metropolis were difficult, and frequently interrupted. Nothing could shake the faith of the Americans; an unlimited confidence, a just sense of gratitude,

\* Companies of marines (sea soldiers) formed into brigades or battalions.—E.

attached them to their last king.' The memory of Charles IV. is still held in veneration amongst them.

The commercial establishments founded in the reign of Charles III., were, I repeat it, uniformly upheld, some, I may say, were revived. Have my readers forgotten the panic, the failures of the bank of St. Carlos, and of the Philippine Company, whether proceeding from the embarrassments in which we were involved by the protracted war in favour of the Anglo-Americans, or by the avowed hostility of the minister Llerena to the company, and still more to the bank ?

These two establishments were preserved, as well as the Havanna and Malaga Companies, not without great trouble and more or less success. The dividends of the Bank of St. Carlos never fell below four and a-half per cent.; those of the Philippine Company remained at five ; whilst the Malaga Company paid as high as twelve per cent.; the Land and Sea Insurance Society, established at Madrid, was prosperous ; another of the same kind was founded at Corunna, in 1794 ; it had

<sup>7</sup> My enemies have censured, as a measure of pomp and vanity, the creation of a fourth company of body guards, under the name of the American Company. What ignorance ! This measure was assuredly not one of pomp, and I was desirous of multiplying and cementing the ties between the mother country and its distant possessions. At the time of which I speak, it became impossible to preserve them without identifying our interests with theirs, and uniting the Spaniards of both hemispheres into one family.

for its object to promote the fisheries on the coast of Patagonia: Government upheld it through its many difficulties: Charles IV. took a personal interest in it; he supplied it with funds, and furnished it, from his arsenals, with every means of repairing its losses. Unquestionably, his Majesty, far from seeking his personal advantage, had no other aim save that of calming the apprehensions of the capitalists or shareholders, and of procuring others, through whose support the undertaking became richer and more powerful. The better to establish its credit, the King caused the six per cent. interest to be paid, whilst waiting for the future dividends. That measure was the last which, before I left the head of affairs, I strongly recommended to the minister Saavedra. It was published by his order, eight days after my retirement.

The constant expenses of the war did not permit me to attend, as much as I could have wished, to the subject of roads and canals: nevertheless, whatever remained to be done in the reign of Charles III. was eagerly followed up. The high road from Yrun to Madrid, and from Madrid to Cadiz, was completed, as well as the road from Madrid to Valencia. Immense sums were invested in the water-works of the Grao, where it was necessary to contend with the elements. In Catalonia the rising city of San Carlos (the Alfaques) received considerable augmentations; fortifications

were added to it : subsequently, the port of Tarragona was completely restored. The working of the American mines was the subject of my anxious solicitude : this branch of industry was improved in these possessions, as well as in Spain. The mean rapacity of the treasury ceased to impede their success. The lead mines of the Alpujarras and of Granada proved highly prosperous : they are now the wealth of the country.

The means of government not always proving sufficient, I strove to kindle a spirit of association and enterprize, in which private interest might be combined with the public weal. For this purpose it was necessary to offer premiums, to set the example, and make experiments. Imitation exercises a far greater empire than reason ; and the most inventive genius has need to see and to compare, in order to aim at new creations.

There was a time when Spain had no occasion to apply to foreigners for lessons or models. More powerful then than she ever was before or since, she was the mistress and arbitress of the arts ! but the Spaniards, subsequently wishing to appear better Christians than their ancestors, banished a whole race of laborious men,—the true promoters and props of commerce and of industry, but who adored the Divinity in a different manner. All the gold of America cannot repurchase what we have lost. After this religious clearance, repeated with respect to the Moors,

Spain saw herself thrown back and impoverished, in spite of the barren abundance of metals of which she had engrossed the sources. Nations more tolerant than we were, received the wreck of our former industrious wealth. It was time to open our eyes to our situation; it rested with ourselves to improve it. It was on the accession of the Bourbon dynasty that foreigners came to govern us on our native soil; some to give up the country to intrigue, others to promote the interests of their own native land. For my part I also encouraged the visits of strangers, not that they should govern us (so long as I was minister, never did they obtain any preference over our own statesmen), but that they should be our adopted brothers, and useful fellow citizens; valuable for the knowledge, the industry, and the capital which they brought into Spain.

Such was the motive of the royal decree of the 8th of September 1797, which I have already mentioned<sup>8</sup>—the first law of toleration proclaimed for the last three hundred years!

<sup>8</sup> The Marquis De Louville, Father Daubenton, Jean Orry, Alberoni, the Princess des Ursins, Ripperda, Squilace, Grimaldi, &c. &c.

<sup>9</sup> In the preceding reign, Don Manuel de Roda had obtained from Charles III. the permission to admit some artisans or manufacturers, of whom our reviving factories stood much in need. These foreigners were not bound to profess the Catholic religion; but at the end of this reign, or rather as soon as Roda's eyes were closed, the system of intolerance having revived, these foreigners



This decree, issued by the King, of his own authority, without being submitted to the customary formalities, which would have shackled its enactment, granted every artist, manufacturer, or capitalist, permission to settle in Spain, whether they were of another than the Catholic religion. No other condition was imposed on them, than that they should respect the worship of the country and its national manners. I hoped that this measure would produce excellent effects; they were not so satisfactory as I had culculated upon. The portfolios of many ministers were full of magnificent projects of roads and canals, but they wanted persons to undertake them; contractors who would undertake to carry these schemes into execution. The very name of the dreaded tribunal of the Holy Office, although long restricted in its power, still terrified all foreigners: this was the occasion for saying, with Quintana—

“ Thus did the old and lofty fortress appear, on the summit of the rocky hill, and lording o’er all around. There formerly were collected together the sons of war, who defended the approaches to it; from those high rocks they rushed shouting upon the armies that could not sustain the violence of the shock. Now lonely, dismantled, silent, half ruined by time, the fortress, ready to crum-

foreigners were compelled to withdraw; they quitted Spain. It was reserved for Charles IV. to break down the barrier, raised by blind jealousy, between the Peninsula and civilization.

ble into dust, still preserves its former terrible aspect.<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless I did all that was possible, under existing circumstances, in favour of agriculture and the arts; I introduced new machinery, new methods, which were wanting in our manufactures; sundry implements of husbandry, and plants hitherto unknown amongst us, &c. &c. What remained to be done, had necessarily to await the effect of time. On my part, I endeavoured to accelerate its course.<sup>11</sup> I was passion-

<sup>10</sup> But why, it may be asked, did not you raze to the ground this frightful ruin? Why? Because it was then as impossible as it was to extend towards the Israelites the favour shown to the professors of other forms of worship. I still remember well what it cost me to save from the fangs of the Holy Office a poor native of Morocco, falsely or truly supposed a Jew, who, in that doubtful quality, was thrown into a dungeon, in 1797. He probably was a Hebrew, and came to visit the sad cradle of his forefathers, under favour of a disguise, that is, in a Moorish habit. It is well known that the descendants of these ancient exiles preserve a hereditary affection for Spain. I was much surprised to hear them, at Marseilles, talking our idiom with great purity; above all, with a thoroughly Spanish accent. They use no other language in their domestic intercourse. How much good might have been derived from these Hebrews, amidst the present financial embarrassments, if they had only been allowed to establish themselves in Spain! Are we, then, for ever to remain the only Christians or Catholics in Europe, who preserve such implacable rancour against the industrious and commercial people whom the Pope himself admits into his dominions?

<sup>11</sup> One of the means of economy for which agriculture is indebted to Charles IV., was the adoption of artificial meadows on the Dutch plan. The first experiment of it was seen at

ately desirous of correcting our system of public contributions, and establishing it on a progressive scale, proportioned to the fortunes of individuals. Of all the suggested reforms, this was by far the most important, and the most difficult of accomplishment : proper knowledge and statistical information were wanting ; opposition would arise from private interests, long standing privileges, and the errors of many centuries. I was not alarmed at the number of opponents, but I dreaded the confusion which pervaded our finances. A good topography, a good registry of lands—these were the objects of my ambition, from the first day of my entrance on the ministry.

Madrid, in the Clos de Brancacio, then belonging to the Duke of Alba, afterwards to the city, and finally became my property by the city's gift. Don Antonio Fons, a life-guardsman of the Flemish company, and a particular friend of the Duke of Alba, was charged with the undertaking. I had already imported into Spain the ray-grass, the sainfoin, the jonquille, and other plants, from Dutch Flanders, which had been unknown to us. I ordered a notice to be written forthwith, with a view to excite interest and curiosity in the provinces. I invited the Economic Societies to recommend these new cultures, from which poor families might derive great advantages. A labourer having two oxen or mules, might feed them for a whole year, by means of this pasture, without any other auxiliary ; the sainfoin possesses a medicinal virtue, and is far superior to the Faveta de Toscana, because it is more salutary and more plentiful ; it furnishes nine crops in three years, after which it becomes an excellent manure for the soil that bore it. Turnips are left in the ground, and are improved by its alimentary salts. I should never end, were I to relate all the good done to agriculture during the reign of Charles IV.

This labour, long, tiresome, and of a novel character, required great care and firmness; but I was not to be discouraged. The task was commenced in 1793, and continued with zeal as long as I remained at the head of the administration. Subsequently, on recovering some influence in state affairs, I insisted on this scheme being vigorously followed up," and who, without these preliminary measures and information, would have dared to undertake so great a reform?

The embarrassments of the treasury were daily becoming more complicated; at this period of perpetual storms, it was dangerous and inexpedient

<sup>12</sup> Is any one ignorant of the fact, that during the war with France, and even afterwards, I commissioned different persons to explore the provinces and collect fresh geographical information, to search for antiquities, and bring together all the elements of a civil, military, ecclesiastical, and political history? Care was to be taken lest the interests of the privileged classes should take alarm at these researches, and impede the discovery of truth, as had already been more than once the case. It was absolutely necessary to explore the archives; above all those of the municipalities; but great prudence was necessary. There was accordingly published, at the royal press, a book entitled, "Notice and Plan of a Journey for the purpose of examining into our Archives, and forming a political History of Spain." The commission was given by His Majesty to Don Manuel Abella. After having spoken of the advantages, the necessity of such a collection, some idea was given of what had already been done in the matter. The author, Abella, anxious to render himself worthy of the King's confidence, and of the special protection I extended to him, by placing him at the head of this undertaking, proposed a plan of labour in furtherance of the mission. Unfortunately my successors, Jovellanos and Saavedra, neglected this important object.

to appropriate the least portion of the ordinary revenues of the state to experiments which might meet with obstacles, or cause dangerous reactions. On the other hand, it was fit we should conciliate the opposite interests of each province, and discover a system of taxation at once just and agreeable to all. This double condition could only be attained by a single contribution, proportioned to each man's fortune, without exception, without privilege of any kind. But this system, already tried in 1760, had met with such violent opposition, that it entirely frustrated the intended project, after much precious time and considerable sums had been vainly expended upon it. In spite of this first disappointment, I persisted in having the registry continued. The census of 1787 required correction ; I caused it to be revised upon fresh data. Such was the census of 1797, which, by a remarkable singularity, was published in 1801. I believed, and I deceived myself, that this newly acquired information, which daily became more interesting, could not fail to produce good effects in the hands of the ministers who succeeded me. I had also bequeathed to them the work entitled *Substitution for Provincial Revenues and Universal Contribution* : a luminous work, drawn up by my order in 1797, and deposited in all the archives and offices of the Finance department. This work had been entrusted to Don Juan Joseph Caamaño de Pardo. I feel no hesitation in openly praising

myself for having encouraged and assisted the author of so estimable a work. Besides the importance of the subject in general, it contained a detailed table of the revenues of the kingdom, and of the general expenses in the years 1792, 1793, 1794, 1795, and 1796, which were liquidated.<sup>18</sup> The work was concluded in May or June 1798, and printed in August of the same year.

On quitting the ministry, I entreated of his Majesty that this labour might not be lost. The King graciously ordered my successor to procure its publication, with an express announcement that it had been undertaken at my desire, conducted and superintended by me, &c. &c.

Many important matters begun during my administration were afterwards completed, without any one giving me credit for the part I had taken in them. Others were neglected, to make way for projects which I had in no way approved—projects, in my opinion unattainable, dangerous to the country, and which, in fact, brought ruin upon our finances.

What I relate is no romance. I draw no fancy picture; I only state real facts; they are notorious; and I defy my most inveterate enemies, if I still have any, to contradict a single one of my assertions. I write the history of my own time;

<sup>18</sup> It is not long since, in a sitting of the procuradores of the kingdom, they quoted, in terms of praise, this general statement (a document at that time unique of its kind) of our financial administration.

all its public documents still exist. That which could only rest upon my word I have omitted. I might have said more, if my papers had not been sequestered, with all that belonged to me; they are in the hands of my foes, who have published no part of them. It is assuredly not to their kindness that I am indebted for such discretion. Had they found proofs against me, they would have hastened to bring them to light, were it only to justify their own violence. Thanks be to God, I have said enough. My readers may have found this history of my administration prolix and minute: I have now but two questions to put to them :

1st. The minister who, in the brief space of six years, and under the most critical circumstances, was engaged in such various subjects, with some degree of success, and without having, for an instant, lost courage, or the desire to promote the welfare of his country,—he who was ever eager for improvements, for reforms, and for the nation's glory,—could he have been a base Syharite, a vile courtier, a contemptible selfish egotist, an ignorant soldier taken from the royal stables, as his enemies have dared to represent him, while he kept a silence enjoined by loyalty, when the hand of his king set a seal upon his lips?

2d. Has Spain, before or since my time, under the circumstances similar to those of the epoch in which I acted a part—has Spain, I say, had many ministers who have done more, or even so much, for the country?

Called to a post which I had not solicited—to which I could not even aspire—the task imposed on me was, in truth, a difficult one; that of preserving the monarchy from the dangers which threatened it, both at home and abroad, owing to the French Revolution;—from these dangers I had the happiness to save it, with greater glory than redounded to any other European power engaged in the same contest. With respect to our internal dangers, they needed not the stake, the dungeon, or violence. I only resorted to gentle and persuasive means; the rein was never too strongly felt.

With such means alone I might have fulfilled my task, and deserved well of my king and country; but conscience tells me I did more. I almost regenerated Spain, without tumult or confusion; by degrees—at a slow pace, it is true, nevertheless, at a sure one. I prepared all the means of success; I created others; I neglected none that were in existence. It was in this progressive state that I left Spain when I resigned the ministry. She was free from revolutions, respected by France; sciences, arts, and literature were flourishing; agriculture was making wonderful strides; the great Spanish family of both hemispheres indulged the hope of a happy future, and cherished all the virtues which constitute the glory and the prosperity of nations. Nothing can tear from me these recollections, which, to this day, console my solitary old age.



## CHAPTER XLVII.

**I quit the Ministry and the Court (March 28th 1796).**

**IMMEDIATELY** after the peace of Basle (1795), I felt a wish to retire. I had listened to public opinion, and acted in accordance with it, both by waging war, and terminating it on honourable and advantageous terms. This was a double triumph; but the satisfaction I experienced was nevertheless alloyed by the murmurs of certain individuals who had least contributed to the defence of the common cause.

My crime, in their eyes, was not the conclusion of that evidently honourable and advantageous peace. I was guilty of being wealthy, and of receiving the rewards which Charles IV. had been pleased prematurely to bestow upon me. Was I then at liberty to reject them? Indeed I would rather have received them in gradual succession; but the King, whose perception and feelings were so quick, wishing to raise me to the highest station in the state, and viewing my loyalty as a guarantee for the security of his crown and of the country, was eager to load me with riches and honours. I had no alternative but to justify so much confidence and condescending kindness.

My duty was now to weigh in an even balance the rights of each ; to abstain from all partiality ; to disarm envy by recompensing the services of all, by equitably distributing the favours of the sovereign. Such was my conduct. A glance at the official gazette, as the acts of the government of that day, will bear me out. There never had been so many virtues recompensed, so many talents put to the test and called round the throne. I established no distinction between those who were more or less attached to me. I granted preferment only to zeal, abilities, and patriotism. This fact is so notorious that it would be superfluous to mention names. With regard to the acknowledged incapacity of some, the times were too trying to allow of their being raised to office ; but the incapables, though judiciously and wisely kept in the back-ground, found, nevertheless, as was subsequently experienced, the means of endangering, and even succeeded in disturbing, the public order. Those men actually wished that Spain had emerged with less glory from her struggle with France ; that the hostile battalions, crossing our frontiers, had imposed upon us a humiliating peace : then would those base and invidious traitors have exulted in my downfall. But the treaty of Basle bore testimony to my foresight and good policy. I will not assert that that policy, justified by its success, was exclusively mine ; but the system emanated from the whole council

of state. My detractors were not aware of the good understanding and harmony which had constantly prevailed among the servants of the crown; they calumniated the Author of the Peace. "It is infamous! treacherous!" Such was their language; nevertheless, my just resentment did not light upon those wretches. I never wielded the weapon of revenge; it was always repugnant to my feelings. The disasters which befell the other powers, whose policy was opposed to mine, afforded me an ample proof of the wisdom of the cabinet of Madrid, who withdrew most opportunely from a struggle, by which the enemy alone was the gainer. At last the country was saved; the government had worthily discharged its duty; nations hailed peace with loud acclamations. I besought the King to allow me to retire. This was my first application; but I had not the happiness to obtain the repose for which I longed. Charles IV., on the contrary, intending to befriend me, filled up the measure of envy by lavishing fresh favours upon me. Could I decline accepting them?<sup>1</sup>

In the following year my enemies redoubled their efforts and intrigues; some unconsciously,

<sup>1</sup> At that period, his Majesty granted to me, to be enjoyed in perpetuity, the Soto de Roma, by his royal decree, dated Sept. 27th 1795; previous to which he had bestowed upon me the Valley of Alcudia, paid for out of his own privy purse, which was to serve as a basis or appanage to the title of Duke, the first with which his Majesty was graciously pleased to honour me.

others intentionally : they were the instruments of the English cabinet, who sought to draw Spain into the league with Italy. The ties of relationship with the royal family of Naples, religious principles, so powerful with the Spaniards, their fidelity to the Holy See, my duty as a Roman Catholic,—in short, every thing was urged and appealed to : but I baffled this coalition. Firm in my determination, I scorned to advise the king to violate, without a motive, the faith he had sworn, and renounce inconsiderately the advantages he derived from his good intelligence with the French Government.

The whole council of state shared my opinion. Peace was maintained, and furnished us with the means of interfering on behalf of the sovereign Pontiff, of the Princes of Parma and of Naples ; whilst my calumniators accused me of being a partisan of the Republic and an enemy to the Church.

A few months after this, the Pope found himself engaged in another quarrel. It is well known that on this occasion, the minister of his Holiness (Cardinal Busca) abusing the confidence, and even acting contrary to the intentions of his sovereign, subjected us to numberless vexations, and endeavoured by every means to entangle us in a war. Charles IV. was obliged to recall his minister, Azara. What imprecations were then uttered against me ! Instead of the noble, frank,

and respectful letter which had issued from my cabinet, a spurious one, forged by enemies, and full of harsh invectives against the court of Rome, was circulated. And yet, at the same moment, the Spanish minister was officiating once more as a mediator, and averting the storm again impending over the Vatican! The united efforts of England and of the internal cabal, tended to excite against me the religious susceptibility of my countrymen. O how strenuously they exerted themselves to move this powerful lever! merely because I had thought of enlisting the Holy Office in the cause of tolerance and moderation, which alone could prevent fatal re-actions, of which other countries had just experienced the ill effects;—because I limited the unbounded power of the tribunal, by submitting it henceforward to the superintendence of the monarch, I, who was the supreme protector of the rights and liberties of his people, was called a heretic, an atheist! This was past endurance. Being too far advanced to retreat, and incapable of abandoning the interest of a country more than ever worthy, by its loyalty, of the solicitude of a paternal government, I begged once more of his Majesty the permission to retire from the ministry; and I forcibly insisted upon the necessity of his granting my request.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Let me not be charged with indulging in exaggerations for the purpose of raising my own merit. The observations contained

Charles IV., far from yielding to my entreaties, wished, on the contrary, to attach me to his

tained in the Epistle of Melendez on Calumny, may be considered as allusive to the crosses I encountered, and the calumnies with which my enemies endeavoured to alarm the religious zeal of the monarch. The epistle is an historical document. This is the passage alluded to (edition of 1797) :

“Will heaven always permit that virtue be trampled under foot? Shall the throne of error always weigh down my beloved country, so long the sport of false delusions? What! shall the zeal of that powerful minister, who so ardently desired to rekindle the almost expiring torch of public reason,—shall that zeal, already crowned by so many glorious successes, be unable to subvert that throne of darkness, like the sun whose vivifying rays enlighten and purify the earth? What! are all those who, burning with the love of doing good, dare advance towards the divine light, destined to swallow the bitter cup of persecution, whilst the ignorant and obscure calumniator, sunk in vice, the very scum of society, only worthy of contempt and oblivion, raising his brow girt with the brazen armour of insolence, claims the reward of that virtue of which he is the murderer?”

Then, after having named several illustrious Spaniards who have been calumniated and persecuted, namely, Columbus and Gonzalvo de Cordova among our ancestors; Ensenada, Olavidé, and Cabarrus among our contemporaries, he thus addresses his friend Jovellanos :—

“Thus, Jovino, my glorious friend, the honour and lustre of the Spanish toga, a perfect model of patriotism and generous sentiments; is not thy virtue obscured and denied? Gross ignorance and base envy are leagued against thee, but thy name becomes still more illustrious in thy humble retreat; and now I behold my prince, though seated at the summit of power, wounded through the heart by the envenomed sting of calumny. He bestows on the nation the sweets of peace, the object of so many vows and entreaties; a peace so nobly, so successfully obtained, imbecile ignorance imputes to him as a crime. He upholds the national dignity, which Italian hypocrisy attempted  
to

august family. He sought to deprive my enemies of all hopes of ruining me in his esteem, when they should see me raised above the reach of their attacks.<sup>2</sup> My marriage, as well as my appoint-

to lower, and his constancy is also imputed to him as a crime. If he desires that Cæsar be reinstated in his rights, which a foreign power, availing itself of the darkness of a former age, had seized upon, calumny accuses him of impiety. An anathema is denounced against him ! Perfidious charge ! Is it come to such a pass ? Merciful heavens ! shall we never be able to attempt a noble act without the venom of this stinging viper sullyng our purest intentions ? Are light and virtue incompatible ? Shall he who devotes and sacrifices himself with no other object but to benefit mankind, be perpetually calumniated ? ”

<sup>3</sup> The King, moreover, had always entertained the desire of granting to the children of his uncle, the Infant Don Luis, all the favours compatible with the situation in which the policy of Charles III. had placed them. But his Majesty would not depart from the system established by his father, which excluded all claims on the part of this detached branch to the succession to the throne. Don Luis de Bourbon, the only son of the Infant, had entered the church ; the two daughters had no other prospect than monastic seclusion, or allying themselves with persons of a rank inferior to the reigning branch. When I married Doña Maria Teresa de Vallabriga (the family name of her mother), Charles IV. authorized Don Luis and his sisters to assume the name and armorial bearings of their father, declaring, in behalf of these three, the title of Spanish grandee of the first class, transmissible to their descendants. I also obtained from his Majesty that the mortal remains of the Infant Don Luis, hitherto deposited in the church of San Francisco d'Arenas, without having been honoured with obsequies suited to the dignity of this prince, should be transferred to the Pantheon of the Escorial. The youngest daughter, my sister-in-law, Doña Luisa, who had no fortune, received an annual pension of 50,000 francs. The following is a copy of the original letter which I have accidentally preserved, and which was written to me at the time by the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo :—

“ Madrid,

ment to the premiership, had taken place in consequence of the express and absolute command of the King. Charles IV. gave directions for the celebration of the nuptials in such a manner that, at the very moment of its being forced upon me, the council was receiving the official notification through a special decree . . . . I obeyed on this, as on all other occasions.\* Time has proved the futility of the perfidious calumny to which I was a victim, of my having trampled under foot legitimate

“ Madrid, October 4th, 1802.

“ Dearest Brother:—None in this world are happier than we. We experience the good effects of your friendship and munificence. Luisa, the only one who had not wherewith to live suitably to her rank, enjoys now a competent allowance. You have procured it for her, and it is to you she is indebted for it, my dear brother. We enjoy the fruit of your labours and watchings. Accept the expression of my profound gratitude ; be assured that it shall be as everlasting as my tenderness for you. I incessantly pray to God for the preservation of your life and health.

“ Your sincere Brother,

“ To my brother, the Prince of the Peace.

“ LUIS.”

<sup>4</sup> Those who might be tempted to attribute this alliance with the royal family to my personal ambition, may give credence to the opinion of Don André Muriel, a writer who is not suspected of partiality towards me. Speaking of the favours granted by Charles IV. to the children of his uncle, Don Luis, and on the occasion of my marriage with the Countess of Chinchon (Doña Maria Teresa de Vallabriga Bourbon), he thus expresses himself:—“ On the occasion of the marriage of the Countess of Chinchon with the Prince of the Peace, proposed, or rather enjoined by Charles IV., this monarch authorized, by a royal ordinance, the children of the Infant Don Luis, his first cousins, to assume the name, armorials, and livery of their father,” &c.—Spain under the Kings of the House of Bourbon, additional chapter 9, vol. vi. page 391.



and previous engagements in order to re-enter the conjugal state. Besides this gross imposture, and others of the same nature, the more readily credited as they were the more grave and absurd, what schemes did not my enemies attempt for the purpose of ruining me! The last means resorted to had for object to inspire Charles IV. with fears derived from the very power and benefits he had conferred upon me. To talk to a King about the danger to which he is exposed from an ambitious subject, is an almost infallible method of ruining the latter. The impostors, who had at first stated as a fact that I was the object of universal hatred, now laid exclusive stress on my popularity, on my numerous friends among all classes, on the functionaries who were devoted to me, the grandees who paid me their court, the men of letters by whom I was surrounded, the applause with which the multitude hailed my approach, the affection of the army, my ascendancy over the troops of the King's household, the signal patronage which I granted to sciences and their progress, my vast projects of amelioration and reforms, which excited a fear of innovations dangerous to religion and the monarchy. . . .

These rumours reached the King, sometimes by means of anonymous writings, sometimes through subtle court manœuvres.<sup>5</sup> In order to confound

<sup>5</sup> I will give one specimen of that gossiping, the propagators of which were not deficient in a certain degree of cunning.  
Wishing

my enemies, and silence them, he appointed me colonel-general of the Swiss Infantry. It was

Wishing to quit the ministry, as I have already stated, I was, however, by no means desirous of causing my absence to be remarked or regretted, by promoting men of little or no influence, as has often been the case in other countries as well as in Spain. I had at first intended to secure the assistance of those who enjoyed a high reputation in the country, should the King persist in keeping me in office ; and, in case he should allow me to resign, I was anxious to leave to talented successors the care of executing what I had meditated or conceived, to raise my country to the level of the present age, and render it independent of all foreign policy. Satisfied with having induced his Majesty to acquiesce in the nomination of Jovellanos and Saavedra, I wrote to the former, acquainting him, in general terms, with the favourable intentions of the King, which afforded a scope for much good, without having recourse to any measure of violence.

“ With such a disposition in the Monarch,” said I, “ one may govern more efficaciously than France herself, with her democratic forms.” I thus concluded my letter : “ Come, then, my friend, and take your place in our monarchical Directory.” Jovellanos must have shown this letter to some false friend. (He delighted in showing my correspondence ; he even affected to praise the precision with which I expressed my thoughts, and a certain eloquence which he found in my style.) In whatever manner this indiscretion took place, my enemies turned it to account. This sentence, thus curtailed, and open at first sight to suspicion, “ come and take your place in our Directory,” reached the ears of the King. Charles IV. asked me if I could explain the real motive or foundation for this idle report ? I hastened to my office, and instantly brought the draft of my letter. I immediately besought his Majesty to demand the production, without delay, of the original letter of Jovellanos, who had arrived in Madrid. The King refused : he desired me to speak no more of the matter, either to Jovellanos or to any one else. Was Charles IV. fully satisfied with my explanation ? I believe not ; and he acknowledged it himself long afterwards. He now apprehended, for the first time, that amongst

assuredly the most striking proof of his unbounded confidence. There remained, however, some doubt on his mind : I perceived it, and I only became the more eager to obtain leave to resign.

At that time, the secret influence of the cabinet of St. James's encouraged the attacks of my enemies ; and, by a singular coincidence, the French Republic did every thing in its power to remove me from the ministry.

The famous declarations of the Count d'Entraigues, and of Duverne de Presle, led to the supposition that our Government favoured the projects of the French princes. In England much importance was designedly given to these declarations, with a view to exasperate the Directory against us.\*

the persons admitted to my intimacy, there might be some who would abuse my confidence, in order to compromise my character. For the rest, Charles IV. never doubted my loyalty.

\* The English ministry was then seeking at Naples, Turin, Rome, Blankenburg, and even Lisle, the means of plotting new intrigues, and of again embroiling us with France. As for the declarations of the emigrants, all that those unfortunate and incompetent men could allege, with any shadow of truth, was that Charles IV., after the peace of Basle, did not desist from sending considerable supplies to his relatives, and particularly to the Count de Provence, and that there existed a regular correspondence between the latter and his Majesty ; but, politically speaking, the faith of treaties was religiously kept with France. The Count de Provence only brought one single question forward, namely, " What will be the conduct of Spain, in case the Royalist party should happen to triumph over the Republic, and overturn the present French government ? " The answer of Charles IV.

To these imputations is to be added my unbending resistance to an invasion of Portugal by the

was candid and straightforward: "Spain is not the ally of France for the object of maintaining against the popular will the form of government which now prevails: Spain will not support a minority—a resisting minority—in case of a convulsion; and in no case, and under no pretext whatever, will Spain ever consent to the dismemberment of France. Should the legitimate Prince be called by a free and spontaneous national majority, the King of Spain is ready to lend that prince the support of his alliance against all internal and external enemies." The Duke d'Havré et de Croi was then in Madrid: he was the constant agent of those communications which were no ways hostile to France. My correspondence with the Count de Provence on that subject was long, undisguised, and always positive, without deviating from this line of policy. I received many letters from this prince; he often told me that the cabinet of Madrid was the only one whose conduct towards France and him was frank and loyal.

M. de Pradt, seeking every where, even in the very kennel, for filth to bespatter me, writes in his Memoirs, that at this time "I was intriguing in Paris to purchase the crown of France and place it on the head of an infant of the royal family of Spain. Such was," said he, "the interested motive of the peace and alliance which I had concluded with the Republic." Accusing me, on this occasion, of folly and perfidy, M. de Pradt was not aware that he was bestowing on me the highest praise. The following is a brief account of the case as it really stood. There existed in France, as every body knows, numerous partisans of monarchy, exclusive of the emigrants, who desired its re-establishment at any rate, with all its ancient prerogatives. Many persons, who had at first approved of the Revolution, wished likewise for a monarchy, and endeavoured to restore it; but in a modified form, and subservient to the laws. Amidst such conflicting opinions, the chief difficulty was to find a prince to whom the crown might be offered. The greater number gave their consent to the restoration of monarchy; but the fear of the former court-influences, and of the men of Coblenz, opposed the

French troops, as well as to the pretensions of the ambassadors, Perignon and Truguet, who demanded, in turn, the expulsion from Spain of the French refugees. It is rather curious to compare the unusual eulogium addressed to me by the latter, on presenting his credentials to the King, with the sally he indulged in against me a few days afterwards in a private and secret audience which he had solicited of his Majesty.<sup>7</sup>

the restoration as it respected the same parties. The truth of this was so universally allowed, that the chancellor Barthélémy, in treating of the peace at Basle with his former friend, the Spanish minister Yriarte, did not hesitate to mention the subject to him. "It is expedient," said he, "to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two nations, not only on account of their mutual interest, but also for the sake of the royal family of Spain, which might one day be called for by those who desire a monarchical government without the dethroned princes, and who fear the vengeance and re-action which would be consequent upon the return of those princes."

Undoubtedly the authority of M. Barthélémy is of far greater weight than that of M. de Pradt. I should not have been a faithful servant to my king, if such insinuations had not awakened my zeal. With respect to bargaining about crowns, I shall only tell M. de Pradt, that if there had been found for that of France a purchaser on the same terms which the Director Barras set upon it, the month of Fructidor, fifth year of the Republic, would have seen a Bourbon, I do not exactly know which, on the throne of his ancestors. . . . Barthélémy, on becoming a member of the Directory, had some misgivings of an event of this nature; but his hands were unsullied. Unfortunately, at the directorial board was seated Barras; in other words, cupidity and perfidy by the side of candour and the most virtuous disinterestedness.

<sup>7</sup> The first paragraph of his discourse was as follows:—  
 "Sire, the executive Directory of the French Republic, wishing  
 to

Was the first intention of this ambassador (Truguet) to win me over by compliments gratifying to my vanity? Did he soon afterwards receive new instructions? Was he himself won over by my enemies, through some occult denunciation against my policy? Was he offended at my reluctance to persecute that multitude of inoffensive refugees who lived peaceably in Spain? I cannot tell.\*

to maintain and consolidate more and more the alliance between the two nations, have chosen me for their ambassador to your Majesty. The guarantee of this alliance is not only to be found in our mutual interests, in our solemn and sacred engagements, it is also founded on the virtues of your Majesty, and the political talents of your prime minister."

\* In the same inaugural speech, after the obligatory tirade against England, Truguet, still exulting in the late triumph against the royalists and emigrants, proceeds in these terms:—"I shall not pollute this august ceremony by pronouncing in the presence of your Majesty the names of those deserters who carry along with them, and every where, the regret of having failed in their attempts to consummate the ruin of their country. Neither shall I mention, Sire, traitors who have served the English party by secret manœuvres. The government of the Republic has detected them in its own bosom: they have been punished and exiled. Your Majesty will, no doubt, make an example of all those who shall be designated to you; for they are the enemies of your crown as well as of the Republic. Sincere friendship, deference, loyalty towards our allies, generous valour against enemies in arms, contempt of traitors, and the desire of seeing them chastised,—such are, Sire, the sentiments of the French people and of their government; such likewise are the sentiments they expect from their allies."

This discourse seemed to impose it as a duty upon the King to become the associate or accomplice of the fierce party who had lately achieved in France the memorable exploit of the 4th of September. My Castilian pride took umbrage. I strictly  
confined

His conference with the King was sufficiently prolix, and even unbecoming. It exclusively adverted to the revelations of Duverne de Presle, to the intercourse supposed to exist between citizen Barthélémy and other members of the opposition of Clichy, and to the fugitives of the late Revolution who were supposed to be concealed in Spain.\* Allusion was also made to the political object I had in view by appointing Count de Cabarrus ambassador to the French Government. At last, Truguet again dwelt on the advantage of mutual relations and of a friendly understanding between the two nations, as also of my removal from the ministry.

Charles IV.'s answer was brief: his Majesty said that he was fully satisfied of the loyalty of his minister; that his removal, solicited by himself for the last two years, would, under present circum-

confined myself within the conventional laws between friendly powers; and expelled from the territory those individuals only against whom there existed strong proofs or presumptions that they were abusing the rights of hospitality. Those who withdrew (and they were but few) had themselves felt the propriety and necessity of such a step. No violence was committed. Many obtained the relief of which they stood in need.

\* There were some no doubt (I forgot their names) who sought a refuge in Spain. What civilized government, unfettered by foreign influence, could have denied hospitality or a free passage to men who were the victims of political proscription? Truguet pretended that many still remained in our provinces; he demanded that they should be given up; they had already left. . . . And had there been any, I would certainly not have yielded to this demand.

stances, be inexpedient. "It might be thought in Europe," added the King, "that the executive Directory, being less favourably disposed towards Spain than had been presumed, was desirous, in reference to the events of the 4th Fructidor, to arraign and condemn the minister in whom his Majesty reposed full confidence."

This storm blew over. Charles IV. related to me what had occurred ; he ordered me to keep my station, and to treat Truguet as before, without showing the least resentment, but with cautious dignity.

In the mean time, my enemies, apprised of the minutest particulars, redoubled their efforts and intrigues. They incessantly propagated injurious reports, and dealt out, in the palace, perfidious insinuations: they contrived to wound me in every possible way. Some came to repeat to me the rumours which were circulated: these very parties were the most strenuous in their efforts to injure my character. Their object was to make me speak out. None ventured to attack me face to face. The blows were dealt in the dark ; the hand that directed them could not be seen.

Charles IV., still hoping to keep me in the ministry, was foremost in concealing from me the scandalous remarks, the foolish imputations which he likewise contemned. For a moment, however, he felt real apprehensions. The scheme was well devised ; though seeming to praise my con-



duct, they inspired him with apprehensions, lest the enemies of the throne (and they were assumed to be numerous, and skilful in concealing their manœuvres), might mislead my zeal by provoking me to adopt extreme measures, of which the ill-designing would avail themselves, to convulse the state. On considering, in fact, the situation of Europe, I had opposed the reduction of the standing army; those furloughs which could be claimed as a right, were the only ones granted; the effective force still remained nearly at its full complement, owing to successive recruitings. Nearly all the new regiments, even those of volunteers levied during the late war, were still on foot, and since the conclusion of the peace, the raising of other regiments had increased the numerical strength of the army;<sup>10</sup> besides the two corps of observation, one of which, in 1798, I had stationed at Algesiras, and at the Camp of St. Roque, the other on the frontiers of Portugal, from the Guadiana to the Tagus; the sea-ports, as well as the northern and southern coasts, were secured from insult on the part of England. There

<sup>10</sup> I subjoin a list of the new corps that were preserved:—1st. The light infantry of Tarragona.—2. Ditto of Gerona.—3. Infantry of Jaen.—4. Light infantry of Barcelona.—5. First and second regiments of military orders.—6. Volunteers of Castile.—7. Volunteers of Balbastro.—8. Volunteers of Valencia.—9. Volunteer grenadiers of the state.—10. Volunteer riflemen of the crown.—11. Swiss infantry of Iann.—12. Spanish husards.—13. Carabineers of Maria Luisa.—14. Horse artillery.

still remained some troops without any fixed determination : I formed the project of collecting the latter into a camp of instruction, keeping them in readiness to bear on any point that might be attacked. This concentration of forces maintained discipline, the moral character and spirit of the soldiery. Charles IV. was made to believe that this was a dangerous measure. Itinerant military schools of non-commissioned officers, appeared useful to me ; I consequently wished to establish a few in favour of that subaltern class, which so powerfully contributes to decide the fate of battles. Cavallero pointed to the King's attention, that there were already several schools for officers and cadets, in Madrid, Barcelona, Cadiz, and Zamora ; and that it was by no means advisable to establish others ; representing my project of military schools as a dangerous innovation. Of this I was kept in ignorance.

One day as the council of ministers was discussing questions of economy, the solution of which was required by the embarrassments of the public treasury, Saavedra proposed to disband a part of the army ; provided, however, said he, that such diminution of the active force should not compromise the security of the country, which is of paramount importance. I instantly opposed it ; and spoke of the danger which threatened us : “ The English may occupy Portugal without our being able to prevent it ; France will renew her

pretensions of closing Portugal against England. If we are not in a condition to carry this object into effect, France will require that a passage be opened to her. On the other hand, if a general peace be not concluded (I had already laid stress upon this point on many previous occasions), and such a peace appears to me very doubtful, we are necessarily driven to the above alternative; and may perhaps have to contend against French and English at one and the same time. Who can now rely upon a solid peace? At all events, let us have a complete, warlike, and well-disciplined army, ready for any emergency, whether against France or England. Such is my motive for proposing to the King a measure, unfortunately rare amongst us, but useful and even under existing circumstances, indispensable. Let us exercise our troops without intermission; let them be inured to hardships; let us form camps of instruction with the disposable force. . . .” I was about to proceed, when the King interrupted me: “No,” said his Majesty, “the camps of instruction are of no avail.”

I remained silent; the other ministers did the same, and the council separated without coming to any resolution. In the course of the day I renewed my entreaties to his Majesty, beseeching he would grant me leave to resign. “You have been offended,” said the King, “at my reply in the council; you are still young; your ardour

carries you too far." "That is the very reason, Sire," I replied, "why your Majesty should substitute, in my stead, an old man, who will act with more prudence." "By no means," retorted Charles IV.; "but endeavour to follow the advice of your elders." "Accept my resignation, Sire, my resignation!" said I, laying particular emphasis on the word. "I have numerous enemies; any act of mine will be misinterpreted. At present, I stand well in public opinion; I have faithfully served your Majesty; to-morrow a misfortune may happen, which would assuredly be laid to my charge. Your Majesty is well aware that I have enemies." "You must take time to consider," answered the King; "for the present, I cannot grant your request; it would be said that your disgrace was occasioned by what happened at the council."

On each successive day I reiterated my instances, and earnestly entreated his Majesty to exonerate me, not only from the duties of a minister, but also from those of Major of the Body-guards. The King repeatedly desired me to designate the person whom I deemed most competent to fill my place: I named Admiral Mazzaredo, Offaril, Don Bernardo Yriarte, Don Antonio Porcel, Don Juan Perez Villamil, Don Eugenio de Llaguno, and I know not how many more, whom I thought likely to act in concert with Jovellanos and Saavedra. I even presumed to point out to the King the ne-

cessity of creating an office of the home department (fomento publico<sup>11</sup>); but the King rejected the suggestion, and would appoint none of the persons I had named. The phantom of a revolution alarmed him. Cavallero, of whom I am about to speak, was the man who had secretly gained an ascendancy over the mind of Charles IV.

I learned soon afterwards, through an indirect channel, that he had drawn up with his own hand the decree accepting of my resignation. Several days elapsed ere his Majesty would communicate it to me, in spite of my reiterated solicitations. "Why," said I at length, "why deny me any longer the repose of which I stand so much need?" Charles IV. then drew the decree from his pocket; a tear stood in his eye; he held out to me the hand of friendship; I took the paper; and the King, without uttering a word, withdrew into the adjoining apartment.

The Decree is thus worded :

"Yielding to your reiterated verbal and written solicitations to be relieved from the offices of First Secretary of State and of Major of my Bodyguards, I exonerate you from the duties of the said offices; I appoint *ad interim* Don Francisco Saavedra to the former, and the Marquess de Ruchena to the latter, to whom you will give up

<sup>11</sup> This idea was wholly mine; my very enemies approved of it; and towards the latter days of Ferdinand VII. they actually attempted to give it effect.

whatever belongs to either of these offices. You shall continue to enjoy the same honours, allowances, and emoluments, and free access to court, as heretofore; and I assure you that I am highly satisfied with the proofs of affection, zeal, and capacity which you have displayed during your ministerial career; I shall feel grateful for them as long as I live, and I will, under every circumstance, mark my sense of the same, as a reward for your signal services.

“CARLOS.”

“Aranjuez, March 28th, 1798.”

“To the Prince of the Peace.”<sup>12</sup>

I immediately repaired to the office of the Secretary of State. I embraced my successor, handed to him the ministerial documents, and received cordial and sincere proofs of the regard of all who were witnesses of this parting scene. A numerous retinue, unusual on such occasions, and far greater than when I was raised to the ministry, accompanied me to my own residence. They had shewn less eagerness to hail my rising fortune than to manifest their regret at my disgrace.

Many deplored my retirement: no one could reproach me with having injured him, either in his honour or in his interests. My very enemies

<sup>12</sup> The date was left in blank; it had to be drawn up in a different handwriting. This decree was textually inserted in the Gazette and the Mercurio of the day.

had no cause to complain. No fortress or prison contained a single victim or state prisoner. The black-holes of the Inquisition were empty ; peace reigned throughout the country. I had wiped away many tears ; no one had been sent into exile ; in a word, not a single person had been proscribed. There remained indeed many venerable old men, who had been banished during the preceding reign, and who were still groaning in exile ; these had lost all hopes of ever revisiting their country. The convulsions of Rome and of the whole of Italy had rendered more excruciating the sorrows of exile. One of the last decrees which I signed on the eve of my resignation, without consulting any one, recalled the Spanish Jesuits, who had the happiness to be restored to their families, and to enjoy in peace the sweets of domestic happiness.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Decree of the 11th of March 1798, communicated direct to the council of Castile.

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

Deplorable Influence of two Men who caused all the  
Misfortunes of Spain.

**DURING** my long career, I had enemies who more or less openly declared against me. I have not hitherto even uttered their names, whatever personal offences I may have had reason to complain of; all has long been forgiven. Being young, and invested with power, I readily forgave an insult which it would have been easy to repress. Such was my disposition; misfortune has not soured it; the experience both of men and things has only made me the more indulgent; but I cannot be so lenient to those who designedly endangered the honour and interests of my country.

In all countries, under any government whatever (I except none), the minister who is at the head of the state must expect his actions to be criticised. If the criticism be well founded, he will profit by it, and the state will be better governed; if it be personal and systematic, it is a salutary curb that restrains and keeps him in the right path. Such was my view of things. I carried toleration very far: my most inveterate detractors cannot deny it.

Therefore will the reader find in these memoirs no names stigmatised, except those of men who



have done a direct injury to the country, and who, whilst they were compassing its ruin and mine, have attempted to load me with the weight of their own iniquities.

Peace be to him who, from either good or evil motives, did not shrink from warring against me, no matter in what manner or at what period! I have already praised many, and shall have to praise more, who, though they evinced no good feeling towards me, were, in other respects, upright and useful citizens. But the miscreants who have dishonoured Spain, the real authors of all the evils with which she has been visited, those who, under the mask of loyalty, deprived me of the means of defending my country, and so far forgot all sense of shame, as to accuse me of having brought upon it the disasters of which they were the sole authors; from such will I strip the treacherous mask, and deliver them up to the impartial severity of history. There is neither noble-mindedness nor charity in leaving those depraved Spaniards unpunished.

For the present I shall only name two of the number: Escoiquiz and the minister Cavallero, who, from the year 1797 down to the catastrophe of 1808, exercised a baneful influence. The first, in particular, was the contriver and promoter of all the scourges which fell upon Spain in 1807,—scourges that have tortured this heroical nation up to this very day. The picture I shall endeavour to

draw, will be less calculated to prove the purity of my conduct, both public and private, than to expose the events and the men of that period. It is important to form a right judgment of both.

An entire forest becomes a prey to a conflagration; an unheeded spark set it on fire. The virus of leprosy has penetrated into the mass of the blood; it is fermenting there, and the patient does not even suspect as yet the existence of the poison that secretly undermines him. The disorder soon declares itself outwardly; the inflamed ulcer baffles all the powers of the medical art. The greatest calamities often spring from some oversight or omission, from some trifling circumstance which had escaped notice. What is termed fatality is nothing else. Alas! the infirmity of human nature! The long train of the misfortunes of Spain is connected with the existence and foolish vanity of an obscure and crafty priest. Oh! that he had remained unnoticed within the precincts of his cathedral, piously engaged in chanting vespers and matins! What brought this churchman to disturb the quiet of the court and royal family, by his diabolical intrigues?

I must trace the subject to its source: I shall assert nothing but that which Escoïquiz himself has spoken. Were it not for this explicit avowal, so well prepared before he uttered it, one might apprehend being reproached with calum-

niating him ; but it is evidently himself who, unconsciously, and while he meant to reflect great credit upon his conduct, loudly proclaimed his own turpitude. Cruelly injured by Escoïquiz, whose victim I became, I never could have suspected so much perfidy, had he not betrayed himself by his own indiscreet confessions.

The Prince of Asturias (afterwards Ferdinand VII.) had just reached the age at which he should be instructed in literature and the exact sciences. His august father entrusted me with the care of finding a tutor competent to finish the education of Ferdinand. Charles IV. wished, moreover, that this tutor should be a churchman. Amongst the numerous applicants who hastened to present themselves, I selected Don Juan Escoïquiz :<sup>1</sup> his appearance and prepossessing manners gave me a favourable opinion of him. He was one of my most assiduous visitors. I thought him a profound philosopher and an advocate for the progress of knowledge : he was eager to pre-

<sup>1</sup> The other tutors and teachers given to the Prince of Asturias, since I came to office, were Don Francisco Cabrera, Lieutenant-general Don Joseph Alvarez de Faria, and the Duke of San Carlos.\* Those who accused me of having selected men of no capacity, were foolish slanderers. If I committed an error in pointing out Escoïquiz, my intention was to supply his Royal Highness with an excellent tutor.

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\* The same who died a few years ago in Paris ; he was the ambassador of H. C. M. Ferdinand VII.

sent me with the homage of a small tract on the Duties of Man; and expressed a desire that this book should be adopted in the primary schools. Shortly after, he shewed me translations of two French books, designed for the instruction and improvement of youth; and he was at the same time engaged in translating Young's Night Thoughts. I made enquiries, and the most respectable testimonials agreed in representing him as a man of talent, genius, and taste; possessed of deep learning, refined feelings, and consummate experience. Nothing was wanting in the canon Escoïquiz;<sup>2</sup> it was a further recommendation that this man of so rare a merit was the object of persecution. His superior talents had excited envy, particularly among the men of his own calling. This persecution, considering the reports of the candid judges who represented his learning and moral qualifications, was, I do not mean to deny it, an additional motive to excite my interest in his favour. Escoïquiz possessed the art to fascinate the most penetrating observer. The proceedings then directed against him had no honourable source (as it was subsequently ascertained); he availed himself of the circumstance, and valued himself

<sup>2</sup> With respect to the learning and literary abilities of the Canon Escoïquiz, there was a great deal of exaggeration; his prose and poetical writings afford a sufficient proof of my assertion. Escoïquiz possessed no other talent but that of intrigue, with a strong dose of hypocrisy.

upon it.<sup>3</sup> This man was impenetrable; he could not be known at first sight, nor even after long observation. His appearance seemed to indicate the candour of a meek and grave christian philosopher; his look wore the expression of a calm and virtuous mind; his conversation announced a learned and unassuming man; his language and his promises bore the semblance of sincerity; he seemed to understand his duty, and to direct all his energies to its fulfilment.<sup>4</sup> Every one was mistaken in him. The priest Escoiquiz, whom I first appointed *Sumiller de Cortina*,<sup>5</sup> at last received the mission, the im-

<sup>3</sup> This priest, who so eagerly imputed to me human weaknesses, was then living, and continued to live to the last, in the most intimate connection with a woman, who, under the assumed name of a relation of his, superintended his household. This was the cause of an action brought against him, with all the reserve and regard due to his sacred character. The housekeeper and the two children, the fruits of this holy concubinage, have successively inhabited Madrid, Sarragossa, and Toledo, where every one had an opportunity of seeing and knowing them. His family, thus multiplied, travelled all over France; they resided by turns in Paris, Bourges, &c.

<sup>4</sup> From all that I have subsequently learned, I discovered that his noble deportment in public gave way in his private intercourse to a sad reality. With his equals and inferiors he affected an intolerable superiority; he required that all should surrender their opinions to his own. When he spoke to those who had an interest in keeping on fair terms with him, he rose to a height from which he would never descend; he spoke incessantly, and was the admiration of ignorant people.

<sup>5</sup> *Sumiller de Cortina*, an office in the interior of the palace, set apart for ecclesiastics. They are grooms of the bedchamber, wearing cassocks.—E.

portant mission, of cultivating the mind and forming the heart of the presumptive heir to the crown. "How happy should I be," said he, in my presence, "if, by teaching literature to H. R. H., I should succeed in making of my royal pupil the most humane of princes!"

Ah! Spain would have been too happy had the philanthropic wish of Escoïquiz been realized! But the egotistical preceptor sought to *humanize* his pupil only to serve his own selfish views; and what phantoms will not enter the mind, the wild and pensive imagination of an ambitious priest! The vain pedagogue was hardly invested with his new literary functions, when he looked upon himself as the equal of the Ximenes and the Richelieus. He fancied he saw before him the opening of a boundless field of glory and power, a prospect as extensive as his own opinion of himself was extravagant. In order to attain this object, he, from a simple humanist, set himself up, without the least scruple, as the political Mentor of his young disciple, and assumed the important mission of instructing him in the art of reigning. To captivate the heart of a prince, still in the years of boyhood; to mould him at pleasure; to inspire him with a mistrust of all around him; to excite and flatter his worst passions; to create obstacles with the view of rendering his own services indispensable; to lay the foundation of his ascendancy over the son, whilst he assumed an air of importance with his august

parents;—such were the schemes of Escoiquiz. He exerted thenceforth every possible means to oust me, in the hope of gathering in due time the spoils of my office. He, however, continued to manifest towards me all the outward signs of sincere friendship, until the moment of my retiring from court—an event which he had not so soon expected; for, being indebted to my patronage for his recent promotion, he still needed my support to establish his fortune on a more secure foundation. I never saw a flatterer more assiduous, more bold in praising me, whether in my presence, at the palace, or in society. Oh! that I could lay my hand upon that notable ode of twenty stanzas, entitled, *La Genetliaca*<sup>6</sup> which he presented to me,

<sup>6</sup> I only call it notable owing to its length. As to the matter, the poetical talent of the author is well known. For want of that document, I here insert the original advertisement (drawn up by Escoiquiz himself, and published in the Gazette), of the three works which he had dedicated to me: “ Our first-rate public schools are in want of elementary books adapted to the intelligence of children, and composed expressly for them, so that in learning to read they may acquire useful knowledge and solid and salutary precepts. The inconvenience attending the use of other books, filled with idle stories, and sometimes even with principles pernicious to youth, has attracted the attention of the Government, who, being convinced that the good or bad education of children is the source of the prosperity or decline of a state, besides various other means already employed to improve the education of youth, has appointed several competent persons to translate or compose works relating to this subject. The fruits of this beneficial measure have already appeared in the works published with so much success by Don Thomas Yriarte and others who have merited the same confidence.

with an air of extraordinary self-satisfaction, on the 1st of January 1798! He extolled me above all the heroes of antiquity, and placed me in Olympus among the gods! How great was his disappointment, when, three months afterwards, he saw me quit the ministry! He then imagined that the King had entirely withdrawn from me the confidence with which I had been favoured. Escoïquiz

dence. The overwhelming occupations of his excellency the Duke de l'Alcudia, the born patron of Public Education, as First Secretary of State, have not precluded his cherishing so important a design, as is proved by the work, intituled 'Treatise on the Duties of Man,' which, in order to contribute to so honourable an object, is inscribed to the nation by his Majesty's *Sumiller de Cortina*, Don Juan Escoïquiz. It is sold at the royal printing-office, with two other translations by the same author, the one entitled 'The Children's Friend,' written by the Abbé Sabatier; the other 'Elements of Natural History,' also written in French, by the Abbé Cotte; which are now in the press, and will be published without delay."\*

This advertisement, printed in the Gazette and drawn up by Escoïquiz himself, April 21, 1795, shows, first, his intention to lavish courteous praise upon me; second, the importance which he arrogated to himself on account of the works I had desired him to write; third, that as he was not yet appointed tutor to the Prince of Asturias, he had a violent desire to obtain that office. In his book, intituled "The Simple Idea, or a View of the Motives," &c., published in 1814, he affirms that this appointment was, without any solicitation on his part, conferred upon him.

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\* I have translated literally the Spanish text. It shews the style of Escoïquiz, and of many others of his countrymen. The Spaniards possess a beautiful language. It is like a magnificent pianoforte, which produces very harmonious notes. Unskilful hands elicit nothing from it but a discordant noise.—E.



was indebted to me for his appointment; he was my dependant; he trembled with the fear of sharing in my disgrace, and of losing that situation which afforded him the means of advancement. The usual preservative in a peril of this nature (though honour and probity hardly sanction its use), is known to every one; it is almost invariably resorted to at court, and that in every country, whatever be the form of government. To disowning the fallen minister—to reprobate his acts—to aggravate his errors, and even to invent fresh ones, with the view of compassing his ruin,—this is the way to keep afloat, and to remain in favour. Thus we daily see courtiers contrive to escape falling into disgrace. Under such circumstances, the wretch, Escoïquiz, whose fears magnified the danger, did not blush to degrade himself by an act of base treachery, which he himself states in his own book, when attempting, in 1814, to justify himself,<sup>7</sup> he boasts of having made against me the most energetic representations to the King and Queen, both verbally and in writing.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> "Simple Idea, or a View of the Motives of King Ferdinand VII.'s Journey in April 1808."

<sup>8</sup> It is wholly false that, in 1797, Escoïquiz had either spoken or written openly against me. All he did at that period was done clandestinely, with great caution, and by indirect means. After I had resigned, Charles IV. informed me that Escoïquiz had written and submitted to his Majesty's perusal a document or case, entitled "Note on the Interest of the State in the Choice of good Ministers."

The note was divided into two parts, and presented the contrast of two portraits placed in juxtaposition. The first, that of a

bad

Escoïquiz was ambitious and wicked, but he had little penetration, and likewise wanted tact; his very endeavours caused him to be mistrusted; he awoke the suspicion of august personages, and nevertheless thought that he had attained the summit of human grandeur, because Charles IV. accepted the dedication of his poem, entitled "The Conquest of Mexico." This favour, of which the King was never sparing, I had myself refused to grant him a twelvemonth before.\* Proud of

bad minister, clearly designated me under the most odious colours, though I was not actually named. . . . . The second, the perfect model of a great statesman, represented Escoïquiz himself—his name alone was wanting to it. He had also interspersed it with verses, after his own style. A dull and cold adulator of the supreme power, he inveighed against its ill-qualified servants, or rather against me. The public were not initiated in the mystery of those silly and perfidious insinuations which constitute the only patriotic zeal for which Escoïquiz takes credit in his book. He even ventures to say that his heroic sacrifices date from that epoch; a mere empty boast after the event! All that he then did or said was suggested by a fear of losing his place; he was indebted to me for it; he had been introduced under my auspices; he endeavoured to escape from a disgrace in which he feared to be involved.

\* In 1796 or 1797, Escoïquiz presented me with some cantos of his poem, and begged I would "do him the honour of allowing my name to be prefixed to the work, if I would excuse so much freedom." These are his very words. Some days afterwards I answered to him, that a man of his merit and known character ought not to confine himself to doing things for which he had to apologise; at the same time quoting to him these lines of Horace:—

. . . . . "nonum quo prematur in annum  
Membris intus positis; delere licebit  
Quod non edideris; nescit vox missa reverti."

This

the monarch's condescension, he became intoxicated with his good fortune, wished to raise himself still higher, and first found his way into the household. He succeeded in inspiring the young prince with a premature desire of being admitted into the cabinet council, in order that he might acquire practical instruction and prepare himself for holding power. This desire was represented to the King by the tutor as a happy suggestion originating with his pupil, and as the early fruit of virtues which gave great promises for the future.<sup>10</sup>

Charles IV. guessed the purpose of Escoïquiz. . . . After having on two or three other occasions caught this restless and dangerous priest in the fact, his Majesty removed him in a delicate manner, and appointed him a dignitary canon of the cathedral of Toledo.<sup>11</sup> The King always punished

This friendly advice very likely irritated his self-love, and was perhaps the cause of that implacable hatred which he bore against me. Time might have enlightened him on the merit of his poem. This poor composition was not even criticised; none took the trouble to speak of it; and I only know of one person, a French philologist, who has quoted a few lines of the "Conquest of Mexico:" this was M. Chalumeau de Verneuil, to whom Escoïquiz had taught the Spanish language, and who proved a grateful pupil.

<sup>10</sup> Ferdinand, born on the 14th October 1784, was then only thirteen or fourteen years old.

<sup>11</sup> This separation had been determined on in the Council of Ministers. The Prince's age did not allow of secret state matters being discussed in his presence, especially in the then critical situation of Europe. Besides, Charles IV. had not forgotten the severe lesson he had received in his youth for  
setting

leniently; he was even generous towards those who wearied his kindness.

setting up a similar pretension. He also was then Prince of Asturias, and could allege a better right than Ferdinand to obtain the favour he requested. He was no longer a child; still Charles III. was angry at the proposal. The son wishing to reply, the jealous old man forbade him to venture again into his presence. This lesson was ever present to the mind of Charles IV.

I do not pretend to determine the question whether this jealousy was politic or not. Kings generally think it necessary to restrain the rising ambition of the presumptive heir. For my part, I should rather approve of a Prince studying the art of reigning at a distance from the court; first in the pages of history, then in the provinces, and in foreign countries, and of his travelling without display; thus qualifying himself to govern at a future day the state of which he is as yet only the first subject.

On this point, however, each one may differ in opinion; but I am anxious to refute here a foul slander propagated by my enemies. It has been said that the Prince of Asturias did not obtain his admission into the Council, because I opposed it; that I designedly perverted his principles; that I affected to despise him; in short, that, through my influence, he became an object of aversion to his parents. I can take God to witness that those kind parents, imbued with the deepest sense of religion, neglected nothing that could tend to the happiness of this child whom they idolized; that they were lavish of their caresses to him; that, on the other hand, out of attachment to my august masters, out of regard for the interest of this young prince, whom I had so often taken up in my arms, for my own sake (here, at least, I ought to be believed,) as well as for my own future prospects, in short, for the good of the state, I carefully endeavoured to prevent any misunderstanding in the palace. Obscure malevolence endeavoured to sow discord, and attempted to lay the blame to my charge. It may, perhaps, be said that I was guilty of rashness, pride, and a foolish confidence, for remaining in so doubtful and dangerous a position. My answer is, that it was a continual sacrifice, pure devotedness,  
passive

Being absent from court, I was seldom seen at the palace. I may safely aver that I was one of the last to hear of the fall of Escoïquiz. But he did not hesitate to attribute it to my secret influence. His chimerical projects had vanished into smoke; he began cordially to hate Charles IV. and Maria Louisa,—meditated their ruin, and embittered Ferdinand's mind; it was he who taught him to count his father's days; the young prince was wounded to the heart. Escoïquiz implanted dreadful hopes in the still festering wound, which he for eight years irritated with diabolical skill. The wretch saw afterwards his hopes realized; the crown of Spain fell dishonoured; the stranger came and raised it from the dust. But let us not anticipate events.

Dismissed from the court, Escoïquiz went to conceal himself in the retreat which was assigned to him. He lived at Toledo in obscurity; but kept up a regular correspondence with his pupil, either by writing or through trusty agents, whom he had designated as safe friends. "At all events," said he, "whether death overtakes Charles IV., or I should re-enter office, or in case of an attempt being made (which some people pretended to fear),

passive obedience. I shall state, day by day, what took place. It will be seen that the chain of fatality kept me bound to the foot of that throne so much coveted by others. Let the impartial reader consent to follow me to the end, and judge from a knowledge of facts;—this is all I request of him.

these faithful friends would be ready to devote themselves to save his Royal Highness."

Thus the intrigues of a priest kept the palace in a dark agitation. An angel of peace, a messenger from heaven, when he fulfils the duties of his ministry, the churchman is often a mere incarnate demon, under the garb of religion.

The infamous Escoïquiz poisoned the finest portion of the existence of the young prince : during the spring of life, which a good son passes in the midst of innocent joys, free from ambition and care for the future ; the idea of ascending the throne does not occur to him ; sports and studies, the fond caresses of his parents, engage all his thoughts. Ferdinand did not enjoy this happiness ; instead of the lively and pure affections of his age, he felt nothing but fear and suspicion. The master seized upon all the moral faculties of his pupil, as an unclean insect sticking to the bud of a blooming rose, and binding it as with an indissoluble net, cramps its growth. Ferdinand, doomed at an early age to feel no affection for any one, was a prey to fear and dissimulation. His youth, his manhood, in short his whole life was passed in a state of uninterrupted suspicion ; he believed not in virtue, not even in that of Escoïquiz ; and at last the tutor received the due reward of the instructions he had imparted ; he died loaded with contempt, ejected, banished by his pupil. . . . What other return could he

expect, when, under the garb of a venerable apostle, inspired by heaven, he had taught the son to doubt the affection of his own mother, and made him believe that he was detested by her; that his father, the best of mortals, shared in that absurd and unnatural hatred?

What could be, on the other hand, the character of the prince? From his most tender age, the time when impressions once received can never be obliterated, he had been told that he was abhorred by the authors of his existence; that they preferred a stranger to him, surrounded him with perfidious snares, and only sought to blight his prospects, and deprive him of his crown! What

<sup>12</sup> It is notorious, that from that period,—nine or ten years before the scenes of the Escorial and of Aranjuez,—a degree of coldness was perceptible on the part of the prince towards his parents; not that he already conceived a profound hatred for the authors of his existence, but rather because he had been taught to believe that he himself was detested and despised by them.

All those who then frequented the palace know how Charles IV. and Maria Louisa loved him in his childhood; although they already perceived the precocious and unnatural reserve of their beloved child. The enemies of his august parents, and the most zealous partisans of the Prince of Asturias, have not denied this fact. But the malignant Escoiquiz, ever faithful to that system of calumny which was the basis and lever of his intrigues, has had the audacity to assert the contrary. In his pretended conversation with Napoleon, he boasts of having said to the latter. " . . . . With respect to the Spanish nation, who idolize their young monarch, who await his return with so much impatience, they hope that your Majesty will be his support, and stand to him in lieu of a father and a mother,

an infamous suggestion ! What an infernal method of sowing discord between the presumptive heir

mother, in whom he never found any other feeling than that of an unjust and unnatural hatred," &c. (Appendix to the "Simple Idea, or a View of the Motives," &c. No. 3, Explanatory Documents.)

Let it not be supposed that Escoiquiz spoke thus in the absence and without the knowledge of his royal pupil ! In the same Appendix, he relates with satisfaction, that on a certain day, at Bayonne, in the presence of the King and of his brother Don Carlos, he (Escoiquiz) addressed a long harangue to Napoleon ; that repeating the above-mentioned reasons in a more explicit manner, he endeavoured to move Napoleon by the consideration of the noble sympathy which he must have felt on beholding these unfortunate princes so worthy of compassion ; "orphans indeed, since their parents, whom they always loved and revered, had become their most implacable enemies." (Appendix, p. 175.) If Escoiquiz said all this publicly, in the presence of foreigners, of enemies, and of his royal disciple himself, what would he have said or suggested when he freely and secretly communicated with him ? Nay, these pompous words were subsequently printed in Madrid, in 1814. The new King read them without being shocked, in a country where the press never was allowed to meddle with state affairs, much less with the conduct of the royal princes. This libel ("Simple Idea, or a View," &c.),—which, under so modest a title, was published, with approbation and by authority, without the King or Government opposing the least obstacle to it—was not the result of sudden enthusiasm or thoughtless indiscretion, it was frequently reprinted ; the parents of Ferdinand were still living ! The cruel pamphlet reached its destination with many others of the same kind ; they were sent to Rome, to those illustrious exiles who were reduced to borrow the means of existence, in their deplorable solitude in a foreign land.

Don Juan Escoiquiz enjoyed at that time, great favour at the court of his crowned pupil ; the latter stated in the same book that his excellent preceptor had always directed his mind towards love, confidence . . . . Yes, but for whom ? . . . .

for



and the King, an old and infirm man, to whom no other consolation remained than that of being loved by his family, and of beholding peace in his dominions!

How atrocious must have been the rancour of that priest, who for ten successive years hatched his criminal plots, too leniently punished by the generous Charles IV.!

Thus much for the Archdeacon. Charles IV. had conferred on the ungrateful wretch this honourable and lucrative dignity, instead of inflicting on him exemplary chastisement."

Don Joseph Antonio Cavallero was one of those students, so numerous in Spain, who took all their

for the Infant Don Carlos, the Infant Don Antonio . . . Ferdinand also said that his tutor had constantly inspired him with the most tender affection for his brother, and the princes of his blood. (Page 13.) Escôiquiz wanted only one thing; and that was common sense. It is impossible to be more malignant, and at the same time more indiscreet and awkward, than he was.

<sup>13</sup> Until February 1799, the Comte de Chinchon, first cousin to the King, was only a dignitary canon of the same church of Toledo (Archdeacon of Talavera). Escôiquiz, at once appointed Archdeacon of Alcaraz, was therefore on the high road to honours and fortune. What rapid progress might he not have made, in his ecclesiastical or any other career, had he been willing to follow the right path! He had of course as much right to be ambitious as any one else. But my feelings are revolted at the odious method he resorted to in order to attain his object; he formed the design of dethroning the King, his benefactor, with the view of prematurely substituting in his stead the young prince, whom he hoped to rule at his pleasure . . . and he plunged the state into an abyss of misery.

university degrees, without having had an opportunity, or even the least notion of opening a single book on history, literature, or philosophy ; having no other knowledge of legislation but such as they picked up in old commentaries on the Roman law, whose minds had been exercised only in the disputations of schoolmen, or the wily practices of pettifoggers. His figure was most ungainly, being corpulent, short, and crooked ; his face, pale and unmeaning.<sup>14</sup> He had lost an eye, and in the remaining one there was an obliquity of vision. The inward man was the exact

<sup>14</sup> Cavallero drank much wine even between meals ; I have often seen him in a state approaching to inebriety some time after his dinner. His second wife, whose maiden name was Rocha, of a good family of Estramadura, who was much younger than himself, and in the service of the queen, as maid of honour, endeavoured to her utmost to keep her beastly husband at home, lest he should be seen in that disgraceful state, especially when he was about to repair to the palace. For the Spanish ministers reside in their own dwellings ; they transact business in the offices which are in the palace where the king resides.

Drunkenness is a vice almost unknown in Spain among people of a respectable class, and very uncommon even among the lower orders. But Cavallero, although of distinguished birth, was entirely deficient in good-breeding. His tastes and manners were vulgar. He continued, however, in the ministry from 1799 to 1808, being entrusted all that time with the seals of the department of justice ; and occasionally, during the same period, with those, *ad interim*, of the navy and of war. But for the revolution of 1808, Cavallero would still have continued in favour with Charles IV. and Maria Louisa ; on this subject, the Prince of the Peace is silent ; I shall elsewhere revert to it.—E.

counterpart of the outward. Cavallero was admitted into the magistracy through the recommendation of an uncle, an old officer, who had served in the campaigns of Italy, and prided himself upon pourtraying the deportment and preserving the costume of the military men of that period, in the recollection of which Charles III. took great delight. He thought this old soldier might make a good minister of war; the illusion soon vanished.

Unfortunately for Spain, his nephew, of whom I am about to speak, an attorney (*fiscal togado*) to the council of war,<sup>15</sup> finding his functions too harmless, sought power in another way. Cavallero, who was an ill-intentioned man, a ready tool of mischief, and an enemy to every virtue, never possessed a single spark of honour or generosity. The back door, at which he introduced himself, is never closed in palaces:—it lies open to spies and informers, the common pests in courts, whom all complain of, and yet all, even sovereigns themselves, encourage. For my part, I had blocked up the door. Nothing had penetrated through it

<sup>15</sup> *Fiscal*: king's attorney. *Council of war*: an administrative and criminal tribunal. It is one of the five great councils of the kingdom of Spain; which are the council of Castile, or royal council; those of the finances; of the orders of knighthood; of the Indies and of war. The latter comprises within its jurisdiction whatever relates, not to military operation, discipline, or administration, but the civil rights of persons belonging to the army, whose highly-valued privilege consists in having no other judges (*fuero militar*).—E.

for years. Cavallero succeeded in opening a passage a short time before my retiring from the ministry. By seeming to be a rigid enforcer of good order, and to discountenance factions, by grossly exaggerating the perils which beset the Government, the innovations that might endanger it, the treachery of public servants, the restlessness of some, the unseasonable projects of others, and by pretending to perceive snares every where;—by such manœuvres, joined to great apparent zeal, a man may succeed in his plans: he may circumvent and morally fetter those whom the height and solitariness of power prevent from distinguishing objects. At that period, the French revolutionary doctrines, as is well known, kept kings in perpetual alarm. Cavallero understood how to avail himself of that circumstance. If he had not acquired a full ascendancy over the mind of Charles IV. he succeeded in inspiring him with doubt, and even with mistrust. This good king, although he was not wholly swayed by his advice, listened to him more than once, conceived a favourable idea of his moral character, looked upon him as a man indispensable to him, and allowed him free access to his presence: he was a watchful observer, who acquainted him with the least irregularity in the movement of the springs of government. Cavallero had no sooner gained the King's confidence, than he made a merit of opposing every kind of

improvement. Such a task suited his taste and character. My administration created a more powerful sensation, and threw out a stronger blaze, especially during its second period, when the King placed me at the head of his land and sea forces; but this power was far less than what I exercised from 1792 to 1798; then my colleagues and all the councillors of state avowed their concurrence in my views; there was nothing to disturb our harmony. We were then strong; whereas, in later years, I was thwarted whenever I attempted to effect any good. Cavallero did not attack me openly; on the contrary, he bowed and cringed, while he secretly opposed my improvements and plans of reform; in short, he was more than once successful in his opposition; I could never succeed altogether in overcoming him. It has been my misfortune to be made responsible by my enemies, for the good which he prevented and the harm which I could not prevent him from doing; they pretended to believe that I had full liberty to act.

There exists, however, a letter of the minister Cavallero, which was written, I believe, from Bordeaux to Don Juan Antonio Llorente, and has been recorded by the latter in his memoirs. This letter, which is in other respects full of falsehoods, contradictions, and abuse, states, "that he maintained a perpetual struggle, in which he displayed all the address and cunning that were compatible with probity; . . . not to mention," he adds, "all

the harm which he thereby averted, all the good he did, and all that he could not accomplish." He concludes by saying, " that their Majesties were well aware of the opposition he had to encounter."

Now, who can mention a single act of generosity or public usefulness that originated with Cavallero? He does not adduce an instance; I will supply his omissions.

His first exploit was to oust Jovellanos from the ministry to which I had called him. On the 24th August 1798, that is to say, in less than five months after my resignation, Jovellanos was banished.

. . . . Who replaced him? Cavallero!

Had I the least share in this disgrace, which was a prelude to the downfall of so many others who were indebted to me for their employments and means of subsistence? Undoubtedly not, as Cavallero himself takes care to own in his above-mentioned letter. He asserts that when a successor to Jovellanos was appointed, I had neither power nor influence.

Another of his exploits was to crush the faithful friend of Jovellanos, for whom I had obtained the appointment of Attorney-General to the Court of Alcaldes (Fiscal de la Sala de Alcaldes de Casa y Corte).

The cunning and address which Cavallero boasts of having displayed, consisted this time in having given Melendez several commissions, in order to remove him from the Court; one of these commis-

sions was a wicked snare, intended to ruin him. Melendez's stoical virtue saved him ; but Cavallero, satisfied with having already brought his character in question, appointed before-hand a substitute (Don Francisco Lopez Lisperguer), who soon took his place. Melendez was thus, through an abuse of authority, and without any cause or pretence, compelled to retire upon half-pay, (jubilado).

I shall not here enumerate all those whose patriotism and knowledge I had rewarded by appointments, in the various departments of the administration, the colleges, or the seminaries of nobles. Cavallero carried his system of turning out public servants to very great lengths, and did not even spare persons of the highest eminence. Previously to my retreat, I was desirous of seeing Don Gonsalo Offaril, then inspector general of infantry, appointed to the ministry of war. To prevent his attaining a station of which he was worthy, Cavallero hastily, and without necessity, had him appointed minister extraordinary to the court of Prussia. The office of inspector was provisionally given to another person. Don Juan de Langara, minister of marine, was dismissed from office. Cavallero caused the seals of this office to be united with those of the war department. My uncle, Don Juan Manuel Alvarez de Faria, an old general officer, whose services had been very meritorious, and who was the minister of the last-

mentioned department, met with so many disappointments, that I myself advised him to resign in September 1799.<sup>16</sup>

Don Miguel Asanza, viceroy of New Spain, who discharged most honourably the functions of that high office, was compelled by Cavallero to give in his resignation.

The minister Saavedra, though he was not considered as one of my partizans, was subjected to every kind of mortification.

His successor for a time was Don Mariano Luis de Urquijo, who owed his preferment to patronage far beyond the reach of Cavallero's influence. However, the latter, by associating himself with others, succeeded in crushing Urquijo.

It would be tedious to enumerate all the events which marked my absence and the power of Cavallero, who had become omnipotent at court. His malevolence did not confine itself to opposing me, and persecuting my friends. Being unable to comprehend that beyond the very limited range of his ordinary studies, there might be learning and talents which should be turned to account; he was an avowed enemy to every kind of im-

<sup>16</sup> Charles IV. gave him a public testimonial of approbation for his long and meritorious services. The Golden Fleece was conferred upon him, as well as an influential appointment in the council, with a stipend and all emoluments, &c. attached to such an office (*Casa de Apposento*), and an exemption from paying the first fruits, were conferred upon him (decree of September 4, 1799).



provement. Nearly all my plans and arrangements for perfecting the system of public instruction, though bearing the impress of prudence, and only requiring, for their being carried into effect, the formality of the sanction of the Council of Castile, were frustrated by this wicked man. If any were persevered in, it was only, as was afterwards apparent, with a view to persecute and stigmatize the authors of them. Many persons of merit atoned, by the loss of favour, for a superiority which gave umbrage.

Far more wicked than devout, he employed the clergy as tools for the purpose of impeding the progress of science and literature. As far as in him lay, he removed all those who, under my ministry, had held the highest dignities in the church, and employed none but ignorant and decrepit nonentities. Would to God he had done no worse! But he unmuzzled the Inquisition, which I had had so much difficulty in keeping within due bounds. In order more effectually to wield this terrible engine without the King's seeming to have abdicated his prerogative in favour of the Holy Office, Cavallero managed in some way to amalgamate the civil with the ecclesiastical power. Charles IV. too readily believed that the altar and throne thus united would more easily repel the attacks of their enemies, who were, he was told, powerful in numbers. Had

<sup>17</sup> I will enlarge upon this subject elsewhere.

the reign of Cavallero lasted longer, the church itself, the tribunals, and all the learned bodies engaged in the business of education, would have been *purified*: Spain, moulded by Cavallero, would have gone back a whole century.

This man has done infinite mischief to his country: I occasionally succeeded in preventing his doing all the harm he wished, when I again obtained access to the King; but some evils were beyond the reach of remedy.

Escoïquiz secretly, Cavallero more openly, laboured to form and increase that powerful party which, after having subverted the throne of Charles IV., rivetted the chains of Spain, and tyrannized over her for so long a period.

## CHAPTER XLIX.

*Policy of the Spanish Government after my Resignation.—  
Fresh attempts on the part of England and other Powers to  
draw us into the Second Coalition.—Probabilities of Success.  
—My Successors, instead of modifying the System, maintain  
it and carry it still farther.*

IN the conduct of the Spanish Cabinet, after the peace of Bâle, and our alliance with the Republic, required to be more fully justified, I would only refer to the religious fidelity with which my successors followed the system of policy which I had deemed it my duty to adopt. Indeed, the peace and alliance were maintained, contrary to the suggestions and repeated efforts of the cabinet of St. James's, and of several other powers, who had entered into a new coalition against France, in 1798 and 1799.

Had I committed an error? Had the whole Council, in conjunction with me, taken a wrong course by assenting to both treaties? Nothing would have been easier than to retrace our steps. A reviving coalition threatened the directorial government. Let us consider the situation of Europe.

Naples, Piedmont, Austria, a part of the Empire, England, Russia, and even Turkey, formed a powerful league.

The General who, in the course of a few months, had conquered Italy, was then in Egypt.

The Executive Directory reigned only by the terror of the bayonet. The disaffected were numerous.

The king of the Two Sicilies gives the signal, and Rome is entered by Ferdinand IV. at the head of 60,000 men. The Austrian General Mack, renowned for his military skill, has pledged himself to conquer.

In Piedmont, Charles Emmanuel was preparing for fresh campaigns.<sup>1</sup>

40,000 Russians, 60,000 Austrians invade Italy. The conqueror of Ismailow, the famous and savage Souvaroff, commands that multitude of soldiers, and is opposed only by 20,000 French, scattered here and there, and in need of every thing.

The nations of Italy rise in a body against the Republicans.

30,000 Russians of the grand reserve arrive from Galicia; Korsakoff is at their head: the Condé emigrants proceed to join him. Hotze, with 30,000 Austrians, protects the march of Korsakoff. The Archduke Charles leads a force of more than

<sup>1</sup> A proclamation of the Sicilian Government contained these menacing expressions: "The Neapolitans are marching to victory under General Mack; the tocsin is about to ring from the summit of the capitol. Death to the common enemy! We proclaim to Europe that now is the hour of rising. Unfortunate Piedmontese! shake off your chains, and with them smite your oppressors!"

100,000 men ; another considerable body is preparing to reinforce Souvaroff or the Archduke, in case of need.

An Anglo-Russian army, composed of 30,000 Muscovites and 15,000 English, invades Holland and threatens Belgium.

The Neapolitans are backed by a dense multitude of auxiliaries, Sicilians, Russians, Germans, Tuscans, Portuguese, Poles, and Turks. The standard of the Cross, the Eagles of the North, the Portuguese Quines, the Ottoman Crescent, the banner of the Holy Virgin, all wave promiscuously. Nelson, the conqueror of Aboukir, occupies the Bay of Naples. He embrues his hands in blood.

Calabria and Apulia also rise; the celebrated Cardinal Ruffo, vicar of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the dreaded Fra Diavolo pursue their triumphs. The Republicans of Parthenope are cut to pieces.

Genoa is in fermentation ; the English blockade the harbour ; Klenau blockades the town from the land side.

Admiral Keith keeps the French and Spanish squadrons blocked up in the roads of Brest.

Only a twelvemonth before, the French were masters of the whole of Italy ; Souvaroff drove them away in less time than Buonaparte had taken to conquer it.

The defeats of Pasturana and of Novi lay open to

Souvaroff the frontiers of France, whose weakened and repulsed battalions can hardly defend the rocks of the Apennines and of the Alps.

The victorious shouts of the Russians rouse Switzerland. Souvaroff obtains another triumph ; the Helvetic barrier can no longer protect France.

At this critical emergency, Spain is assailed at once with threats and promises. England offers her subsidies ; Portugal her troops, with Russian auxiliaries to cross the Pyrenees. Spain persists in her amity with France. The landing of an army of English, Muscovites, and Portuguese, in order to force her to join the coalition, was a likely event.

Spain remains deaf to all proposals ; despises all menaces, and the autocrat Paul I. declares war against her ; she remains unshaken, and faithful to her treaties of peace and alliance with the French Republic.

Who was then minister in Spain ?—Saavedra ! Saavedra : the same who, ten years afterwards, being minister of the Central Junta (in 1808), signed the manifesto in which I was charged with having been the cause, the main-spring of all the evils which afflicted Spain, by signing the peace of Bâle, and the treaty of alliance with the French !

What prevented Saavedra, his colleagues, and the council of state from breaking this alliance, from waging war against the Republic, on the point of

sinking under the overwhelming number of her enemies ? On quitting the ministry, I had left ninety or a hundred thousand men ready to take the field, exclusive of militia ; and England offered money !

What, I say, prevented Saavedra from altering his system of policy towards France ? The same reasons which had actuated me, when I was at the head of the cabinet . . . Assuredly not my personal influence ; no one will dare to say so. I had withdrawn from public business ; my enemies were exulting at court ; they directed the Government. France herself had contributed, by her solicitations, to remove me from the ministry. The Directory had declared against me : no one, therefore, consulted my opinion ; and if I had been consulted, I would have undoubtedly approved the opinion of those who would not break the treaty of alliance with the Republic. . . . They soon found it was the wisest course.

After a first check, the Moscovite hero gave up the contest, execrating the Austrians, the coalition, and that unfortunate war in which his glory had lost all its former lustre.

Souvaroff was compelled to abandon Germany and Italy ; Buonaparte returned from Egypt ; the conflagration was rekindled ; gigantic battles were fought, which secured new triumphs to the Republic ; the whole continent sued for peace. The Queen of Naples, who had been the firebrand of

discord, looked to Russia for support and mediation with the new French chief.<sup>2</sup> Paul I., in whom so many princes had placed their hopes, being dissatisfied with Austria and the English, became the friend of Napoleon! The fruits of this coalition were reaped by France only; she

<sup>2</sup> In June 1796, the mediation of the cabinet of Madrid had averted the storm which threatened the reigning dynasty of Naples. An armistice, obtained with difficulty, was signed by General Buonaparte and Prince Belmonte Pignatelli. The consequence was an honourable peace between the two governments, which cost no sacrifices; thanks to the intervention of our cabinet. Queen Caroline was then sending her portrait, set with diamonds, to the conqueror of Italy; at the foot of which were read these words: "*à l'Amitié, à la Reconnaissance!*"

In 1801, less confident of obtaining the same result through the good offices of Spain, Queen Caroline presumed that, as the First Consul endeavoured to conciliate the friendship of the Czar, she might once more save her kingdom through the mediation of Paul I. She embarked at Palermo in the severest weather, and proceeded direct to St. Petersburg. This long peregrination was not without its utility. Paul dispatched to France his great equerry, who carried on the negotiation. Many have said, and it is not incredible, that it was Napoleon who, either in person or by means of his confidential emissaries, had pointed out this indirect course to Queen Caroline. The fact is, that the Russian great equerry was extremely well received both in Paris and at Naples. The armistice of Foligno, and afterwards the peace of Florence (March 28, 1801), were the consequences of this diplomatic pilgrimage. The second treaty was not, however, so advantageous as the previous one of the 10th October 1796. The king of Naples was forced to renounce all his possessions in Elba, in the presidencies of Tuscany, and in the principality of Piombino; binding himself, moreover, to close all his ports against England, and to receive, under various pretences, French garrisons in several parts of his dominions.



aggrandized her dominions, and found herself much better off than after her former struggle. The latter had been of shorter duration.

I have praised the foresight of the ministers who averted from us an useless war, and the calamities with which Europe was incessantly scourged until the peace of Luneville; but I cannot understand the error which my successors soon after committed. Far from profiting by the example which I had set them, they were too obsequious towards France, and flattered her at the expense of other cabinets friendly to Spain. We had no right to take upon ourselves the office of censors. The government of one essentially differs from the government of many; for it must be more cautious, and should be more circumspect in its words and actions. This dignified reserve on the part of a monarchical government, was requisite to allay the pretensions of the French Republic. When we renounced the coalition, we had just motives for so doing; we were free; but those who were still engaged in the struggle not having acted offensively towards us, we could not assume a hostile posture against them. They were our ancient friends and allies; they had a claim to our sympathy, our good wishes, at least as long as they gave us no reason of complaint. The treaty I had signed with France was lying before them. With how much care had I not contrived that our good understanding with the Republic

should not lead to a rupture with the powers which still carried on the war.

After I quitted the ministry, this line of conduct was not persevered in; my successors went much further than I had done. The political and monarchical dignity of Spain was often wantonly compromised during those three years, from 1798 to 1801. I will only quote a single instance. Paul I. declared war against us because we were on friendly terms with France; he published a manifesto in every respect worthy of that crowned Don Quixote, and distinguished by the improper and bombastic tone which he assumed towards H.C.M. This is the literal preamble of Charles IV.'s answer:—

“ The scrupulous fidelity with which I have endeavoured, and will endeavour to maintain the alliance I have contracted with the Republic, and the ties of friendship and good understanding which unite the two countries, and are cemented by the evident analogy of their mutual interests, have excited the jealousy of certain powers, particularly since a new coalition has been formed, whose real object, under the chimerical appearance of restoring order, is, in fact, to introduce disorder, by treating despotically the nations that do not concur in their ambitious views. Among these powers, Russia has made herself conspicuous. Her Emperor, not satisfied with arrogating to himself titles which in no wise belong to him,

and manifesting thereby his own selfish views, probably because he did not experience on my part so much condescension as he expected, has just emitted a declaration of war, the mere publication of which is sufficient to expose its obvious injustice," &c.

This preamble, in which language and politics are equally disregarded, is levelled at all the belligerent powers. It is not enough for the Spanish Government to stand forth as the friend of the Republic; it attacks all other governments, including those who still kept up friendly relations with us. Was this a proper and laudable policy? The French Directory could not have used more offensive language.

All who read those long and taunting phrases, saw nothing in them but a desire to pay a base compliment to the Republic. And after they were uttered, it was said of me, that I had dishonoured Spain!—that I had submitted her to the French dictatorship! Gracious heavens! when I retired from public life, to seek repose in a private station, I at least left the national honour unsullied, and Spain beloved and respected by the whole continent.

And my enemies—I can never cease repeating it—have dared to impute to me the faults, errors, and blunders of three successive years, during which, being a complete stranger to both the internal and external administration, I was exposed to the attacks even of France and of England,

because I had allowed neither to impose upon us her domineering pretensions! It has already been seen within what narrow limits I had succeeded in confining the former of these powers as long as I held office. I here adduce other facts, which may serve as additional grounds of comparison.

After the peace of Bâle, the arrival of the first ambassador of H. C. M. in Paris was enthusiastically hailed. It would not have been surprising, nor even censurable, if the inaugural speech of the Marquis Del Campo had been rather laudatory, under these circumstances, when the ancient alliance between the two nations was about to be re-established. Yet this harangue, previously composed in my cabinet, is confined to three or four phrases, remarkable for circumspection :—

“ The happy restoration of peace between the King, my master, and the French Republic, is an event of the highest importance to both nations. His Majesty, actuated by an ardent desire to maintain that peace for the benefit of his people, will take the utmost care to avoid any thing which might endanger it. On appointing me his ambassador to the Republic, the King ordered me to repair as soon as possible to my new destination. It is a pledge of his good faith and his earnestness. Honoured with the confidence of my Sovereign, I obey his orders with a respectful zeal. I shall be too happy if, in fulfilling the

noble intentions of his Majesty, I secure the good will of the Government I have the honour to address."

The speech contained neither more nor less, as may be seen in the public newspapers of Paris and Madrid. The presentation took place on the 31st of March 1796.

Let us now refer to the speech of the new ambassador who succeeded the Marquis Del Campo, June 29th, 1798. (Saavedra was then minister.)<sup>a</sup>

"Citizens Directors:—Appearing for the first time before you as the ambassador of his Catholic Majesty, I shall not repeat what is well known to you—what is notorious. It were useless to remind you that the King, my master, is your first ally—is the most loyal, the most useful friend of the French Republic; for if alliances and good faith be founded on relative interests, never were two nations more intimately united than France and Spain; there is no dispute between us on the subject of territory; our common friends and enemies are common to both; the ruin of Spanish commerce would, sooner or later, entail ruin upon French commerce. The moral character of the Sovereign I have the honour to represent is a guarantee for the punctuality with which he will fulfil his engagements; his probity will be the pledge of a frank, loyal, and open friendship. The nation

<sup>a</sup> Don Joseph Nicholas de Azara, of whom mention will be made in the course of these memoirs.

whom he governs is known for its nice sense of honour: it is your friend, and has been so without rivalry for a whole century; the changes which have taken place in your Government, instead of weakening that union, can only tend to add daily to its strength, for our common interests and our very existence are dependent upon it.\* I have been an eye-witness to the exploits of the French in Italy, and I now come to admire more closely the wisdom by which they were directed. Having been so fortunate as to be elected to fulfil this mission, I shall be instrumental to a more intimate intercourse between the two nations; and if my conduct has

\* It is difficult to believe that such a speech was ever uttered by the representative of a monarch, the next of kin to the French dynasty, dethroned and put to death, were not this strange document recorded in the Paris journals, had not our official Gazette reprinted it. It excited the indignation of the monarchs of Europe. Those phrases were freely, spontaneously uttered; they could not even be excused on the plea of fear. Spain was condemned to read them in her official journals, from which it even appeared that we were proud of having used this degrading language. How many worthy Spaniards hastened to my residence to express their grief at reading it, and to remind me of the time when I directed the cabinet! Nevertheless, the minister Saavedra, who subsequently held an eminent station in the Central Junta (1808), dares to call me an *infamous traitor*,\* for having assented to a treaty of alliance with the French Republic against England. "This alliance," says the manifesto before-mentioned, which Saavedra signed as well as others, "was the first origin or cause of all the evils which afflicted Europe! . . . *O pectora cæca!*"

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\* Manifesto of the Junta.

occasionally merited the approbation of the Directory in critical emergencies, I hope that my character will never belie itself," &c.

This speech gives rise to many reflections: 1st. The minister who succeeded me, and whose patriotism was afterwards so loudly proclaimed, knit much more closely than he ought to have done, more than was necessary, the bonds of the alliance which had been entered into with the French Republic, under my administration; but which was negotiated with a noble dignity, and without the least particle of cringing adulation. By this harangue, solemnly spoken in the face of France and of Europe, the minister Saavedra endeavoured to meet the complaints which the Directorial Government had preferred some time previously, because they had found me little disposed to yield to their demands. 2d. This political creed, or sentimental declaration, whatever it may be called, was addressed in the name of the august Sovereign of Spain and the Indies. His Majesty was made to say that the changes which had occurred in France, instead of weakening our union with it, could but daily cement it more closely. Whether this declaration was a mere act of courtesy on the part of our Government, or was enjoined by the Directory, it was no less degrading to the King of Spain in the eyes of the other sovereigns of Europe. The Directory required it; Saavedra had not the courage to

resist : his weakness is proved by the answer given to the ambassador Azara's speech.<sup>5</sup>

" Sir," said the President of the Directory, " when mutual esteem conciliate two neighbouring nations that are equally brave and generous, it is a pleasing task for their governments to draw closer the bonds which unite them. Be pleased, Sir, to assure his Majesty the King of Spain, that in return for the sentiments he has manifested towards the Directory of the French Republic, his Majesty will always find them faithful to their engagements, and eager to promote the prosperity of the Spanish nation as well as the personal happiness of his Majesty. As for you, Sir, the regard you have shown for the French on trying occasions, has endeared you to the numerous friends of humanity: it is with a lively satisfaction that the Directory avail themselves of the present opportunity to express to you their gratitude in a solemn manner, and in the name of the Republic."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Don Joseph Nicolas Azara.

<sup>6</sup> Any one doubting the accuracy of the French journals which give a report of this speech with affected exultation, may be referred to the Gazette of Madrid of the 22d June 1798. Don Francisco Saavedra did not conform to the rule which I had imposed upon myself, and to which I had scrupulously adhered as long as I was a minister, of submitting matters of consequence to the cabinet or state council. Don Juan de Langara, secretary of state of the marine department, and my uncle, Don Juan Manuel Alvarez, who was intrusted with the war department, have both assured me that they were apprized of this diplomatic ignominy through the Gazette. Jovellanos was then a minister, and the intimate friend of Saavedra. Was he better



These unworthy methods of cementing our alliance with France being once adopted, the policy of Saavedra and of his substitute and successor, Don Mariano Luis de Urquijo, were a servile continuation of that course of conduct.<sup>7</sup> One false step brings on another. From that moment the Republic had only to express its wish. Fortunately the Directory disdained to take advantage of the facility of our obsequious and complying cabinet.<sup>8</sup> Buonaparte soon appeared, and was received with open arms.

better informed? This point I have not ascertained, and will give him the benefit of the doubt. But what I do know is, that the same Jovellanos, whom I so cordially raised to the ministry, and recalled from banishment, having become, as well as Saavedra, a member of the Central Junta of Spain in 1808, signed jointly with him, the manifesto in which the epithet *infamous* is applied to me, which I never can forgive, because I had (not of my own will, but with the unanimous approbation of the council of state) concluded a treaty of alliance with France. That alliance was, during their short ministry, renewed and strengthened with inexcusable meanness. It is very painful to me to have to repeat these charges; but a just resentment is my apology. These facts can never be too often brought forward.

<sup>7</sup> Don Mariano Luis de Urquijo, first clerk in the department of foreign affairs (ministry of state), appointed to take the place of Saavedra during his illness, the 17th August 1798. Saavedra's health having improved for a short time, Urquijo was on the eve of setting out as ambassador from his Majesty to the Republic of Holland; but the minister again fell ill; Urquijo discharged his provisional duties until February 1799. Then only was he appointed minister, *ad interim*. Saavedra definitively left the cabinet.

<sup>8</sup> In order to judge of the subordination or servility of these two ministers, in their dealings with the Republic, we need only glance at the French journals of that period; our official Gazette agrees

Many of those who then exercised sway considered his arrival as the end of all calamities. He

agrees with them in commending the union of the two cabinets. See a passage of the *Moniteur* of the 21 Vendemiaire an VIII. (13 October 1799). "The Spanish squadron was at Brest; the commander in-chief, Don Joseph Mazarredo, furnished with the most ample powers, was authorized to take measures in concert with the French Government, and to dispose of the squadron. Such extensive powers were never before intrusted to an admiral." Mazarredo united with the military command all the powers of a plenipotentiary and extraordinary ambassador.

In reality, the Directory showed moderation. They might have availed themselves of this extraordinary act of condescension. The united squadron was only employed for objects mutually useful to the two countries. The Directory was less delicate upon other points which affected the generous character and the dignity of a free nation.

There were in Spain a great number of French refugees, who were generally inoffensive. I had protected them against the unjust persecutions of the Directory. Urquijo consented to their expulsion on the first demand of the Republican government. He went farther, the sacred right of asylum, and of a free passage, a slight temporary favour always readily conceded to political exiles by magnanimous monarchs and independent governments, was violated in Spain to please the Directory. The giving up of many of these unfortunate men will not be easily credited; it was, however, ordered. We here subjoin an official note of Urquijo, addressed to the ambassador of the Republic, 4th September 1799, textually copied into the *Moniteur* of the 3d Vendemiaire an 8:—

"Citizen ambassador:—In replying, on the 2d instant, to your letter dated the preceding day, I had the honour to inform you of the rigorous measures taken by his Majesty, as soon as he was informed that some of the rebels who disturbed the tranquillity of the Republic in the southern departments of France, had introduced themselves into Spain, in the direction of Arragon. Conformably to the above-mentioned declaration, they are all to be delivered to the nearest French authorities, in  
order

overturned the Directory, restrained Jacobinism, and offered peace to the world ! How readily all indulged the hope of a happier futurity ! How welcome was this man, who became the universal and irresponsible heir of the power and ambition of the Republic !

I had left our army on a respectable footing ; it was more than ever needed to repel the threatened attacks of England, and especially to insure respect to our alliance. We disdained to be the humble servants of a neighbouring state ; but were determined to be a free, independent, self-controlling power. Well : this army, for I must state the fact, was reduced to half its effective numbers, ill clothed, ill paid, in consequence of miscalculations and wrong financial measures. Fortunately there remained some flying or detached camps which I had established along the coasts. A handful of brave men defended Ferrol, when attacked by superior forces. The English being repelled at Dofinos, were compelled to re-embark. What might not have happened if, being less engaged in Egypt, and on their own shores, they had not relaxed in their attempts against us ?

order to suffer the penalty they have merited." Urquijo proceeds in the same strain :—"The King's government, out of pure zeal, has issued orders to the chiefs of certain frontier provinces. You will perceive, in the exercise of these means, the constant aim and care of his Majesty, who wishes to promote to the utmost the welfare of the French Republic, and the stability of its government."

With regard to France, we felt secure in the faith of treaties ; it was not to be supposed that the new chief would either take unfair advantage of, or violate existing engagements.

The dangers and misfortunes with which the future was pregnant, were unforeseen by the statesmen of that period.

## CHAPTER L.

Finances and Public Credit, from 1798 to 1801.

It is in the highest degree unjust and absurd to impute to me the calamities which, amidst the general conflagration of Europe, fell to the share of Spain, in consequence of oversights and errors committed without my co-operation, or my having the power to prevent them.

It has been generally said and believed that during that period, I continued at the helm, and that no opinion, no will but mine prevailed ; that, in short, I was answerable for every thing, in consequence of having exclusively possessed the confidence of King Charles IV.

I avow that, from 1792 to 1798, my power was great, so much the greater, as all my colleagues, and all the other councillors of his Majesty were willing to act in concert with me, and there was uniformity of will. This perfect unanimity was attended with as favourable results as circumstances permitted.

But does not the line of policy adopted by my successors from the beginning of 1798, which was in many respects contrary to that which I had followed, or expressed an intention of adopting,

prove, beyond a doubt, that I had no longer any share in the administration?

Recalled in 1801, and becoming again connected with the Government, without, however, taking a seat in the cabinet, my power once more appeared boundless, but it was in reality precarious, indirect, and thwarted in every quarter. The responsibility ought not, therefore, to rest upon me alone. This truth shall be made manifest by numberless proofs in the second part of my reminiscences.

Let us first take a short review of the three years during which it is a matter of notoriety that I had nothing whatever to do with the management of public affairs.

The disordered state of our finances from 1798 to 1801, can in no manner be ascribed to me. Far from my having, either directly or indirectly, contributed to it, every thing was done in opposition to the principles I had laid down, and in contempt of the rules I had established and maintained during the six preceding years.

I will not censure the intentions of the minister Saavedra, nor even those of the men who, after him, wished to realize his projects and his system of economy. No one ever doubted the disinterestedness and purity of intention of his colleagues or his successors.

I am, however, justified in censuring some fatal theories, the application of which plunged us into

an abyss, either through want of experience, or because regard was not had to the national spirit, manners, and prejudices, in which it was impossible to introduce a too sudden change.

Precipitation, a rash and misplaced confidence, and the still-increasing embarrassments of the period, overturned the resources of the state. This disorder still continued, when, in 1801, I was again doomed to undertake fresh duties, which I found it impossible to escape.

When I was prime minister, in 1792, the financial department was not strictly within my province ; but I was president of the cabinet. Thanks to the excellent spirit which animated my colleagues, and to the happy conformity of our views, there were no false measures, nor any misunderstanding between us ; progressive improvements were effected, though by slow degrees. Thus, the motion of the hand which points out the hours is unperceived, whilst going its round.

These were the objects at which we aimed, and which we partly accomplished : not to aggravate the general distress by the imposition of new taxes ; to draw as little as possible from the capital embarked in trade, whereon depends the labour which procures to the poor man his subsistence ; to favour agriculture, which is the basis of the existence of all ; to encourage the useful arts, and even those that administer to luxury ; and to open wider and safer channels to commerce.

These were, in our opinion, the solid means of increasing the revenues of the state, and diminishing the public debt. Until then, judicious loans, proportioned to our resources, had extricated us from our difficulties. We had maintained war against France, and did not shrink from that which England had just declared against us.

At the same time we had it in contemplation to strengthen the public credit by other mortgages, and other assignments of the funds especially appropriated to the payment of the old and new debts, without neglecting the sinking fund. After having, to the best of our power, met these engagements, and repressed, or, at least, restrained speculation, we had improved the revenue, and were not in the least alarmed at the fluctuations in the rise and fall of the currency, which were occasioned by the chances of war. No one had reason to complain. All the engagements of the public treasury were faithfully discharged.

In order to secure the public credit, men of the most eminent talent, and our best economists, were incessantly at work, and submitting their views and projects to the examination of the council of Castile. The practical knowledge of the council of finances, and of the state council, were also put in requisition. When I left the ministry, it was agreed and determined that a sufficient sum should be set apart for the liquidation of the royal vales, by substituting in their stead a less burdensome debt at



a lower rate of interest, without oppressing any class. On the contrary, all were to find their advantage in it, and the public wealth was to be greatly benefited by this measure.

The plan consisted in the sale of every kind of property belonging to foundations or pious donations, patronages, lay impropriations, and other establishments of the same kind. The proceeds deposited in the sinking fund were to pay off the annual interest of three per cent. of the value of the property sold. This measure, for the due execution of which we relied on the discernment of the council of Castile, besides its immediate object of diminishing the public debt, was intended to take away a large proportion of landed property from negligent and short-sighted usufructuaries, who, not being themselves able or willing to cultivate or improve the land, let it to farmers who had only a transitory interest in the property. To bring it into the market, divided into lots which were within the reach of purchasers of the slenderest means, was to create a crowd of real proprietors, and consequently to increase the produce or the common mass of wealth.

The titular possessors of estates, scarcely productive in their own hands, gained thereby the secure enjoyment of a clear interest of three per cent. A still greater advantage accrued to the country. The interest of three per cent., substituted for that of the vales, already produced a

material decrease, and the public debt would have been liquidated by degrees, either by means of the sinking fund, or with the proceeds of the property withdrawn from mortmain.

This extensive operation, while it gently diminished the burdens of the treasury, was attended with another advantage, the putting a stop to stock-jobbing, an evil which is no less pernicious to morality than to public credit.

I was, however, of opinion, that the sales for account of the state should be limited to the sum absolutely requisite for the liquidation of the royal vales, so as to exempt the treasury from new issues, which are always burdensome. I deemed this restriction a proper one, on the following grounds: 1st, In order to check the increase of the new debt, so long as a contrary course was not imperatively called for by circumstances; 2d, To preserve hospitals, infirmaries, charitable institutions, &c. from all risk, seeing that in the event of the situation of Europe becoming more critical, and of the difficulties of the state being further aggravated, the non-payment of the three per cent., and, perhaps, the consequent insolvency of the treasury, would endanger the existence of these establishments, the last resource of the unfortunate.

I was not the only one of that opinion, and I gave it in writing.<sup>1</sup> Another measure was proposed for

<sup>1</sup> General Rule.—All property should be alienable, with the exception of that which is necessarily set apart for the main-

liquidating the royal vales, putting a stop to stock-jobbing, and bringing a great mass of wealth into circulation. This plan consisted in allowing the alienation of civil entails, the proceeds of which were to be deposited in the sinking fund, subject to the charge of three per cent., to be paid to the titular possessors of the entails disposed of.

tenance of the church and charitable institutions, and that which belongs to the high nobility. The power of alienating property was always, in my opinion, a condition in the absence of which our country could never emerge from the state of misery in which the major part of the population has languished for so long a time.

I am, however, of opinion, that the state would lose nothing by securing, inalienably, certain portions of land to useful establishments. Such a course would be both advantageous to us and honourable. Now, as the least fluctuating revenue is that which arises from landed property, the existence of those establishments should be secured, on this imperishable basis, by the grant of lands, houses, &c. But a restoring government ought to restrict the accumulation of inalienable property; without this precaution, there will soon be a monopoly of landed property, which will only tend to foster foolish prejudices and idleness, the parent of all vices. In such cases the government has a right to act peremptorily whenever the treasury is in difficulties. . . . Such was our situation during the period of my ministry; we tried gentle remedies. . . . I write for the public. . . . If any one were to reproach me with partiality towards the high nobility, I would answer, that in all governments, even in republics, some benefit has been derived from a class of patricians or of families connected with historical associations, the existence of which class, if properly constituted, proves a safeguard to a state, and serves as an embankment to restrain by turns the popular waves and inordinate ambition. As for monarchies, a body of nobles is essential to them; without such support they degenerate into a spurious democracy, void of energy and virtue, which soon falls a prey to despotism. Instances of this may be found in ancient and modern history.

It did not appear to me that this measure would be so productive as some people affirmed. Besides, I should have opposed it even on this ground alone, that it would have been improper to expose the possessors of entails to the necessity of alienating their property, and thus render their future existence contingent on the chances of the public debt.

A third plan was proposed, which was intended to consolidate the vales by a system of progressive redemption. The guarantee offered for the liquidation of the public debt was to be the property of the clergy, which body would have its exclusive control and management.

That was a good idea, as it secured a high value to public stock, the revenue of the clergy, independently of the voluntary gifts of the faithful, amounting to double, almost treble, the revenues of the state.

Many ecclesiastics relished this plan, either from a patriotic feeling, or a wish to be exempted from the frequent subsidies demanded of the church, and especially to prevent the sale of those superfluous estates which it was proposed to apply to the relief of the treasury.

Others saw with pleasure, in this shifting mode of proceeding, the means of securing to the regular and secular clergy a control over the administration.

But this project would, in reality, have been attended with serious disadvantages. 1st. It was

to be feared that, morally speaking, the burden would be too heavy. Was the clergy possessed of sufficient discernment and talent, or of sufficiently uniform and fixed principles, for carrying through so complicated, so extensive an operation? 2d. Fortune, or rather the existence of the state being committed to the clergy, would not this body be tempted to enslave the Government to its will in regard to the management of internal and foreign affairs?

I had a favourable opinion of the plan, provided the King had a right of interposing and superintending it, not with a view to his exercising an absolute control, but for the purpose of preventing his giving up the reins into other hands, and being led blind-fold.<sup>2</sup> In the discussion of these several plans,

<sup>2</sup> This project was very favourably received in 1799, but failed on account of the exorbitant demands of the clergy; not, as Don Juan Antonio Llorente inconsiderately affirms, through the intrigues and manœuvres of the five great commercial companies (*Cinco Gremios Mayores*). Among the conditions demanded by the Ecclesiastical Junta that was deputed to treat of the matter, one was, that the decimal rents in kind on that part of the tithe which went to the King should be wholly disposed of. Circumstances by no means warranted the treasury in surrendering that branch of the public revenue. We had just been engaged in the unseasonable and rash attempt to form a discounting bank. The circulating medium was gradually and irrecoverably disappearing, and there remained only paper money, while specie was wanted for providing, at a reasonable price, the requisite supplies for the army and navy. The decimal rents were the best resource of the treasury to meet the exigency. This was the motive of the rejection of the proposed plan. We should in vain ascribe it to any other cause.

one consideration was of paramount importance in the opinion of Saavedra, who, in order to repress the speculation in the royal vales, was not only desirous of punctually paying off the interest and of extinguishing that stock, but wished to have an office always open for discounting it, on the application of those who were really in want of specie.

Saavedra was not deficient in talent. Yet he did not perceive the danger of assimilating a sinking fund to an ordinary bank, without having stock, or a sufficient quantity of cash to meet all demands. This minister thought that by promising to pay, and by acting at once up to his promise, all distrust would be allayed; and the vales would immediately acquire the same value in ordinary transactions as they possessed when presented at the office, where they were to be discounted by Government. Such was his opinion, notwithstanding the difficulties of a maritime war, which was particularly burdensome to the commercial class. This class necessarily included many persons desirous of being reimbursed; not to mention the incurable mistrust of others, the avidity of speculators, panics, the chances of war, and, in short, the pernicious influence of the agents and partizans of England on the value of our public funds.

I have already dwelt elsewhere on these matters; but it is proper to revert to them in this place, in order that my readers may compare the period when I was minister with that when my

successors adopted a different and even a contrary line of policy.

I subjoin a summary of their financial operations. The first measure, which was an appeal to national patriotism, was adopted a few days previously to my resignation, in consequence of the continual expenses of the war, and other pressing necessities. Two subscriptions were open in Spain and America. The first was for a voluntary gift in hard cash, or in gold and silver articles; the second for a loan without interest, voluntary likewise, and to be reimbursed by the state in ten instalments, each of them payable annually, commencing from the second year after the conclusion of the peace. Such was the object of the royal ordinance of the 17th June 1798. This official document expressed, according to custom, the monarch's desire not to impose new taxes upon his people. The King and Queen were foremost in setting the example of patriotism. Their Majesties gave up half of the allowances in specie which they received from the treasury. There were reductions in the salaries of the attendants upon the royal family. The Queen sent a portion of her jewels to the mint. Half of the King's plate, and that of his chapel, was devoted to the same purpose. The loyalty of the people was roused by the monarch's voice; every one gave according to his means. Those who had no money offered their estates; some possessors of entails solicited permission



W. Kent. Sculp.

*Maria Louisa.*  
*Queen of Spain.*

*Maria Louisa*  
*Reine d'Espagne*





to sell them, if the King would accept the value as a loan. These offers were accepted; in consequence of which the King's Ordinance of the 24th September 1798, was published, which allowed of such sales for the benefit of the state, securing, at the same time, to the owners an interest of three per cent. on the amount of the sale. This interest was to be paid within the stipulated time, and the heirs-at-law of the entails were to receive the interest on the very day on which, in the natural order of events, the possession would have devolved to them.

Every possessor of entails, substitutions, &c. was allowed an unlimited power of selling his property, and investing it in the treasury, at the rate of three per cent.; which interest was to be reckoned from the day the respective sums in specie were deposited, and was to be paid out of the sinking fund.

The next day, on the 29th September, two royal ordinances appeared: the first enjoining generally, and without exception, the deposit in the public coffers, or in the sinking fund, of all legal deposits, for which three per cent. interest was to be paid, reckoning from the day on which the deposits were made, until that on which they were to be withdrawn, conformably to the decision of the tribunals; the second, applying the above ordinance to all property sequestrated in consequence of bankruptcies, but at the same rate of interest, and on the same terms.

There was another royal ordinance, which appro-

priated to the sinking fund the property and income of the six great suppressed colleges of St. Bartholomew, Cuença, Oveido, the Archbishop of Salamanca, Santa Cruz de Valladolid, St. Ildefonso, and Alcala.

These properties were sold, and an interest of three per cent. reserved for any future destination to which that source of revenue might be applied.

All the remaining property of the Jesuits, whatever might be its present use, was applied to the relief of the finances, owing to the actual wants of the state, a reservation being made, in favour of third parties concerned, of an interest of three per cent. derivable from that property.

Then followed a royal ordinance laying a fresh duty on legacies to collateral heirs, or such as were not akin to the deceased.

On the same day another royal ordinance was published, which required the sale and deposit in the sinking fund of the proceeds of all landed property belonging to infirmaries, hospitals, charitable institutions, brotherhoods, pious foundations, lay impropriations, with a reserve of three per cent. in favour of those who were dispossessed, and a special mortgage on all revenues and capitals then appropriated to the sinking fund, and others which might in future be applied to the liquidation of the public debt.\* The reverend

\* The plan which I had previously recommended, and explained in writing to the Council of State, when the disposal  
of

bishops and prelates were, in this ordinance, called upon to favour the sale of collective benefices, (capellanias), and all others within their jurisdiction, &c.

The simultaneous publication of these ordinances, which involved so many interests, and promised numerous resources, revived the credit of the vales, which immediately rose from seventeen to thirty per cent. Thus was it attempted to restore public credit, with a view to procure a loan, of which the Government stood in need, until the called-for resources should become efficient.

Ere a month had elapsed, a royal ordinance, published on the 17th of October, called for a second loan of four hundred millions of reals (a hundred millions of francs) to be supplied in four years, at the rates of four, five, five and a-half, and six per cent., according to four series,

of the landed property of these institutions was discussed, came again under consideration. My opinion, although supported by several members of the council, produced no other effect than the insertion, in the regulations of the sale, of the 29th clause, which was perfectly nugatory. It ran thus: "The sale of the above-mentioned property shall proceed in regular order. Those belonging to brotherhoods, pious foundations, and lay impropriations shall be sold first, to prevent confusion in the successive sales; next, those of infirmaries, hospitals, and charitable institutions, unless, as it is expressed, purchasers should come immediately forward to secure certain estates belonging to these establishments, in which case such estates will be forthwith sold by public auction." However, this article subsequently enabled me to save some of the estates which were entitled to form an exception to the rule.

to be selected at the option of the lenders, until they were fully reimbursed. In order to create a competition, there were prizes in money and in annuities. The revenue derived from American tobacco was added to other mortgages, and declared free of all charge. This loan was also effected without any difficulty.

After the lapse of a few months, other measures were adopted with regard to the property belonging to religious foundations. A special junta was created to direct this operation.\* Funds were immediately wanted to fill the public coffers, and restrain speculation ; it was attempted to turn the royal vales to account.

On the 13th of January 1799, another ordinance of his Majesty confirmed the right of selling entails and substitutions, by depositing the proceeds in the public coffers, at an interest of three per cent. and in consideration of a premium of the eighth part of the price of sale, to be allowed to the possessors of the entails. The granting of this premium was held to be an immoral act, both on the part of the government offering and of the party accepting it. There were persons, however, whose

\* This Junta was composed of a president, Don Antonio Despuig, archbishop of Seville ; of four ministers, two of them, Don Joseph de Vilches and Don Domingo Codina, belonging to the Council of Castile ; of one from the Council of the Indies, Don Juan Gonzales de Pineres ; one from the Council of Finances, Don Manuel Sixto Espinosa ; and two Secretaries, Don Rodrigo Gonzales de Castro and Don Balthazar Godinez.

greediness for money induced them to dispose in this manner of their patrimony.

As for religious foundations and charitable institutions, &c. nothing was left untried to accelerate the sale of them throughout the kingdom ; the royal vales were taken in payment, though a preference was given to specie. The vales, however, were received as money, at two-thirds of their nominal value. Each estate was sold separately ; large ones, when practicable, were subdivided, either to favour the purchasers or to increase the number of landholders. The sales were free from the duties of Alcabala, fines, twentieths, &c. The judicial duty was also lowered. Purchasers were allowed two years to make good their payments, if none were found to pay ready money.

A royal ordinance of the 15th of February of the same year, extended the term for purchasing redeemable or life annuities on the revenue derived from tobacco, a fourth part of the money lent during the reign of Philip V. being taken as ready money.

On the 17th of March, a royal decree required the deposit in the sinking fund of the fifth of the capitals existing in money, or in corn stored in the communal depôts or public establishments. On the 8th of April another ordinance created a new loan in royal vales of 53,109,300 piastres, from the 10th instant, in two issues, the one of 44,257 vales of 600 piastres, with the same formalities as in former cases, and an interest of four per cent. con-

formably to the royal ordinance of the 20th of September 1780, published in the reign of Charles III. The object of this twofold issue was to meet the payments and negociations of the public treasury. These last vales were declared legal tender. A general panic arose; the vales were refused by every one; the fear of being compelled to take them caused an advance in the price of provisions, and especially in the value of specie. To the payment of the interest were appropriated the ancient revenues of the state, the mortgages and other stock destined to the same purpose. These united resources were deemed adequate to meet the annual interest of the debt. This interest then amounted, according to a strict calculation, to eighty-seven millions of reals, and twenty-five maravedis,<sup>5</sup> or about twenty-two millions of francs. The surplus of the revenues and mortgages, as well as the proceeds of religious foundations and donations, &c. already sold, were to be applied to the gradual extinction of the vales. The royal ordinance mentioned other resources as having been joined to those above-mentioned.

The difficulties of the treasury daily increased. It was thought proper to alter the course of management. The junta to which the general direction and control of the finances had been entrusted on the

<sup>5</sup> Thirty-two maravedis are equivalent to a real of vellon, and four reals of vellons to a peceta, or the fifth of a piastre of five francs and a fraction of centimes.

11th of January of the same year, was suppressed. A decree of the 6th of June restored the sinking fund to the same footing as at the time of its original foundation, in conformity with the royal ordinance of the 16th of January 1794. The Council of Castile was commissioned to propose to the King new regulations and economical measures for putting a stop to speculation and for consolidating the debt. All the estimates, plans, labours, and documents of the junta were transferred to the council.

In conformity with its report, seconded by the three attorneys-general (fiscales), his Majesty issued the decree of the month of July, wherein the council and ministry, with the best intentions in the world, and in accordance with the most brilliant theories, completely perplexed and overturned our financial system. Without any regard to the intellectual state of Spain in matters of public credit, the nominal value of the paper money was declared real and effective, with a difference of six per cent. in favour of specie; every contract wherein it should be stipulated that payment was to be made in gold or silver, to the exclusion of royal vales, was strictly forbidden; any payment in vales, with a discount of six per cent., was declared legal and valid. Judges and notaries were forbidden, under pain of forfeiting their situations, to attend to claims for payment in specie only. Every negotiation for the payment of vales beyond the prescribed



limit, was made punishable with confiscation ; and one-half of the sum, respecting which information was given, was to be the reward of the informer.

Industry, agriculture, commerce, were successively paralyzed.

What were the measures adopted to revive them?

Banks were established in the principal cities, to provide for the deficiency of specie : an offer was made to discount the vales when a case of necessity could be proved, to facilitate the circulation by means of notes payable to bearer. The amount of these notes was not to exceed the amount of specie.\*

What means, what resources were available for the establishment of those banks? The forming or realizing of a capital of 495,000,000 of reals, of which 165 were in specie, and the rest in bank notes.

How was this money procured? Government furnished a tenth part of the sum required. The remaining nine-tenths were collected by means of voluntary or forced subscriptions, every one being bound to contribute in proportion to his means, throughout the kingdom. The royal ordinance required that the whole sum should be collected within a month of its publication.

These shares, and various sums, could not be realized. Each one contributed more or less

\* Those cities were Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Malaga, Bilbao, Corunna, Alicant, Carthagena, Valentia, Santander, Pampe-luna, and Majorca.

according to localities and individuals, though every where with reluctance ; 33,000 shares were required to make up the desired capital.

What were the advantages offered to the shareholders ? Four per-cent. interest for the vales, whilst they remained in the bank ; and in respect of specie, the enormous premium of six per cent., to be deducted from the nominal value of the paper-money, and added to that progressive interest.

Nothing was left untried to attain this object. The government itself declared (royal ordinance of the 18th November 1799) that these banks were the sheet-anchor of the state, and could alone revive the public credit, and avert the ruin of commerce. It employed all imaginable means to organize and establish them . . . . unlimited confidence, full and complete liberty in the exercise of their functions, a power to indicate any resource which might appear suitable, a solemn promise to turn those resources to the best account, and to sanction every measure which would not be obviously opposed to the good of the state. The following is a list of anticipated concessions :—

1st. All the specie arising from assignments appropriated to the liquidation of the vales, which remained suspended until the secure establishment and circulation of the discounting chests.

2d. One-half of the funds coming from America.

3d. An annual and general contribution levied

on hired servants, on mules and carriage-horses, on inns, eating-houses, coffee-houses, confectioners, public-houses, wine and spirit-merchants, perfumers, licensed gaming-houses, hosiers, cloth and silk-merchants, cutlery, fashions, foreign provisions, and all articles of luxury.

4th. The proceeds of a tax on the titulars to royal appointments, who were to pay a third of the actual income of those offices, according to an estimate that should be made.

5th. An extensive lottery, with various prizes, namely—four of two, three, and four millions of reals, payable in ready money; 16,075 shares of annuities, on favourable terms, and with facilities for investing them. The price of a ticket was to be four reals (a franc and a few centimes). The total amount of the prizes was twenty-five millions of francs, or a hundred millions of reals.

6th. The proceeds of a duty of a fourth of a real (rather more than six centimes) laid on each *fanega* of corn, valued at a piastre (five francs), lying in public and other stores.

To check the overflow of the vales, with which the discounting banks were threatened, the Government endeavoured to find employment for the paper-money. The sale of landed estates, pious foundations, lay impropriations, &c. was accelerated; and by a fresh regulation, out of many of the same kind, every one was allowed to redeem with vales the charges with which his property was

burdened. The vales thus employed were no more brought into circulation. The public treasury kept them back, and paid the owners three per cent. interest until the capital could be reimbursed.

All calculation respecting the receipt and re-issue of monies had been made for the year 1800. But there was a deficiency of three hundred millions of reals (seventy-five millions of francs). The Government, being at the same time apprehensive of increasing the debt and forfeiting its credit, ordered this sum to be levied, in due proportions, upon the whole number of tax-payers. This afforded great facilities to the discounting banks.

What was, it may be asked, the result of this financial undertaking?

In respect to the banks or discounting chests, scarcely established, it was a heavy, an overwhelming burden; its result was insignificant as respects the public, notwithstanding every effort, and the best meant intentions. It is beyond the power of man to perform a miracle. How was it possible to struggle against that multitude of holders of vales, who were eager to obtain specie? The offices were beset, not only by commercial people, but also by persons of all classes who had their hands full of paper-money, received in payment, and could not purchase the common necessities of life.

The fatal ordinance which forced the circulation of the vales as a legal tender, imposed on banks

the duty of converting them into specie, whenever a case of necessity could be proved.

This was doubtless the best way of checking speculation ; but, leaving out of question greedy men and the speculators themselves, who pleaded poverty, the real wants were so numerous that it was impossible to satisfy them all.

Little stock was discounted ; every one complained ; the credit of the Government disappeared. What farther aggravated the evil was, that a royal vale could not be discounted unless the urgent want of specie were fully proved ; and thus a tradesman was obliged to make known to the public the actual state of his affairs, and the nature of the business for which he wanted money.<sup>7</sup> This was suffi-

<sup>7</sup> In order to convey an idea of the situation of discounting banks, and of those who were compelled to have recourse to them, let us quote a passage from a manifesto published by the directors of the Bank of Barcelona, one of those that were established under the most favourable auspices (3d August 1799) :—  
 “The insufficiency of the sum which it has as yet been possible to realize, relatively to the capital of twenty millions in specie and forty in notes, which is always to be held in hand, requires that, even in cases of real necessity, we should proceed with the greatest circumspection. If we comply with the first demands, all the existing funds, and those we are to receive, will soon be exhausted, to the detriment of those who may subsequently apply for relief. The bank has, therefore, established strict regulations for giving permanence to the means of affording relief. The least indulgence might exhaust the supply,” &c. The sixth chapter of the royal ordinance of the 17th July is then adverted to, which declares liable to forfeiture any one who might apply for the indulgence of discount, unless he proved the necessity for such application. The penalty incurred by the delinquent is the

cient to deter many people from applying to the discounting banks. They preferred having recourse to usurers, with whom every place overflowed, and who waged a secret but active war against the banking system. It also happened that the favour granted to some excited the envy of those who were refused.

In times of scarcity, there always prevails an intense anxiety respecting the future, an imaginary hunger, as it were, which is more fatal than actual famine. Thus it happened that many persons, without being in want of specie, were impatient to get their vales discounted, and wished to get the start of others. The terrors of ignorance were manifested by fearful symptoms.

Of those who had notes payable to bearer, few

the loss of his stock. The manifesto further adds :—" The Junta hopes, that all will be withheld from unlawfully soliciting the benefit of the discount, through fear of the threatened penalties, and of injuring those who are really necessitous. It ought not, therefore, to be a matter of wonder, if the directors do not immediately give specie without a previous and certain knowledge of the wants of the applicant. None should take offence at this course ; he who has a just right need only ask ; and our severity will be a sufficient curb to those who are not justified in making the demand, as they will incur forfeiture and lose their character." The junta recommends forbearance and respect towards the directors, whose feelings will be put to a severe trial whenever they shall be compelled to withhold the relief applied for, but whose patriotic zeal and austere probity will firmly reject the demands of those who may not clearly establish their right according to the terms enjoined by the royal ordinance.

were aware of the advantages of circulating banks, which merely require the having in hand a greater or less portion of the sum represented by the circulating notes. The vales and notes payable to bearer were looked upon with equal mistrust. Persons engaged in local trade seldom carried their money to the banks, the sole guarantees for which were the Government securities, and the voluntary or compulsory shares which the banks could procure. A catastrophe was apprehended. Those even who could have supported and supplied the banks, and had the greatest interest in their prosperity, were the first to discountenance them.

The exchange of vales for specie, which was wanted by those who desired to effect advantageous purchases of estates belonging to religious and charitable foundations, was not productive of any great result. The banks only offered a discount of six and a-half per cent., as fixed by the royal ordinance, whilst speculators exchanged the vales at conventional prices far below their rate, and the banks could neither compete with, nor restrain them. Such was the fatal consequence of the errors of a government which, having first fettered itself, could no longer make a stand against speculators, nor raise the value of paper-money by affording it the guarantee of an immense quantity of landed estates which were about to be sold, and of which the purchase could not fail to excite competition. We were then in March 1800. The vales

lost more than half their nominal value ; they were perpetually sinking ; those, likewise, who wished to obtain the estates of religious foundations at a more moderate rate, did all in their power to depreciate the vales ; this had the effect of reducing almost to nothing the proceeds of those estates.

In this conflict those who were not addicted to speculations, and had no thought of purchasing landed estates, suffered all the consequences of the fatal ordinance, being compelled to receive in royal vales the rents received in kind by the farmers. The speculators sold the paper-money at any price to the debtors, who paid their creditors with it. Contracts presupposed good faith in the mode of reimbursement ; but those who had received gold or silver under a promise to repay in coin, availed themselves of the letter of the law which gave a forced circulation to the vales, and if the creditor refused to receive them, he was basely denounced as an infringer of the royal ordinance. At last, the Government discovered its error, and endeavoured to check the evil ; the law was modified, agreements were no longer compulsory. Let us attend to the pitiful official narrative emanating from authority.—(Circular of the 7th April 1800.)

“ The royal ordinance of the 17th July 1799, has given occasion to reiterated complaints. The King, the council, and the governor of the council, have received them from several ecclesiastical and secular bodies, as well as from a great number of private individuals . . . .”



“ His Majesty sees with regret the abuse that has crept into the execution of the royal ordinance, which had public utility for its object, and was intended to supply the scarcity of specie, occasioned by the embarrassments of trade and navigation during the present war. His Majesty had only sought to consolidate the credit of the paper-money.

“ It was not to be expected that this paper, which was guaranteed by the most solemn engagements, and by general and special mortgages, intended for the payment of the interest and the extinction of the capital; it could not be expected, says his Majesty, that this paper-money would give rise to so many painful disappointments.

“ But the manœuvres of certain persons, who, greedy of unlawful gains, are indifferent to the dictates of honour and conscience, have succeeded in discrediting the royal vales to such a degree, that they now circulate with a loss of half their nominal value. The legal interest of six per cent. is disdained. Some hoard up their money, others subject the vales to a heavy deterioration by underhand means, which it is impossible to detect or punish.

“ Speculation has accordingly made rapid progress. There is a daily increase of the number of those who, led away by bad example, seek to enrich themselves by an infamous traffic, and, which is worse, plead as an excuse for their guilty ma-

nœuvres the letter of the law, of which they affect to misapprehend the spirit. By this conduct they have perverted the benevolent intentions of the Government, and converted into an instrument of loss and ruin to the state, and to the classes the most entitled to attention, what was calculated to be an effectual relief for all.

“ The discounting banks offered a prompt relief to all those who wanted specie for their payments, their purchases, and other negotiations below the nominal value of paper-money; they were designed to frustrate a spirit of cupidity, to restore confidence, and revive the public credit. These banks have as yet been unable to receive the funds assigned to them, although so long a time has elapsed since the publication of the royal ordinance. We can no longer hope to see them fully organized, unless by the adoption of fresh and more effectual measures, which may succeed in removing the difficulties raised by the rich capitalists themselves. These capitalists affirm, that it is impossible for them to furnish their quota, because they receive no specie, and their farmers or copyholders, in contempt of solemn engagements, to the fulfilment of which they cannot even be compelled by the tribunals, allege the 2d, 4th, and 5th articles of the royal ordinance, as a solid plea for their bad faith.

“ If there has existed thus far any apprehensions of injuring private interests, it is impossible any longer to disregard manœuvres which are subver-

sive of public morality and of every principle of natural right. In certain engagements entered into subsequently to the royal ordinance, it was expressly stipulated, under all the guarantees which the keenest mistrust could suggest, that payment should be made in specie; and yet, after such binding contracts, the stipulations have not been kept. Paper-money has been substituted for specie, with a discount of six per cent. It has been designedly overlooked that if engagements were contrary to the ordinance, he who failed in performing them could not avail himself of an illegal act, nor derive benefit from a transgression; whilst the other party, which was least in fault, suffered the whole detriment arising from the contravention; whence it followed, that not only were bad faith and the violation of the compact in some respects countenanced, but all the principles of morality, those tutelary principles which should be the basis of all contracts in a well organized society, were violated.

“The council brought all these disorders to the knowledge of H. M., in their representation of the 21st of last March, on the presentation of a memorial, amongst many others on the same subject, in which are more particularly demonstrated the damages occasioned by an unworthy and manifest abuse of the said royal schedule.”

<sup>8</sup> The reader may compare those excuses with the article of the fourth chapter of the ordinance of the 17th of July, which is thus worded:—“The public treasury and all my subjects are bound

“H. M., whose feelings are wounded by all that militates against the laws and morality, has benevolently attended to, and, by his royal resolution of the 26th of the same month, adopted the suggestion of the council. It is consequently ordained, that all conditions stipulated in the contracts, leases, sales, purchases, and other obligations, anterior or subsequent to the ordinance of the 17th July, shall henceforth be strictly observed ; that the payments either due or falling due shall be made in the currency stipulated, and that this rule shall be generally adhered to for the future, and include bills of exchange duly accepted ; that in verbal contracts, the parties shall express, simply and in good faith, the money to be received, to the end that from this moment the legal difference between the vales and specie be understood and voluntarily assented to ; that in case of non-payment, if the goods of the debtor be distrained, and the latter should only possess royal vales, the legal deduction shall be made from these bills, and be

bound punctually to pay their obligations in gold or silver, and not in royal vales, according to the conditions stipulated, until the day of the publication of the present royal ordinance ; but, henceforward, such engagements shall not be binding, for a contrary course would be tantamount to disowning the peculiar privilege of the state paper ; the same shall hold with respect to bills of exchange.”

It is immediately added :—“ I forbid the justices and notaries to receive any direct or indirect claim against the assimilation legally established between specie and the royal vales in every description of contract, under a penalty of interdiction, dismissal from office,” &c.

chargeable to the debtor's account; that every agent of the treasury or of private individuals, charged to collect either public contributions or other funds, shall deliver the money to his principals in the same currency or coin in which he shall have received it; that neither the agent nor the principal shall take advantage of the text of the royal ordinance, which is not to be taken in a literal sense, and which is, from this moment, to be considered as null and void in this particular. . . . . The foregoing is thus ordained for the present, until discounting banks are efficiently and permanently established, and until the royal ordinance receive its full effect, pending the eventual determination of H. M.," &c.

Heaven would not permit that the correction of such serious errors should be effectually and permanently decreed. The words, *for the present*, raised fresh doubts. It was feared lest the Government should again fall into the same error, and, sooner or later, should again raise paper-money to a level with metallic money. The vales were still viewed with great suspicion; they were only used from absolute necessity, and lost all their value.

Neither would Heaven permit the Government to see the abyss into which all the resources destined to consolidate the public debt were becoming ingulphed. It was loudly said, that those discounting banks were like the cask of the Danaïds, powerless to arrest speculation, powerless to relieve

commerce, objects of suspicion to the very parties who had taken an interest in their establishment. They were still perseveringly kept up for a few months ; extortion and violence transgressed all bounds ; capitalists were compelled to furnish the quota imposed upon them ; the quick return of new contributions, for the most part hitherto unknown, and equally burdensome to the poor and odious to the rich, was urged with severity. The stoppage of the payment of interest until the discounting banks should be in an efficient state, and the extraordinary subsidy of three hundred millions of reals, demanded with earnest entreaty, to make up the deficiency of the banks, produced much discontent ; terror became general ; cash wholly disappeared.

A last measure, just perhaps in itself, but ruinous in its effects, tended to increase the general alarm.

Portugal, always devoted to the cabinet of St. James, without being at war with us, served as a protection to the English, whose privateers incessantly infested our coasts, and found shelter in her harbours, where the British squadrons were provided with every means of refitting. As Portugal was not in a state to supply them from her native produce, the country people came to us for flour, oil, wine, meat, brandy, and even biscuit and fresh bread. The high price they paid for all these articles, and the extent of the demand, were a sufficient proof that the object was to victual the English fleet.

No doubt this protection granted to our enemies justified our declaring war against Portugal ; the cabinet merely caused our markets to be closed against these ill-intentioned and ungrateful neighbours. But, on the other hand, the prohibition, rigorously enforced, completed the obstruction to our commerce, stopped an influx of money which had at least the effect of promoting the agriculture of the frontier provinces. The remedy was worse than the disease. Ought we, in order to deprive the enemy of this resource, to have condemned ourselves to misery, by stopping an outlet which proved of advantage to us ?

In short, the absence of coin seriously alarmed the country, the anxiety went on increasing : about the month of August, the paper money had lost, in the principal towns, three-fourths of its nominal value ; in the interior, none were found to take it at any price ; all transactions were suspended owing to its general discredit, and to the want of metallic currency. The contributions were no longer paid ; the treasury was empty ; the banks were provided with paper only ; and the property of religious establishments found no more purchasers, not even with royal vales.

The ministers did not yet understand the evil they had caused, and that evil was immense, perhaps incurable.

The King had again recourse to the Council of Castile, entrusting to it for the second time the management of the public debt.

In extreme emergencies, the assurances of governments lose all their authority.

The pragmatic sanction was however received with some degree of confidence. The King had published it in accordance with the suggestions of the council :

“ H. M. acknowledges and solemnly proclaims the validity of the public debt. The capital and interests shall be paid ; this is an obligation binding upon the crown ; it shall be scrupulously fulfilled ; the assignments of the bank shall be kept distinct and separate from the public treasury, and free from all other mortgages ; new assignments shall be added to the old ; the sinking fund shall be restored, and the payment of interests resumed and continued from the 1st of January next. This formal pledge is given to the country ; every thing shall be placed under the guarantee and superintendence of the council, in the same manner as from 1794 to 1798. The recovery and receipt of funds, the sale of the property appropriated to the extinction of the vales, and the whole administration and management revert again to the council.” \*

\* I must here point out to the reader, that the only means of repairing the errors committed during my absence from the ministry, were found in reverting to the state in which I had placed them during my administration, acting as I did in concert with my excellent and worthy colleagues. Our labour had not been so inefficient, since our successors were compelled to return to the same system in order to restore public credit.

Here



Such was the lamentable history of our public debt, during the three years of my absence from the administration and the court. My successors had blindly adopted a system at variance with the course I had marked out.

I claim the undoubted right to repel the charge of errors I have not committed, of misfortunes which I neither have, nor could have occasioned. I was a stranger, I repeat it, to the management of public affairs; they were conducted in utter disregard of my well-known principles.

I was bound to indicate the origin, the period of that enormous mass of taxes and burdens which have oppressed the nation during those three years; they gave rise to the ever-increasing embarrassments of our finances, the weight of which it would have been so advisable, and perhaps so easy to lighten.

How unjust was the censure which tended to throw the responsibility of so many errors upon him whose conscience was clear of them!

Here follows the thirty-first article of the Pragmatic Sanction, which restores the pre-existing system of my administration.

"Conformably to my royal decree of the 29th June of the last year, contained in the royal ordinance of the 6th July of the same year, the object of which is to replace all that concerns the ways and means, and the inversion of the funds, in the same state as from 1794 to 1798; and desirous of giving to this measure all requisite and suitable validity, so as to leave no pretence for mistrust, I ordain that all which appertains to the royal vales, and to matters thereunto relating, be separated from the public treasury, and immediately placed under the direction of the council. The officers and others attached to that service shall also be under the immediate orders of the said council," &c.

## CHAPTER LI.

## Conclusion.

PRAISE be to God! half of my task is accomplished! I also purpose to complete the second part of this long investigation of the past: justice and severity are my guides.

It has been seen that my task is not exclusively confined to the vindication of my own personal interests: I write the history of Charles IV., a monarch so little, so imperfectly known, yet so worthy of better fame. The critical and stormy period through which he had to struggle did not permit his reign to be peaceful and prosperous. In this reign, however, Spain was not visited with sterility: she brought forth sufficient valour, courage, and patriotism, to maintain her ancient celebrity. The concatenation of our glorious reminiscences shall not suffer interruption.

Sparing of censure towards those whose errors were unintentional, and ever ready to praise whosoever has well deserved of his country, I cannot be lenient towards the unworthy Spaniards who, to the calamities springing from a foreign source, have added the scandal of domestic treachery. I accuse them of having betrayed their country to

the enemy. This faction has triumphed through a succession of years, wielding the powers of heaven and earth ; it perverted and obscured facts. It behoved me to restore them to light ; and henceforth we shall be better appreciated. These Memoirs contain wherewith to fill up the chasm left in our annals.

Previously to resuming the thread of events, which daily acquired greater importance, I may be permitted to take a retrospective glance of the past.

If I am not labouring under a complete delusion, I may indulge a hope that the reader is now prepossessed in my favour.

The singular rapidity of my elevation, the high favour with which I was honoured by my sovereign, his extraordinary dread of the French revolution, the exaggerated idea he had formed of the extent of my resources to meet the impending storm,—all these may be explained and appreciated with more or less indulgence ; but no one will deny me the merit of having attempted to deserve my good fortune, and of having constantly endeavoured conscientiously to discharge the duty which was imposed upon me.

1st. I did not engage in war with precipitation ; neither did I shrink from the attack when the time had arrived to meet it.

2d. Our land forces were unprepared ; in a few days the Spanish army was organized ; our

colours waved on the enemy's territory; we won victories. Did stronger and better-prepared nations perform greater achievements?

3d. When the second campaign proved unsuccessful, far from being dispirited by defeats, I never despaired of the safety of the country.

4th. Our battalions rallied, our thinned ranks were again filled up, our extensive frontiers were defended at every step. Among the states adjoining France, was there one that prevented the French from penetrating into the heart of her provinces?

5th. I knew at what stage the struggle, becoming useless and fatal, and deviating from the great object it first had in view, only served to increase the strength, and consolidate the establishment of the Republic. I then made peace; not before the other coalesced powers, but six months after a powerful sovereign had signed it<sup>1</sup>—when one half of the empire was breaking off from the coalition—when it was clearly evident that none but England and France had any interest in protracting the war.

6th. The peace, on the part of Spain, was concluded at a moment when the Republic, having subdued the factions by which she had been convulsed, appeared to return to the councils of moderation, and willing to respect the common rights of nations; when she first uttered a language

<sup>1</sup> The King of Prussia.

of conciliation, and evinced a desire of renewing an amicable intercourse.

7th. This peace was not dictated in an imperious tone; there were conferences, a long discussion, conditions laid down on both sides, arms in hand, and without armistice. Our troops were full of vigour, in excellent condition, and again in readiness to cross the French frontiers. Battles were daily fought, and blood was still flowing even after the Bâle treaty had been signed.

8th. This peace cost not a single village, nor a rivulet, nor a hill, nor a bush; the sacred boundaries of our territory were not displaced. Spain was the only belligerent power which, in making peace with France, submitted to no sacrifice.

9th. The English cabinet, displeased at our peace with France, strove to cause a rupture; wished to allure us into a contest, as it had the Italian princes, without caring, without grieving for the devastation, the ruin which those princes were bringing upon their dominions. England resorted to intrigues, threats, provocations, and insults, with a view to influence us; she assailed our pride, and affected to entertain doubts of our independence. . . . Placed between two rival nations, threatened on every side, I preferred that course which would at once rescue us from the yoke of England, and relieve us from carrying on an expensive war for her sole interest, and on our own soil. I would not allow the Peninsula to be used as a

field of battle for foreigners ; a struggle that might be indefinitely protracted, or end like the rash enterprises of Holland and Naples, like the siege of Toulon, or the landings on the coast of Brittany.

10th. A war having broken out between Spain and England, without any provocation on our part, we had to look out for allies who could protect our colonies and commerce. We cordially joined France and Holland against England, without however separating from the other cabinets with which we kept up friendly relations, although some were still the avowed enemies of the Republic.

11th. Wisdom and moderation constantly presided over our policy. I attentively listened to the wishes and the opinion of the country ; I took no step without the unanimous concurrence of the Councils of State.

12th. Our alliance was no servitude ; it was a simple and open contract, entered into for the mutual interests of both nations in what related to that exclusively maritime war ; and Spain, having to preserve, as she actually preserved, her extensive possessions of North and South America, was powerfully assisted by France and Holland, whose naval expeditions were combined with ours.

13th. Were not the ministers who succeeded me at liberty to alter their system with regard to France, if they thought proper so to act ? They

not only followed in my footsteps, but united themselves still more closely with the Republic, and manifested a spirit of obsequiousness far less perceptible in the cabinet under my direction.

14th. This double war, first with France, and afterwards with Great Britain, was carried on during my ministry without loading the people with fresh taxes. Voluntary and patriotic contributions, and national loans, were found adequate to meet the immense preparations for war both by land and by sea: public credit was sustained by simple means, by the strictly moral motives of our operations.

15th. During the evil days of the war against France, there occurred in Spain no acts of violence, no persecutions, as in other countries, or even in our own, during the two years preceding my accession to the ministry.

16th. Far from dreading the progress of knowledge, I favoured it; I sought its support as a weapon against the pernicious doctrines which threatened Europe. I called round the throne all the men of talent, all the generous Spaniards, both friends and enemies of the ministry, without distinction. This system of impartiality answered the intended object. The cabals which had arisen at the very commencement of the reign of Charles IV. vanished away whilst I held the reins of power: the monarch alone reigned—the ruler of his people, and not the ruler of a party: there

was but one government—no *Camarilla*. The council of state, that of Castile, and all others, discussed and administered the affairs of the country according to constitutional forms.

17th. Merit never failed of its reward: there were few political offences, very few condemnations, and these were readily and liberally commuted, even in favour of the unworthy. No one suffered, in its full extent, the imposed penalty.

18th. War did no injury to the cultivation of letters and the study of the sciences; on the contrary, the time lost in the two preceding centuries was repaired.

19th. I exerted every means to instil knowledge into the working classes, by disseminating instruction to all, from the simplest elements to the use of compasses and analysis.

20th. The productive arts, which enrich society, the ornamental arts, which add to its embellishment and delight, were flourishing, notwithstanding the state of penury occasioned by the war: the noble and wealthy classes set the example, by combating prejudices, encouraging industry, and exciting a worthy emulation.

21st. I held agriculture as sacred; I honoured and patronized it in the furthestmost recesses of the kingdom, and where lands had, until then, lain waste; time would have subsequently introduced extensive improvements; the husbandman was



leniently dealt with, was freed from numerous shackles, received abundant succours; the Government created new resources for him.

22d. I trusted to commerce, which, in return, relied upon me in the painful circumstances in which it was involved during that fatal war. It had only to make its wants known to obtain, in Spain and in America, all the favours which it solicited.

23d. My elevated station did not prevent me from hearing and listening to the voice of poverty. What the charity of our predecessors had omitted to do in behalf of the unfortunate, I had the happiness to perform. Of all the miseries which assail mankind, the most cruel are those of having no parents or relations, no social rights, and of being deprived of speech, of the power of imploring assistance from our fellow-creatures: these I endeavoured to remedy. The Government adopted all foundlings, whose physical and moral education was secured; they henceforth had a country, an avocation, a cheering prospect. Next came the deaf and dumb paupers, for whom no one before me had entertained the idea of providing. I devoted all my attention to them; the Government furnished them with an asylum, caused them to be properly brought up and instructed; the first idea of this institution I claim; it was the object of my most lively solicitude, and was gra-

dually upheld and improved almost exclusively at my own charge.\*

24th. Lastly, during my administration, of which so much harm has been said, and about which so many lies and calumnies have been circulated, day and night did not suffice me to wade through the labours of the cabinet, as well as through a multitude of other matters to which I willingly attended; independently of the many transactions of which I have merely given a slight sketch in these Memoirs. All my time was devoted to my country; my sole enjoyment, my only pleasure was to do good, to perform something useful or honourable for my native land. I am not aware of having lost a single day.

I do not claim much credit for my exertions; I was fulfilling a duty; the unlimited confidence of the King, his signal favours, my profound gratitude imposed upon me this duty; and the applauses of the nation enhanced, on the other hand, the reward of my services. Undoubtedly I was but a man; and what man is infallible? But I

\* It would once have been improper for me to speak of the alms and private charities to which I devoted a part of my fortune. I am now, however, at liberty to mention the subject; the secret I had imposed upon myself, through a regard for those who were the objects of them, ought not to deprive me of the merit which is my due. I was charged with sordid meanness; I knew it. . . . The judges delegate appointed by King Ferdinand to inspect my books and papers found that I annually gave in charities from 150,000 to 200,000 francs. One of these judges is still alive.

have nobly and faithfully served my country. She has no right to reproach me with a single error of omission or neglect ; I have respected her in every one of her children ; I have benefited many ; no one can venture to affirm that I have been the cause of his ruin. I challenge even those who were my most inveterate enemies. Few statesmen, having had as much power at command, can make such an assertion without exposing themselves to a flat contradiction. It was with this full and perfect conviction that I retired from the ministry in 1798, carrying away the esteem of nearly all those whose censure or jealousy had at first been provoked by my rapid elevation. Mr. Bourgoing, in his *Picture of Modern Spain*, gave vent to his feelings in terms which it were unbecoming in me to repeat (vol. 1st., chap. V., p. 193). I shall only quote this sentence as an undeniable truth : “ If his elevation excited envy, few were dissatisfied at his conduct.” Removed from the court, I had occasion to view things more closely, and without illusion. I was divested of power ; and yet the friendly throng still crowded round my residence. Whether absent or present, tokens of affection and interest were lavished upon me ; towns and corporations were not satisfied with written testimonials of their regard.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> When a minister, several towns did me the honour of appointing me perpetual *regidor* (alderman, municipal officer) of their corporations, a popular distinction not usually conferred upon

When an accumulation of errors subsequently overturned our financial system, many good patriots called upon me, in great alarm, to inquire what means might still be found to arrest the evil.\* No doubt they were beginning to do tardy justice to my administration ; and the regret they manifested at my absence was not wanting in sincerity. . . . .

Heaven was reserving for me a last trial, far longer and more painful than the first : a period

upon ministers. One might have supposed that their interested homage was addressed to the power with which I was invested ; but, after my resignation, when I had no longer any interest at court, some corporations, who abstained from greeting my power, courted my favour when I was in disgrace. The town of Valencia, that of Ronda, and others, whose names I forget, gave me, afterwards, this unequivocal pledge of their esteem and affection.

\* One of the grave personages who wrote to me on this occasion, and the more earnestly, as he was a member of the council of state,\* was the Bailli Don Antonio Valdes, ex-minister of the naval department. He spoke to me of the approaching and inevitable ruin of our finances, consequent on the system of Saavedra and his successors. Valdes' letters, and those of many other respectable individuals and corporations, must have been found amongst my papers.

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\* It is necessary to inform the reader that the dignity of councillor of state is not in Spain the same as with us. None can attain it until they have long held the rank of minister, or have exercised the highest military or civil functions, and deserved, by a long and honourable career, this last proof of the confidence of the sovereign. A Spanish councillor of state is, in a measure, what we term a minister of state ; though no longer holding the seals of office, he may nevertheless, be called, in that capacity, to the cabinet council, on important occasions.—E.

was to come when my devotion to my king and country would hurl me into a fathomless abyss, accused without the possibility of making a defence, despoiled and proscribed without a trial, and apprehensive of not having sufficient time or strength to complete this painful refutation—the last service I am bound to render to my country and my family. . . .

END OF VOL II.

## EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTS.

(No. I.)

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*Official Letter of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to the  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Govern-  
ment.*

SIR :

I received with heartfelt satisfaction the letter you did me the honour to send me, together with the papers relating, 1st. to the neutrality of Spain; and 2d. to the convention between Spain and France, with regard to the reciprocal withdrawing of the troops assembled on the frontiers of both kingdoms.

I hope that the executive council, the French nation, and her representatives, will find in this negotiation fresh and incontestible proofs of the candour and friendly intentions of H. C. M.; it will be impossible for the least doubt to arise respecting his firm and resolute determination to preserve peace, good harmony, and a brotherly love between the two nations.

The literal meaning of the expressions used by H. C. M., his good faith, and even the manner in which this negotiation has been carried on, should, in the eyes of every impartial judge, add to the good opinion to which, at all times, Spanish loyalty has enjoyed a rightful claim throughout Europe. For my part, I discover in it an additional motive to congratulate myself on the happy circumstance

of having, at the same time, received private and analogous instructions, the result of which will be to strengthen the ties of friendship between two nations already united by mutual esteem and a common interest; which approximation deserves to be carefully cultivated, in order to maintain unimpaired those advantages which both Spain and France respectively derive from it.

The despatches containing these orders, with the instructions which, according to the orders themselves, are to facilitate their execution, were brought to me by a French extraordinary courier. I take the liberty to call your attention to this circumstance, as an additional proof of the sincerity with which H. C. M. is actuated, without giving cause to suspect that there might be secret instructions, or any other reservation on his part.

The declaration of neutrality demanded by the French ministry from the Spanish court, might be considered as supererogatory, seeing that this neutrality previously existed *de facto*, and that no act of hostility on the part of Spain could give reason to suspect an intention of infringing it. But H. C. M. felt, nevertheless, that the events which have occurred, and the war in which France happens to be involved, might, if not justify, at least occasion certain suspicions, which it is proper to remove; and that, moreover, this declaration, whether superfluous or necessary, by giving a more authentic character to his peaceable and friendly views, serves still more to consolidate the intimate connexion which it is our object more firmly to secure between the two nations.

What I have before stated respecting the good faith of H. C. M., and his full confidence in French loyalty, is unquestionably proved by the King's consent to the recall into the interior of the extraordinary forces which had been sent to the Pyrenees, though without any other view than

that of maintaining good order, which was endangered by some of the inhabitants of those frontier provinces, where malignity had propagated seditious principles. H. C. M. gave his consent the more generously, as he demanded no other condition on the part of France than that of withdrawing likewise the extraordinary forces which she had marched to her frontiers.

Although, at the first glance, the clauses of the convention appear to be perfectly equal, it is easy to perceive that they do not present, on both sides, an equal security, on account of the different nature of the two governments, and their respective positions. For it is indisputable that the French troops could assemble in greater numbers and in less time than ours. This inequality will find a guarantee in our mutual good faith and confidence.

But there is at this moment another circumstance which might consolidate the friendship and intimate union of the two nations; the interest of Spain, of France, and indeed of all Europe, is concerned on this point. I mean the successful issue of the important question in which France is engaged, and which absorbs the attention of all nations.

The mode of treatment which may be adopted towards the unfortunate Louis XVI. and the royal family, will afford to all nations an example of French generosity, and of her political moderation. When, however, the life of the head of the house of Bourbon is at stake, the King of Spain cannot feel unconcerned; he will not, on that account, be suspected of a desire to intrude himself into the affairs of an independent state; the interference of H. C. M. is confined to giving utterance to the voice of nature and compassion on behalf of his relative and ancient ally. The morality of all governments and of all countries justifies this step, and gives it plausibility under existing circumstances.

Therefore, without entering into a discussion of principles



which might appear unseasonable on the part of a foreigner, I shall confine myself to submit to you, in the name of the King of Spain, a few considerations, not so much because they are mine, as because they spring from the dictates of humanity and justice, and are founded on the right of nations.

Only those men who are regardless of humanity, justice, and common rights, can wonder at the importance of the trial of Louis XVI. in the sight of all nations; it is easy to answer that they themselves, by eliciting opinions in an opposite sense, enhance the importance of this great trial. The non-observance of the first rules of justice in the method of proceeding would have been condemned by them in any other legal prosecution; this violation of rules has been protested against, with much energy, by a multitude of Frenchmen, and by many members of the Convention, whose opinions and complaints have been published. Those opinions and complaints have been echoed in foreign countries, where they have deeply affected all calm observers, who, without passion or prejudice, contemplated from a distance the case of a defendant tried by the very men who, of their own assumed authority, have constituted themselves his judges, and of whom the greater number manifested, by anticipation, an opinion fostered by previous prejudices and hatred; a defendant whom they mean to condemn in the absence of all pre-existing law, and for offences of which I shall not attempt to examine the proofs; for even if they were established, they could not deprive him of his inviolability, guaranteed by the constitution of the state, formally accepted. Such an example, independently of all notion of justice, is of so serious a nature, that a nation, having any regard for itself, should dread to hold it up to other nations, of whom she claims the good opinion and respect.

It is impossible that the whole world should not be terrified at the violence exercised towards a prince remarkable,

at least, for his gentle and kind disposition ; a prince whose very meekness and good-nature have hurried him unto a precipice to which the most flagrant perversity would not have led the most cruel tyrants.

In short, if Louis XVI. has, in reality, committed errors, have they not been atoned for by his so unexpected downfall, by the miseries of a long and cruel captivity, by his harrowing anxiety concerning the fate of his children, his consort, his sister, and, what is worse, by the insults and outrages of men who thought they would act heroically by trampling on fallen greatness ! Such men disregarded this political truth, " That if a change of institutions may dispense a nation from the respectful regard due to her ancient sovereigns, no revolution whatever should obliterate in virtuous minds the respect due to misfortunes and to suffering humanity."

Spain is aware, (and for this reason she wishes to interpose her good offices) that France is neither guilty of, nor responsible for the errors and opinions of some of her children ; that France is a generous nation, and that most of her representatives abhor every kind of violence and useless severity ; but it is evident that they are not free, but under control ; and if, taking advantage of this general despondency of the public mind, the enemies of the unfortunate Louis XVI. should proceed to the last extremities against his person, it would become impossible to persuade other nations that France acted with full liberty ; the inference would be that in France there are men more powerful than the government, or than France herself.

After such a discovery, what confidence could be placed in her protestations, or in any treaty of peace, of alliance, or of commerce with such a nation ? Europe could only find, in such a state of things, a ground of perpetual

uneasiness ; she would be daily assailed with the fear of fresh commotions ; she would consider her interests endangered, and the consequence would be a general anxiety, and conflicting suspicions on the part of both.

An equitable and magnanimous conduct towards the royal defendant, would, on the contrary, secure the return of general confidence. The very presence of Louis XVI., and of all his family, in a country where he would enjoy an asylum under the faith of treaties stipulated to that effect, would be a living testimony of the generosity of France, and at the same time, of her strength. The whole world would admire a people moderate after victory, inflamed with exaggerated but noble passions, and whose triumphant arms would not prevent her voluntarily bending to the altar of justice. The esteem which this conduct would command from all nations would bring on a peace, which is an object of universal desire, and of which France herself is in need, in the midst of all her glory. May this bright hope be at length realized !

I have laid before you, Sir, the wishes of the King of Spain and those of the Spanish nation, which, true to its ancient character, knows how to appreciate all generous sentiments. Spain hopes that the French nation will be anxious to afford to future ages another example of the magnanimity which is its peculiar character.

Actuated by sentiments equally honourable to both, (the more honourable to France as she is now struggling against the most violent instigations,) the French and Spanish nations will henceforth be united by a sincere and durable friendship ; both have acquired sufficient glory to aspire to this noble alliance, founded on virtues of a humane and pacific character.

It is from these motives that H. C. M. considers he is taking a step consistent with his own dignity, by addressing

to the French government, the most earnest, the most pressing intercessions respecting the pending trial. The whole world watches our conduct.

I entreat that you will be pleased to submit to the National Convention, the request and mediation of the King of Spain. Could I, in my answer to H. C. M., apprise him that the desires of his heart have been fulfilled, I should be proud of having been the agent of this honourable and generous negotiation; happy in having alike served my country and your own, I would look back upon this day as the most glorious of my life, and upon this consolation as the most precious I can aspire to.

I have the honour of reiterating to you the expressions of my most distinguished consideration, &c.

JOSEPH OCARIZ.

## No. II.

*Ordinance of the 4th of September 1796, relative to the Treaty of Friendship, Boundaries, and Navigation, concluded and ratified between H. C. M. and the United States of America.*

(Registered in the Council of Castile, on the 12th of August in the same Year.)

## T R E A T Y.

H. C. M. and the United States of America, wishing to consolidate, in a permanent manner, the good understanding and friendly relations subsisting between the two contracting powers, have resolved to determine, by a treaty, various points, the settlement of which must promote the general welfare and mutual advantage of both countries.

H. C. M. has accordingly appointed H. E. Don Manuel de Godoy Alvarez de Faria, Rios, Sanchez, Zarzosa, Prince of the Peace, Duke del'Alcudia, Lord of the Soto de Roma and of the estate of Albala, Grandee of Spain of the first class, Perpetual Regidor of the town of Santiago, Knight of the illustrious Order of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III., Commander of Valencia del Ventoso Ribeira, and Acechal of the Order of St. James, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Malta, Councillor of State, First Secretary of State and Despatches, Secretary of H. M. the Queen, Chief Superintendent of posts,

bridges, and high-roads, Protector of the Academy of Arts, of the Royal Cabinet of Natural History, of the Laboratory of Chemistry, of the Botanical Garden, and of the Astronomical Observatory, &c., Gentleman of the Chamber in waiting, Captain-General of the Forces, Inspector and Major of H. M.'s Body-Guards ;

And the President of the United States, with the consent and approbation of the senate, appoints Thomas Pinkney, citizen of the United States, his minister plenipotentiary to H. C. M. :

And the two plenipotentiaries have drawn up and signed the following articles :—

1. There shall be a solid and inviolable peace and a sincere friendship between H. C. M., his successors and subjects, and the United States and citizens thereof, without any personal or local exception.

2. To avoid all discussion respecting the limits which divide the territories of the two high contracting powers, it has been agreed and declared in the present article, that the southern limit of the United States, which separates their territory from that of the Spanish colonies of East and West Florida, shall be determined by a line drawn from the river Mississippi, in the most northern part, from the 31st degree north of the equator, and thence proceeding in a straight line due east as far as the middle of the river Appala Chicola, or Catahouche, then through the middle of the river as far as its junction with the Flint ; and thence in a straight line as far as the source of the river Santa-Maria, and following the course of the river into the Atlantic Ocean. It is agreed between the two powers, that in case there should be any troops, garrisons, or settlements of the one in the territory of the other, conformably to the line of boundaries above described, such troops, garrisons, or settlements shall withdraw from the said territory

within the space of six months after the ratification of the present treaty, or sooner, if possible; and shall be permitted to carry with them all such goods and effects as are their lawful property.

3. For the execution of the foregoing article there shall be appointed by each of the high contracting parties a commissioner and a surveyor, who shall meet in the Natchez, on the left bank of the Mississippi, within the period of six months after the ratification of the present treaty. These commissioners shall proceed to draw the line of demarcation, conformably to the stipulations of the foregoing article. They shall draw plans, and record in a journal all their proceedings, which shall be considered as an integral part of the present treaty, and have the same force as if they had been textually inserted therein. If, by any motive whatever, it should be deemed necessary that the said commissioners and surveyors be attended by a military escort, the same shall be granted to them, in equal numbers on both sides, by the general commanding H.C.M.'s forces in the Two Floridas, and by the general officer commanding the forces of the United States in their south-western territory. These generals shall act in concert and amicably for the purpose of furthering this object, and also for the supply of provisions and instruments, and every thing requisite for the execution of this article.

4. It is also agreed, that the western boundary of the territory of the United States, which separates them from the Spanish colony of Louisiana, shall be fixed in the middle of the channel, or bed of the Mississippi, from the northern limit of the aforesaid states as far as the complement of the 31st degree of latitude north of the equator. H.C.M. also consents to the navigation through the whole extent of the river, from its source to the ocean, being free and open to all his subjects, as well as to all the citizens of

the United States, unless, by a special treaty, this liberty be equally conceded to the subjects of another power.

5. Both the high contracting parties shall endeavour, by every possible means, to maintain peace and good harmony among the Indian tribes who inhabit the adjacent districts, in the vicinity of the lines and rivers which, according to the foregoing articles, shall constitute the boundaries of the Two Floridas; and, in order to attain this object, the two powers expressly bind themselves to repress all kind of hostilities on the part of the Indian tribes dwelling beyond the line of the common boundary; so that Spain shall not allow her Indians to attack those who inhabit the territory of the United States, nor the American citizens; and the United States shall likewise prevent their Indians from attacking the subjects of H.C.M., or his Indians, in any manner whatsoever.

Considering the existence of various treaties of alliance between the Indians and the two contracting powers, the latter pledge themselves never to enter, henceforward, into any alliance or treaty (except treaties of peace) with the Indian tribes who dwell on the respective territories of either. They shall, nevertheless, carry on their commerce, to the common benefit of their respective subjects and citizens, with perfect reciprocity; to the end that, by avoiding the expenses hitherto incurred by them on account of the said Indian tribes, the two contracting parties may enjoy all the advantages of a general and substantial harmony.

6. Each of the contracting powers shall endeavour, by every possible means, to protect and defend all vessels and other property whatsoever belonging to the subjects and citizens of the other party who should happen to be found within the range of their jurisdiction, either at sea or on land. They shall use all their efforts to recover and cause to be restored to the lawful owners the vessels and



other property which may have been taken from them within the range of their jurisdiction, whether they be or be not at war with the power whose subjects may have seized upon the aforesaid vessels or other property.

7. It is agreed, that the subjects or citizens of either of the contracting parties, and their vessels or other property, shall not be liable to any embargo or detention on the part of the other power on account of any military expedition, or public or private service of any description; and that in cases of seizure, detention, or arrest, whether for debts contracted or offences committed by the citizens or subjects of one of the contracting powers within the jurisdiction of the other, all proceedings shall be by legal course and authority, according to the legal forms required in similar cases. The said subjects and citizens shall be permitted to employ such counsel, solicitors, notaries, agents, or factors as they shall think necessary to manage their business or causes before the tribunals of the other contracting party; they shall also be permitted freely to attend the trials, and to be present at all examinations and depositions of witnesses which might occur in the course of the proceedings.

8. When the subjects and inhabitants of either of the two contracting parties, with their trading vessels or ships of war, shall be compelled by stress of weather, or to escape from pirates or the enemy, or by any other urgent necessity, to seek refuge or shelter in the rivers, bays, roads, or harbours of either of the two powers, they shall be received and treated with humanity, shall enjoy full protection, receive the necessary succours, and be allowed to supply themselves with refreshments, provisions, and other things requisite for their subsistence; to repair their vessels, and facilitate their pursuing their destination,—all which shall be furnished at a reasonable charge; they shall not be detained:

nor prevented, under any pretext whatever, from quitting the said roads and harbours. They shall, on the contrary, be at liberty to quit when and in what manner they please, without any obstacle or molestation.

9. All vessels and merchandize, of any description whatsoever, which may have been retaken from pirates on the open seas, and brought into a harbour of either of the two powers, shall be delivered up to the officers and authorities of the said harbour, to be wholly restored to their lawful owners, as soon as the right ownership shall have been legally certified.

10. In case a vessel belonging to either of the contracting powers should be wrecked, or have suffered any damage on the coasts, or in the rivers of the other power, assistance shall be afforded to the said respective subjects and citizens, either as respects their persons or their properties, in like manner as it would be afforded to the inhabitants of the country where the misfortune has occurred, without any other charge or duty than such as the inhabitants of the country are bound to pay in similar cases. Should it be found necessary to unload the vessel wholly or in part, in order to make the necessary repairs, the reloading of the cargo shall be subject to no export duty whatever.

11. The citizens or subjects of either of the two contracting parties shall enjoy, in the dominions of the other, the liberty of disposing of their personal property, whether by will, by donation, or in any other way. If the heirs be subjects or citizens of the other power, they shall nevertheless inherit the property which devolves to them by virtue of testaments or *ab intestato*; they shall be empowered to take possession, in their own persons, or by their proxies, and dispose of the property as they shall think fit, without

paying any other duties than those already established in the country wherein the succession takes place.

Should the heirs be absent, care shall be taken of the property devolving to them, in like manner as would be practised in a similar case respecting the natives of the country, until the legatee has approved of the arrangements adopted to collect the succession. Should any dispute arise among the claimants, it shall be definitively settled according to the laws of the country in which the said inheritance has fallen in. If, by the death of a person possessing real estates in the territory of either of the contracting parties, the said real estates, according to the laws of the country, should be transferred to a subject or citizen of the other power; and should the said subject or citizen, in his character of alien, be disqualified from holding the same, due time shall be allowed him for disposing of the property and collecting the amount, without any obstacle, and free from all deduction on the part of the respective Governments.

12. Trading vessels bound for any port of a power hostile to either of the contracting parties, the destination and cargo of which should give rise to well-founded suspicions, shall be obliged to exhibit, whether on the open sea or in harbours and capes, not only their passports but also certificates, clearly proving that the said cargo is not of the prohibited kind constituting contraband.

13. To favour the commerce of both countries, it is agreed that, in case of a rupture or war between the two nations, the space of a twelvemonth, reckoning from the time of the public declaration of the said war or rupture, shall be granted to commercial men, in the parts which they inhabit, to recover and remove their merchandize; should any part thereof be abstracted from them, or any injury

done to them by either of the two powers, or any of their subjects, during the term prescribed and laid down, they shall receive full satisfaction from both governments.

14. No subject of H. C. M. shall take letters of marque or patents as a privateer, against the United States, their citizens, or the establishments, or property of the latter, in the name of a sovereign with whom the United States may be at war. In like manner no citizen, or inhabitant of the United States, shall apply for or accept letters of marque or patents, to fit out a vessel or vessels against the subjects of H. C. M. in the name of a sovereign or state with whom H. C. M. may be at war. Should any individual of either nation take or accept such patents or letters of marque, he shall be treated as a pirate.

15. It shall be permitted to all and every one of H. C. M.'s subjects, as well as to the citizens and inhabitants of the United States, to navigate, in full freedom and security, with their own vessels and without any restriction, from whatever ports, whence the cargoes of the said vessels may come; and though they should be bound for the ports of a power actually hostile, or that might afterwards become so, either to H. C. M. or to the United States. The subjects and citizens here alluded to shall also be allowed to sail with their vessels and merchandize, and frequent with the same freedom and security the places and ports of the powers hostile to the contracting parties, or to either of them, without obstacle or opposition; and to trade not only from the ports of the hostile power direct to a neutral port, but also from a hostile port to another hostile port, whether the said port be in the power of one or in the power of many. It is, moreover, stipulated by the present treaty, that free vessels shall also secure the freedom of merchandize: all property is reputed free which is found on board of vessels belonging to the

subjects of either of the contracting parties, even should the cargo, whether wholly or in part, belong to the enemies of either power; it being, however, well understood that contraband trade shall always be excepted. It is, moreover, agreed, that the same freedom is guaranteed to the individuals who may be on board a free vessel, even should they be enemies of the two contracting parties; they consequently cannot be taken prisoners, nor be removed from the said vessels, unless the said individuals be military men, engaged at the time in the enemy's service.

16. This freedom of navigation and commerce shall be extended to all kinds of merchandize, those only excepted which are comprehended under the denomination of contraband, or prohibited goods, such as arms, cannon, shells, bomb-matches, powder, matches, pikes, swords, spears, darts, halberds, rockets, grenades, saltpetre, muskets, balls, shields, helmets, cuirasses, coats of mail, and other arms of the like kind, calculated for the equipment of soldiers; musket-holders, belts, horses in harness, and all other implements of war, of every description; but the goods and wares hereafter designated are not included among the contraband or prohibited articles; namely, all kinds of cloths, woollen, flaxen, silk and cotton textures, or any other tissues; all kinds of garments and the stuffs whereof they are made, gold and silver, either wrought, coined, or uncoined, pewter, iron, brass, copper, bronze, coal, as also oats, wheat, barley, and all kinds of vegetables, tobacco, spices in general, smoked and salt meat, salt fish, butter and cheese, beer, oil, wine, sugar, all kinds of salt, and in general all articles of consumption or eatables; all descriptions of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, resin, ropes, cables, sails, sailcloth, anchors, masts, boards, oak, timber, and other matters used in ship-building and refitting; and every other material not having the shape of an instrument

prepared for land or sea warfare, and much less are to be deemed contraband, any material prepared for other purposes. All the above-named shall be free merchandize, as well as all other articles and wares not expressly designated in the enumeration of the contraband articles; so that they may be transported and conveyed into hostile towns, except such as might be actually besieged, blockaded or attacked, and except the cases in which a ship of war, in consequence of damage or other causes, should be under the necessity of taking the goods of a trading vessel. In this latter case, the ships of war shall be empowered to detain them, and take such provisions as they stand in need of, for which they shall give a receipt, to the end that the power to whom the vessel which took the goods belongs, may pay for them according to their value and current price in the port to which the owner was bound, as shewn by his papers. The two contracting parties bind themselves not to detain the forementioned trading vessels, except in cases, and for such length of time, as shall be rigorously necessary to take out the requisite stores and provisions. The contracting powers shall immediately honour all receipts, and indemnify the proprietors for all damages incurred by them.

17. To avoid all complaints and discussions, it is further agreed, that, in case of either of the contracting powers being involved in a war, the vessels belonging to the other power shall be provided with naval patents or passports, describing the name and residence of the proprietor and of the master, and the nature of the cargo, to the end that it be thus ascertained that the said vessel and cargo really and truly belong to the subjects of one of the contracting powers. The passports shall be delivered according to the form hereunto annexed. They shall be renewed annually, should the vessel re-enter the port from whence it sailed in

the course of the same year. It is likewise agreed, that if the said vessels be loaded, they shall have to exhibit not only their passports, but also certificates containing the particulars of the cargo, the name of the place from whence they sailed, and a declaration of any articles of contraband that may happen to be on board. These certificates shall be expedited in the usual form by the officers of the administration at the port from whence the said vessels set out; should it be deemed prudent and advisable to designate in the said passports the proprietors of the merchandize, it shall be allowable so to do; in the absence of these formalities, the vessel shall be taken to a port of the respective power, and the case tried by the competent tribunal, according to the rules just laid down. In the event of these rules having been infringed, the vessel shall be declared a lawful prize, unless the objections be legally removed by the production of competent proofs.

18. When a vessel, belonging to the subjects, towns, or inhabitants of either of the two powers, shall be met with along the coast, or in the open sea, by a man-of-war, or by a cruiser of the other power, the man-of-war, or cruiser, to avoid unpleasant occurrences, shall keep out of the range of cannon, and be at liberty to send her long-boat alongside the trading vessel. The said trading vessel shall allow two or three men from the long-boat to go on board; the master or captain of the vessel shall exhibit his passport and other papers, which must be in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty, and leave no doubt respecting the ownership of the said vessel; after having thus exhibited his passport and legal documents, he shall be at liberty to resume his voyage without being molested, or any way pursued or obliged to alter his course.

19. Consuls shall be established, on principles of reciprocity, with all the privileges and faculties enjoyed by

those of the most favoured nations, in those ports where consuls actually reside or are at liberty to do so.

20. It is likewise agreed, that the inhabitants of the territories of both contracting powers are reciprocally admitted, by the courts of justice, legally to claim the restitution of their property, the payment of what is due to them, and compensation for the damage they may have incurred, whether the parties against whom they have complaints to prefer, belong, either as subjects or as citizens, to the country in which they happen to be, or against any other persons who may have taken refuge therein. The proceedings and verdicts of the said tribunals shall be the same in case the pleading parties be subjects or citizens of the same country.

21. To put an end to all disputes concerning the losses experienced by the citizens of the United States in consequence of the capture of vessels and cargoes, made by H. C. M.'s subjects, in the last war between Spain and France, it is agreed, that all such cases shall be finally settled by commissioners, appointed in the following manner:—H. C. M. shall appoint one, and the President of the United States another, with the knowledge and approbation of the Senate; these two commissioners shall appoint a third. In case they should not agree, each shall name a person, and these two names shall be drawn by lot, in the presence of both commissioners; the person whose name shall first come out shall be elected as a third commissioner, having a casting vote. The three commissioners shall then be bound, on their oath, to examine and decide without partiality, the claims under consideration, according to the nature of the respective cases, and conformably to equity, justice, and the rights of nations. The said commissioners shall hold their sittings at Philadelphia; in case of death, absence, or illness, of one of



them, he shall be replaced in the same manner as he was elected; and the new commissioner, exercising the same functions, shall take the same oath. Within the time of eighteen months from the day of their first meeting, all complaints and claims authorized by the present article, must have been preferred. The commissioners shall receive, under the guarantee of an oath, the declarations of all persons brought before them, to give explanations on the aforesaid claims. They shall admit, as evidence, all written testimony sufficiently authenticated and proved to be valid. The decision of the commissioners, or of two of them, shall be final and peremptory, both with respect to the justice of the claim and to the compensation duly and lawfully awarded. H. C. M. pledges himself to cause them to be paid, either in gold or in silver coin, without deduction, and at such times and places, and under such conditions as shall be determined by the said commissioners.

22. The two high contracting powers, trusting that the good understanding and friendship at present subsisting between them will become more closely cemented in virtue of the present treaty, and will tend to promote the wealth and prosperity of both countries, will be disposed to grant from time to time to commercial pursuits all the favour and latitude which their common interest may require.

And from the present time, in consequence of what has been stipulated in the 4th article, H. C. M. allows, for a term of three years, the citizens of the United States to deposit their goods and merchandize in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence, without paying any other duty than the exact amount of warehouse rent. H. C. M. offers, moreover, to prolong the term of this concession, if, from the experience of the three preceding years,

it does not appear to compromise the interests of Spain; and if it should not be found convenient to prolong the said concession in the port above designated, H.C.M. will name another place on the banks of the Mississippi for the same purpose.

23. The present treaty shall not be in force until after its ratification by the contracting powers; and the respective ratifications shall be interchanged within the term of six months, or sooner if possible, from the present date.

In faith of which we, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of H.C.M., and of the United States of America, have, by virtue of our full powers, affixed our signatures to this present treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, and sealed it with our seals.

THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE (L.S.)

THOMAS PINKNEY (L.S.)

St. Lorenzo el Real, October 27th, 1795.

Here follow the full powers, ratifications, and exchanges.

The models of passports or naval patents, mentioned in the 17th article of the treaty, are subjoined:—

Model of a Passport or Naval Patent granted to all Vessels to navigate in Europe, as mentioned in the 17th article.

Don Carlos, &c., having granted a license to ..... inhabiting ..... to the end that, with his ..... of ..... tons burden, he may navigate and traffic in the seas and ports of Europe, whether in my dominions or in foreign states, and especially at ..... under the express prohibition to stop in the islands or continent of America.

I desire that, after having verified the ownership of the vessel in his favour, or in that of one of my subjects whose authorization he has obtained to that effect, he should be

permitted to man and equip the abovenamed vessel with men from his own country, or from such of my dominions as have been declared by the naval ordinances proper for this levy of seamen, to navigate and traffic in the mid seas under existing regulations. And I order the general officers or others commanding my squadrons and ships, the commanders and comptrollers of the naval departments, the provincial commanders, sub-delegates, port officers, and all other officers and commanders of my naval forces, the captains and commandants general of the provinces, the governors, corregidores, justices, and authorities of the ports of my kingdoms, and my other subjects, in whatever does or may concern them, not to cause any obstacle or occasion the least delay; but, on the contrary, to aid and assist the above-named ..... in every thing useful or necessary to enable him to continue his navigation and lawful traffic; and with regard to the subjects of the Kings, Princes, Republics, or Governments friendly and allied to me, to the commanders, governors, and authorities of their provinces, towns, squadrons, and ships, I also request them not to cause any obstacle to his free navigation, entrance into, and departure from their ports, where he might suddenly or accidentally enter; to allow him to prosecute his lawful traffic, victual his vessel, and provide it with necessaries.

To this end, I have ordered that the present passport be delivered to him, countersigned by my secretary of state for the naval department, which passport shall be valid for the term of ..... from the day on which it is availed of, as described in the note at foot.

Given at ..... on the ..... of .....  
of 17 .....

I, the KING.

PEDRO VARELA.

**Model of a Passport or Letter of Marque granted to Vessels navigating in America, as mentioned in 17th Article.**

Don Carlos, by the grace of God, &c., having granted permission to ..... to go with his vessel, named ..... of ..... tons burden, leaving the port of ..... with a cargo and commercial goods, and to repair to that of ..... to return to Spain in the port of ..... under the express condition to steer his course on going and returning directly to the above-named places, without deviating or stopping in any other ports, national or foreign, nor in the islands or on the coasts of Europe or of America, except in case of necessity and urgent compulsion. In consequence of which, my will is, that the president of the contratation of the Indies, or the minister charged with the dispatch of vessels in my dominions beyond seas, and the intendant of the naval department, at the port where the said vessel shall be equipped, shall concur to facilitate, on his behalf, all lawful and reasonable objects, each in own jurisdiction ; the first (the president), in every thing concerning the accommodations and cargo ; and the minister of marine in what appertains to the formation of the crew, which ought to be composed of persons duly entered in the registers, a certified extract of which must be exhibited, under the obligation of taking care of them and of answering for their conduct, as it is prescribed by the naval ordinances.

And I order the general and other officers, the commanders of my squadrons and ships, the president, minister of the contratation of the Indies, commanders and ministers, &c. .... and to all my other subjects whom it may concern, not to cause any obstacle, or occasion the least delay ; but, on the contrary, to afford succour and protection to the said ..... to favour his free navigation and licit commerce.

And with respect to the subjects of the kings, princes, and republics, my friends and allies; the commanders, governors, authorities of the provinces, towns, and squadrons, &c., I request of them likewise, not to cause any obstacle to his free navigation, his entrance into and departure from their ports, which he might suddenly or accidentally enter, to allow him to take in provisions and to supply his ship with all necessaries.

To this end I have caused to be delivered the present passport, countersigned by my secretary of state for the naval department, which passport shall be valid for the time of the duration of his voyage, going and returning; after which it shall be withdrawn by the minister charged with this department. And for the departure of the said ..... and for immediate use, a note thereof shall be written in the margin of the present passport, by the competent authorities.

Given at ..... on the ..... of ..... of 17

I, the King—PEDRO VARELA.

The present decree having been published in my royal council, it has been resolved to execute the same, and to expedite this royal decree: to this end, I order all, and every one of you, according to your respective duties, residences, and jurisdictions, to take cognizance of the present treaty of friendship, navigation, and boundaries, concluded and ratified between my royal person and the United States of America, in order to execute, observe, and give it effect in all and every particular, according to the tenour thereof, without contravening or suffering any contravention thereto; but, on the contrary, should the case require it, you will respectively issue the necessary orders to secure its full and punctual execution.

(No. III.)

## TREATY OF ALLIANCE.

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DON CARLOS, &c.

Having always sought to procure for my people the inestimable blessing of peace, I had brought the war with the French Republic to as speedy a termination as possible, and immediately turned my attention to concluding a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the said Republic; being persuaded that by this means, the two nations becoming united, would obtain the consideration and respect due to them in Europe, and that general tranquillity might be re-established.

After a long negociation, this treaty has been concluded and ratified; I have ordered the usual minutes to be remitted to my Royal Council, as well as my decree of the first instant, to the end that, after having taken cognizance of the same, the said treaty be observed and caused to be observed in all that concerns my said Council; the following is the tenour thereof:

TREATY.—H. C. M. the King of Spain and the Executive Directory of the French Republic, desirous of strengthening the bonds of friendship and the happy restoration of intercourse established by the treaty of peace concluded at Bâle on the 22d of July 1795 (4th Thermidor an III. of the Republic), have resolved to enter into a second treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, embracing all that may concern the common defence and interests of both nations.

H. C. M. and the Executive Directory of the Republic have, to this effect, invested with their full powers, and appointed for this negotiation, namely; H. C. M., His Excellency Don Manuel de Godoy Alvarez de Faria, Rios

Sanchez, Zarzola, Prince of the Peace, Duke del Alcudia, Lord of the Soto de Roma, and of the estate of Albala, Grandee of Spain of the first class, &c. &c. &c. ; and the Executive Directory, the Citizen Dominique Catherine Perignon, general of division of the armies of the Republic, and her ambassador to H.C.M. the King of Spain.

Who, after having communicated and exchanged their respective full powers (a copy of which is hereunto annexed), have adopted and decreed the following articles :

Art. 1. An alliance offensive and defensive in perpetuity, between H.C.M. the King of Spain and the French Republic.

Art. 2. The two contracting powers mutually guarantee to each other, in the most authentic and absolute manner, the states, territories, islands, and towns which they possess or may hereafter possess; and should either of the two be menaced or attacked, under any pretext whatever, the other pledges and binds itself to assist by its good offices, and to succour the same as soon as called upon, as it is stipulated in the following articles.

Art. 8. Within the term of three months from the time when the application shall have been made to either of the two powers, the latter shall place at the disposal of the other fifteen ships of the line, three of which shall be three-deckers, and twelve shall carry from seventy to seventy-two guns, six frigates of corresponding burden, four corvettes or light vessels, all armed, equipped, and supplied with provisions for six months, and with rigging and every other requisite for one year. The power thus called upon shall assemble this naval force in such part of its dominions as the power applying shall appoint.

Art. 4. In case the applying power, with a view to commence hostilities, should think proper to demand only one half of the force mentioned in the foregoing article, this same power may, at any period of the campaign, claim the

other half, which shall be supplied in the manner and on the terms agreed upon, to be reckoned from the time when the requisition shall have been made.

Art. 5. The power called upon shall also hold in readiness, in compliance with the requisition of the power applying, and within the same term of three months from the date of the requisition, a force of 18,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, with a proportionate train of artillery; this force to be only employed in Europe or in the colonies which the contracting powers possess in the gulf of Mexico.

Art. 6. The power applying shall be at liberty to send one or two commissioners, to ascertain that the power called upon by virtue of the foregoing articles, has taken the requisite measures to commence war on the appointed day, with the land and naval forces determined by the said articles.

Art. 7. These forces shall be laid at the entire disposal of the power applying, either to be detained in her harbours, or on the very territory of the power applied to, or to employ them in such expeditions as shall be deemed advisable, and without the said power being bound on that account to explain the motives which have determined her to give them any destination it may think proper.

Art. 8. The requisition made by one of the two powers for the succours stipulated in the foregoing articles, shall be considered as proving the need of them, and shall impose on the other power the obligation of acceding to the said requisition, without discussing whether the war be offensive or defensive, without its having any claim to explanations calculated to elude or retard the fulfilment of the stipulations.

Art. 9. The troops and vessels demanded by the applying power, shall remain, during the whole of the war, at the disposal, and not in any wise at the charge, of the said applying power. The power called upon shall keep them in its pay wherever its ally may employ them, as



though the power so called upon were employing them on its own account. It is merely agreed, that during all the time when the vessels and troops shall remain on the territory, or in the ports of the power applying, the latter shall supply from its own stores and arsenals whatever may be necessary, in the same manner, and at the same prices, as though the troops and vessels were its own.

Art. 10. The power called upon shall replace, without the smallest delay, the vessels forming part of its quota, which may perish by the casualties of war or by accidents at sea; it shall also repair the losses which may be incurred by the land forces.

Art. 11. Should the above-mentioned succours prove inadequate, the two contracting powers shall bring forward the greatest land or sea forces at their command, against the enemy of the power attacked, which latter shall use them in co-operation with her own, or separately; but still in accordance with a general plan concerted between the two powers.

Art. 12. The succours stipulated in the foregoing articles shall be supplied in all the wars in which the contracting powers may happen to be involved, even in case the power applied to should have no direct interest in it, and should merely act as an auxiliary.

Art. 13. If the two contracting powers should conjointly declare war against one or more powers, the question being of equal interest to both, the limitation prescribed in the foregoing articles shall cease to operate as a rule; both powers shall direct against the common enemy all their land and naval forces; they shall combine their plans of attack on such points as they shall deem most advisable, whether by uniting their forces, or by acting separately. The contracting powers bind themselves, in such cases, not to treat or make peace, unless by common consent, to the end that each of them may obtain suitable satisfaction.

**Art. 14.** In case one of the two powers should merely act as an auxiliary, the power attacked shall be at liberty to make peace or to treat separately; in such way, however, that no prejudice shall result therefrom to the auxiliary power; but rather, if possible, that the said auxiliary power shall derive advantage therefrom. To this effect, the said power shall be made acquainted with the negotiations commenced or about to be opened.

**Art. 15.** A treaty of commerce shall immediately be drawn up, founded on principles of equity and mutual advantage between the two nations, in order to secure to each, in the dominions of its ally, a preference in favour of the productions of its soil and manufactures; and advantages equal at least to those enjoyed by the most favoured nations; the two powers bind themselves, from the present date, to act in concert to repress and combat the maxims adopted by any country whatever in opposition to their present principles, and contrary to the respect and security due to neutral flags; as also, to re-establish and restore the colonial system of Spain on the same footing as it has or should have been according to treaties.

**Art. 16.** The character and jurisdiction of the consuls shall at the same time be regulated by a special convention; previous conventions shall provisionally remain in force.

**Art. 17.** In order to avoid all kind of misunderstanding between the two powers, it is agreed, that they shall, without delay, explain and clear up the 7th article of the treaty of Bâle, relative to the respective frontiers of the two countries, according to the instructions and plans communicated by the undersigned plenipotentiaries.

**Art. 18.** England being the only power from whom Spain has received direct offences, the present alliance shall only take effect against her in the present war, and Spain shall remain neutral with regard to the other powers at war with the Republic.

Art. 19. The exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty shall take place within a month, to be reckoned from the day on which it has been signed.

Done at St. Ildefonso, the 18th of August 1796.

(I. S.) THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE.

(L. S.) PERIGNON.

(Here follow the ratifications and exchange of full powers.)

The present decree having been published in my royal council, it has been resolved that it should be executed, and the present decree expedited in consequence. Therefore, I order and command all and every one of you, according to your attributions in the respective places and jurisdictions, to receive the present treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, hereunto annexed, between my royal person and the French Republic, which treaty you will inviolably observe and execute, and cause to be observed and executed as it is stipulated, without suffering or allowing, in any manner, the least deviation therefrom, by giving the necessary orders, such as the case may require.

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(No. IV.)

## MANIFESTO AGAINST ENGLAND.

(ORDINANCE of the 7th October 1796.)

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DON CARLOS, &c.

Make known that, under the date of the 5th of the present month, I have addressed to my royal council the following decree:—

### *Royal Decree.*

One of the chief motives by which I was influenced in making peace with the French Republic, as soon as that

Government began to assume a solid and regular form, was the conduct persevered in by England towards me during the whole of the late war, and the just diffidence of the future to which the past experience of her bad faith had given rise.

This bad faith manifested itself, 1st, in the most critical moment of the first campaign, by Admiral Hood's treatment of my squadron at Toulon, where his only aim was to destroy what he could not carry away; 2ndly, by the occupation of Corsica, a short time afterwards, an expedition which the said admiral carefully concealed from the knowledge of Don Juan de Langara, when they were together at Toulon.

The English ministry evinced equal bad faith by keeping a profound silence respecting its negotiations with other powers, namely, the treaty concluded on the 24th November 1794 with the United States of America, without any regard or consideration for my well-known rights. Her reluctance, her invincible aversion to adopt the plans or ideas which might hasten the termination of the war, were also forced upon my attention, as well as the vague answer of Lord Grenville to my ambassador the Marquis del Campo, when the latter applied to him for succours to continue the war with success.

No doubt remained on my mind concerning the bad faith of England when she so unjustly embezzled the rich cargo of the Spanish vessel the *Santiago* or *Achilles*, which should have been restored according to the terms of the convention passed between my secretary of state, the Prince of the Peace, and Lord St. Helens, ambassador of H.B.M.; to this contempt of treaties, may be added the seizure of naval stores which were brought to Spain on board of Dutch vessels, and the restitution of which was also the subject of chicanery and of interminable difficulties; and the continual landing

of the English on the coasts of Peru and Chili, to carry on smuggling, to explore minutely all the accessible points, under pretence of whale-fishing, the privilege of which they alleged by virtue of the convention of Nootka Sound.

Such were the proceedings of the British ministry, in proof of the good understanding and confidence it had constantly promised to us on all occasions, conformably to the treaty of the 25th of May 1793.

When peace was concluded with the French Republic, I not only had well-grounded motives to suspect that the English were forming serious designs against my possessions in America ; but I also received direct insults, which proved to evidence the resolution adopted by the English ministry to force upon me a course contrary to the welfare of humanity, desolated by a war which annihilates Europe, a course diametrically opposed to the desire I have manifested to the British cabinet, on numberless occasions, of putting an end to this calamity, by interposing my good offices to bring about a general peace.

England has revealed her secret designs by sending powerful expeditions to the Antilles, sometimes against St. Domingo, to prevent its being given up to the French, as may be seen by the proclamations of the English generals in that island ; sometimes to support the establishment of their commercial companies in North America, on the banks of the Missouri, in order to penetrate by that means into the Pacific Ocean ; and finally, by the conquest, on the continent of South America, of the colony and roadstead of Demerara, belonging to the Dutch, an advantageous situation, which opens to England an access to other important points.

But those intentions are still more clearly shown to be hostile from the reiterated insults offered to my flag, and from the violent acts committed in the Mediterranean by their frigates, which have carried away by main force recruits for

our armies, that were on board several Spanish vessels, on their passage from Genoa to Barcelona; by the piracy and constant vexations of the Corsican and Anglo-Corsican corsairs, protected by the English government of the island of Corsica, who infest the Mediterranean, and pursue the Spanish vessels even into the roads of Catalonia; by the seizure of ships laden with Spanish property, which are conducted to England on the most frivolous pretexts, and especially that of the wealthy cargo of the frigate *Minerva*, which, in contempt of my flag, has been detained, after having exhibited before the competent tribunal the authentic deeds which justified the origin of its cargo.

No less grievous is the insult offered to the character of my ambassador, Don Simon de Las Casas, by a London tribunal, which ordered his arrest on the demand of a trifling sum made by a boat-owner.

It is impossible to tolerate any longer the outrageous violence exercised on the coasts of Alicant and Gallicia by the brigs of the British Royal Navy, the *Cameleon* and *King-Roo*.

What can be more scandalous, more insolent, than what has just occurred in the island of *Trinidad*, where the captain of a frigate, Mr. Vaughan, went on shore with flying colours and drums beating at the head of his armed crew, to attack the French and revenge himself for an insult which he pretended to have received; thus audaciously disturbing the peace of my subjects, without any regard for my sovereign authority!

By such revolting, such unaccountable proceedings, that ambitious nation has proved that she no longer knows any other interest than that of extending every where her commercial avidity, no other laws but her arbitrary will over all the seas.

My patience and moderation have been tried to the utmost.

The honour of my crown, the duty imposed on me of protecting my people, compel me to declare war against the king of England, his dominions, and subjects. Let orders relative to the defence of my possessions and that of my own subjects, and to attacking the enemy, be issued in every direction. Let the council be informed and apprised of this, to the end that each one may conform to it in what concerns him.

(Escorial) St. Lorenzo, 5th October 1796.

To the Bishop, Governor of the Council.

Published in full council on the 6th of the same month. Ordered to be carried into effect. Dispatch of the royal decree, by which the order is enjoined.

(The usual Formula.)

END OF VOL. II.

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## ERRATA.

### VOL. I.

Introduction. Page xli, line 38, *for* Proofs are wanting, *read* Proofs are not wanting.

### VOL. II.

Page 55, line 21, *for* against France,—and against France, *read* against France and against us.

87, — 16, *for* It is assigned from funds which secure, *read* funds are assigned to secure.

124, — 11, *for* the general interest, *read* in the general interest.

134, — 8, *for* 1790, . . . those who, *read* 1790. Those who.

139, — 19, *for* of execution, *read* of being sentenced.

186, — 9, *for* that, *read* those.

187, — 19, *for* did they exert, *read* did they not exert.

188, — 7, *for* disgraced, *read* ill-favored.

193, — 1, *for* a carefully arranged education, *read* an education carefully provided for.

200, — 15, *for* Velasques, Ribera, *dele* comma after Velasques.

234, — 17, *for* Father de St. Nicolas, *read* Father Pato of St. Nicolas.

281, — 6, *for* as the acts, *read* at the acts.

23, *for* captivating, *read* captivate.

312, — 9, *for* disowning, *read* disown.

327, — 30, *dele* were conferred upon him.

360, — 4, *for* St. Ildefonso, and Alcala, *read* St. Ildefonso d'Alcala.











